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ABSTRACT
This study examines state arbitration policy in Georgia from its establishment as a colony
until the present time. It describes early informal and nonjudicialized procedures such as the
Muhlenberg arbitration in Ebenezer in 1774; initiatives of the Georgia Legislature for the arbitral
resolution of disputes; the application of arbitral devices in Georgia’s tax and municipal
corporation law; arbitration in Georgia’s chambers of commerce and boards of trade, and forms
of public law arbitration still existing in Georgia. The survey then shifts its attention to formal
and judicialized arbitration in Georgia, focusing on the rise of uncodified common law
arbitration in the nineteenth century and the adoption of formal Arbitration Codes in 1856, 1978;
and 1988. The study concludes with reflections on modern challenges to the viability of state
arbitration policy in Georgia, especially the risk of total federal preemption of Georgia
arbitration policy initiatives.
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1
PROLOGUE

Not since the adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act1 in 1925 has public attention in the
United States been so drawn to issues touching on arbitral processes as it is at the dawn of the
twenty-first century. Near the end of the millennium, the Federal Congress amid a spirited
debate enacted into law the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 19982 which –while directed
towards a variety of methods of dispute resolution alternative to conventional litigation– touched
directly upon a high degree of popular interest in the subject of contractually agreed upon,
binding arbitration as a means of private dispute resolution. This interest, in turn, had been the
product of widely publicized instances where contractually mandated arbitration was perceived
as a frustration of legitimate consumer interests, imposed on purchasers of goods and services by
manufacturers and sellers eager, it was widely believed, to avoid both the exposure entailed in
court litigation as well as the “even playing field” of the public court room.3

1

Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, §1, 62 Stat. 669 (1947), now codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 116 [sometimes hereinafter, Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Federal Arbitration Act, or
“FAA.”]. This statutory code is the single most influential law adopted in the United
States governing arbitration, and its relation to state laws generally –and the Georgia
Arbitration Code of 1988 in particular– will be addressed in this study’s Chapter Three,
A Concluding Note: Challenges to Arbitration Policy in Georgia at the Dawn of A New
Millennium, Section 1. (The Doctrine of Federal Preemption and the Autonomy of
Georgia Arbitration Policy), infra.
2

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993,
amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58. See generally C. H. Crowne, The Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1768 (2001).
3

See generally Frances E. Zollers, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Product Liability
Reform, 26 AM . BUS. L. J. 479 (1988). See also Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice
Through Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts Or A Trap
For The Unwary Consumer?, 5 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP . 112 (1993).

2
As early as 1985, the Supreme Court of the United States had already entertained, but
rebuffed, a consumer challenge to the enforcement of an arbitration clause in a franchise contract
insisting that arbitration was selected by the franchisor as a means of exploiting the grossly
unequal bargaining power of the two parties.4 A more explicit challenge to arbitration grounded
on its supposed frustration of consumer interests was turned back in a more recent decision of
the federal Supreme Court which once again found against the consumer’s argument insisting
that the arbitration contract in that case was unenforceable because it failed to advise the
consumer of the substantial costs of arbitration.5 State courts too, including those of Georgia,
have been pummeled with consumer claims that they have been deprived of rights by the arbitral
process, one held captive –it is argued– by the interests of the financially stronger, dominant

4

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
The principal holding in Mitsubishi addressed the arbitrability of antitrust claims in an
international commercial context, the Court finding that such matters could be resolved
by arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act and were not restricted to adjudication in
formal courts. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a local automobile retailer in Puerto Rico,
also challenged the enforcement of the arbitration clause by a procedure conducted
outside of that Commonwealth on the basis that such would violate Puerto Rico’s Dealers
Contracts Act, P. R. Laws Ann. Tit. 10, Sec. 278 (1964), et seq. (“Act 75"), designed to
protect local franchisees against such purported impositions by franchisors. The
suggestion of Soler that leaving the resolution of a commercial dispute between
commercial parties to other commercial persons somehow undermined the integrity of
the process was declined by the Court.
5

See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), in which the
Court stated, at 89-90 (citations omitted), that:
We have likewise [in previous cases, including Mitsubishi] rejected
generalized attacks on arbitration that rest on "suspicion of arbitration as a
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants." ... These cases demonstrate that even claims
arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be
arbitrated because " 'so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,' " the
statute serves its functions.

3
party. 6 A recent amendment to the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code, altering the defenses to the
enforcement of awards under that law to include any “manifest disregard of the law” by the
arbitrators in fashioning the award, was also touted as a measure designed to protect consumer
interests.7

6

In Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 245 Ga. App. 432 (2000), where the consumer (a
purchaser of a mobile home manufactured in Alabama under a contract controlled by
Alabama law) argued that he did not know he was signing an arbitration clause in a sales
transaction and that he did not understand the implications of such a clause, the Georgia
Court of Appeals –in language relying on Alabama law but reminiscent of that used by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Mitsubishi and in Green Tree, supra– found
the buyer’s attack on the arbitration agreement without merit:
As we have held, the mere existence of an arbitration clause does not
amount to unconscionability. Further, lack of sophistication or economic
disadvantage of one attacking arbitration will not amount to
unconscionability. See Green Tree Financial Corp. &c. v. Vintson, 753
So.2d 497 (Ala.1999); [Green Tree Financial Corporation v.] Wampler,
supra [749 So.2d 409, at 413 (Ala. 1999)]; Ex parte Smith, 736 So.2d
604, 612-613 (Ala.1999); Ex parte Parker, 730 So.2d 168 (Ala.1999); see
also Pridgen v. Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp., 88 F.Supp.2d 655,
658-659 (S.D.Miss.2000); Rhode v. E & T Investments, 6 F.Supp.2d
1322, 1328 (M.D.Ala.1998).
Therefore, [the consumer] has failed to show such coercion, either
procedural or substantive, that would be a defense to [the seller’s] motion
to compel arbitration of the merits of the dispute ...
Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 245 Ga. App. 432 (2000), at 441.
Consumer contracts continue to present the appellate courts of Georgia with
issues respecting a variety of aspects of arbitration. See, e.g. Stewart v. Favors,
264 Ga. App. 156 (2003), determining that, respecting the binding nature of an
arbitration agreement in consumer loan transaction governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act, it was incumbent on the court (and not the arbitrator) to
determine the enforceability of the agreement.
7

See O.C.G.A § 9-9-13 (b) (5), as amended on April 25, 2003, by HB 792 (2003 Ga.
Laws, Act 363, § 2), signed by Governor Sonny Perdue on June 4, 2003, and effective as
law on July 1, 2003, discussed in more detail, infra, in this survey’s Chapter Two,
Section 6, “The 2003 Amendment to the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code: Manifest

4
Such assaults on arbitration and the arbitral process in both state and federal courts as
well as in the legislatures of the nation have generated a wave of practice and scholarly comment
on the compatibility of arbitration with the full expression of consumer interests and on the more
fundamental issue of the appropriateness of arbitration as a means of resolving civil claims
without regard to the relative economic strength of the parties or the nature of the substantive
rights asserted.8
Vastly more publicity-generating and debate-provoking than the academic debate over
arbitration, however, has been the book and later film, Erin Brockovich,9 the story of a streetwise and struggling divorced mother working as a paralegal in a small law firm in California
who stumbles upon a mysterious outbreak of cancer in Hinkley, a tiny desert village situated on
the edge of a plant of the Pacific Gas & Electric Company.10 By sheer determination, hard work,
and no small measure of good luck, the heroine of the drama links the community’s ailments to

Disregard of Law.”
8

Representative of this literature is, for instance, Hossam M. Fahmy, Arbitration Wiping
Out Consumer Rights?, 64 TEX . B. J. 917 (2001); Shelly Smith, Comment, Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection and the
Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (2001); S. J. Ware,
Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements,
2001 J. DISP . RES. 89; and C. R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695. See also, Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic
Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST . U. L. REV. 927
(2002) and Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST . U. L. REV. 361
(2002).
9

Universal Pictures, 2000.

10

A good review of the story, and an effort to place the tale within the context of
accepted legal literary traditions, is Jeffrey Abramson, The Jury and Popular Culture, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 497 (2000).

5
the illegal discharge of toxic waste at the PG&E facility. Her detective work uncovers a plot to
hide the company’s actions, and a major wrongful death and personal injury law suit is filed.
As the case develops, the small-time lawyer for whom Erin works finds it
necessary to invite into the case an experienced attorney from the upper echelons
[of the legal profession] to help him both financially and legally...
How did civil litigation work? The people of Hinkley expected to get a jury trial,
to have people such as themselves deliver PG&E to judgment day. However, the
big lawyers suggest that binding arbitration will be quicker and more efficient. It
falls to the small-time lawyer to call the six hundred plaintiffs to a town meeting
and sell them on the idea of arbitration. Although popular instincts favor the
public face juries give to justice, the lawyer reminds them that PG&E will delay a
jury trial for years and "many of you cannot afford to wait." That is the last time
anyone mentions a jury trial.11
Millions of movie-goers all across the United States –indeed, throughout the world– left
theaters after seeing Erin Brockovich, better informed about arbitration and its role, but puzzled
and uneasy about the arbitral process, its nature, and its relation to dispute resolution in the
conventional courts. As a consequence, public interest in the subject of modern arbitration has
never been so high as it is at this moment; never has the debate over the merits of arbitration, in
contrast to the advantages and disadvantages of dispute resolution in the courts, been so sharp as
it is at the present time.

11

Ibid, at 504.

6
Goal and Plan of the Survey

This survey of arbitration in its principal formal and informal varieties throughout the
history of Georgia, from the time when its charter was first issued under the authority of George
II in the summer of 1732 until the turn of the twenty-first century, is intended to demonstrate the
rich arbitral tapestry which has enriched the life of this state for almost three centuries. Through
an understanding of this arbitral past, the survey may serve as a basis for the debate on the
appropriate responses to some of the questions now surrounding arbitration and its place in
modern Georgia life.
It engages this task by first, in its Introduction, advancing the organizational framework
of the study which centers on the dichotomy of formal and informal, judicialized and
nonjudicialized arbitration suggested in the writings of Jerold S. Auerbach, Bruce H. Mann, and
others. In its Part I, it then reviews the forms of informal and nonjudicialized arbitration known
in Georgia’s past, some of which functioned under official sanction and some of which did not.
With this array of arbitral practice in focus, the survey then shifts in its Part II to a consideration
of major instances of formal and judicialized arbitration which have appeared in Georgia legal
history, principally the legislative codes of arbitration of 1856 and 1863 and their modern
descendant, the Georgia Arbitration Code of 1988 and a significant amendment to that Code in
2003. It is in this latter arena –primarily one of commercial and business dispute resolution–
where the modern debate about the utility and role of arbitration is primarily focused. The survey
concludes in its Part III with an examination of such a current issue in modern Georgia
arbitration law –the extent of federal preemption of Georgia’s legal and constitutional capacity to
shape and fashion its own arbitral environment in the future as it has throughout the past.

7
INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement which gained
notoriety in the United States in the 1960s,12 a variety of social sciences have turned increased
attention –and their particular disciplinary tools and methodologies– to an examination of the
phenomenon of dispute resolution in organized human society.13 Among the earliest social
scientists14 to address the broader issues in dispute resolution were anthropologists15 and

12

Perhaps the statutory capstone of this movement was achieved when the United States
Congress passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315,
112 Stat. 2993, amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58, authorizing federal district courts –the
trial courts of the federal judicial system– to provide a variety of ADR programs for
litigants. See generally C. H. Crowne, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998:
Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1768 (2001). A useful
history of the early stages of this movement –including the rise of the Neighborhood
Justice Centers while Jimmy Carter was President of the United States and Judge Griffin
Bell was attorney general– can be found in RICHARD L. ABEL, INFORMALISM ,
DELEGALIZATION, AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (1982).
13

The Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research has, over the past several
decades, extended the parameters of the research in this important field to include
nonhuman primate studies. I am grateful to that Institute for the support provided for me
to attend its Spring 2001 Conference in Tübingen, Germany, where my understanding of
the relationship of law, anthropology and biology was immeasurably broadened.
Important works published by the Institute bearing generally on the theme of
extrajudicial dispute resolution include LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF
LAW (Margaret Gruter and Paul Bohannon, Eds., 1983) and MARGARET GRUTER, LAW
AND THE MIND: BIOLOGICAL O RIGINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1991).
14

The literature of arbitration is a vast and an old one, but perhaps the modern study of
the field, at least in the United States, begins with the publication of Frances Kellor’s
works, ARBITRATION IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1934) and AMERICAN
ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948). Kellor, whose
earliest work was in political science, was an early arbitration advocate and a VicePresident of the American Arbitration Association.
15

The juxtaposition of anthropology and law generally (and dispute resolution in
particular) has spawned a vast literature. Some of the earliest anthropologists to explicitly

8
sociologists.16 These more recently, however, have been joined by historians (including legal
historians)17 intrigued by the challenge of unraveling the often clouded and uncertain history of
the nonviolent resolution of conflicts and disputes in human society, especially through methods
outside the arena of public institutions where, by and large, the historical record is somewhat
more complete.
The advances made in the historical study of dispute resolution, both conventional and
alternative, have done much to shed light on the inner dynamics of the process and its dominant
characteristics, as well as the external conditions and circumstances which promote or impede its
appearance and effectiveness. While these studies have not yet achieved the universality of an
accepted unitary and cohesive theory which explains all facets of dispute resolution outside
public institutions, nonetheless great progress had been registered as of the turn of the twenty-

explore the integration of the two fields and who have heavily influenced subsequent
thought include Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel who collaborated on the
ground-breaking THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1941); Max Gluckman, who published THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG
THE BAROTSE OF N ORTHERN RHODESIA (1955); and Laura Nader whose Choices in Legal
Procedure: Shia Moslem and Mexican Zapotec, 67 AM . ANTHROPOLOGIST 394 (1965),
remains a classic of this genre.
16

Unquestionably, Donald Black’s two seminal volumes –SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989)
and THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976)– have literally defined the discipline of the study of
sociology and law. A recent anthology edited by M. P. Baumgartner and including,
among others, works by the editor (Law and Social Status in Colonial New Haven, 16391665); by William J Bowers and Glenn L. Pierce (Arbitrariness and Discrimination
Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes); William O’Barr (Speech Styles in the Courtroom:
Powerful Versus Powerless Speech); Henry P. Lundsgaarde (Murder in Space City); and
Mark Cooney (Evidence as Partisanship) –and it was Prof. Cooney of the Sociology
Department of the College of Arts & Sciences at the University of Georgia who
introduced me to this field– will serve to acquaint the student with the discipline. See M.
P. BAUMGARTNER, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW (1999).
17

The efforts of legal historians to come to grips with the place within the history of law
of alternative dispute resolution in general, and arbitration in particular, are addressed
more fully and in greater detail hereafter.

9
first century in identifying social environmental characteristics which bear on the phenomenon,
even though disagreement still exists among social science disciplines (and indeed within each
of the disciplines considered independently) respecting the enumeration of those factors and
their relative priority in shaping the forces which support or deflect the impetus to alternative
forms of dispute resolution.
Legal historians seem united, however, in the implicit view that alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms not only define themselves in part relative to formal dispute resolution
agencies, but that they also demonstrate change over time,18 and that there are discernible
patterns in these changes which, once identified, can themselves become useful analytical tools
in identifying the phenomenon of ADR in differing historical and social circumstances. For the
legal historian, then, ADR offers a field of study not fully appreciated even two or three decades
ago.
Jerold S. Auerbach, then of the Wellesley History Department, first published his
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS in 1983, taking as his point
of analytical departure the proposition that the rule of formal law as expressed in official state
structures such as courts has consistently been rejected throughout much of American history in

18

Examples abound, but Edward Brunet’s Replacing Folklore Arbitration With A
Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999) comes close to a paradigm in
this respect. See also William H. Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated
Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 27 (1993). Works of this nature tend to be heavily teleological and
judgment-laden; in addition, there is a pronounced tendency to concentrate on the history
of commercial arbitration in many of these works, to the exclusion of the many other
forms of arbitration known and practiced in both European and American experience.
See, e.g., Note, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States,
12 MINN. L. REV. 240 (1928); and Eben Moglen, Commercial Arbitration in the
Eighteenth Century: Searching for the Transformation of American Law, 93 YALE L.J.
135 (1983), concentrating on the experience with commercial arbitration in New York.

10
favor of “alternative means for ordering human relations and for resolving the inevitable disputes
that arose between individuals.”19 The nature of these alternative means –and Auerbach
identifies these as both arbitration and mediation– and their success in resolving conflict outside
of formal state mechanisms are, in his view, a corollary of the existence of “a coherent
community vision. How to resolve conflict, inversely stated, is how (or whether) to preserve
community.”20 The “community” which Auerbach envisions as the arena for dispute settlement
may be defined as an integrated social unit manifested by a variety of factors including
“geography, ideology, piety, ethnicity, and commercial pursuit.”21 Within groups so defined
(communities), arbitration and mediation were adapted, Auerbach maintains, to local
circumstances in order to “express an ideology of communitarian justice without formal law, an
equitable process based on reciprocal access and trust among community members.”22 Despite
the wide variety of factors contributing to the definition of community and their inherent
differences, Auerbach’s research led him to comment on the “singleness of vision” which
inspired them and which, despite their diversity, “used identical processes because they shared a
common commitment to the essence of communal existence: mutual access, responsibility, and
trust.”23

19

JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAWYERS 4 (1983).
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

11
Auerbach’s empirical data were drawn largely from the communitarian experience of
groups whose primary cohesive element was religion,24 especially the Puritans in New England,
Quakers in the mid-Atlantic region, and members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints (Mormons) in Utah.25 For these groups, Auerbach notes, “Christian doctrine encouraged
alternatives to law. Legal institutions languished while religion legitimated the social order.”26
Within these groups, lawyers and the apparatus of the courthouse were irrelevant to the grander
issues and purposes of life and “superfluous” within groups where “religion remained the source
of moral wisdom.”27
Although widely separated in fundamental ideology, Auerbach finds that secular
commercial interests shared much of the inner sense of cohesion which united religions and
ethnic groups, and that this inner sense of unity or purpose led “secular, competitive, and
materialistic merchants and businessmen”28 to create for themselves enclaves from which the
formal structures of law and the participation of lawyers were banned. The structures and
operative principles29 which they designed to substitute for those of the formal state were
24

Kermit Hall would attribute the strength of church-based arbitration in early American
history not to the strength of communitarian values, but rather to the relative weakness of
the courts. Colonial experience in Georgia, as will be seen below, seems to provide
support for this view. As a consequence, “[a]s formal legal institutions grew in authority,
the significance of arbitration and church disciplinary procedures waned.” See KERMIT
HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1989).
25

JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAWYERS 5 (1983).
26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Decisions made in commercial arbitration proceedings on the basis of mercantile
interests and practices were derided by judges of the formal courts as “rustic justice.” See
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal

12
intended to (and largely in fact did) “contain conflict within their own community boundaries –
with courts and lawyers as remote as possible.”30 For these mercantile subunits of the broader
society, “the familiar patterns of commercial custom were (and remain) vastly preferable to the
alien procedures, frustrating delays, and high costs of litigation.”31 “Even in the modern era,”
Auerbach finds, “when business interests have used non-legal dispute settlement to escape the
strictures of government regulation, they have expressed a tenacious commitment to
communitarian values (in their case, a community of profit).”32 Auerbach thus shares some of
the basic assumptions of the model of eighteenth and nineteenth century commercial arbitration
developed by Morton J. Horwitz. 33
Auerbach’s analysis encompassed not only religious and commercial groups but also
found application in newly-arrived immigrant ethnic groups as well. The early Dutch in the
colony of New Amsterdam, the Jews who congregated in the lower east side of Manhattan,
Scandinavians of Swedish and Norwegian birth who came together in the American Mid-West,
as well as the Chinese who populated the west coast of the United States: these all developed

Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L.REV. 931 (1999), where she quotes Associate Justice Joseph
Story of the U.S. Supreme Court in Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321
(C.C.D. Mass 1845), labeling arbitral awards as “rusticum judicium.”
30

JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAWYERS 5 (1983).
31

Id.

32

Ibid, at 5-6.

33

See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 144145 (1977). Horwitz’ review of the development of commercial arbitration notes its
historical origins within the commercial community, as does Auerbach, but stresses that
the independence and autonomy of the system of commercial arbitration were soon sold
out, generally by mid-nineteenth century, to judicial control of the process as a means of
guaranteeing state enforcement of arbitration awards, a feature unavailable in arbitration
of a wholly private, nonjudicial nature.
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within their individual ethnic moieties the same alternative dispute resolution mechanism which
characterized conflict resolution within secular business and religious groupings. These
immigrants,
... aliens in a hostile land . . . encountered a society whose legal institutions often
were overtly biased against them or, at best, indifferent to their distinctive values.
Their indigenous forms of dispute settlement, centuries old in some instances,
shielded them from outside scrutiny and enabled them to inculcate and preserve
their traditional norms. Ethnic-group dispute settlement often demonstrated a
strong preference for community justice over legal due process, which was
significantly less benevolent for new immigrants than government officials and
legal professionals proclaimed.34
The thesis advanced by Auerbach takes into account a persistent tension and conflict
between the internal dispute resolution mechanisms of business, ethnic, and religious groups in
the United States and the formal structures of the states and of the organized bar. Especially,
Auerbach notes, for the immigrants, the adaptation to American law and legal forms was an
external symbol of assimilation into the broader American society; “[l]aw was one of the
primary instruments of acculturation; its rapid extension to immigrant community was a national
imperative.”35 As a result, for all ethnic immigrant groups, the adoption of American legal forms
was in part an appealing prospect “as a vehicle to hasten their absorption into American

34

JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAWYERS 6 (1983).
35

Id.
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society.”36 Nevertheless, that same absorption was the source of anxiety for others who
anticipated –perhaps correctly– that their adaptation to American legal forms would result in a
cost to them greater than any benefit that they might thereby obtain. It comes as no surprise,
then, that the various ethnic groups assimilated in different ways and at different rates to the
requirements of American legal structure. Auerbach notes that the Chinese were successful for a
long period of time in retaining their own internal dispute resolution mechanisms as a means of
retaining their cultural identity while the Jews in New York, among others, “modified theirs to
facilitate acculturation.”37 The different degrees of adaptation were, Auerbach notes, “as intricate
as the American ethnic mosaic itself.”38
Auerbach is careful to note that communitarian responses to the insistent demands of
American formal law were neither monolithic nor uniform through history:
Even in the most thoroughly legalized society there is likely to be a restless
movement over time: between the strictures of the formal legal system and the
lure of informal alternatives. To be sure, once the older customary order (based
on the shared moral vision of a group) deteriorates, the dominant shift is toward
explicit legal rules and procedures “to clarify what the disintegration of
community has made dark and slippery.” But the benefits of legalism are
unevenly (though seldom randomly) distributed through society. Because the
cherished social values of some groups cannot be expressed in legal norms, the
transition to legality is neither tidy nor complete. It is the unstable equilibrium,
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Id.
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Id.

38

Id.
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particular to time and place, that opens cultural and historical vistas.
Communitarian efforts, like the American experience itself, are complex and
diverse. Yet there are fascinating patterns, and coherent themes, which disputessettlement processes can eliminate. The enduring Edenic vision of a harmonious
community may invariably be undercut – but even in the American experience
where law reigns supreme the vision is never entirely stifled.39
Although never, as Auerbach puts it, entirely stifled, since he is quick to note the
metamorphosis of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms within secular commercial,
religious, and ethnic groups over time: there is, he insists, a direction in the evolution of
alternative dispute resolution devices which is defined by social movements towards
individualism, towards “assertive contentiousness,” and towards the judicialization and
legalization of social processes once informal and simple. The modernization and
commercialization which increasingly characterized American society as the nineteenth century
wore on were to take their toll and to weaken the alternative conflict resolution mechanisms
spawned within earlier commercial, ethnic, and religious groupings. In Auerbach’s view, the
end of the Civil War was a watershed for American alternate dispute resolution because “beyond
[the Civil War], amid the turbulence of race and labor relations, alternative dispute settlement
was reshaped,”40 and “in the second half of the nineteenth century, the purposes (if not the
forms) of alternative dispute settlement were redefined.”41 Laura Nader adds to this observation
the further view that “fears of racial hostility and class warfare encouraged arbitration as a
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Ibid, at 7.
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Ibid, at 57.
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Id.
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remedy for the congestive breakdown of the court system and as an externally imposed deterrent
to social conflict. Until the Civil War, alternative dispute settlement had expressed an ideology
of community justice. Thereafter, according to Auerbach [and in the view of Laura Nader] it
became an external instrument of social control and a way of increasing judicial efficiency.”42
Other authorities have used exegetical models similar to that of Auerbach and have applied them
to different historical and geographic contexts.43
42

Laura Nader, The Recurrent Dialectic Between Legality and Its Alternatives: The
Limitations of Binary Thinking, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 626-627 (1984). Her review of
Auerbach’s historical model subjects Auerbach’s communitarian thesis to scathing
critique. Suggesting that this paradigm is “is deceptively simple, and could only have
been [advanced] by a scholar deeply steeped in the materials on the varieties of religious,
ethnic, and class-based communities throughout our history,”ibid at 634, she finds that
Auerbach’s research is infected with “an ethnographic acceptance of questionable
assumptions,” and that it “fall[s] into the grips of binary thinking.” Id. The whole
structure of Auerbach’s conclusions are fundamentally binary, she finds, “solving
disputes with or without lawyers, individualistic pursuits vs. communal ideals, the Haves
vs. the Have-Nots, litigious Americans vs. non-litigious others.” Id. This exclusively
dichotomous approach robs Auerbach’s work of a certain sensitivity, Nader suggests, to
the rich tapestry of American alternative dispute resolution which would have been
corrected by an integration of his approach with the results of sociological and
anthropological research. A more fundamental flaw, Nader argues, characterizes
Auerbach’s work: it is premised at a number of critical junctures on a variety of
unexamined assumptions, the accuracy of which are central to the validity of his overall
thesis. For example, Auerbach argues that, over time, American society has moved away
from its communitarian roots and has exalted to the rank of canon the preservation of
individual liberties and rights. Nader flatly counters that this is wrong and that “nothing
requires that individualism and competitiveness be coupled with disorder and
contentiousness.” Ibid, at 635. In fact, she notes, both contentious and noncontentious
social groupings have been studied by anthropologists who have found that some of these
are based on considerations of trust, but that others are founded on relations presumed to
be less trustful. Nader challenges as well the central allegation of Auerbach that
American society is the most contentious and litigious in the world, pointing out simply
that such an assertion, especially one occupying such a central role to the overriding
thesis, cannot simply be put forward without evidence and that, in simple terms,
Auerbach has failed to meet his burden of proof in this respect. Ibid, at 637.
43

See, e.g., Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1984). In an exhaustive and insightful
study of alternative dispute resolution in Connecticut prior to the American Revolution,
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A study of the evolution and practice of arbitral dispute resolution mechanisms in
Georgia offers much which illustrates the works of theoretical authors such as Auerbach, Mann,
and Nader. There has been no time in Georgia history when the arbitral resolution of disputes
–here defined most broadly as the binding settlement of a dispute between two or more parties
by a third party or parties, accomplished outside the judicial structures for dispute resolution
maintained by the state– has not been palpably in evidence. From its earliest days, the Georgia
experience has exhibited arbitral processes, if not directly under court supervision, still strongly
associated with them. These bare facts alone, nevertheless, neither sustain nor refute the validity
of theoretical models of arbitration in history developed by scholars such as Mann, Auerbach,
and others. Does the historical record of arbitration in Georgia provide the raw data from which
one could substantiate a relation between instances of informal arbitration and communitarian
values in the state’s religious groups in the colonial period? Did communitarian interests extend
to the sponsorship of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution in the Georgia commercial
context under the aegis of chambers of commerce, boards of trade, or commodity exchanges? Is
there evidence of the state’s design to harness earlier informal arbitral processes for public rights
issues arising from state-wide, county and local operations? In which contexts were such arbitral

Mann developed a paradigm for the life cycle of arbitral devices which, although it
slightly preceded much of the more recent scholarship on the subject, nonetheless
anticipated much of what has been written since his work appeared in 1984. Auerbach’s
thesis advanced in Justice Without Law? appeared at about the same time as Mann’s
piece on colonial arbitration in Connecticut: “Jerold S. Auerbach’s suggestive historical
treatment of the interplay between nonlegal dispute settlement and community in
America appeared after I completed this article” Mann was later to write. “Our
conclusions regarding the colonial period seem complementary, particularly since the
changes in legal form discussed [by Mann] were not within the scope of Auerbach’s
analysis.” Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 481, fn. 4 (1984).
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processes most used in Georgia? Tax matters? Eminent domain proceedings? How vital is
judicialized, formal arbitration today? Do such instances of informal or communitarian-oriented
arbitration persist in modern Georgia practice?44

These are among the questions which are examined in this work, and these look
fundamentally to the legal history of Georgia, both colony and state, for answers.

44

If so, is this a good thing? Katherine Van Wezel Stone suggests reasons why this may
not be the case:
The present regime of rustic justice embodies a vision of society as
a collection of legally autonomous and morally disconnected
subcommunities. While there is some truth to this description of our
associational life, it does not capture the many ideals, values, and
sensibilities that bind us together. The varied, overlapping, and
shifting associational ties in American society constitute an
experience of pluralism that promotes certain moral and political
values and permits what Nancy Rosenblum calls a "democracy of
everyday life" to flourish. In addition to, or perhaps because of, our
robust associational life, we participate in a common culture and
thus we all benefit from a public intellectual space in which general
norms are debated, determined, and enforced. Thus, we need to
question whether the fractionated and privatized world of rustic
justice is a world we want to embrace.
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 1035 (1999).
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CHAPTER ONE
INFORMAL AND NONJUDICIALIZED ARBITRATION IN GEORGIA

Section 1. Arbitration As Alternative: A Note On The Courts of Colonial Georgia

Communitarian values of the kind identified by Mann45 and Auerbach46 were among the
engines which drove colonial Georgia’s particular ethnic and religious populations into the
practice of arbitration for the resolution of their conflicts and disputes in the early days of the
British outpost on the Savannah River; commercial interests in the colony (and eventually, the
state) exerted pressure for similar results later in the eighteenth and well into the nineteenth
centuries.47 Candor requires, however, the frank admission that not all of the forces resulting in
the arbitration practice of colonial Georgia were of a positive nature: serious reservations
regarding the structure and functioning of the regular court system in colonial Georgia,
especially during the period of the Trusteeship (1732-1754) but also during the interlude of royal
government in Georgia (1754-1776), provided powerful disincentives for resort to the public
courts by Georgia’s early citizenry. No survey of arbitration in colonial Georgia can safely
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Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American
Revolution, 59 N. Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1984), discussed supra in the Introduction to this
survey.
46

JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAWYERS (1984), discussed supra in the Introduction to this survey.
47

Legislative initiatives to promote commercial arbitration through chambers of
commerce, boards of trade, and commodity exchanges are discussed at length, infra, in
this survey’s Chapter One, Section 3, “Statutory Forms of Informal and Nonjudicialized
Arbitration in Georgia.” Private commercial arbitration subject to public law forms and
requirements are the focus of the latter half of this study, particularly the impact of the
Georgia Arbitration Codes of 1856 and 1988.
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overlook these factors in the apparent popularity of arbitration as a dispute resolution device in
the colonial Georgia experience.

Town Court of Savannah: The Trusteeship (1732–1754)

Throughout much of the history of Trusteeship Georgia, there effectively existed but a
single major judicial tribunal for the colony, the Town Court of Savannah.48 This tribunal had its
origins in the charter provisions granted to the Trustees of the new colony on June 9, 1732,
which had made provision for the creation of a judiciary for the period of the Trusteeship, after
which all judicial authority would then revert to the crown.49 Even though the court structure of
48

The description which follows here of the Town Court of Savannah, and incidentally of
the structure of Georgia courts during the period of the Trusteeship (1732-1754) in the
province, is an amalgam of information contained in a variety of historical resources. See
generally CREATING GEORGIA: MINUTES OF THE BRAY ASSOCIATES, 1730-1732, &
SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS ®. M. Baine, ed., 1995); WALTER MCELREATH, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA (1912); ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE
CREATION OF A JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT
(2001); and see especially JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE:
THE EXECUTION OF A TRUST (1917).
49

The measure of judicial authority granted to the Trustees under the charter of June
1732 had been extensive, perhaps more so than in any other British colony in North
America. Some have seen a counterweight to this broad power in the term limitation to
which it was subject:
As the charter was finally issued, there were numerous provisions for
imperial control. The most remarkable one was that limiting the powers
of government bestowed on the founders of Georgia to a period of twentyone years. The petitioners had sought greater powers of appointing and
removing officers and of establishing courts, and the request was granted
only on the condition of the time limitation. Formal laws must be
approved by the King, but regulations and orders to fit special occasions
could be given without approval. The power of making laws was also
limited to a period of twenty-one years, and no law could become
effective until actually approved.
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Georgia under the charter terms was to be the creation of the Trustees acting jointly, it was clear
that the bodies which they were empowered to create were to function and act in the name of the
monarch and that the justice which they were to dispense was to be royal in its character and not
simply an adjunct of the corporate entity administering it.50 Acting pursuant to the authority
JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A
TRUST 25-26 (1917).
50

The charter granted in the summer of 1732 was explicit in providing that colonial
judges were to sit in the name of the monarch:
And we do, of our further grace, certain knowledge and mere motion,
grant, establish and ordain, for us, our heirs and successors, that the said
Corporation and their successors, shall have full power and authority for
and during the term of 21-years to commence from the date of these our
letters patent, to erect and constitute judicatories and courts of record, or
other courts, to be held in the name of us, our heirs and successors, for the
hearing and determining of all manner of crimes, offenses, pleas,
processes, plaints, actions, matters, causes, and things whatsoever, arising
or happening within the said province of Georgia or between persons of
Georgia; whether the same be criminal or civil, and whether the said
crimes be capital or not capital, and whether the said pleas be real,
personal or mixed; and for awarding and making out executions
thereupon; to which courts and judicatories, we do hereby, for us, our
heirs and successors, give and grant full power and authority, from time to
time, to administer oaths for the discovery of truth, in any matter in
controversy or depending before them, or the solemn affirmation to any of
the persons commonly called Quakers, in such manner as by the laws of
our realm of Great Britain the same may be administered.
WALTER MCELREATH, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA 224-225(1912).
Nor was the lawmaking authority of the infant Colony of Georgia and its relationship to
royal authority overlooked in the charter:
And we do hereby, for us, our heirs and successors, ordain, will and
establish, that for and during the term of twenty-one years to commence
from the date of these our letters patent, the said corporation assembled
for that purpose, shall and may form and prepare laws, statutes, and
ordinances, fit and necessary for and concerning the government of the
said colony, and not repugnant to the laws and statutes of England, and the
same shall and may present, under their common seal, to us, our heirs and
successors, in our or their Privy Counsel [sic], for our or their approbation

22
granted them in the charter document, the Trustees moved to create a court for the colony at its
meeting at Georgia House in London on November 2, 1732. They designated the single tribunal
of the colony as the “Town Court,” granting to it essentially all of the judicial authority which
they had derived from the royal charter provisions. This broad subject matter jurisdiction
encompassed not only civil but criminal matters as well,51 and it was left to deduction that both
of these forms of justice would be administered not only in the same court but by the same
procedure. Essentially then, the Town Court amalgamated into a single entity the functions of a
variety of existing English courts, both of a criminal and civil nature.52 There was, moreover, no

or disallowance; and the said laws, statutes and ordinances, being
approved of by us, our heirs and successors, in our or their Privy Counsel
[sic], shall from thenceforth be in full force and virtue within our said
province of Georgia.
Ibid, at 220-221.
51

See generally on the work of the Town Court, ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE CREATION OF
A JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT 4-6 (2001).
Early on in the process of negotiation between the Bray Associates and the Board of
Plantations and Trade regarding the charter provisions of the new colony, the Associates
had suggested the broad powers which the court of the colony would exercise:
And in relation to the regulation of the intended settlements We propose to
Your Lordships that this Corporation shall have full Power and Authority
to Erect Courts of Record or other Courts to be held in the Name of his
Majesty for the hearing and Determining of all and all manner of Crimes,
Offenses, Pleas, processes, plaints, Actions, Matters and things arising
between Persons inhabiting or residing within the said Limits whether the
said Crimes be Capital or not with Liberty of Appeal to King and Councel
[sic] where the matter in Dispute shall be above £ 300.
CREATING GEORGIA: MINUTES OF THE BRAY ASSOCIATES, 1730-1732, &
SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS 41-43 ®. M. Baine, ed., 1995). The charter of June, 1732,
reflected substantially these terms originally proposed by the Bray Associates.
52

The variety of English tribunals existing at the time of Georgia’s foundation is
considered more fully, infra.
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explicit right of appellate review either in terms of the charter granted by the king or in the
provisions implementing that charter adopted by the Trustees in November of 1732.
The personnel of the court consisted of the Bailiffs, of whom there were three,53 who
were assisted in their work by petit juries which would be impaneled to hear complaints brought
by citizens in civil matters and would, in a fashion similar to the functioning of English courts in
criminal matters, hear criminal cases referred to it on true bills by a grand jury. The grand juries
as employed in the Town Court were still the amorphous and somewhat diffuse bodies with a
mix of governmental authority –executive, judicial, and legislative– which had been known in
metropolitan England: grand juries –and these sat with an indeterminate number of members–
basically promulgated community standards in broad form as a kind of legislature, while at the
same time specifying infractions of community standards by individuals in its guise as a
preliminary criminal body.54 In all of these functions, the grand jury of the Town Court was a
flexible and elastic body, organized ad hoc by the bailiffs in response to specific legal needs, and
wholly subject to manipulation by the bailiffs to achieve their predetermined ends.55
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See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE CREATION OF A JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE HISTORY OF
GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT 2-3 (2001). This work also contains a helpful
Appendix which sets forth the names of each of the First, Second and Third Bailiffs of
the colony (as well as those of the various Recorders), the dates of their respective
appointments, and a reference to a documentary source for this information. See Ibid,
“Appendix I,” at 10-11.
54

On the work and procedure of colonial grand juries generally, see BRADLEY CHAPIN,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606-1660, 33-34 (1983).
55

This fact was, of course, was hardly a virtue in the administration of justice, and was
the subject of formal recriminations by some colonists directed to the Trustees back
home. Perhaps the most celebrated such instance was the petition forwarded to the
Trustees by the grand jurors who dissented from the indictment of John Wesley on
September 1, 1737, and who protested forcefully the intervention of the bailiff into their
deliberations on this matter. See CHARLES COLQUIT JONES, JR., THE HISTORY OF
GEORGIA 292-294 (Boston: 1883).
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Except for a brief and ill-fated attempt to raise up a second Town Court for Frederica on
St. Simons Island in 1735,56 the Town Court of Savannah functioned even after a major reform
of the system in 1741 as the premier court of the colony throughout the Trusteeship period and
until the institution of a royal court system upon the surrender of the Georgia charter back to the
King in 1752.57 Excluding certain minor offenses (and some few civil matters not exceeding a
subject matter jurisdictional amount of forty shillings58 ) the Savannah Town Court existed as the
court of Georgia for the first several decades of the colony’s existence. It was a rough and
tumble affair: with judges (the Bailiffs) who were wholly untrained in the law excepting only
what they had learned on the job and, in some instances, barely literate, and with grand and petit
juries constituted of the kind of backwoods frontiersmen whom the colony had attracted from
London’s lower middle to lower class elements, the procedures before the court –if these could
be dignified with the term– were free for all adventures in creative judicial role playing.59
Compounding these structural problems with the early Town Court and its procedures were ad
hominem difficulties centering on Thomas Causton, the First Bailiff of the Town Court for a
period during the colony’s formative stages.

56

JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A
TRUST 201-202 (1917).
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W. W. ABBOT, ROYAL GOVERNORS OF GEORGIA, 1754-1775 6-7(1959). Abbot
attributes the general failure of the Trusteeship to the inability of the colonial
administration prior to the advent of royal government to achieve its economic goals on
the one hand and, on the other, the loss of the utopian vision which had inspired the
colony in the first place.
58

JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A
TRUST 199 (1917).
59

Ibid, at 212-217, passim.
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Thomas Causton and The Town Court of Savannah

Few figures in early Georgia history have been the subject of so much opprobrium as has
Thomas Causton who served under Oglethorpe effectively as the deputy leader of the colony in
the period of the Trusteeship until he was deposed from this office in the late 1730s by action of
the London authorities. A calico maker60 back in England, he had run afoul of British tax laws
and was, in late 1732, eager to start anew. In November of that year, his name appears in the
minutes of the meeting of the Georgia Trustees when they were engaged in detailed planning for
the new colony, the charter of which had only months before been approved by George II.61
Causton was among those first Georgians on the ship Anne who came across, first to Charleston
and Beaufort, and then barged down to Savannah on February 12, 1733. It is certain too that he
occupied a position of prominence –in some respects, even a certain qualified preeminence– in
the early days of the settlement, not only functioning as a Bailiff of the Town Court,62 together
with two other individuals, but also as storekeeper,63 a formal appointment which gave him a
virtual monopoly over trade activities officially licensed by the colony.64 Prospering from these
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HAROLD E. DAVIS, THE FLEDGLING PROVINCE: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE IN
COLONIAL GEORGIA, 1733-1776, 60 (1976).
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JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A
TRUST 163 (1917).
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See JOURNAL OF THE EARL OF EGMONT : ABSTRACT OF THE TRUSTEES [SIC]
PROCEEDINGS FOR ESTABLISHING THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 8 (Robert G. McPherson,
Ed., 1962). Cf. CHARLES C. JONES, JR., THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA 151 (Boston: 1883);
and JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A
TRUST 163 (1917).
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CHARLES C. JONES, JR., THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA 151 (Boston: 1883).

Jones is blunt: in the absence of Oglethorpe, the leadership of the colony devolved
upon Causton. Ibid, at 190.
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official functions, Causton amassed in short order a relatively substantial estate in the colony
which included not only his property within the township of Savannah itself but a “plantation”
outside the city which he dubbed “Oxstead,” but which quickly became known then (and
remains today) as Causton’s Bluff, lying between Savannah and the Atlantic coast to the east of
the city.65
Causton was not a man of great formal education, but the record he amassed in Savannah
before the end of the 1730s indicates a sharp and calculating mind and a character which was
determined to overcome the modest circumstances of his birth and status, not to mention the
somewhat clouded circumstances of his departure from England.66 Enjoying immensely the
exercise of the prerogatives of his official colonial status, prerogatives which would never have
touched him had he remained in his native England, Causton soon attracted the envy and
jealousy of others, and his own overbearing personality no doubt contributed to his growing
unpopularity in the colonial settlement.67
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In some readings, this is rendered “Ocstead” and, in some, the not nearly so elegant
“Hogstead.” WILLIAM HARDEN , A HISTORY OF SAVANNAH AND SOUTH GEORGIA 65
(1913). McCain goes so far as to say that the “finest estate in the colony” was that of
Thomas Causton at “Ocstead.” See JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY
PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A TRUST 163 (1917).
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HAROLD E. DAVIS, THE FLEDGLING PROVINCE: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE IN
COLONIAL GEORGIA, 1733-1776, 60 (1976). See also CHARLES C. JONES, JR., THE
HISTORY OF GEORGIA 266-274 (Boston: 1883), on the fall of Thomas Causton from his
position of authority in the colony.
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Harden describes some of the reasons for Causton’s growing unpopularity:
Though left in charge of the colony during the absence of the leader,
Causton was fully advised beforehand as to the duties he was to perform
and what authority he should exercise. Notwithstanding this, he acted in
such a way as to cause great displeasure to the people and to be the subject
of the special rancor of those men who have become known [in Georgia
history] by the title of “malcontents” ... They arraigned him in this
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In his defense it must be said that the exercise of his official duties as bailiff (or judge) of
the court and as storekeeper (with its attendant function of licensing trade transactions, trade
agents, and generally controlling commercial flows in the city) were not calculated to win him
any popularity contests; at the same time, his rather imperious method of discharging the duties
did little to blunt the natural dislike which the performance of his duties would engender.
Nonetheless, it appears that Oglethorpe –the undisputed patriarch of the colony– continued to
hold Causton in some degree of regard, retaining him in office even though other colonial
bureaucrats were not infrequently dismissed for one shortcoming or the other. Many of
Oglethorpe’s duties, especially those of a military nature, required his repeated absences for long
periods of time from Savannah; given this circumstance, perhaps the sheer necessity of the

language: “Whilst we labored under those difficulties in supporting
ourselves, our civil liberties received a more terrible shock; for instead of
such a free government as we had reason to expect, and of being judged
by the laws of our mother country, a dictator (under the title bailiff and
store-keeper) was appointed and left by Mr. Oglethorpe, at his departure,
which was in April, 1734, whose will and pleasure were the only laws in
Georgia. In regard to this magistrate, the others were entirely nominal, and
in a manner but ciphers. Sometimes he would ask in public their opinion,
in order to have the pleasure of showing his power by contradicting them.
He would often threaten juries, and especially when their verdicts did not
agree with his inclination or humor, in order the more fully to establish his
absolute authority, the store and disposal of the provisions, money, and
public places of trust, were committed to him; by which alteration in his
state in circumstances he became in a manner infatuated, being before that
a person of no substance or character, having come over with Mr.
Oglethorpe amongst the first forty, and left England upon account of
something committed by him concerning his majesty’s duties. However,
he was fit enough for a great many purposes, being a person naturally
proud, covetous, cunning and deceitful, and would bring his designs about
by all possible ways and means.
WILLIAM HARDEN , A HISTORY OF SAVANNAH AND SOUTH GEORGIA 66 (1913).
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situation required that the colonial leader retain all the assistance he could muster, regardless of
its quality or deficiencies.68
There were numerous complaints that Causton was partial at the store, that he did
not give everybody equal treatment, that he was domineering, and that he was
generally hard to get along with. The Trustees sent over the complaints which
they received to be answered after their usual custom, but there is no indication
that they or Oglethorpe were dissatisfied with Causton’s actions. Because he
came into contact with most of the people as storekeeper, Causton was in a
vulnerable position to be complained about. He seemed able to take responsibility
and to get things done, abilities not uniformly displayed upon Georgia’s early
colonists. He undoubtedly had a hot temper and probably favored some colonists
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Although it runs counter to the conventional impression, it seems that during the bulk
of the period of Oglethorpe’s leadership of the colony, he was either in the south along
the disputed Florida border and at Frederica on military missions, at Charleston in
Carolina conferring with English officials there, or otherwise back in England engaged in
business with the Trustees: his time in the colonial capital at Savannah was rather limited
and his reliance on second-level officials such as Causton all the more necessary and
explicable. See SARAH B. GOBER TEMPLE & KENNETH COLEMAN, GEORGIA JOURNEYS,
BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE LIVES OF GEORGIA’S ORIGINAL SETTLERS AND MANY OTHER
EARLY SETTLERS FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE COLONY IN 1732 UNTIL THE INSTITUTION
OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN 1754, 24 (1961), describing the effect on the people of the
colony caused by Oglethorpe’s absence in Charleston as early as 1733; see also JAMES
ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A TRUST 147
(1917). The Trustees, McCain there notes:
... had never authorized Oglethorpe to act for them on any extensive scale,
but if they had expected it, it would have been impossible. He was out of
the province a great deal, and after 1735 his almost constant residence at
Frederica made it impossible for him to supervise work at Savannah,
where most of the executive officials were located.
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over other. That he had ability seems obvious from what both his enemies and his
friends said about him.69
The grudging acknowledgment of his ability and talent, even by those opposed to him,
did not extend far enough to provide him an immunity from the growing discomfort of the
Trustees regarding the man who had become, essentially, the second in command and chief
judge of the only effective court in the colony of Georgia:
He was not a popular official, and he succeeded in getting the ill will and even
active opposition of some of the best men in Savannah. The Trustees complained
occasionally of his neglect in writing to them and in sending his accounts
promptly; but they trusted him fully until the spring of 1738, when they found
that he had gotten them into debt by several thousand pounds. They then
suspected him of fraud and ordered his arrest, suspending him from his offices of
storekeeper and first bailiff until his accounts were satisfactorily adjusted. The
accounts never were completed; they were worked over by a committee for about
eight years; and then Causton went to England to try to settle them in person with
the Trustees. He was only partially successful and he was returning to Georgia in
1746 to complete the work when he died at sea. It was never proven he acted with
fraudulent intent in his dealings with the Trust; but it was undoubtedly true that
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SARAH B. GOBER TEMPLE & KENNETH COLEMAN, GEORGIA JOURNEYS, BEING AN
ACCOUNT OF THE LIVES OF GEORGIA’S ORIGINAL SETTLERS AND MANY OTHER EARLY
SETTLERS FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE COLONY IN 1732 UNTIL THE INSTITUTION OF
ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN 1754, 72 (1961).
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he reaped a great deal of personal profit out of them and that he almost ruined the
Trust by his mismanagement70
The historical record, then, makes the judgment almost unavoidable: the person of
Thomas Causton may well have been one of the primary and decisive factors in making
arbitration a dispute resolution method of choice in early colonial Georgia and, in addition,
almost certainly contributed to the popularity of that extrajudicial dispute resolution device in
Georgia’s very earliest years.71
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JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A
TRUST 164 (1917).
71

The Salzburgers –whose steadfast reliance on arbitral methods of dispute resolution is
considered in some detail in the present Chapter of this survey, Section 2, “An
Arbitration in Colonial Georgia: The Salzburger Experience in Ebenezer”– certainly were
aware of Thomas Causton’s activities as bailiff of the Town Court. When, in 1737, John
Wesley (a confidant of the Salzburger leadership in the colony and soon to become the
founder of Methodism) was haled before the Town Court on a variety of charges
stemming from his relation with Sophia Hopkey, the niece of Thomas Causton, the bailiff
personally intervened in the matter in almost all its aspects. These ranged from drawing
up the allegations against Wesley, hand-picking the grand jury, manipulating the
processing of the matter to Wesley’s disadvantage and, ultimately, delaying the hearing
in the case in order to harass the Anglican minister and successfully drive him from the
colony. On Wesley’s trial in Causton’s court, see generally CHARLES COLQUIT JONES,
JR., THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA 288-296 (Boston: 1883). Wesley’s infatuation with the
young woman and the legal proceedings which flowed from it are romanticized in
WILLIE SNOW ETHRIDGE, STRANGE FIRES: THE TRUE STORY OF JOHN WESLEY’S LOVE
AFFAIR IN GEORGIA (1971), a work that stays relatively close to historical sources, and in
MARIE CONWAY OEMLER, THE HOLY LOVER (1927), a romanticized work which has no
such ambition.

31
The Courts of the Royal Colony of Georgia (1754-1776)72

At the end of 1751, the Trustees made the decision, prompted by a variety of economic
and political factors, to cut short the tenure which they held under the 1732 Georgia charter and
to surrender the colony to royal control and administration. An interim period of almost two
years then ensued until the arrival from London of the colony’s first royal governor, John
Reynolds, who reached Savannah in October of 1754. Reynolds quickly set about replacing the
courts of the Trusteeship with ones established under royal mandate.73 While the establishment
of a system of royal courts in Georgia at that time was undoubtedly a substantial improvement in
the administration of justice over the dark days of Thomas Causton’s reign in the old Town
Court, royal courts too –particularly as political and economic tensions mounted between the
American colonists and the British monarchy after the Treaty of Paris in 1763– demonstrated
72

I follow here the convention suggested by W. W. Abbot in ROYAL GOVERNORS OF
GEORGIA, 1754-1775 (1959), and count the end of Trusteeship government in the colony
of Georgia (and beginning of the royal administration) in 1754. There is little doubt, of
course, that the legal life of the colony began on June 9, 1732, when George II granted
the charter which brought the Trusteeship into existence; this de jure beginning was
followed the next year by the physical establishment of the colony when, on February 12,
1733, the first settlers landed at Yamacraw Bluff. The termination of the Trusteeship,
however, is not so easily or clearly fixed. The Privy Council decided to end the
Trusteeship before its twenty-one year charter period had expired, a decision taken at its
meeting of December 19, 1751; accordingly, on June 23, 1752, four Trustees –the only
ones in attendance at the meeting– executed a surrender of the charter (essentially, in
form, a deed) back to the king, thus ending the legal existence of the Trusteeship.
Nonetheless, Trusteeship administration of the colony –there being in truth none other
there–limped along for another couple of years until, in late October of 1754, Royal Navy
Captain John Reynolds arrived in Savannah with his commission as royal governor to
begin the work of colonial administration. See JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A
PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A TRUST 134-135 (1917).
73

A detailed description of the judicial transition from proprietary to royal colony is
found in ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE CREATION OF A JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE HISTORY OF
GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT, 15-23 (2001).
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disincentives to their use and, hence, reasons for the colonists to resort to arbitration outside the
formal court structure to resolve their conflicts and disputes. In short, these negative features of
the royal courts stemmed from their excessive technicality, particularly in the circumstances of a
frontier province such as Georgia,74 and the lack of a jury in the procedures of several of the
royal courts, particularly Chancery and Admiralty. These are examined briefly here.

The General Court

This was the primary court of the colony following the revocation of the 1732 charter and
the creation of royal courts for Georgia. It was a court of record held four times annually and
gathered into itself the jurisdiction of three separate English tribunals, that of King’s Bench75 ;

74

Erwin Surrency speaks of common law procedure as “highly technical and hence,
needlessly complex,” but suggests that colonial dissatisfaction with the system was, at
least in part, due to the fault of Americans who attempted to apply common law
procedure to disputes not addressed by the system in England and therefore inappropriate
for resolution by it and, in addition, the failure of a vast majority of colonists to truly
understand the system at all. Ibid, at 190.
75

So called because the monarch himself frequently sat at its sessions (and hence was
referred to as coram ipso rege), the Court of King’s (or Queen’s) Bench was effectively
the “supreme court” of the common law, joining in itself extensive power in both
criminal (“crown side”) authority and civil (“plea side”) jurisdiction. A part of the aula
regis, it traveled about the realm with the person of the king in early years, but soon
became a fixture at Westminster. Under modern English practice known as the King’s (or
Queen’s, as the case may be) Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, the court had,
even by the time of Georgia’s foundation in the 1730s, assumed its position of
preeminence, especially in civil matters, exercising subject matter jurisdiction over all
actions in personam, a power which in modern terms would have permitted the court
jurisdiction over all civil actions with the exception of some few in rem proceedings
brought in Common Pleas. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 431 (4th ed. 1957), Court of
King’s Bench.
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Common Pleas76 ; and Exchequer.77 The General Court held first instance power78 over all
criminal matters and over all civil matters above the sum of 40 shillings, over which original
jurisdiction lay with the Inferior or Justice Court. Where the amount in controversy exceeded
£300, an appeal could be lodged as a matter of right with the governor and the Provincial
Council. If the amount in controversy exceeded £500, a further appeal lay to the King in Council
subject to a bond requirement and the commitment that the appellant would press the claim and
respond to any adverse final judgment.79
76

Historically, Common Pleas (sometimes also designated Common Bench) was one of
the four superior courts located at Westminster, functioning there as an independent body
at the time of Georgia’s establishment in the first half of the eighteenth century and until
its amalgamation under the reformist English Judicature Acts of the late nineteenth
century. It was an ancient tribunal and had its origins in the specialization and
centralization of the old aula regis established in the times of William the Conqueror. Its
exclusive jurisdiction was over all real actions brought in rem asserting rights in land,
and it was here that communa placita, or common pleas, were heard, i.e., claims by one
subject of the Crown against another such subject. By tradition, appeals out of Common
Pleas were heard in King’s Bench, but these were later directed to the Court of
Exchequer. Common Pleas exercised a jurisdiction wholly civil in nature, the court
having no authority in criminal matters; its jurisdiction over personal actions and
ejectment was concurrent with that of King’s Bench. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
429 (4th ed. 1957), Court of Common Pleas. In the process of generalization and
increased imprecision which was characteristic of judicial innovations in the British
North American colonies, Common Pleas was transmuted into the tribunal which
exercised general and original subject matter jurisdiction over the trial of issues of fact
and law where the substance of the matter in dispute was controlled by the principles of
the common law. See also Moore v. Barry, 30 S.C. 530 (1889).
77

The Court of Exchequer evolved, of course, into an administrative body and is
represented in modern times by the governmental treasury. See EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH
R. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 23 (5th ed., 2000).
78

A Court of Session of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery was, in the
original design after the advent of royal government, to have first instance authority over
misdemeanor criminal matters and was to sit twice a year. This Court was soon abolished
as a separate entity, however, and its jurisdiction transferred to the General Court. See
CHARLES COLQUIT JONES, JR., THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA 465 (Boston: 1883).
79

See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE CREATION OF A JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE HISTORY OF
GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT, 16-17 (2001).
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The Chancery Court

It would be inappropriate here, no less than it would be futile, to attempt a full-scale
description of equity jurisdiction80 as it had evolved over the centuries of English history down
to the time of the colonization of Georgia. Worth noting, however, are the procedural81 and
substantive82 characteristics of chancery practice which manifested themselves in organizational

80

The interested student will find the classics of equity jurisprudence helpful in exploring
this subject, including POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (Bancroft-Whitney Co., 3rd
ed., 1905). Good modern overviews of the field, including some consideration of the
history of the system and its relation to the common law (always necessary when equity
is under examination) include EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON REMEDIES (5th ed., 2000). A useful review of the Georgia application and adaptation
of equity is THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEORGIA LAW, (1960), Volume 10A, Equity, a better
than three hundred page review of the history, principles, and procedural aspects of
equity in Georgia.
81

Broadly stated, chancery procedure was heavily influenced by the techniques of the
ecclesiastical courts in England; these in turn demonstrated the influence of Roman law
and practice as these were known on the continent, particularly after the Reception. One
of the most dramatic distinctions between the two procedural systems –the common law
on the one hand, and the equitable tradition on the other– is the strong reliance by the
former on the jury, while the jury was wholly unknown in the latter. Many in the colonies
at the time of the Revolution linked, fairly or unfairly, equity and the royal authority:
Hostility to the chancery courts was quite widespread in the eighteenth
century. Governor William Burnet of New York (1720–8) used the
chancery court as a court of exchequer, to collect the colony’s unpaid
quitrents. This added nothing to the court’s popularity. Chancery was
closely associated with executive power, in turn with the English
overlords. Equity worked without a jury; thus public opinion could not
effectively control the use of the court as a tool of imperial policy.
Besides, equity courts sat, as a rule, only in the capital; unlike the common
law, it was not brought to every man’s doorstep. Litigants complained,
too, that chancery procedures were clumsy, inefficient, interminable.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 47-48 (1973).
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Much has been made of equity’s reliance on moral precepts as the core of its system of
jurisprudence. “The clerical chancellors, interpreting the language of the Roman jurists
according to their own Christian philosophy, conceived of equity as synonymous with the
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and institutional ways and which would, therefore, serve as a bellwethers indicating the presence
(or absence) of a mature system of equity practice. Primary among these, of course, is the fact
that the substantive remedies afforded by the chancery system (together with the equitable
principles which informed them) were separate and distinct from the common law and in
eighteenth century English legal contemplation could hardly be thought to be housed under one
and the same roof. Access to equitable relief, in fact, was generally conditioned upon a
demonstration of the inadequacy of legal remedies.83 As an important corollary to the distinct
nature of the equity jurisprudence, of course, was the principle that equity was to be
administered separately from the law, by separate judges and in separate tribunals and without
the intervention of juries. Kermit Hall has suggested a political dimension to the general disfavor
which the chancery courts met in the British North American colonies: “Chancery courts were
also controversial because governors sought in their capacity as chancellors to seek political ends
rather than justice.”84

Divine law of morality, and therefore as compulsory upon human tribunals in their work
of adjudicating upon the civil rights and regulating the personal conduct and relations of
individuals.” THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEORGIA LAW, (1960), Volume 10A, Equity, at
103. With the growing maturity and institutionalization of chancery practice, however,
the subjectivity of the chancellor’s foot gave way to the rationality and predictability of a
full-blown system of jurisprudence in which the moralistic perceptions of an individual
functionary had little or no role. Id., at 104. The generally accepted bromide that equity
principles look to the continent and to Roman sources has much, however, to recommend
it.
83

As it still is, of course. See O.C.G.A. § 23-1-3: “Equity jurisdiction is established and
allowed for the protection and relief of parties where, from any peculiar circumstances,
the operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from anticipated
wrong or relieving for injuries done.”
84

KERMIT HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 22 (1989).
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With respect to Georgia colonial experience, the salient point is the clear absence of any
institutional mechanism for the administration of equity in the early years of the province.85 The
absence of a formal body for the administration should not be taken, however, as a signal that the
system of equity was lacking in the colonial experience as well for, as Hall notes:
Equity ... had emerged in the colonies as a matter of practice if not of form.
Seventeenth century colonial lay judges exercised a kind of equity through the
laxity with which they followed common law precedents. But as the English
tightened control over the colonies in the eighteenth century, governors
discovered that by assuming the status of chancellors they could extend the reach
of their authority.
*

*

*
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This is not to say, however, that the pre-existing institutions of colonial government in
Georgia did not have access to or apply equitable principles for, as Justice Joseph
Lumpkin – later to be designated the first Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court–
observed as far back as 1854:
What cases, pray, did then [in Georgia’s colonial past], as now, require the
powers of a Court of Equity, in the first instance? All, unquestionably,
where a Common Law remedy was not adequate. To this extent, then, at
least, this rule, adopted during the last century, recognizes Equity powers,
as existing in the Superior Courts of this State. And, I apprehend, there
never was a time, from the settlement of the colony in 1732 [sic], to the
present period, when, for all practical purposes, less power than this was
lodged in the Judiciary Department of the Government, under every
change and form of organization. ... By reference to the early records of
the older counties of the State, the fact is established, that both before and
subsequent to the Judiciary Act of 1799, the Superior Courts of Georgia
were in the constant habit of exercising all the Chancery powers which
were usual to Courts of Equity in England.
Cook v. Walker, 15 Ga. 457 (1854).
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The furor over equity practice subsided by the mid-eighteenth century, and the
growing technicality of the common law system in the colonies revived interest in
it. There was a "generally recognized need for equity as a part of the . . .
American legal system," but it was accepted only after the colonies had either
adopted viable chancery courts free of gubernatorial influence or granted this
jurisdiction to the common law courts.86
The absence of such a court in Trusteeship Georgia is underscored by the attempts early
on in the colony to secure such a tribunal. Even prior to the advent of royal government for the
young colony, the 1751 Georgia Assembly had petitioned the Trustees for the establishment of
an equity court at Savannah for those cases where law courts were inadequate; the executive of
the colony –the Presidents and assistants– did not concur with the recommendation and the
Trustees did not act on it.87
Georgia’s colonial Court of Chancery met each term subsequent to the sessions of the
General Court, and was presided over by the governor as chancellor, assisted by a master, a
register and an examiner.88
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KERMIT HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 22 (1989).
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JAMES ROSS MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A
TRUST 204 (1917).
88

ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE CREATION OF A JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE HISTORY OF
GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT 18-20 (2001).
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The Court of Admiralty

The presence of an admiralty court in a colony was a clear signal of the economic and
trade interests of the crown which were to be protected and advanced by this judicial body.
Friedman notes that, by the early eighteenth century, at least nine separate admiralty courts had
come into existence in British North America.89 Since the scope of admiralty jurisdiction
included the enforcement of trade laws, officials in metropolitan England were quite concerned
with the judicial appointments to these courts and demonstrated a degree of administrative
oversight and day-to-day involvement noticeably lacking with respect to other judicial bodies of
the North American colonies. In a move which was unique among colonial judicial experiments,
London created a central all-colony admiralty court with its seat in Halifax, Nova Scotia: while
this court theoretically had an important role to play in the coordination of trade, tariff and
navigation policy throughout all of the British colonies in North America, it was never effective
in this regard.90 So close was the identification of trade policy and the work of the colonial
admiralty courts that the detested Stamp Act was entrusted to them for enforcement,91 despite the
fact that the act had nothing whatsoever to do with traditional admiralty jurisdiction. In 1763, the
central Halifax admiralty court was abolished and was replaced by a series of regional admiralty
courts sitting in Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston.92 These newly created bodies
were expected to coordinate their activities with the admiralty courts already created in the
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LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 45 (1973).
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Ibid, at 46.
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Id.
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Id.
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individual colonies but, as Friedman notes, the new bodies merely replaced the separate
admiralty tribunals in the towns were they sat.93
Kermit Hall has described the sources of the general unpopularity which admiralty courts
aroused in the colonial population:
Vice-admiralty ... developed independently of the hierarchical layering of the
indigenous colonial courts ... [and] provided imperial control and commercial
coherence to ocean trading. In the seventeenth century governors had acted in the
capacity of vice-admirals, handling disputes arising out of maritime matters such
as prize, wrecks, insurance, and seaman's wages. Parliament in 1696 authorized
separate vice-admiralty courts as part of its larger program to tighten the imperial
grip. These new courts brought the highly technical law of admiralty to the
colonies. The judges received fixed fees and percentage payments of the goods
they condemned, a practice that denied colonial assemblies control over their
salaries.
The colonists resented the courts even though they offered important
commercial advantages. Vice-admiralty judges, who were often Americans,
placed colonial merchants and customs racketeers on short legal leashes in
commercial dealings with their English masters. Moreover, the colonists, who
coveted the benefits of local control through trial by jury, resented the prerogative
[non-jury] nature of the vice-admiralty proceedings.94
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LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 45-46 (1973).
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KERMIT HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 21-22 (1989).
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The first consideration of an admiralty court for Georgia came during the Trusteeship in
an unsuccessful attempt to elaborate the courts of the province along lines familiar to English
practice when there was a request of the Trustees to the King in Council, in 1748, for the
establishment of such a court in Georgia. Admiralty, with subject matter jurisdiction over claims
arising on navigable waters, had long been associated with periods of international stress and
belligerence: it was the admiralty court in British practice which exercised a monopoly of
authority over the processing of prize claims, the forced sale of belligerent vessels for
distribution of the proceeds to the victorious crew. 95 After it became known to the Trustees that a
recommendation by the commanding officer of the British troops at Frederica for the
appointment of a judge to this court had been made, the Trustees interposed the objection that,
under their charter, only the Trustees themselves could effect such an appointment in Georgia. It
was at this point that it was discovered that no such court existed in the colony at all, whereupon
the Trustees approached the King in Council for the establishment of the court for Georgia. The
easing of international tensions and the subsequent withering away of Frederica’s military
significance took the steam from this proposal which was not granted by the crown; the Trustees,
for their part, did not press the matter further and no admiralty court appeared in Georgia until
after 1754 and the surrender of the charter by the Trustees.96
95
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See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 46 (1973).

Trevor Reese states flatly that no admiralty court was created in Georgia until the
advent of royal government, and this assertion has about it the ring of authenticity.
TREVOR R. REESE, COLONIAL GEORGIA: A STUDY IN BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 27 (1963). McCain, on the other hand, seems to indicate that
such a tribunal was present in Georgia at least as early as 1748. See JAMES ROSS
MCCAIN, GEORGIA AS A PROPRIETARY PROVINCE: THE EXECUTION OF A TRUST 122
(1917). Surrency seems to come down on the side of Reese, noting that the first session
of the admiralty court was held January 16, 1755, as a result of Governor Reynolds
organizing efforts. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE CREATION OF A JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE
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The admiralty court sitting in Savannah enjoyed a continuous existence from the time of
its creation until the time of the Revolution, a period of about twenty years. Appeals from this
court were lodged in the High Court of Admiralty of England. Generally, the court had exclusive
authority within the colony of those matters traditionally relegated to the English admiralty
courts, including enforcement of the trade acts, disputes respecting the wages of seamen, salvage
claims and other maritime matters, customarily defined as all matters arising on navigable
waters. Here, the governor, sitting in his ex officio capacity of vice admiral for the colony, was
assisted by a judge-advocate, an advocate-general, a marshal and register.97

HISTORY OF GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT 20 (2001). The truth of the matter
appears to lie with Reese and Surrency.
97

Trevor R. Reese provides a succinct overview of the work of the admiralty court in
colonial Georgia:
During the Trusteeship period there had been no admiralty court in
Georgia, but one was established in January 1755, and consisted of four
members, the Governor granting commissions to a judge, an advocategeneral, a marshal, and a registrar of the court. It tried breaches of the
Acts of Trade, had jurisdiction over cases concerning salvages, mariners’
wages, piracy, enemy ships taken as prizes, and over other maritime
affairs, and “proceeded according to the course of the civil law and the
established method of determination used in Great Britain and other
maritime nations.”
TREVOR R. REESE, COLONIAL GEORGIA: A STUDY IN BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 27 (1963). See also ERWIN C. SURRENCY, THE CREATION OF A
JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO PRESENT 20 (2001), on
the work of the admiralty court in colonial Georgia after the conclusion of the
Trusteeship.
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The Inferior (or Justice) Court

These royal courts, sometimes referred to as Courts of Conscience,98 exercised authority
over all civil claims up to £8, and exclusive civil jurisdiction over controversies up to 40
shillings, beyond which an appeal lay to the General Court in Savannah. After the dissolution of
the Court of Session of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery and the amalgamation of
that court with the General Court, the justices of the Courts of Conscience were assigned a
supporting role for the criminal functions in the General Court and were granted power in
emergencies to try charges against slaves under special writs of oyer and terminer.99
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The use of this term with respect to the Inferior Courts of colonial Georgia has been the
occasion of no small degree of confusion. Traditionally, “Court of Conscience” was
descriptive of chancery courts exercising equitable jurisdiction; so used, the term was one
of description and not a formal designation. See Harper v. Clayton, 84 Md. 346 (1896),
cited in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 429 (4th ed. 1957), Court of Conscience. The
Georgia usage seems to relate back to the English “courts of request” established by the
English Parliament in certain localities, having limited jurisdiction over minor debts. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 435 (4th ed. 1957), Courts of Requests. These were
supplanted by the modern English county courts in the 1846 reforms, while their Georgia
analogues, the justice of the peace courts, lived on until the creation of the Magistrate
Courts in each of Georgia’s one hundred fifty-nine counties under the Georgia
Constitution of 1983. See 1983 GA. CONST . Art. 6, § I, ¶ 1.
99

Reese summarizes the place in the judicial hierarchy of the “Court of Conscience”:
By an Act of April 1760, Courts of Conscience were designed to avoid the
heavy expense incurred in the ordinary method of suing for and
recovering small debts in the General Court. Every settlement had its own
justices of the peace commissioned by the Governor to determine in these
courts all actions of debt and damage, except those concerning titles to
land, in which the amount involved did not exceed £8 sterling.

TREVOR R. REESE, COLONIAL GEORGIA: A STUDY IN BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 27 (1963).
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Significantly, the winds of revolution were to blow away colonial objections to and
discomfort with the creakiness and excessive technicality of common law pleading as well as the
terrible –to American eyes– specter of judges sitting without juries as a matter of course. Within
a few short years after the victory at Yorktown and the Peace of Paris in 1783, Georgia law had
radically simplified procedure in the common law courts100 and, somewhat later, had extended
the right to jury trial even in equity matters.101 Before the American Revolution, however, these
radical measures were beyond the political grasp of the colonists on the Savannah. However,
they could –and they did– avoid the disincentives of English legal practice by withdrawing into
an arbitral practice which facilitated the expression of community values, in ways
comprehensible to the community, and in tribunals which themselves were constituted by and of
the community.
100

For instance, common law demurrer practice –the hypertechnical method whereby the
sufficiency of opposing pleadings could be contested procedurally (and without the
intervention of a jury) was discouraged by a statute enacted in 1782, even before the
peace with England had been concluded in Paris. Georgia Laws 1782, Watkins Digest,
339, cited in Surrency, op. cit. supra, at 207. Major procedural reforms intended to
streamline and simplify common law practice were registered by the Judiciary Act of
1797, amended two years later, which addressed the entire civil pleading and trial
process, beginning with the provision that pleadings were to be “plainly, fully and
distinctly” set forth. Georgia Laws 1799, 14.
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See generally Cawthon v. Douglas County, 248 Ga. 760 (1982), regarding the
historical evolution in Georgia of the statutory right to a trial by jury of fact issues arising
in equitable proceedings, especially as it appeared in the Code of 1895, § 4849. It appears
that the statutory right to elect trial by jury in equity cases was deleted at the time of the
enactment of the Code of 1933 which in its §37-1104 made no reference to such a right.
An additional prerogative extended to juries in Georgia by the state’s first constitution
(that of 1777) was the right to pass on contested issues of law, a provision unheard of in
English practice. GA. CONST ., 1777, § 279. The Georgia Judiciary Act of 1778,
implementing the terms of the 1777 Constitution, provided that courts were to “proceed
with a jury in summary way on petition, in all disputes of a civil nature,” a mandate to
reverse the objectionable English practice. See the discussion in ERWIN C. SURRENCY,
THE CREATION OF A JUDICIAL SYSTEM : THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA COURTS, 1733 TO
PRESENT, 50-51 (2001).

44
Section 2. An Arbitration in Colonial Georgia: The Salzburger Experience in Ebenezer

When James Edward Oglethorpe –a leading force in the establishment of Georgia,
Britain’s last colony in North America– met the arrival of the transport ship The Purisburg on
March 11, 1734, at Savannah’s river harbor, he knew that the vessel brought more than the
material supplies and provisions so badly needed by the infant English outpost where the
Savannah River mouthed into the Atlantic Ocean: it delivered as well the first complement of
German Protestant refugees –some seventy-eight souls– from Roman Catholic principalities in
Austria and southern Germany.102 These –collectively known in history as the “Salzburgers”103 –
had been financed in their flight from their homelands by the Anglican Society for the
Propagation of Christian Knowledge, a major missionary adjunct of the Church of England in
the eighteenth century. A hardy and robust people, the Salzburgers had, for the most part, been
farmers in their native homes and were well adapted to the hardships which life on the Georgia
frontier promised them that spring of 1734; their strong Lutheran ethics recommended them to
the Society’s financiers perhaps even more than their agricultural traditions and backgrounds.
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The history of this group, from their expulsion and during their wandering in Europe
until their final arrival in London before departure for the new colony of Georgia, is
rehearsed in P. A. STROBEL, THE SALZBURGERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS 1-59
(Baltimore, 1855). In the first two decades after its foundation, the colony accepted a
large number of German-speaking Protestants from a variety of regions in central
Europe. See generally GEORGE FENWICK JONES, THE GEORGIA DUTCH: FROM THE RHINE
AND DANUBE TO THE SAVANNAH, 1733-1783, 33-67 (1992).
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At the time of the expulsion of the Protestants from the archbishopric of Salzburg in
the period 1729-1732, that principality consisted of lands in the regions of Friessingen,
Ratisbon [Regensburg], Passau, Chiemre, Seckau, Lavant, Briscen, Gurk and Neustadt,
an area vastly larger than that which today constitutes the Land Salzburg in the Austrian
Federal Republic. See P. A. STROBEL, THE SALZBURGERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS 4
(Baltimore, 1855). The main body of German-speaking Lutherans who were to become
known in history as the “Salzburgers” in fact left from Bavarian Augsburg in October of
1733. KENNETH COLEMAN, COLONIAL GEORGIA: A HISTORY 40 (1989).
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Oglethorpe and the authorities in London also saw in the Salzburgers a potential military and
economic bulwark against Spanish advances from south of the Florida-Georgia boundary line or
against intrusions by Creeks or Cherokees to the north and west of the colonial capital.
Oglethorpe’s vision of the Salzburgers as the young colony’s first line of defense was realized
when, shortly after their arrival in the New World, they were assigned –and agreed to– an
isolated venue for the German-speaking outpost northwest of Savannah and along the banks of
the Savannah River at a place soon known as Ebenezer,104 near the present town of Springfield in
modern Effingham County, Georgia.105
In their isolated location on a bluff overlooking the muddy Savannah River, the German
colonists were free to recreate (or better, perfect) the societies which they had left behind them in
Central Europe, and soon a successful community –reinforced by additional shiploads of
German Protestants who periodically appeared at the Savannah harbor– developed.106 German in
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The name –often appearing as “Eben-Ezer” in documents of colonial vintage– is from
the Hebrew and is translated as “Rock of Help,” an expression of the profound
motivations which brought the German farmers to the wilderness of near-tropical
Georgia. See P. A. STROBEL, THE SALZBURGERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS 63
(Baltimore, 1855): “After singing a psalm,” upon first arriving at the site of the new
town, the colonists “set up a rock, which they found upon the spot, and, in the spirit of
the pious Samuel, named the place Ebenezer, (the stone of help,) [sic] for they could
truly say, ‘Hitherto the Lord hath truly helped us.’”
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GEORGE FENWICK JONES, THE GEORGIA DUTCH: FROM THE RHINE AND DANUBE TO
THE SAVANNAH, 1733-1783, 35 (1992). See also JAMES ETHERIDGE CALLAWAY, THE
EARLY SETTLEMENT OF GEORGIA 23-24 (1948): “Following his usual plan of planting
settlers in the most strategic spots, Oglethorpe placed them on a spot near two rivulets
surrounded by woods and meadows, sixteen miles to the north and west of Savannah; and
although this is not the reason given in the contemporary accounts, by an examination of
early maps it is evident that Ebenezer was placed squarely on the path customarily taken
by the Indians when they attacked Carolina.”
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GEORGE FENWICK JONES, THE GEORGIA DUTCH: FROM THE RHINE AND DANUBE TO
THE SAVANNAH, 1733-1783, 114-138 (1992) (Chapter Five, Success at Ebenezer).
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religion, German in language, and German in its social organization as a small, essentially
theocratic state, the Salzburgers eschewed contact with the English legal system represented by
the unfamiliar and alien court structure functioning in Savannah.107 Rather, the Salzburger
community persistently looked inward to resolve disputes on its own terms and in its own way.
Heinrich Melchior Mühlenberg, the North American Lutheran patriarch with his seat in
Pennsylvania, reflected the distaste and aversion108 with which the Lutherans in North America
107

A. G. Roeber, Germans, Bench, and Bar in the South, 1715-1770, in AMBIVALENT
LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 208 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely,
Jr., eds., 1984) (“...[T]hat decision [not to integrate into the English legal system] was
one of [the Salzburgers’] own choosing.”):
Moreover, the history of both bench and bar in Georgia had not been one
that would have encouraged immigrants to seek out these institutions,
even if they had been so inclined. During the same decade that the
Salzburgers were settling in, Francis Moore noted in his diary regarding
Savannah that “there are no Lawyers allowed to plead for Hire, nor no
Attorneys to take Money, but (as in old times in England) everyman
pleads his own Cause.” Though perhaps regarded as a boon by opponents
of lawyers, this absence of a genuine bar meant that “everyman” who
pleaded was best served when he both knew the English language and also
had influential friends.
Ibid, at 209. It does not appear, especially in the formative years of Ebenezer’s existence,
that there was even a minimal presence of English justice in the Ebenezer settlement. See
Thomas Stephens, A Brief Account of the Causes that have retarded the Progress of the
Colony of Georgia (London, 1743), reprinted in TREVOR R. REESE, THE CLAMOROUS
MALCONTENTS: CRITICISMS & DEFENSES OF THE COLONY OF GEORGIA, 1741-1743, 281
(1973), where Stephens laments the fact that there was not so much as a single official
magistrate in Ebenezer as of 1743.
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Avoidance of English law and legal institutions did not equate to ignorance of them,
however.
German immigrants studied English and colonial laws to protect
themselves against those who would use the courts against them. In 1752
Henry Melchior Muhlenberg [sic] traveled to New York and saw how
badly English lawyers had cheated Lutherans out of their land and church
buildings. When he returned to Pennsylvania he initiated a long process to
acquire a charter of incorporation for St. Michael’s Lutheran Church in
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viewed colonial American civil justice: “[a]ccording to the English laws,” he wrote in 1745,
“when a disputed matter has long been before the court and the lawyers of both parties have
grown tired of it, seeing perhaps that their clients have been already plucked bare, the judges
usually refer the business to an arbitration.”109 If arbitration was the end result of the English
legal machinery, the Salzburgers may well have reasoned, why not abbreviate the process and
institute arbitral mechanisms within the German community?
Gaps in the historical record make it impossible to determine with precision when the
Salzburger community at Ebenezer first resorted to internal arbitration as a method of civil
dispute resolution. It is clear, however, that as early as 1741 the German enclave north of
Savannah had evolved a system of folklore arbitration which served its needs sufficiently well to
keep the German Protestants out of the English (and, worse perhaps, Anglican) courts based in
Savannah. When Benjamin Martyn wrote his broadside An Impartial Enquiry into the State and

Philadelphia, which he hoped would protect them from a similar fate.
Muhlenberg [sic], Conrad Weiser, and Emmanuel Zimmerman requested
that David Henderson, a young lawyer from Berks County [Pennsylvania],
write a legal handbook for the Germans, explaining the essential English
and colonial laws. The German printer Henry Miller translated and
published the book, whose central theme is property rights, in Philadelphia
in 1761. In addition, the German press and church ministers began to
emphasize writing wills in America.
AARON SPENCER FOGLEMAN, HOPEFUL JOURNEYS: GERMAN IMMIGRATION,
SETTLEMENT, AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1717-1775, 143-144
(1996).
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HALLESCHE NACHRICHTEN , OR, REPORTS OF THE UNITED GERMAN EVANGELICAL
LUTHERAN CONGREGATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA, SPECIALLY IN PENNSYLVANIA, Vol. I
at 188 (W. J. Mann, B. M. Schmucker and W. Germann, eds., trans. C. W. Schaeffer,
Reading, Pa.: 1882) (letter of Mühlenberg to Halle, Dec. 12, 1745), quoted in A. G.
Roeber, Germans, Bench, and Bar in the South, 1715-1770, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 221 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds.,
1984).
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Utility of the Province of Georgia, a 1741 response to criticisms of the young colony made by
malcontents to the London authorities, he found that the German immigrants demonstrated little
need for the types of legal structures maintained by the English authorities in the colonial capital.
“Though there is no regular Court of Justice” among them, he wrote, the Salzburgers “live in
Sobriety, [and] they maintain Great Order and Decency. In case of any differences, the Minister
calls three or four of the most prudent Elders together, who in a summary Way hear and
determine as they think just, and the Parties always acquiesce with Content in their Judgment.”110
Reliance on lay elders of the community, however, was not the exclusive method of
arbitration employed by the Salzburgers of Ebenezer. George Whitefield, the great evangelical
preacher who from his base at the Bethesda School outside Savannah was to launch one of the
great revivals of the eighteenth century in North America, noted that the Salzburgers “are . . .
blessed with two such pious ministers as I have seldom seen. They have no courts of jurisdiction,
but all differences are immediately settled by their pastors.”111 This same pattern of clerical
arbitration of civil and religious disputes was apparent in the intervention by Mühlenberg into
the dispute in Ebenezer between Pastor Rabenhorst and Pastor Triebner which festered in the
first half of the 1770s. Mühlenberg’s diary reflects his dispatch from Pennsylvania as the sole
arbitrator in their disagreement, his arrival at the Ebenezer community in Georgia, the express
submission of the contesting parties to the arbitral authority of the Pennsylvania divine, and their
110

See A. G. Roeber, Germans, Bench, and Bar in the South, 1715-1770, in AMBIVALENT
LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 209 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely,
Jr., eds., 1984), quoting Martyn as cited in CHARLES C. JONES, THE DEAD TOWNS OF
GEORGIA 47 (1974).
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See A. G. Roeber, Germans, Bench, and Bar in the South, 1715-1770, in AMBIVALENT
LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 208-209 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W.
Ely, Jr., eds., 1984), citing P. A. STROBEL, THE SALZBURGERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS
110 (Baltimore, 1855), quoting a 1738 letter of George Whitefield.
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willingness to obey his decision in the matter. A more perfect depiction of early Georgia
–indeed, of American colonial– arbitral procedure is difficult to imagine. Certainly, no
arbitration in Georgia before the end of the eighteenth century is better known.

Mühlenberg’s Arbitration at Ebenezer

The Lutheran colony at Ebenezer in the first three decades of its existence had become
stable and well established and, with application of the industry and hard work for which the
Salzburgers were regularly praised by General Oglethorpe,112 the Protestant enclave on the
Savannah River north of the colonial capital had become quite comfortable and prosperous.113
With the improvement in their material circumstances, however, tensions and divisions had
developed in the little Lutheran community114 and these, before 1774, had erupted in personal
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Strobel says that the General’s attitude toward the German Protestants was marked by
the “kindness and frankness of an affectionate parent.” See P. A. STROBEL, THE
SALZBURGERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS 88 (Baltimore, 1855); see also GEORGE
FENWICK JONES, THE GEORGIA DUTCH: FROM THE RHINE AND DANUBE TO THE
SAVANNAH, 1733-1783, 38 (1992) (“Despite the Salzburgers’ difficulties, Oglethorpe . . .
had only positive things to say about them.”).
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See GEORGE FENWICK JONES, THE GEORGIA DUTCH: FROM THE RHINE AND DANUBE
TO THE SAVANNAH, 1733-1783, 114-138 (1992) (Chapter Five, Success at Ebenezer).
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The connection between the material success of the experiment at Ebenezer and the
sad divisions which arose in the community seems to have been a rather direct one: the
expansion of the temporal holdings of the community was one of the major factors
requiring the assignment of additional clerical leaders to the Lutheran colony in Georgia,
and it was the tension between these –especially Christian Rabenhorst and Mr. Christoph
Friederich Triebner– which set the stage for the rivalry underlying the community’s
discontent. See P. A. STROBEL, THE SALZBURGERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS 151
(Baltimore, 1855) (“Mr. Tribner [sic] was a young man of fine talents, but very
impetuous in his character, and seems to have been possessed of a small share of the
humility and piety which characterized his predecessors . . . His selection as assistant
pastor was attended with the most disastrous consequences to the congregation; for he
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attacks and even threats of physical violence involving factions which had gathered around the
two ministers then in Ebenezer, Christian Rabenhorst and Christoph Triebner. In the
commission issued on February 2, 1773, to Mühlenberg to act as arbitrator in the matter, Johann
August Urlsperger at the Lutheran center back in Germany had described the tensions in the
evangelisch community in Georgia:
For a long time, now, there have been unfortunate disputes between the present
preachers at Eben Ezer [sic], Mr. Christian Rabenhorst and Mr. Christoph
Friederich Triebner, disputes which have not only caused harmful disquiet in their
own minds and distress toward each other but which had even given rise to grave
divisions within the congregation, concerning which such flatly contradictory
reports and complaints have been sent to London and Augsburg that we have
been at a loss to know what to say or think. Therefore, His Reverence Court
Preacher Ziegenhagen, that old patron of Eben Ezer whose signature will be
found at the end of this document, proposed, in order to settle this harmful
dispute, that Pastor Heinrich Melchior Mühlenberg of Philadelphia, be entreated
not to grudge the trouble of making a journey to Eben Ezer and by his presence
and God’s help to restore the former order and peace by making an impartial
investigation and settlement of the existing strife. . . . To this end, in the hope of
favorable acceptance of this commission, he gives to the said Pastor Mühlenberg,
in God’s Name, with the full approval of the Reverend Court Preacher
Ziegenhagen who is very dear to Eben Ezer and with the same authority and

succeeded in raising ... turmoil and strife among the members . . .”).
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effect as if he himself were present, full power, according to the more detailed
instructions transmitted to him, to hear the pastors there, concerning their
differences, to investigate and adjust them impartially and, as need shall inquire,
to enlist the assistance of such members of the congregation who he in his own
prudence shall consider competent thereto.115
In addition to this warrant authorizing Mühlenberg to act on behalf of the Lutheran
authorities in Augsburg, the Philadelphia pastor was issued formal “Instructions” from
Urlsperger. “Pastor Mühlenberg is empowered,” the Instructions ran:
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HENRY MELCHIOR MÜHLENBERG, THE JOURNALS OF HENRY MELCHIOR
MÜHLENBERG, Vol. II, 556-557 (Theodore G. Tappert & John W. Doberstein, trans.,
1942). In the spring of 1742, Heinrich Melchior Mühlenberg, a thirty year old Lutheran
pastor from Halle, had been dispatched to North America by German church authorities
at the urgent request of three small German-speaking Lutheran congregations in the
Philadelphia area. A storm near the end of his fourteen week voyage to America
fortuitously brought him to the harbor of Charleston, affording him an unexpected but
not unwelcome opportunity to visit, but not for the last time, the Lutheran community on
the Georgia side of the Savannah River at Ebenezer. Mühlenberg’s relation with the
small Georgia mission was to continue virtually until the time of his death in the fall of
1787: one of his primary functions in North America was to serve as the official and
formal link between, on the one hand, the German Lutheran communities in the colonies
– and these ranged from Vermont to Georgia– and, on the other, the Francke Institutes
(which financed his presence in the New World) and the ecclesiastical superiors of the
Synod of Wernigerode under whose supervision he exercised religious authority in
America. Mühlenberg’s diaries, kept meticulously for the forty-five year period from his
arrival in America until his death well after the Revolution, have been a gold mine for
historians ever since: detailed and insightful, they recorded the colonial and postrevolutionary American scene with the eye of one who sensed that he was writing for the
ages and whose duties exposed him to the entire geographical spread of the British
colonial world, to the young United States, and to all ranks of the societies which
inhabited them. See Ibid, Vol. I, at vii-xxiv (Translators’ Introduction).
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1. To hear and judge with utmost impartiality the complaints of both
preachers and, if necessary, receive the testimony of members of the
congregation concerning the same.
2. To diminish as far as possible the number of complaints and reduce them
to a few major complaints which, so far as I know, will boil down to the
charge that Mr. R[abenhorst] has been self-seeking, violent, and not only
selfishly neglecting, but obstructing the necessary discipline of the church;
as concerns Mr. Tr[iebner], however, that he likewise has been violent,
headstrong, and unable to keep peace when Mr. R[abenhorst] offered it to
him ... .116
The Instructions issued to Mühlenberg made it clear, in addition, that not only Christian
harmony and peace were at stake in the contentious circumstances prevailing at Ebenezer.
Involved as well were civil property rights in which both the contending factions in Georgia had
an interest as well as the Lutheran authorities in Germany:
... Since the administration of the mill establishments [in Ebenezer] has also been
a bone of much contention, these complaints are also to be heard and settled. In
the main, however, the revenues of the mill establishments must remain under the
direction of London and Augsburg, for I know of no other origin of these
establishments [the mills] than the charitable gifts gathered in Europe and sent to
Eben-Ezer, especially by the hand of my late papa [Samuel Urlsperger].
Therefore these establishments must remain permanently in the old connection
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Ibid, Vol. II, at 557.
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with Europe and accounts must be rendered and directions followed as to their
use for the benefit of Eben-Ezer.
... All the rest is left to the discretion of the authorized agent who will endeavor
with God’s gracious help to establish the bond of peace upon a firm foundation.
To this end he shall also bring the two gentlemen to an agreement with regard to
all work and the manner in which it should be done. However, if all his efforts
should fail to bring about harmony, he shall render an impartial report and
opinion concerning the entire matter, at which time he will be advised concerning
the further disposition of the case, etc., etc.117
Despite his misgivings that he was “incapable, unsuited, and inadequate to carry out such
a commission in accord with the earnest wish of the Reverend Fathers [in Germany],”118
Mühlenberg undertook the hazardous journey to Savannah during which he almost lost his life in
a storm while on board ship,119 arriving on October 27, 1774, in the Georgia capital after a short
delay in Charleston.120
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Ibid, at 558.
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While in Charleston awaiting sea passage to Savannah, the pastor had occasion to
meet with the Lutheran community in that sister city to Georgia’s capital; Mühlenberg
assisted in preparing a “constitution” for the German immigrants in South Carolina
which contained an arbitration provision setting forth terms very much like those under
which he had himself been subjected by the authorities in Germany:
...in Case, which God forbid!, there should happen Dispute or Disturbance
between the Minister and the congregation, no Party can nor shall be her
own Judge, but the Minister shall have the Privilege to chuse [sic] one or
two impartial able Arbitrators, and the Vestry or congregation shall have
the same Liberty to chuse [sic] one or two impartial prudent Arbitrators,
who together may inquire into, discuss and decide the Matter, or chuse
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Among Mühlenberg’s first acts in Georgia was to dispatch virtually identical letters to
the two contending Lutheran clergymen, inviting them to visit him since he had remained in
residence in Savannah as a means of maintaining his neutrality between the two contending
camps up the river in Ebenezer.121 During this interval in Savannah, Mühlenberg learned that the
complications of the Ebenezer situation were compounded with a potential dispute with the
English authorities over the title and ownership of Jerusalem Church which had been erected by
the Lutheran community at its enclave in Ebenezer. The church, owing in large part to the
unfamiliarity of the German Lutherans with the English language and English legal procedure,
apparently rested on lands which under Georgia law were held by the Church of England.122
Recognizing that the unrest and dissension within the Lutheran community could well draw the
attention of English authorities to this unrelated church property issue, Mühlenberg began his
arbitral office with increased intensity. The Philadelphia representative met with both Pastor
Rabenhorst and Pastor Triebner on October 31, 1774, while still in Savannah123 and as his first
function secured their agreement –as would any good arbitrator– as to the authenticity of his
warrant and his letters of Instruction from Urlsperger: “I then asked them whether they
[sic] an Umpire if they can not agree, and both parties shall acquiesce in
their award.
Ibid, at 575.
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Rumors were afoot even before his arrival on Georgia soil that Mühlenberg was so
Calvinist and Reformed in his views that he would be unfit to act as arbitrator in the
dispute dividing the Lutheran community in Georgia. It was for this reason that
Mühlenberg declined the invitation of Johann Zubly, the Reformed pastor in Savannah,
to be his guest while in the city. Ibid, at 595-596. Despite this inauspicious beginning,
Mühlenberg and Zubly in fact managed to cooperate during the Lutheran pastor’s visit in
Savannah and the two became friends, as discussed infra.
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acknowledged them to be authentic, whether they recognized me as being empowered, and
whether they would permit me to act in accordance with my authority as far as God would
enable me.”124 Not content with oral indications of agreement from both of the Lutheran
ministers, Mühlenberg obtained the written agreement of both of them to the same effect.125
Rabenhorst signed a statement establishing that “I have read this thirty-first day of
October, 1774, the warrant given through the wise providence of God by the Venerable Fathers
to the beloved Pastor Mühlenberg, and hereby acknowledge that I will cheerfully and most
willingly yield obedience to it, to which I testify with my signature.” Similarly, Triebner
provided Pastor Mühlenberg with a written statement that he “willingly agree[d] to acquiesce in
and obey the warrant furnished to the Rev. Pastor Mühlenberg by the most beloved Reverend
Fathers, the Rev. Court Preacher Ziegenhagen and the Rev. Senior Urlsperger.”126 At their first
meeting of October 31, Mühlenberg also instructed the two pastors to reduce their complaints
against each other to a written form, following which, Mühlenberg indicated, he would set the
matter down for “a hearing of the case.”127
Mühlenberg’s belief, if any he ever had, that the arbitration in Georgia would conclude
easily was shaken when he later learned after his first meeting with Pastor Triebner that the latter
had soon repaired to an “English judge,” basically to obtain a “second opinion” regarding the
procedure before Pastor Mühlenberg and the rights of the local Lutheran community.128
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Mühlenberg’s discomfort with Triebner was increased even further when, awaiting the written
submission of the two pastors, Mühlenberg received a letter dated at Ebenezer on November 4,
1774, which, although reiterating Triebner’s willingness to be obedient to Mühlenberg’s
decision, also informed the Philadelphia preacher that “a certain friend and well-wisher in
Savanna [sic], Mr. Joseph Ottolenghe, proposed to me repeatedly, even before your arrival, that
our dispute could be settled more agreeably and with greater impartiality by a number of
gentlemans [sic] in Savanna [sic] rather than in Eben-Ezer [sic].”129
In his response to Triebner, Mühlenberg did not acknowledge the proposal of “English”
arbitration, instead assuring his “Reverend Brother” that “it will be my endeavor to act in accord
with justice and equity and truth and love, as before the all-seeing-eye of God, and that I shall
pray God for the grace to do so.”130

Capitalizing upon the delay in Savannah before moving on

up the river to Ebenezer, Mühlenberg took the opportunity, quietly in all probability, to collect
the available documentation regarding the question of the property title to the Lutheran church in
Ebenezer, finding to his dismay that the original grant specifically provided that the church
erected upon the lands would be dedicated to the “Using and Exercising divine Service
according to the Rites and Ceremonies of the Church of England within the said Parish and their
Successors forever.”131 “Now,” Mühlenberg lamented, “there is an end of it. I see no help. From
the above extract from the grant it is clear that since April 2, 1771, the so-called Chief Mother
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Church in Eben-Ezer and its appurtenances have been under the jurisdiction of the established
Church of England.”132
On November 7, Mühlenberg took a chaise up to Ebenezer where he was to stay with
Pastor Rabenhorst. While there, he received the written statement of “complaints of Pastor
Triebner and his party” –close in both spirit and letter to a modern demand for arbitration–
which rehearsed a litany of complaints regarding personal slights and insults against Triebner
allegedly made by Rabenhorst and members of his faction in the community.133 In addition, the
formal complaint alleged a number of liturgical and doctrinal violations by Rabenhorst and
alleged that Rabenhorst had secured to his own benefit the profits of the ministers’ glebe which
had been purchased by the German Lutheran authorities for the benefit of the Lutheran
congregation in Ebenezer.134 Triebner also alleged that the tension had grown so great that in
June of 1774 Rabenhorst had arranged a fraudulent parish election for new church officers but
had excluded the party of Pastor Triebner, thereby depriving the Triebner group of their lawful
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Ibid, at 606-607 (emphasis in original). In exasperation, Mühlenberg referred to the
thorny issue of the title to the Jerusalem Church at Ebenezer, stating that “I still do not
know who was the real author of this affair and who tied this knot.” Showing not a little
pique at Triebner’s actions, he continued: “This is what happens when one selects a
number of English gentlemen [emphasis original] in Savanna [sic] as patrons and friends
who ... can settle the Eben Ezer ‘dispute more agreeably and with greater impartiality
than a German who has been authorized by the Reverend Fathers’ [in Germany] ... . Mr.
Tr[iebner] was trying to stir up trouble somehow, that he should acknowledge my
warrant by signing it on October 31 and then, immediately after taking leave of me on
November 2, visit this gentleman (identified as “Squire O[ttoleng]he, ... a Portuguese Jew
now a member of the High [Anglican] Church”) and confer with him about the whole
thing ... .” It appears that the eminent Lutheran leader was not wholly above a touch of
jealousy.
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minister.135 A similar written statement dated November 5, 1774 –much in the nature of an
answer and counterclaim in modern arbitral and procedural parlance– was received from Pastor
Rabenhorst and from the deacons of the church who supported him. Rabenhorst alleged that his
opponent, in addition to unchristian and unbrotherly behavior, had misrepresented the salary
arrangements made on his behalf and complained of Triebner’s allegations regarding the alleged
mismanagement of the mill establishments by Rabenhorst. “In addition to the dishonor inflicted
upon my honest name,” Rabenhorst went on, “I was represented as a false teacher and a
perverter and destroyer of the congregation. The blame for the division of the congregation is
cast upon me, whereas it was caused by his [Triebner’s] own obstinacy and tyranny, in that he
dreadfully abused the preaching of the Word of God and the holy sacraments of Baptism and the
Lord’s Supper to accomplish this purpose. This last [the Lord’s Supper] he refused to me myself
because I reported the great distress of Eben-Ezer to the Venerable Fathers [in Germany] and
attributed its difficulties to Triebner.”136
While reviewing the various submissions made to him by the parties, Pastor Mühlenberg
took counsel from Johann Zubly, the Swiss Calvinist Reformed minister of a congregation in
Savannah137 who maintained close and fraternal ties with the Germans in Ebenezer.138 Zubly,
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apparently concerned that the church procedure for which Mühlenberg had been commissioned
might not have validity before the English authorities in the English colonial courts, approached
Mühlenberg with a possible resolution of this potential defect:
The Reverend Doctor Zubly made a tentative suggestion, namely, that it might
possibly be necessary for the leaders or representatives to arrange an arbitration in
accord with local custom, to appoint me, and perhaps one or two more if I so
desired, as arbitrators, and to bind both sides to abide by the decision and final
judgment of the arbitrator or arbitrators with legal bonds or obligations for a sum
of money.139

contributed to Zubly’s growing republican sentiment. With the advent of the Revolution,
Zubly –arguably the best-educated citizen of pre-Revolutionary Savannah– became a
leading spokesman for American interests but, ultimately, he balked at political
separation from England. Zubly served in both the colonial legislature and in the
Continental Congress as a representative of Savannah and Chatham County but left the
national legislature around the time of the Declaration of Independence and rode out the
war in British-occupied Savannah. He died there during the Revolution, in July of 1781,
an honored and revered figure but never again admitted to the highest councils of
government, Whig or Tory. See ibid, 1-27. Today’s Independent Presbyterian Church in
Savannah is the direct lineal heir of Johann Joachim Zubly’s labors in Georgia before the
Revolution.
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“Many important disputes,” Mühlenberg noted, “are settled in this way in the English
colonies.”140
This suggestion would seem to make my task easier if I were able to secure
several other men to serve with me, for in this case, too, the saying may be true,
“Woe to him who is alone,” and especially between these two opposing parties.
Squire Tr[eutlen], who as a justice is well versed in the English laws,141 promised
to draw up such documents and was of the opinion that he and the other
representatives of the majority party would agree to the plan, but whether the
opposite party will consent, no one knows.”142

between us, whether or what Indemnification I ought to be allowed for the
injury I think I sustained, I shall make use of the undoubted right of every
subject to seek redress by Law, & do not wish to have any altercation by
word or letter on the subject.
LILLA MILLS HAWES, Ed., Volume XXI, COLLECTIONS OF THE GEORGIA HISTORICAL
SOCIETY, The Journal of the Reverend John Joachim Zubly A. M., D. D., March 5, 1770
through June 22, 1781 (1989), at 111 (letter of J. J. Zubly to Captain Moon [should be
Moore], dated August 10, 1780).
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It does not appear from the extant records that Treutlen’s proposal for a double
arbitration –one complying with both the German Lutheran prescriptions as well as those of the
English law– ever came to fruition: on the same evening after his conversation with John
Treutlen, Pastor Triebner approached the Philadelphia divine and suggested that Treutlen was
not to be taken at face value:
They earnestly warned me that I must be on my guard against the man [Treutlen]
because he had once written a letter to Pastor B[oltzius, an early pastor at
Ebenezer], whereupon the latter died soon after. My reply was: we must love our
neighbor as ourselves and seek to win and improve everyone with love and
gentleness, but never forget ourselves and rather seek to know ourselves
thoroughly. ... They construed this honest man’s proposal of an arbitration as a
dangerous thing, as if it were the most perilous wile inspired by the evil spirit, and
were ignorant of the fact that it had come this morning from the honest heart of a
reverend doctor of theology [Zubly]. There was also a mistake in our modus
procedendi according to the wisdom of the world. If I myself had presented a
proposal and the squire and his consorts had opposed it, then Pastor Tr[iebner]
and W[erstch], etc. would have insisted that an [additional English-style]
arbitration and obligation were highly necessary.143
It would seem, then, that the proposal of a double arbitration came to naught for no
reason other than it had been proposed by one of the parties, a fact which made it suspicious in
the eyes of the other.
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On November 11, the two disputing pastors met with Mühlenberg and, in a session which
began in an unpromising manner, the two ministers seemed moved by the profound
disappointment of Mühlenberg in the state of affairs at Ebenezer. It appeared, at least
temporarily, that both of them were disposed to end their quarrel and heal the schism in the
Georgia Lutheran community.144 On the following Monday, November 14, 1774, Pastor
Rabenhorst submitted his accountings for his administration of the properties of the community,
including the records regarding his purchase of a plantation and saw mill for the community in
1754.145 It had become clear to Mühlenberg that much of the dissension and discontent within
the community had arisen regarding misinformation surrounding Rabenhorst’s later purchase of
certain church properties and his administration of other such holdings.146
On November 22, 1774, no informal resolution of the disputes within the congregation
having in fact been achieved, Pastor Mühlenberg convened the first formal conference of the
arbitration at Ebenezer which was attended by both Reverend Christian Rabenhorst and
Reverend Christopher Triebner, joined by the
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Trustees of the Ebenezer church. 147 Mühlenberg again took care to display his warrant and
credentials from the German authorities and obtained from all in attendance their submission to
these instructions. The bulk of this meeting was given over to an examination of the legal
documentation respecting the property of the congregation and the administration of the income
which it had produced.148 Another meeting was scheduled for the following day, November
23,149 and once again Pastor Mühlenberg was disappointed that the parties were unable to
achieve an amicable resolution of their disputes and that, in fact, the party of Pastor Triebner was
becoming increasingly inflexible and demanding in tone, even to the point of submitting new
written complaints to be joined with those that had already been filed with the Philadelphia
minister.150 The balance of this meeting was spent largely in mutual recriminations. As a final
gambit, Mühlenberg –who, despite all that had transpired since his arrival in Georgia, remained
universally respected by each of the contending parties at Ebenezer– threatened to give up on
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any hope of reconciling the parties and proposed that he leave Ebenezer and return to
Philadelphia.151 The Triebner group expressed its willingness that Mühlenberg remain and see
the procedure through to an amicable conclusion and Mühlenberg agreed, subject to the
conditions that the parties “bury all their former contentions and quarrels and sincerely forgive
and pardon one another, since they had all been more or less at fault” and that “the Jerusalem
Church should be left open to Mr. Triebner so that both parties might be able to come together
again and both ministers perform their common ministerial duties in the congregation
unhindered.”152 If these conditions were met, Mühlenberg indicated, he would endeavor “with
the help of the ministers, to draw up a plan for the improvement of the whole thing.”153 Despite
this conclusion to the meeting of November 23, which left Mühlenberg “between fear and
hope,”154 it quickly became apparent in the next few days that the dispute had not in fact been
finally and fully resolved. Disabled by a recurring disability from which he had suffered even
while in Charleston, Mühlenberg was unable to personally intervene further in the matter.
While still recuperating in between intervals of pastoral service, Mühlenberg took the
opportunity to draw up a new constitution for the Ebenezer community which would, he
believed, serve as an enduring foundation for the reconciliation for the divided community and
would, in addition, assist in effecting a reunion in accord with the Instructions Mühlenberg had
received from Germany at the beginning of his involvement in the resolution of the Ebenezer
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dispute.155 The new constitution proposed by Mühlenberg represented, in net effect, a formal
arbitral conclusion to the disputes which would give the community an opportunity to put old
complaints behind it and to start afresh. Reverend Triebner, however, had prepared his own
version of such a constitution and the two ministers thereupon engaged in a lengthy debate
regarding the relative merits of the two documents. On December 27, Mühlenberg met with
Johann Caspar Wertsch and presented him with a revised version of the proposed constitution
for the congregation, seeking his advice and suggestions for the improvement of the document.156
Further meetings followed and the discussions concerning the terms of a new congregational
constitution continued on into January of 1775. Finally, on January 16, an agreed-upon
constitution in hand, the congregation came together and, after some discussion prompted by
questions from individual members of the congregation, they signed the document at Jerusalem
Church.157 The arbitration procedure had come to its formal end.158
Mühlenberg remained on in Georgia well into February, 1775, attempting to use his
personal status and influence to further cement the relations between the groups within the
congregation and, during this time, he took the opportunity to meet with the royal governor of
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the colony, Sir James Wright.159 At this meeting with Wright, Mühlenberg learned that the
complication respecting the title to the land of Jerusalem Church and its status vis a vis the
Church of England had been addressed and resolved by the governor.160
Taking advantage of his presence in Savannah, Mühlenberg arranged an introduction to a
number of the leading luminaries of the colony including its Chief Justice, Anthony Stokes161 ,
and its leading merchant, James Habersham.162 On February 17, 1775, Mühlenberg and his wife,
determined to finally leave Georgia and return to their Philadelphia home, embarked on a ship in
Savannah harbor, but it was not until Sunday, February 19, 1775, that the vessel reached Tybee
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Roads.163 On the following day the ship reached open waters, and in early March it arrived off
the headlands of Cape Henlopen and the river entrance into Pennsylvania.164
With the return of Mühlenberg to his Philadelphia home, Georgia’s most famous –if not
most successful– arbitration of the eighteenth century came to a close:
The Salzburgers and their descendants should cherish the memory of Dr.
Muhlenberg with lively gratitude. For ... he was not only instrumental in restoring
harmony to the congregation: he saved the church property from being alienated,
and by his presence and labors, and the introduction of a wholesome discipline,
he prepared the way for the future peace and prosperity of the church. . . . [H]e
did everything which human wisdom could devise and human agency could
accomplish, to place the congregation at Ebenezer upon such a footing as would
secure its permanent prosperity and success.165

Section 3. Statutory Forms of Informal and Nonjudicialized Arbitration in Georgia

Only four short decades separated Georgia’s birth in the 1730s and the outbreak of the
American Revolution in the mid-1770s and yet, in that brief interlude, the natural inclinations of
the people of the state stemming in the main from strong ethnic and religious identifications
within subgroups in the population coupled with the generally positive experience with
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arbitration in that forty year span virtually insured that Georgia, when she assumed the mantle of
full sovereignty and statehood with competence to legislate for her own interests, would
continue the emerging arbitral tradition of the state.

Legislative Provisions for the Arbitral Resolution of Civil Disputes

Even before the end of the eighteenth century, the Georgia legislature recognized the
utility of arbitration and particularly the usefulness of arbitration in the maintenance of public
services, especially with respect to transportation and communication initiatives which were, in
this phase of Georgia’s development, particularly important. For instance, in 1799 the legislature
appointed a slate of commissioners for the regulation of navigation pilots in Georgia’s ports to
ensure minimum standards of safety and competency in that critical function. As a means of
ensuring that civil claims and disputes would not disrupt licensed pilots in their duties, the
commissioners appointed by the legislature were vested with authority, “in case any damage,
dispute, complaint or difference shall happen or arise or be made against or between any master
or pilot for, of, or concerning the pilotage of any ship or vessel or any other matter incident or
relative to the business or care of a pilot in any of [Georgia’s] harbors,” to resolve claims –at that
time, not to exceed $100– acting as arbitrators in the matter.166
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The ability of the arbitral process to ensure uninterrupted provision of such public
services, as foreshadowed by this legislation regarding navigation pilots, was quickly adapted to
other forms of transportation as well. In 1821, in the legislative charter granted to the
Washington Turnpike Company, the power of eminent domain granted to the corporation was
joined with the statutory command that, “in case of disagreement [regarding the value of any
land or property interest taken by the company], then the same shall be decided by two persons,
(with power of umpirage) one of them shall be selected by each party; and the damage so
ascertained shall be paid forthwith to the party [whose property was] injured.”167 The same
pattern was repeated the next year when the legislature granted a similar charter to the Turnpike
Companies of Milledgeville, Greensboro and Eatonton.168
By this time, a clear pattern was emerging in Georgia legislation: when, in 1826, the
legislature acted to grant a charter to the Brunswick Canal Company –one of the most famous
transportation undertakings in the history of the State of Georgia, memorialized in some detail in
the diary of Frances Kemble Butler169 – the legislature once again resorted to arbitral processes to
ensure the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the new public utility. In this case, the
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corporation was authorized to select and purchase strips of land from the Altamaha to the Turtle
River “as may be necessary for their canal or railway.” Were any disagreements to arise
regarding these land seizures, the legislature determined that the company was to appoint three
disinterested freeholders and the owner to appoint a like number, all subject to the approval of
the Inferior Court of Glynn County, to act as an arbitral committee to evaluate and decide the
disputed matter. Where these six were unable to resolve the dispute, they were empowered to
choose an additional umpire to make the necessary decision. 170
As the pace of both urbanization and industrialization increased in Georgia toward the
middle of the nineteenth century, the General Assembly was more and more frequently invoked
to grant corporate status to yet additional infrastructural enterprises and, almost invariably, the
legislature resorted to arbitral devices as a means of resolving the inevitable disputes which
arose in the wake of the operations of these new corporations. When the St. Mary’s and
Columbus Rail Road Company received its charter in 1836,171 the corporation –much along the
lines of the Brunswick Canal Company before it– was authorized to condemn strips of land
between the cities of St. Mary’s and Columbus, subject to the arbitral resolution of disputes
which might arise in the course of these condemnations. Three years later, corporate
condemnations of property along the Altamaha and Sapelo Rivers and their branches were made
subject to arbitration by the new Bellville and Altamaha Canal, Railway and River Navigation
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Company.172 In like fashion, when the legislature in 1849 incorporated in one act multiple
turnpike companies (the Dahlonega and Marietta Turnpike and Plank Road Company; the
Cumming and Atlanta Turnpike and Plank Road Company; the Cobb County and Alabama Plank
and Turnpike Road Company; and the Washington Railroad or Plank Road Company), the
legislature conditioned the companies’ right to exercise powers of eminent domain subject to an
arbitration requirement in terms almost modern:
The said corporation may use for the construction of said road the route of any
public highway or public road on said route without obstructing in any manner
the said public highway or road; and when the said Turnpike or Plank Road shall
pass over the lands of any private individual and not along the track of such
public highway, and if any damage shall be claimed by any such individual by
reason of said road passing over his land or premises and the amount of damage
cannot be agreed upon by such individual and the proper agent of the company,
then the said agent may select one disinterested person and the owner of such
premises another disinterested person to assess such damage, the said arbitrators
first being duly sworn to decide the same equitably and justly between the parties,
and if the said arbitrators should disagree as to the amount of damage, they may
and are hereby required to select an umpire who is wholly disinterested and who
shall be in like manner duly sworn, and whose decision shall be final and
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conclusive between the parties, and the right-of-way so in dispute shall be vested
in said corporation during the continuance of their charter.173
In 1855, the legislature authorized William and Robert Schley, both of Richmond
County, the “right to open and construct a railroad, plank road, or other road from their sawmill
in Spirit Creek in [Richmond] County to any point on the Augusta southwestern plank road
between the 11 and 13 mile post on said plank road from this city of Augusta for the
transportation of timber, lumber and wood.”174 Damages caused by the opening and maintenance
of this road, in accordance with the now-established tradition of the legislature, were to be
submitted to arbitration. Each party was to have the right to “select one disinterested person to
arbitrate the issue, and if the two said arbitrators so selected cannot agree, then they are to
choose a third disinterested arbitrator as an umpire, and their award as to the amount of
compensation or damages for the right-of-way, shall be final and conclusive between the parties
. . .”175
With the advent in 1861 of armed conflict in Georgia and the Southern Confederacy,
most infrastructural development of roads, turnpikes, railroads, and canals came to a halt 176 ; with
Reconstruction, however, the pace of such incorporations once again increased and, with it,
additional instances of legislatively mandated arbitration. When in 1870 the Georgia Seaboard &
Northwestern Railroad Company was formed, its right to exercise powers of condemnation
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–much in the fashion of the legislative privileges granted in such cases prior to the 1861 war–
was subject to dispute arbitration by two disinterested freeholders residing in the county where
the dispute arose. The statute further provided that if these were unable to agree on an amicable
resolution of the dispute, a third arbitrator was to be chosen to act as an umpire to decide the
dispute finally and fully. The registration of the arbitral award under this statute would dissolve
any injunction issued against the railroad in the condemnation of the land in question.177
Within three years, the legislature employed similar language to require arbitration of
disputes arising out of condemnations by the Valdosta and Fort Valley Railroad Company. 178
Similar provisions were made in 1882 at the time of the incorporation of the Irwinton Railroad
Company179 and the Fulton Street Railroad Company180 in Atlanta. In 1886, substantially the
same stipulations were inserted into the corporate charter of the Tallahassee, Bainbridge and
Western Railway Company181 and, in 1888, into the charter of the Thomasville and Suburban
Railroad Company.182 In the last general transportation company charter of the nineteenth
century, the legislature subjected the right of the Collins Park and Belt Railroad Company to
condemn privately held lands to a requirement of arbitral resolution of disputes, consistent with
the pattern which had developed throughout that century. 183
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The legislature’s incorporation of yet other companies outside the transportation field
registered the growing industrialization of the State of Georgia, particularly in the years after the
midpoint of the nineteenth century.184 The Etowah and Auraria Hydraulic Hose Mining
Company and the Cedar Creek Lumber Drifting Association were both chartered in 1859 on the
eve of war, the former being authorized to divert the waters of the Etowah River, Nimble Will
Creek, and Jones Creek “from their natural channel, by dam or dams, ditch, or aqueduct of any
kind, [in order] to work for gold or any other valuable mineral, according to the Hydraulic Hose
Mining System.” In conducting these operations, any damages inflicted upon or compensation
otherwise due to the owners of both vacant and occupied lands were to be resolved in an arbitral
process conducted under the auspices of the “three freeholders of the company, one chosen by
said company, one by the claimant, and the third chosen by Inferior Court of [Lumpkin]
County.” The decision of this arbitral panel was final as to the issues presented to it, and –upon
deposit of the amount of the award with the Clerk of the Lumpkin County Inferior Court– the
mining company could proceed with its operations even over the objection of the property
owner.185 This pattern proved popular. The next year, the General Assembly incorporated the
Courticay Hydraulic Hose Mining Company, including in its charter terms virtually identical to
those of the Etowah and Auraria Hydraulic Hose Mining Company.186 Identical stipulations were
also included in the charter of the Mountain Town Hydraulic Hose Mining Company that same
year.187
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The exploitation of the North Georgia gold fields unquestionably continued throughout
the period of the 1861-1865 war,188 but no new corporations were formed for this purpose until
Reconstruction when, in 1866, the Georgia Company was formed to resume the hunt for gold in
the Georgia hills. This corporation was granted the right to “divert from their sources and
channels, the waters of the streams of Clear Camp and Clay Creeks, in Lumpkin County, and
Little Amicalola, in the County of Dawson;” damages to landowners and their compensation,
where no agreement could be reached as to this matter, were to be determined by an arbitral
process in which the owner would appoint an arbitrator, the Georgia Company to appoint
another, and the Justices of the Inferior Court to select the third. In an unusual provision, this
statute stipulated that upon a failure of this arbitral panel to reach a decision, then a majority of
the Justices of the Inferior Court of the county where the land was located could, upon the
application of the company, appoint new arbitrators who were to assess the damages involved
and whose decision in this regard would be final.189 Yet another gold mining company, the last
formed in Georgia history insofar as the records of the legislature indicate, was granted a
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corporate charter in 1868.190 This corporation too was subject to arbitration of claims by
landowners affected by its operations. So accepted had arbitration become as the preferred
means of dispute resolution among such mining companies that the records of the appellate
courts of Georgia reflect at least one such procedure even where it was not required under the
mining company’s charter.191
As entrepreneurs turned their attention from the exploitation of Georgia’s yellow gold to
the extraction of its black gold –the iron and coal deposits192 which enriched the soil of the
state’s northwest quadrant– the legislature was prevailed upon to grant charters to these
extractive industries as well. In 1874, the Bear Mountain Iron and Coal Company193 and, in the
same year, the Dade Coal Company were formed.194 Both of these coal mining corporations were
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subject to a requirement to arbitrate disputes with landowners where the property rights of the
latter were impacted by the operations of the corporation. 195
Other forms of economic boosterism drew the legislature’s attention in the latter half of
the nineteenth century, and in these instances too arbitration was called upon by the General
Assembly to ease the course of economic expansion. A general law adopted in 1888, for
instance, extended the privilege of constructing telegraph lines over all lands owned by the State
of Georgia and also upon any right of way or structures of any railroads in the state, so long as
“the post, arms, insulators, and other fixtures of such lines be so erected, placed and maintained
as not to obstruct or interfere with the ordinary use of such railroads, or with the convenience of
any landowners more than may be unavoidable.” If any dispute regarding the diminution of a
property right arose in this connection, then under the statute “the question of . . . compensation
shall be referred to arbitrators, mutually chosen, whose award, or, in the case of disagreement,
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The charter of the Bear Mountain Iron & Coal Company, for instance, made provision
in its Section X that the company had the right to construct roads, tramways, and
railways necessary for the shipment and delivery of ore and materials at its furnaces,
mills and shops and that it could, where necessary, condemn private property for these
purposes. In the event of a disagreement regarding the valuation of the property so taken,
compensation was to be assessed by two arbitrators chosen by the parties, together with
an umpire chosen by the party-appointed arbitrators. In the event that the landowner
failed to appoint such an arbitrator, the Ordinary of the county where the road was to be
located performed this function. See 1874 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 257, at 259-260. The Dade
Coal Company had been formed a year earlier in 1873 by a charter granted by the
legislature in that year naming Joseph E. Brown as the company president. See 1873 Ga.
Laws, Vol. I, 185. The following year that charter was amended to include language
substantially similar to that featured in the charter of the Bear Mountain Iron & Coal
Company, permitting the company to condemn lands necessary for connecting roads and
railways, subject to the right of the landowner to arbitrate the valuation of the property so
taken. See 1874 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 263, at 264-265.
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that of the umpire, shall be binding between the parties, the umpire to be selected by the two
arbitrators appointed by the parties.”196
A unique piece of legislation from 1874 foreshadowed the development of the great
tourist attractions which dot the Georgia landscape today: in that year, the legislature authorized
the governor to detail penitentiary convicts to improve the roads from Forsyth in Monroe County
to Indian Springs, in Butts County, so that the public would have greater ease of access to “the
great medicinal and curative properties of the waters of the Indian Spring.”197 The General
Assembly foresaw that in the improvement of the roads to the recreation site private real
property claims might arise and these, it determined, would be resolved by arbitrators appointed
by the landowner and the directors of the Indian Springs facility. Unusually for the nineteenth
century, this statute created an express right of appeal from the decision of the arbitral panel, in
this case to the Superior Court of the county in which the land allegedly damaged was located.198
During the legislative session 1865-1866, the first to meet after the surrender of
Confederate forces at Appomattox and Durham Station the previous spring, the legislature
authorized the Chatham Academy, the Free School, and the Union Society –each of which was
an eleemosynary or charitable society active in Georgia well before the outbreak of war in 1861–
to sell off their interests in certain vacant lands located in Chatham County which had been
deeded to them by a previous act of the legislature in 1829. Apparently forewarned that squatters
occupied some of these theoretically vacant lands, the legislature provided for the arbitration of
any claims or disputes centering on rights of these individuals: the public corporation was to
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appoint one disinterested freeholder and the person in possession another; these, if they were
unable to achieve an agreement, were to select a third freeholder who was to place a value on
these lands and whose decision in the matter was to be final and conclusive on these issues.199
Nor was the General Assembly oblivious to the possibilities of arbitration in the
resolution of disputes between a private individual and the sovereign state itself. The model for
such an arbitral process had been established in 1819 when the House of Representatives, in a
resolution adopted on December 18 that year, referred to arbitrators the claims of Dr. William
Greene who had been appointed a surveyor by Governor Rabun. 200 Four decades later, “matters
in difference” between Elzey B. Reynolds and the state-owned Western and Atlantic Rail Road
were submitted to the arbitration and award of an auditor, George D. Phillips, and John W.
Lewis, the Superintendent of the Western and Atlantic Rail Road.201
A more extended experiment in private claim resolution began on December 10, 1862,
when Georgia entered into a contract with the firm of Divine, Jones & Lee “for the purchase of a
half-interest in certain card-making machinery,” along with the contract right to the use and
manufacture of this machinery on joint account. Within a short period of time, disagreements
arose between the firm and the State of Georgia with the result that the former submitted a
memorial to the General Assembly “alleging a violation of the spirit and the letter of the
agreement and a consequent damage to [the private firm] and asking for a dissolution of the
partnership.” This petition was received by the legislature but ignored and, after the close of the
1861 war, Governor Jenkins appointed P. M. Compton as an umpire to settle the respective
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claims of the parties in the card-making machinery and to divide their relative property interests.
Pursuant to this power, a sale of the inventory of the card-making equipment was set down for
April 5, 1866, but Compton –arbitrarily, in the view of the firm– postponed the sale over the
protest of the company. By a resolution of the General Assembly of August 26, 1872, the
respective claims of the state and of Divine, Jones & Lee were referred to three arbitrators (all
members of the Georgia Senate) who were instructed to make a decision and report it back to the
legislature at the next session.202 Although the record is scanty, it seems that the senatorial
arbitration came to naught, for on March 3, 1874, the legislature adopted yet another resolution,
this time sending the claim of Divine, Jones & Lee to William A. Walton of Richmond County
who was instructed to decide the matter –provided that the firm would agree to his arbitration–
and whose decision in that case was to be final and conclusive.203 This second arbitration was
apparently more successful than was the first: the next year, the legislature voted an act to
compensate Walton “for his services rendered in the case of Divine, Jones & Lee against the
State of Georgia.”204
The Divine, Jones & Lee arbitration, though it spanned several sessions of the legislature
and was submitted to at least two separate arbitral bodies, complicated as it was, was near child’s
play compared to what erupted in 1907. In that year, the State of Georgia through its attorney
general John C. Hart filed an original bill in equity in the Supreme Court of the United States
seeking both legal and equitable remedies against the Tennessee Copper Company and the
Ducktown Sulfur, Copper, & Iron Company, Ltd., both of which were engaged in copper

202

1872 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 523.

203

1874 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 10.

204

1875 Ga. Laws 316.

81
smelting enterprises just over the north Georgia state line, but well over the boundary with
Tennessee. The formal intervention of the State of Georgia in this matter began several years
earlier when, in 1903, a resolution was adopted by the Georgia General Assembly creating a
“commission to report on damage done by smeltering copper at Ducktown,” Tennessee.205 “It
has been represented,” the resolution ran, “that great and irreparable damage has been, and is
being, done to the timber, fruits and agricultural interests in the counties of Murray, Gilmer
Fannin, Union and Towns, in the northern part of the State, through and by the smoke and fumes
produced by the smeltering of copper ores at the copper mines in Ducktown and vicinity in Polk
County, State of Tennessee.” Taking action to “suppress . . . this evil,” the General Assembly
appointed a commission consisting of the commissioner of agriculture, the state chemist, the
state geologist, and two private citizens from the affected area nominated by the governor to
look into the facts of the matter and to report to the state’s chief executive as to the damage
done, the risk of future damage, and suggestions to the governor to remedy the problem. The
governor, in turn, was to take “such steps as shall be proper and necessary to correct this evil and
to prevent future damage” following the receipt of this report.206
The inquest reported back that “great damage was being done the territory in Georgia
contiguous to the Ducktown district [in Tennessee], said damage being caused by the smoke,
sulfur fumes and noxious, poisonous vapors and gasses generated by the roast-heaps, pits, ovens
and appliances of the Ducktown Copper Companies.”207 The legislature took note of the fact that
the governor had quickly instituted a suit in the Supreme Court of the United States “to abate the
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nuisance and injury by restraining and enjoining such methods of roasting and reducing the
copper ores.”208 The reaction from the companies in Tennessee had been equally swift: according
to a resolution of the Georgia General Assembly, they had agreed to abandon the injurious
methods of treating ores and to adopt newer, cleaner methods which “it was hoped and believed
would entirely remove the offensive gasses.”209 The state thereupon dismissed its suit on
assurances that the Tennessee companies had abandoned the smelting methods of which the suit
had complained.210
Regrettably, according to the legislature’s resolution, the “new process . . . is reported . . .
equally injurious to all manner of vegetation as the former method.”211 As a consequence,
another commission was appointed to investigate the matter further and the state attorney general
was instructed once more “to take such legal steps as may be necessary to abate the nuisance.”212
The response of the Supreme Court to the reinstituted bill in equity filed by Georgia after
the 1905 resolution was, measured against the modern expectation of the Supreme Court of the
United States, rather rapid. The case was argued before the court on February 25 and 26, 1907,
and, on May 13 of that year, the court handed down a resounding decision supporting the
position of the State of Georgia in the matter in virtually every respect. In an opinion by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the court noted that most of the traditional predicates for equitable relief were
absent in the case in that Georgia owned “very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and
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the damage to it [is] capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, [in a small amount].”213 The
case, Holmes stressed, was by no means an ordinary suit in equity which the normal rules could,
in the usual course of events, resolve.
This is a suit by a state for injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that
capacity the state has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forest and its inhabitants shall
breathe pure air. It might have to pay individuals before it could utter that word,
but with it remains the final power.214
Ruling that Georgia was entitled to bring and maintain the equitable petition for an
injunction despite the fact that it did not fully demonstrate the expected prerequisites for
equitable relief,215 Holmes noted that:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its
territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulfurous acid gas, that the
forest on its mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic
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destruction they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by
the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills
should not be endangered from the same source. If any such demand is to be
enforced this must be notwithstanding the hesitation that we might feel if the suit
were between private parties, and the doubt whether, for the injuries which they
might be suffering to their property, they should not be left to an action at law.216
Despite an argument by the Tennessee defendants that Georgia had been guilty of laches
in bringing the action before the court, Holmes ordered the injunction to issue.217
Almost immediately, the Tennessee Copper smelters approached the Georgia officials for
an amicable end to the dispute. As a consequence, the General Assembly on July 27, 1907,
adopted a resolution which –noting that Georgia’s cause “has . . . been passed upon by the
Supreme Court of the United States adjudging the State of Georgia in her sovereign right, was
entitled to the injunction prayed for”– insisted that the interlocutory relief for Georgia granted by
the Supreme Court of the United States be made final but that, “recognizing and fully realizing
the vast interest involved to the copper companies and to the people dependent thereon,” Georgia
would –so ran the resolution– “act in a spirit of wisdom, justice, and moderation.”218 The
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attorney general was instructed that he was to proceed before the Supreme Court for a
finalization of the interlocutory equitable relief issued by Justice Holmes on May 13, 1907, but
that he was to otherwise “proceed liberally in the matter, to the end that no unnecessary hardship
should be imposed upon the copper companies, and that no unnecessary time shall be allowed
them to complete the structures that they now are building to stop the fumes, to the damage and
injury of the citizens of Georgia and to her public domain.”219
The cautious, wait-and-see attitude evidenced by the General Assembly’s resolution of
July 27, 1907, paid off: by 1913, Georgia had worked out a modus vivendi with the Tennessee
Copper Company to put the adjustment of their disagreement over the operation of the
Ducktown and Copper Hill smelters on a long-term basis. Under their agreement, the company
was to make an annual deposit of $16,500 as a form of reparation for the damage to Georgia
property interests and, in addition, until the final determination of the case then pending in the
U.S. Supreme Court, the company would make an annual payment of $8,500 “for the arbitration
of all claims” arising out of the operation of the smelters.”220 Under the contract approved by the
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General Assembly’s 1913 resolution, a board of arbitration was constituted, consisting of one
arbitrator appointed by the copper company, and one appointed by the governor of Georgia; in
addition the governor was to appoint a referee who was to, “when necessary,” act as a standing
umpire. Under this arbitration arrangement, the decision of the state arbitrator and the arbitrator
for the company “in cases where they agree” would be final. Where they disagreed, however, the
umpire would be called in for a final resolution. A total of $16,500 was to be made available to
the arbitral panel on an annual basis “for the payment of awards that may be made for damages
caused by Sulfur Dioxide Gasses from the plant of the company.”221 So long as the company
abided by the terms of the agreement, Georgia covenanted that it would not apply for injunctive
or other relief against the Tennessee Copper Company in the case still pending before the
Supreme Court.222
Continuing dissatisfaction on Georgia’s part with the performance of the Tennessee
Copper Company led to a renewed application for more definitive injunctive relief in the
Supreme Court. The matter was argued on April 6 and 7, 1915, and just over a month later on
May 10, 1915, the Supreme Court in a decision written by Justice McReynolds issued its
interlocutory decree, but stipulating specific terms requiring the company to keep daily records
showing its operations; to make available to an inspector appointed by the Supreme Court all of
the books and records of the company, and to submit to inspections on a semiannual basis, all to
be paid for by the company; and to comply with emission limitations set by the court.223 Within a
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week of this decision, on June 1, 1915, an order of the Supreme Court embodying the terms set
forth in Justice McReynolds decision was issued.224
Experience with the arbitral arrangements mandated by the 1913 contract between
Georgia and the copper companies in Tennessee indicated the necessity for a number of
modifications and, in 1916, under the authority of yet another resolution adopted by the General
Assembly, that agreement was modified to provide that the state’s arbitrator was to be a citizen
of Fannin, Gilmer, or Union counties, the areas of Georgia most directly impacted by the
smelting operations in Ducktown and Copper Hill.225 In addition –and most probably at the
insistence of the Tennessee Copper Company– the umpire who was to decide cases where the
two arbitrators were unable to resolve the issue was not to be a citizen of Fannin, Gilmer, or
Union counties. In addition, the 1916 modifications also provided that the two arbitrators and the
umpire appointed under its terms were to hold their offices for the full term of the contracts and
were no longer to be filled by interim appointments, a practice which had apparently led on
previous occasions to some instability in the work of the arbitral panel.226
The parties were back before the court in 1916 as a result of several reports by the courtappointed inspector, Dr. John T. McGill of Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. As a
consequence of these reports, the court modified its standing order with respect to permissible
emissions by the company; ordering the payment of expenses and compensation of the inspector;
and assessing costs of the proceeding subject to certain limitations against both the Tennessee
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Copper Company and the Ducktown Sulfur, Copper, and Iron Company, Ltd. The Court retained
the case on its docket until further order.227
It was mutually agreed between Georgia and the companies in 1918 that, “on account of
the great need for both of said commodities by the government of the United States in the
present national crisis produced by the [First World] War,”228 the continuing order of the
Supreme Court should be modified in certain respects. These modifications, embodied in a 1918
resolution of the General Assembly, eased the burden of proof on claimants who could not
identify which of the two Tennessee companies was the specific source of the emissions which
had harmed it and otherwise coordinated the position of the Ducktown Sulfur, Copper and Iron
Company, Ltd., with that of the Tennessee Copper Company. In the revised contract terms, the
payment of awards where the source of the emission was indeterminate was to be shared by the
two companies on a ratio of two-thirds for the Tennessee Copper Company and one-third by the
smaller Ducktown Sulfur, Copper and Iron Company, Ltd.229 In 1925, Georgia –recognizing that
it was “more expedient and to the interest of [Georgia] citizens to give to these companies
opportunity to remedy the evils complained of and to adjust such damages as may be done to its
citizens of this state” through a system of arbitration– yet again renewed and extended the
contracts between the state and the two Tennessee corporations for an additional term ending in
1930.230
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After the renewal of the contract in 1925, Tennessee Copper Company acquired the
assets of the Ducktown Sulfur, Copper and Iron Company, Ltd., and in 1937 sought and obtained
certain other adjustments to the arbitral process determined by the prior agreements:
The Board of Arbitration herein referred to shall be composed as follows: the
company shall appoint one arbitrator, whose compensation and expenses shall be
paid by it, to be known as the company’s arbitrator. The Governor of the State
shall appoint one arbitrator, who shall be known as the State’s arbitrator, unless
the arbitrator appointed by the company shall be a citizen of one of the three
counties of Fannin, Gilmer, or Union, then the State’s arbitrator shall be a citizen
of one of those counties and may be selected from one of those counties even
though the company’s arbitrator also resides therein. The State’s arbitrator shall
also be ex-officio an inspector . . . 231
The modified contract dispensed with the necessity of a permanent umpire, shifting to a
system where the two arbitrators would appoint an umpire in the event they were unable to agree
as to any specific dispute. In addition –and apparently for the first time– the contract between the
state and the Tennessee Copper Company made provision for the company arbitrator and state
arbitrator to “make and formulate appropriate rules and regulations for the governing of the
arbitration in accordance with [the] contract.”232 Further, a separate procedure was stipulated in
the 1937 contract revision for the appointment of an arbitral panel in the event of allegations
regarding the lack of bona fide performance of the contract by the company. In that case, the
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company was to appoint an arbitrator of its own selection, and another was to be appointed by
the governor of Georgia who was to be the chemist of the state or such other person as the
governor chose; these two were then to select some additional competent person as umpire and
these three individuals were to constitute a board which, by majority vote, could determine any
issues before it and whose decisions would be final and binding on all the parties:
It is the intention of the parties hereto to create and maintain a permanent
arbitration system, and it is agreed that this contract shall continue in effect,
unless terminated by the mutual agreement of the company and the Governor,
after the Governor has been authorized and directed by the Legislature of the
State to do so, or terminated by the permanent cessation of both of said plants of
the company, it being understood and agreed, however, that the temporary
suspension of operations at either or both of said plants shall not terminate the
contract.233
The 1937 revisions concluded with the resolution that the case filed by Georgia in 1905
–and still pending before the Supreme Court in 1937– was to be “dismissed and stricken from
the docket of that Court, and all orders and decrees heretofore entered in said cause vacated and
the order in such appropriate form as may be approved by said Court shall recite that all costs in
the cause which have been taxed against the State or said Tennessee Copper Company are to be
paid by that company. 234 As a consequence, on January 10, 1938, the Supreme Court, on joint
motion of the Tennessee Copper Company and the State of Georgia, dismissed the bill in equity,
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bringing to a close almost three decades of litigation. The case had been long and arduous, but it
had demonstrated the effectiveness and utility of arbitration in the management and resolution of
a long-term, ongoing, and politically sensitive dispute.235

The Role of Arbitration in Georgia’s Tax Structure

The use of arbitration as a helpful adjunct to the taxation process in Georgia has
paralleled its use in the other fields of civil conflict outlined above. Georgia, not unlike other
units of modern government, has over time developed an intricate, almost byzantine, system of
statutory provisions to implement a policy of imposing taxes of an almost bewilderingly wide
spectrum. Taxes on the ad valorem valuation of real property; county taxation; municipal
taxation; school taxation; ad valorem taxation of motor vehicles and mobile homes; ad valorem
taxation of public utilities; ad valorem taxation of airline companies; taxation of intangible
personal property; taxation of real estate transfers; intangible recording taxes; taxation of
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Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals, and the official Reporters of both the Georgia
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legislative provisions, including the stipulation that in the event of the submission of an
apparently erroneous statement by the publisher to the reporter, the attorney general of
Georgia was to act as an arbiter between the reporter and the publisher. 1972 Ga. Laws,
Vol. I, 460.
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financial institutions; state income taxation; local income taxation; and state taxes on sales, use,
and other transactions both at the state and local level are only a few of the tax mechanisms
featured in the overall structure of Georgia law.236 Given the rich variety of forms of Georgia
taxation and the fact that most of these are, to a greater or lesser degree, fact-oriented in their
assessment, imposition, and collection, it comes as no surprise that factual disputes are a
common occurrence in the state’s taxation process whether at the state-wide level, the county
level, or locally. The Georgia legislature has adapted the arbitral process to the resolution of
these disputes in a number of key respects.
The state’s statutory scheme for the assessment of property and the imposition of ad
valorem taxes at the county level, for instance, envisions the valuation of a taxpayer’s property
by professional staff, subsequent to which a County Board of Tax Assessors may meet to receive
and inspect tax returns laid before it by the tax receiver or tax commissioner of the county. This
board is charged to determine that all taxable property within the county is assessed and returned
at its fair market value, and that fair market values as between and among the individual
taxpayers are “fairly and justly equalized so that each taxpayer shall pay as nearly as possible
only such taxpayer’s proportionate share of taxes.”237 In the event, however, that a taxpayer is
disgruntled with both the action of the appraiser and the County Board of Tax Assessors, it may
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be possible under certain circumstances to then seek a review of the valuation of the property
concerned by a County Board of Equalization, a body separate and distinct from that of the
County Board of Tax Assessors, which effectively acts as a review body over actions taken by
the lower board. Georgia law provides further that “any resident or non-resident taxpayer may
appeal from an assessment by the County Board of Tax Assessors to the County Board of
Equalization or to an arbitrator or arbitrators as to matters of taxability, uniformity of
assessment, and value and, for residents, as to denials of homestead exemptions.”238 The
arbitration system which the statute contemplates as a means for review of decisions taken by the
County Board of Tax Assessors and the County Board of Equalization requires that a taxpayer so
electing must provide a written notice of arbitration with the County Board of Tax Assessors,
filed within forty-five days from the date of the mailing of the notice from which the appeal is
taken. In the framework of this statutory arbitration, the disputed matter may be submitted to a
single arbitrator if both parties (the taxpayer and the board) agree; if the parties are unable to
concur in an arbitration using but one arbitrator, “then three arbitrators shall hear the appeal.”239
Significantly, only registered real estate appraisers (or a higher classification as classified by the
Georgia Real Estate Appraisers Board) may serve as an arbitrator in this connection. Further
appeals from this arbitral tribunal to the Superior Court are provided for under the statutory
terms.240
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An analogous process at the state-wide level in Georgia is provided for the resolution of
disputes concerning the correctness of the annual current equalized adjusted property tax digest
of each county in the state and the current equalized adjusted property tax digest for the state as a
whole. Under Georgia law, the state auditor is required to furnish to the State Board of Education
the current equalized adjusted property tax digest of each county in the state and the current
equalized adjusted property tax digest for the state as a whole and, in any county which has more
than one school system, the state auditor is then to furnish the State Board of Education a
breakdown of the current county equalized adjusted property tax digest showing the amount of
the digest applicable to property located within each of the school systems located within the
county.241 Simultaneously, the state auditor is also required to furnish the governing authority of
each county, the governing authority of each municipality having an independent school system,
the local Board of Education of each school system, the Tax Commissioner or Tax Collector of
each county, and the Board of Tax Assessors of each county the current equalized adjusted
property tax digest of the local school system or systems, as the case may be, and the current
equalized adjusted digest for the state as a whole. Under the provisions of this legislation, any
party questioning the correctness of the digest is afforded the right to refer this issue to a Board
of Arbitrators consisting of three members, one of whom is chosen by the State Auditor, one
chosen by the complaining party and one chosen by these two.242 In a somewhat unique
provision, the law further provides that where the two arbitrators are unable to agree on a third
member of the panel, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall appoint the third
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member at the request of either of the participating parties.243 The arbitral panel so constructed is
allowed fifteen days after the appointment of the full board to render a decision regarding the
correctness of the digest in issue and, under the terms of the statute, the decision of this
arbitration board is final.244
These technical and seemingly dry provisions of Georgia’s tax code are but the modern
descendants of statutory provisions reaching back more than a century into Georgia’s legal past.
As early as 1877, the state’s General Assembly adopted a statute providing that issues as to
property valuation in connection with corporate, individual, agency or institutional tax returns
were to be referred to arbitrators for decision, a reflection perhaps of the desire to remove this
important issue from final determination by local officers appointed in Georgia under
Reconstruction governments. Under this statutory prototype, each complaining taxpayer was
afforded the right to appoint one arbitrator and the Comptroller General of Georgia –a
constitutional office no longer in existence– the other; these two were vested with a power to
choose an umpire in the case of their disagreement and, in any event, the decision of the
arbitrators was to be final. 245
The method of arbitrator appointment under this early statutory system was modified a
year later by legislation adopted in the General Assembly providing that where the arbitrators
appointed under the system envisioned by the 1877 statute were unable to select an umpire
within thirty days after their appointment, then the governor would have the power to appoint
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two arbitrators who would, with the arbitrator selected by the taxpayer, form the arbitral panel to
decide the question of amount or value.246
This statutory arbitration system appeared to work well and it was next modified only in
1905 when an amendment to the 1877 and 1878 legislation stipulated that only citizens of
Georgia were to serve as arbitrators or umpires in the statutory scheme.247 Legislation adopted in
1907 further prescribed the terms of the oath to be taken by the arbitrators or umpires in the
system and also vested in them the power to compel the production of testimony and the right to
issue subpoenae duces tecum to order parties to produce books and papers, and to summon
witnesses.248
In 1910, the legislature saw fit to devise a general method for assessing and collecting
taxes where authorized and, in the event no adequate provision otherwise existed in the law, for
giving the taxpayer notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the valuation and taxability of the
property subject thereto. In this general scheme, a disgruntled taxpayer could refer the question
of true value of property subject to ad valorem taxation to a panel of arbitrators in which the
taxpayer could choose one arbitrator, the other being chosen by the Comptroller-General of
Georgia, these two being authorized to choose an umpire in the event of their disagreement.249 In
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the same year, the General Assembly adopted legislation governing the assessment and
collection of past due taxes, again providing that the taxpayer could raise issues as to the
valuation of property before an arbitral tribunal consisting of an arbitrator chosen by the
taxpayer and another by the assessing officer of the municipality of the taxing municipality, with
power in these two to select an umpire in the case of their disagreement.250 In 1913, the
legislature once again relied on the arbitral process as a device to resolve disputes as to the
evaluation of property when it created a general system of tax equalization for Georgia.251
Assessment arbitration was also the method of preference for the resolution of valuation disputes
in a 1924 statute governing the taxation of railroad equipment companies.252
A Revenue Department of the State of Georgia was created by legislation in 1943 and,
once more, it was provided that determinations by the new State Revenue Commissioner that
particular property had been improperly assessed for ad valorem taxation purposes could be, on
dispute, determined by an arbitral panel consisting of one arbitrator chosen by the taxpayer and
one by the governor, with a power in these two to choose an umpire. Failing a resolution of the
issue by this means, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia had the power of
appointment with respect to the third member of the panel.253
With increasing urbanization of formerly rural areas in Georgia, the need for joint CityCounty Boards of Tax Assessors in the more populated counties of Georgia became apparent. In
1953, legislation adopted by the General Assembly provided for the establishment of such joint
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boards in all counties of Georgia having within their borders a population of 300,000 persons or
more. Consistent with a tradition long established in Georgia by that point in time, provision was
made that “any taxpayer dissatisfied with the action of joint City-County Board of Tax Assessors
may demand arbitration” as provided in prior law.254 The special considerations and concerns
touching on ad valorem taxation on motor vehicles owned by dealers was addressed by statute in
1967 when the Georgia General Assembly passed an act providing for the classification of motor
vehicles as a separate and distinct class of tangible property for ad valorem tax purposes and
permitting arbitration of any disputes as to such tax valuations.255
Arbitration of disputes arising from valuations assessed by equalized adjusted school
property tax digests was permitted by legislation adopted in 1970.256 When these provisions
relative to the equalized adjusted school property tax digests were amended in 1989 to change
the method of their preparation, the general arbitration option for a disgruntled party was
preserved, ensuring that arbitration will continue to have a significant role in the resolution of
civil disputes arising from Georgia’s tax processes in the twenty-first century.257
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Arbitration Within Georgia’s Municipal Corporations: From the Early Nineteenth to the MidTwentieth Centuries

The end of war in 1865 unleashed forces in Georgia which were, over the coming
decades, to impose tasks on the state’s urban governments, the likes of which could hardly have
been conceived in the halcyon days before the outbreak of armed conflict in 1861. A great deal
of the legislation pertaining to Georgia’s towns and cities in the antebellum period was
haphazard, spotty in nature, and lacking in any overall, comprehensive plan or structure. Perhaps
the closest that Georgia had come to a comprehensive urban government charter was the
compilation in the 1863 Code of the statutes which had been passed up until that time for the
governance of Savannah, a compilation which served to some degree as a model for legislative
charters in the years following the war.258
To be sure, the Georgia statute books were dotted with discrete and scattered pieces of
legislation pertaining to Georgia’s burgeoning urban centers and some of these, from time to
time, included authority for the city to utilize arbitral processes in the resolution of disputes
which might arise in the course of city government functions. For instance, an 1836 statute
amending the charter of Milledgeville authorized the mayor and aldermen of the city to open
lanes and alleys through the town’s squares, including the right to take private property for this
purpose if necessary. When disputes arose as to the valuation of property so taken, “the
question,” the amended charter provided, “shall be referred to the arbitrament of four
258
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disinterested and impartial persons,” two of whom chosen by the property owner and two by the
Milledgeville board of aldermen. These four in turn were authorized to call in an umpire in the
event they could not reach a majority decision as to the valuation, and a majority of the panel of
five so constituted could render a decision which would be binding and obligatory on both the
city and the aggrieved landowner.259 Similarly, any disputes as to the use of the municipal bridge
across the Savannah River at Augusta was, under an 1841 statute, to be determined by a board of
“competent civil engineers or mechanics” nominated by the City and by persons seeking the use
of the bridge who had been denied that privilege for engineering reasons by the city council of
Augusta. The private party- and city-appointed engineers, if they could not reach a decision as to
the feasibility of the proposed use of the bridge, were authorized to call in a third arbitrator to act
as umpire and any decision thereafter reached was to be conclusive on the issue.260 The
legislature again in 1870, drawing largely on the pattern which it had employed in the earlier
1836 law regarding disputes over the condemnation of land for Milledgeville’s squares, made a
provision in an amendment to the charter of Blackshear providing for arbitral resolution of any
valuation disputes when the city took lands to open new streets and roads:
[The intendant] and commissioners [of Blackshear] shall have power to have all
the roads, streets, lanes and sidewalks open and kept in good order to lay out and
form new roads, streets and lanes in said town, whenever, in their judgment, it is
necessary to do so: Provided, That before any new road, street or lane shall be
open, the owners of the land, if known, or their agents, if they reside in the
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county, shall have written notice to appear before Council at a regular meeting,
and choose a man on his, her, or their part, and the Council shall choose a man on
their part, and the two thus selected shall choose a third who shall assess the
amount of damages such owner or owners sustained by running such road, street
or lane through their land. If the owners of such lands fail to choose a man on his,
her, or their part, then the intendant and commissioners shall choose both the
umpires, and they, a third, who shall proceed to assess the aforesaid damages.261
The increasing demands on urban governments in Georgia occasioned by the great social
shifts during and after Reconstruction were soon to be reflected in municipal charters, whether
by original grant or amendment to existing legislation, which vastly increased the range of
activities and the extent of powers possessed by the state’s cities.
The new era in powers granted to cities chartered by the General Assembly is
reflected in the new charter Atlanta received in 1874. This statute restated many
of the powers previously granted the city but also many more. The local
government was authorized to establish a water works and given the power of
eminent domain for this purpose, as well as for laying out streets. A city court
was created with far greater jurisdiction than the typical mayor’s courts.
Additionally, the city could appoint a building inspector who would check the
inside of the building rather than being limited to whether the building was a
nuisance. Moreover, the duties of many officials were clarified. Therefore,
charters granted to new towns after 1874 began to resemble in many aspects the
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one granted Atlanta. Unlike other regions of the country, Georgia was rather late
in granting such a broad range of powers to their municipal corporations. But
when this change came, a new era for Georgia cities had begun.262
This new generation of Georgia municipal charters frequently stipulated the arbitration of
disputes arising in the course of the exercise of municipal powers. Atlanta’s 1874 charter, for
instance, in its terms relative to the functions of the Board of Water Commissioners, made
explicit provision for the arbitration of any disputes between the water board and the owners of
property taken by the board for the construction of Atlanta’s new municipal water works:
The Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County, upon application of either
party . . . [shall] appoint three disinterested persons to examine said property, and
to assess the value thereof, or the damages done to the same who shall, with as
little delay as possible, discharge said duty, after having taken an oath, before
some officer authorized to administer the same, to do the same impartially, to the
best of their ability, and to make a return of their acting and doings in the
premises to the next term of the Superior Court of Fulton County, to be entered on
the minutes of said Court, and made the judgment thereof . . .263
Additionally, in language drawn almost directly from the 1836 statute pertaining to
Milledgeville and the enlargement of its squares, the 1874 law permitted the mayor and council
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of Atlanta to “have full power and authority to open, lay out, to widen, straighten, or otherwise
change, streets, alleys, and squares, in the said City of Atlanta.”
Whenever the said Mayor and General Council shall exercise the power above
delegated, they shall appoint two freeholders, and the owners of said lots fronting
on side streets or alleys shall, on five days notice, appoint two freeholders who
shall proceed to assess the damages sustained, or the advantages derived, by the
owner or owners of said lots, in consequence of the opening, widening,
straightening, or otherwise changing, said streets and alleys, and in case said
assessors cannot agree, they shall select a fifth freeholder; the said assessors to
take an oath they will faithfully discharge their duties, and either party to have the
right to enter an appeal, to the Superior Court of Fulton County . . .264
Throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, arbitral provisions appearing in
municipal charters grew increasingly frequent and these were, more often than not, modeled on
the provisions on the 1874 Atlanta charter and its legislative antecedents. The 1882 charter of
Chauncey granted the city council and mayor there the right to condemn lands for the
improvement of public streets and alleys, subject to arbitration rights in aggrieved owners quite
similar to those provided for in Atlanta’s earlier charter.265 Similarly, an amendment to the
charter of Washington in 1884 provided for the arbitration of any disputes arising out of attempts
by the city to widen or straighten its streets and sidewalks.266
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An unusual provision for the application of the arbitral process was made in an 1884
amendment to the road law of Chattooga County providing for the arbitration of disputes
between road contractors and the county’s road supervisor where disagreements had arisen in
connection with road building projects undertaken by the county:
. . . all differences arising between the contractors and the supervisor in reference
to compliances with contracts made between said supervisor and said contractor
shall be submitted to an arbitration as follows: The contractor to select an
arbitrator and the supervisor another, in the district where said road lies, and if
these two cannot agree, then said arbitrators shall select an umpire, whose
decision shall be final, and the Ordinary shall accept it as such; Provided,
however, that no contractor or road defaulter shall be competent as an arbitrator
or umpire in such cases.267
In 1886, Social Circle received an amended charter providing for arbitration of property
damage claims occasioned by road improvements much in the fashion of the 1874 Atlanta
law;268 in like manner, a special act imposed a similar arbitral regime on the City of Athens, this
too in connection with road improvement and widening projects.269
If the 1874 Atlanta charter was influential in establishing on a state-wide basis the
concept of arbitration in connection with the municipal condemnation of lands, the 1888
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amended charter of Jesup was equally influential in extending the arbitral process into municipal
ad valorem taxation property value assessment disputes:
. . . if any assessment of any estate authorized by this Act shall be deemed
erroneous, the owner or agent of any such real estate who may be dissatisfied
with such assessment shall have the privilege of making complaint to the said
Mayor and Alderman of said town within 20 days after the date of the report of
the Assessors, which complaint must be made in writing; and upon such
complaint being made, the assessment complained of shall be immediately
referred to three arbiters, one chosen by the Mayor and Alderman of said town,
one by the party complaining, and the third by the two so chosen, whose award in
the matter shall be made within ten days, and shall be conclusive and final.270
An amendment to the charter of Carrollton in 1888 provided for the arbitration of
disputes as to the valuation of property for ad valorem taxation purposes271 and a further
amendment to Brunswick’s charter in 1888 brought that city in line with the growing statewide
practice of arbitration of both valuation issues in tax proceedings and in land condemnations for
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city street improvements.272 Atlanta’s 1874 charter which had seemingly opened a pandora’s box
of arbitral processes in Georgia’s urban governments was itself amended in 1890 to place strict
time and procedural constraints on the assessor appointment process, but otherwise its
fundamental arbitral features remained intact.273
Before the end of the nineteenth century, the basic Atlanta model for arbitration of
disputes centering on land condemnations had been extended to the City of LaGrange,274 the
town of Rhine,275 the City of Austell,276 the City of Covington,277 and the town of Davisboro.278
The twentieth century opened with the first municipal charter arbitration provision
granted by the legislature appearing in that adopted for Thomson, providing for arbitration of
land condemnation issues arising in connection with street improvements in the city.279 The
following year, both Sandersville and Harrison were granted charter provisions requiring the
arbitration of disputes centering on the valuation of property for ad valorem tax purposes280 and
in that same year Chester was granted a charter requiring the arbitration of disputes as to the
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valuation of land arising in connection with street improvements by the city.281 A tax assessment
dispute arbitration provision was included in the new charter of Davisboro in 1903282 and the
next year similar terms were included in the new charter of Greensboro,283 a provision
substantially copied in the charter granted Riddleville that same year.284 Canton’s charter was
amended in 1905 to require the arbitration of disputes regarding valuation of property for ad
valorem tax purposes,285 and Harlem that same year had its charter amended to provide for
arbitration of disputes arising from city land condemnations arising out of street
improvements.286 When the town of Yonker in Dade County was incorporated in 1906, its initial
charter required the arbitration of disputes regarding damages consequent upon the city’s
widening and straightening city streets and alleys.287
A veritable explosion of charter rights requiring arbitration of civil disputes within the
structure of Georgia’s municipal corporations appeared on the statute books in the years
immediately prior to the entry of the United States into the First World War: Georgia urban
centers receiving such charter provisions included Pineview,288 Leon,289 Commerce,290
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Grovetown, 291 Mitchell’s District,292 Roberta,293 Claxton,294 Cordele,295 Covington,296 DuPont,297
Pavo,298 Swainsboro,299 Cotton, 300 Marietta,301 Blackshear,302 Cobb,303 Oxford,304 Tifton,305
Vienna,306 Davisboro,307 Milan,308 and by an amendment, the City of Covington.309 In the year
following the end of the First World War, but a single charter was granted by the legislature
–that to Sandersville– mandating the arbitration of an intra-municipal issue (the valuation of
property for ad valorem taxation purposes),310 but in 1920 – the following year– a record number
of such provisions were inserted in municipal charters by the legislature in a single session. In
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that year, Cusetta,311 Linwood,312 Marietta,313 Powder Springs,314 Thomasville,315 and Tifton,316
received such charter mandates. Before the end of the 1930s, an additional thirteen charter
provisions requiring the arbitration of disputes consequent upon municipal operations were
mandated by the Georgia legislature.317
Whether because the legislature lost interest in the issue or, as is more probable, fewer
opportunities for the original grant or the amendment of municipal charters arose, the pace of the
adoption of charter revisions requiring arbitration in Georgia municipalities slackened
dramatically from 1930 until the outbreak of the Second World War. In that period, only four
municipal charters were granted (or amended) which required the arbitration of either valuation
issues arising from ad valorem taxation or compensation owing to landowners in connection
with condemnations: those of Folkston318 Hawkinsville,319 Brunswick,320 and Hogansville.321
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Arbitration in Chambers of Commerce
A central thesis in Bruce Mann’s historical paradigm of American arbitration is that the
impetus to forms of dispute resolution outside (or sometimes, as he points out, as occurred in
Connecticut, alongside) the formal court structure in general, and arbitration in particular, is a
communitarian impulse and proceeds in the main from a sense of shared values and priorities
within a definable subgroup of society.322 Arbitration in the early colonial experience was

I, 995. The legislature’s stipulation of arbitration in this instance was as unusual as it was
creative: on March 3, 1939, the legislature had adopted an act authorizing the Board of
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues for Fulton County to establish a pension system
for county employees. See 1939 Ga. Laws 571, as amended on March 27, 1941, by 1941
Ga. Laws 846. The 1943 amendment created a Pension Board to process claims for
pensions and provided that:
... if, during the course of [an] investigation [into an individual’s
entitlement to pension benefits and rights], either the applicant or Fulton
County shall demand arbitration upon any question of disability of a living
person, such arbitration shall be granted by referring the question of
disability to three physicians licensed to practice medicine in the State of
Georgia. One physician so licensed, shall be named by the party making
the demand by the written selection filed with the Clerk at the time
demand is made. The opposite party shall, within five days, likewise name
his physician and the two so chosen shall select a third physician. Such
physicians shall thereupon examine the applicant and determine whether
or not the applicant is disabled as claimed. The decision of the majority of
physicians so selected shall be conclusive upon all parties on the question
of disability and extent thereof and shall be incorporated in the judgment
of the Pension Board as a part thereof.
1943 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 1001-1002.
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Mann notes:
Connecticut in the seventeenth century was a small society. The universe
for most people was the town in which they lived. It is difficult now to
imagine what this meant. The average town contained perhaps a hundred
families, five or six hundred people, most of whom lived within a few
hundred yards of the center of town. Where houses stopped, field and
forest began. People not only knew one another, they knew one another in
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centered upon shared religious interests and ethnic ties, so Mann’s argument goes (and as we
have seen here with the Salzburgers in early Georgia); over time, as faith communities and
immigrant groups assimilated into the broader American society and as that society itself became
more heterogeneous, other shared interests came to the fore as the foundation for a renewed
interest in arbitral procedures for the resolution of disputes.323
The process which Mann recorded for Connecticut was also observed by Auerbach in the
mid-Atlantic region as well where wider, more secular communal bonds competed with the
religious as the cement of society:

a variety of contexts. Of course, there are times when knowing one's
fellow townspeople may be small comfort. Nevertheless, the
interdependence of the early settlers, born as it was partly of choice and
partly of necessity, gave the first towns a powerful cohesiveness. A
voluntary process such as arbitration could work in such communities
either because of trust, which one would expect in covenanted
communities, or because of naked self- interest, which one would expect
in all communities in which survival depended on cooperation.
Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American
Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443, 448-449 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
323

Mann posits that the weakening of family ties as a basis of consensual, voluntary
arbitration was counterbalanced by a rise of commercial interests as a primary impetus
towards arbitration as a means for the settlement of disputes. See ibid, especially at 470471:
Merchants in the American colonies, like their counterparts in England,
required ways of settling disputes that would not delay them in their
business of making money. But the institutions and special jurisdictions
that supported the law merchant in England did not cross the Atlantic.
Instead, colonial merchants were left largely to their own devices.
Arbitration was a readily available substitute. The only authority
arbitrators needed to settle disputes was that conferred by the parties in
their submission. Moreover, until the middle of the eighteenth century, the
mercantile community retained enough community of interest that the
procedural mechanisms for enforcing arbitration awards were both
unnecessary and inappropriate.
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Community in colonial America was also defined by trade and commerce.
Colonial merchants, like their predecessors in medieval guilds, preferred to
resolve their disagreements according to familiar business custom rather than to
enter the labyrinth of common-law technicalities and uncertainties. The common
law was “too cruel in her frowns,” but mercantile practice could be relied upon to
expedite dispute settlement without “interruption of the traffick.” As early as the
seventeenth century, commercial arbitration developed along the New YorkPhiladelphia axis. Not only were these the major colonial commercial centers;
both the Dutch in New York and the Quakers in Philadelphia had their own
independent commitment to arbitration. The strong Quaker presence in western
New Jersey strengthened the impetus provided by the advantageous location of
that colony between the commercial cities.324
In Georgia too, as the cohesion of the ethnic and religious groups which characterized the
earlier demographic patterns in the colony and state diminished and as the state first increasingly
commercialized and then made initial tentative moves towards industrialization both before the
War of 1861-1865 and during Reconstruction, chambers of commerce and commodity
exchanges emerged as the new platforms for arbitration and the private resolution of civil
disputes.
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JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAWYERS 32 (1983).
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As early as 1841, the Georgia legislature had, on petition of leading merchants in
Savannah,325 enacted legislation to incorporate “the Chamber of Commerce of the City of
Savannah.”326 Although this legislation made no explicit reference to the authority of the
chamber to organize an arbitration tribunal or to conduct arbitral proceedings, it did nonetheless
establish the essential conditions for the conduct of such proceedings by authorizing the chamber
to adopt its own rules and regulations to which its members would be subject, carefully limiting
this authority to the regulation of “... intercourse between merchant and merchant, and between
domestic and foreign merchants.”327 The enacting legislation was careful to prohibit to the new
chamber the power to adopt any “by-laws infringing the rights and privileges of any person or
persons who may buy or sell in or trade to Savannah,” a provision consistent with the implicit
intent of the legislature to allow the chamber to sponsor the arbitration of commercial or
mercantile disputes within its membership.328
What was implicit in the authority of the Savannah Chamber of Commerce under the
1841 legislation with respect to the arbitration of civil disputes, however, was made explicit in a
statute adopted three decades later in 1872 regarding the powers of the Augusta Exchange and
the Chamber of Commerce of the City of Atlanta. In that year, the Georgia General Assembly
voted to permit the creation of a five-member standing board of arbitration within the structure

325

These included Joseph Cumming, Benjamin E. Stiles, Godfrey Barnsley, Henry Roser,
William P. Hunter, and Charles Green. See 1841 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 105, especially § 1.
326

Id.

327

1841 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 105, at § 3.

328

Id.
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of the Augusta Exchange –the first such in Georgia legal history. The powers of this Board were
well-defined:
... when the members of said Exchange [of Augusta329 ], or any one claiming by,
through or under them, have among themselves any matter of controversy, other
than those matters of which the Superior Court, or some other court, has exclusive
jurisdiction under the Constitution of this State, such matter of controversy may
be submitted to said board of arbitration, by an instrument in writing, signed by
the parties to the controversy, clearly setting forth the matter of controversy, and

329

The legislation was drawn rather awkwardly and, to some extent, confusingly: its
dispositive provisions were expressed in terms of the authority of the Augusta Exchange
to render enforceable arbitral awards, but –in the last section of the statute, almost as a
seeming afterthought– these powers were made applicable to a board of arbitration of the
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce as well:
... [T]he powers herein conferred on the board of managers of the
Augusta Exchange are hereby also vested in the president and
directors of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce; and the arbitrators
elected by the president and directors of the Atlanta Chamber of
Commerce shall have the same jurisdiction and authority as is
herein conferred on those chosen by the board of managers of the
Augusta Exchange. All awards made by the arbitrators elected by
the president and directors of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce
shall be filed in the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of
Fulton County, and all proceedings in said awards shall thereafter
conform to those prescribed in this act for enforcing or resisting an
award made by the arbitrators chosen by the board of managers of
the Augusta Exchange.
1872 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 138, at § 4. Subsequently, the legislature saw fit to exempt the
Atlanta Chamber arbitrators from jury duty in any Fulton County court. See 1876 Ga.
Laws, Vol. I, 384. No record has been uncovered, however, of a statute extending a
similar privilege to the arbitrators of the Augusta Exchange.
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time by which the award thereon shall be rendered; the board of arbitration shall
thereupon hear the same, and said board, or a member thereof, shall have power
to subpoena witnesses, and to issue commissions for the examination of witnesses
as arbitrators under the Code of Georgia are authorized to do; and said board may
adjourn, from time to time, a hearing of the matter submitted to them, but not
beyond the time named in the submission for the rendition of the award; and an
award of the majority of the board shall be taken and deemed the award of the
board.330
Moreover, any award rendered by the Augusta board of arbitration was, in the absence of
any objection thereto, to be recorded with the clerk of the Superior Court of Richmond County
as though the award were a judgment of that court:
Any award so rendered, when signed by the board of arbitrators, or a majority of
them, may be filed at any time thereafter in the office of the Clerk of the Superior
Court of Richmond county, and if exceptions to such award, on the ground of
fraud of said board, or some member thereof, in making said award, are not also
filed in said office in the meanwhile, the Clerk shall enter said award, ten days
after the filing thereof, among the minutes of the Court, and thereupon said award
shall become the judgment of the court, and thereupon execution in pursuance of
the award may issue and be enforced in the manner of executions from the

330

1872 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 138, § 2. The “Code of Georgia” referred to in the statute is
the Cobb 1863 Code, discussed infra.
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Superior Court, and shall also be entered on the execution docket. The judgment
so entered as aforesaid shall be final and conclusive between the parties.331
Under legislation enacted ten years later in 1882, the Board of Arbitration for the Atlanta
Chamber of Commerce, created under the terms of the 1872 law as an almost mirror image of
the Arbitration Board of the Augusta Exchange, was enlarged from a membership of five up to
fifteen members; no corresponding legislation similarly increased the arbitration board
membership of the Augusta Exchange.332 Of greater significance, however, was the provision of
the 1882 law effectively permitting the enlarged Atlanta Board to sit in three-member panels333
and allowing the arbitration of claims of parties not members of the Atlanta Chamber of
Commerce:
Persons, firms and corporations not members of the [Atlanta] Chamber of
Commerce, having a difference with any person, firm or corporation a member of
the Chamber, may submit the same to arbitration, as provided in said original Act
[of 1872] and in this act, and the decision shall be binding, as therein provided.334
This proviso significantly extended the impact of the Chamber arbitration law and
represented from a conceptual perspective a major advance in the promotion of commercial
arbitration in the State of Georgia. Similarly important was the stipulation of the act that the
“president and directors of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce may make rules for the
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1872 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 138, § 3.

332

1882 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 668, § I.

333

Ibid, at § II.

334

Ibid, at § III.
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government of said board of arbitrators not inconsistent with law,” a provision permitting the
board to devise its own rules of procedure, appointment of arbitrators, challenges to their
authority and other related issues.335
As decades wore on and as Georgia’s urban centers became more densely populated,
more diverse and heterogeneous in nature, municipal entities denominated “Chambers of
Commerce” ceased to be created directly by the Georgia General Assembly, although city
charters not uncommonly provided for their establishment by city governments.336 Legislative
records affirm that the legislature would, from time to time, intervene to create “boards of trade,”
a term which, in the mid- and late nineteenth century, seems to have been used interchangeably
with the expression “chamber of commerce.” With time, however, the denomination “board of
trade” came to be more closely associated with specific product sectors and lines of
production, 337 just at the same period when the mercantile and business interests represented by
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Ibid, at § IV.

336

See, for example, the 1918 legislation creating a new charter for the City of Calhoun
in north Georgia and determining that the city could, if it so elected, “establish a bureau
for the commercial and business interests of the city,” and allowing the officials of the
city to make fundamental determinations of that office including “the scope of its work,
the duties devolving upon its membership, its officers, and appropriate such sums for its
maintenance as they deem proper.” 1918 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 563, at § 95. Such a
subordinate organ seems a far cry from the semi-autonomous, merchant-created and driven commercial power centers of the mid-nineteenth century, the later organizations
apparently given over more to city “boosterism” than to internal policing and control of
mercantile standards and procedures.
337

The “boards of trade” known in earlier Georgia legal history were of at least two
types: some were geographically restricted to the advancement of general business
interests within a given community, for example the Columbus Board of Trade
referenced in 1890-1891 Ga. Laws, Part VI, 523, and the Clarkesville Board of Trade
established in 1917 by 1917 Ga. Laws, Part III, 581, as a part of the new Clarkesville city
charter. More narrow in focus but still geographically restricted was the Port of
Brunswick Board of Trade which seemed centered on maritime issues. See 1899 Ga.
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the typical Georgia “chamber of commerce” were broadening and becoming more
comprehensive in terms of the commercial interests which it served.
To the extent that the official reports of the Georgia Supreme Court are any accurate
measure, however, the most active source for institutional arbitral activity in nineteenth century
Georgia was neither the chambers of commerce nor the boards of trade: the commodity
exchange –and in nineteenth and early twentieth century Georgia this meant, almost invariably, a
cotton exchange– held the position of primacy in this respect. A number of these are documented
to have existed and functioned –among them, those in Bremen,338 Rome,339 Augusta,340 and,

Laws, Part IV (Resolutions), 520. The second common form of board of trade, much later
in appearance, was commodity and sector-specific, sometimes tied to a given city but not
unusually having state-wide fields of activity. See, e.g., the Tobacco Board of Trade
created by 1962 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 102, an act specifically authorizing arbitration
resolving disputes between tobacco warehousemen “as to any matter authorized under
the provisions of this Act.” These forms of boards are more accurately seen as
descending from the commodity exchanges of the nineteenth century, discussed above,
rather than from the broader-based and more widely representative chambers of
commerce.
338

The Bremen Cotton Exchange maintained its own board of arbitrators well into the
twentieth century. In B. B. Ford & Co. v. Stewart-Morehead Co., 145 Ga. 802 (1916), the
Superior Court of Bibb County enforced a so-called “arbitration certificate” –an award of
that board– which resulted from a board ruling that the plaintiff Stewart-Morehead
Company was due the sum $1,308.41 on account of a quality price adjustment in a cotton
sale transaction with defendant B. B. Ford Company. This order was later affirmed by the
Georgia Supreme Court. The decision suggests that it was the practice of the board, on
complaint of a party to a cotton sale subject to its rules, to ascertain whether there was
any deviation in contract weight, quality or cotton type and, on finding the complaint was
well founded, to simply issue a certificate in the nature of a negotiable instrument to the
prevailing party apparently on the account of the losing party, a remarkably efficient and
no frills method of resolving the disagreement, issuing an award, and executing the same
instanter.
339

The manager of the Rome Cotton Exchange was charged with criminal violations in
McGhee v. State, 92 Ga. 21 (1893), “[t]he charge being that the accused [McGhee] did
engage in the business of selling and buying, ‘through regularly organized stock and
cotton exchanges and boards of trade,’ various farm products and other property
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foremost among them all, Savannah– but none of these based in Georgia341 appear to have been
brought into existence by legislative fiat342 ; rather, they seem to have emerged out of the

enumerated in the [tax act which was the basis of the indictment] mentioned, and the
proof showing that he carried on this business in the Rome Cotton Exchange, of which he
was manager, the state was not required to show, further, that he placed his orders with
exchanges or boards of trade elsewhere.”
340

See Dozier v. Davison & Fargo, 138 Ga. 190 (1912), in which the rules of the Augusta
Cotton Exchange were invoked by the parties to a cotton sale transaction to determine the
quality classification and weight of the cotton concerned.
341

Of course, out-of-state cotton exchanges were active in Georgia as well. See, e.g.,
Benton v. Singleton, 114 Ga. 548 (1902), in which the plaintiff sought to enforce an
arbitral award under the New York Cotton Exchange rules against a defendant in Jasper
County, Georgia, where the court ruled that the underlying contract was illegal under
Georgia law as a futures transaction (and, hence, under the prevailing law, a wager) and
the award of the New York Cotton Exchange unenforceable:
... it by no means follows that any conclusion which a board of arbitrators
may reach with respect to such matters is likewise final and conclusive.
On the contrary, while the law favors the submission to arbitration of
disputes arising between individuals over private matters as to which they
alone are concerned, the submission to arbitrators of questions in which
the public at large is interested is not only discountenanced, but positively
forbidden. Thus ‘parties cannot submit to arbitration the question of the
liability of a person to a criminal prosecution, or matters of an illegal
nature, or a claim which is absolutely forbidden by statute.’ 6 Lawson,
Rights, Rem. & Prac. § 3306. To the same effect, see Morse, Arb. 53, and
2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 557, 558.
Benton v. Singleton, 114 Ga. 548 (1902). Issues implicating the New Orleans Cotton
Exchange also came before Georgia courts. See Phelan v. Vestner, 125 Ga. 825 (1906);
Barrett v. Butler, 52 Ga. App. 704 (1936); but cf. Allen v. Sams, 31 Ga. App. 405 (1923).
342

It may well have been that the cotton exchanges of the State, given the history of the
Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade before them, actively avoided the cooption
by the government which state chartering would have entailed. Lack of formal charter did
not, however, cause the General Assembly to pause before granting special privileges to
the Savannah Cotton Exchange where, for instance, it was necessary to allow the
Exchange to encroach on public property to construct Exchange buildings in Savannah.
See 1884 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 386. These same buildings –located just back from River
Street in the city’s historical district– serve today as a priceless architectural heritage of
Georgia’s nineteenth century commercial history.
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perceived self-interest of merchants seeking effective mechanisms for internal self-discipline and
control, especially as to issues of pricing, uniformity of standards and the enforcement of
internal commodity rules and procedures.
The Savannah Cotton Exchange –its rules, its procedures, its arbitral processes– made
regular appearances in the pages of the Georgia appellate reports343 during the years between
1875 and 1924; a number of these decisions directly framed issues concerning the arbitral
processes of the Exchange.
When the firm of Tison & Gordon, for instance, obtained an arbitral award under the
rules and procedures of the Savannah Cotton Exchange against the firm of Warfield & Wayne
–both of these commercial companies then being members of the Exchange– Warfield & Wayne
refused for reasons not fully revealed by the historical record344 to pay the amount of the award
to the prevailing party. In light of this refusal, the Savannah Cotton Exchange initiated
procedures to expel the defaulting member firm from its rolls. This expulsion was premised upon
the terms of Article 7 of the Association of the Savannah Cotton Exchange which provided that:

343

See, inter alia, Savannah Cotton-Press Association v. McIntyre, 92 Ga. 166 (1893);
Flannery v. Harley, 117 Ga. 483 (1903); Wall v. Bashinski Brothers, 8 Ga. App. 592
(1911); Bashinski Brothers v. Lake, 9 Ga. App. 352 (1911); Batts v. J. H. C. All & Son,
137 Ga. 358 (1912); Lunsford v. Milledgeville Cotton Co., 11 Ga. App. 62 (1912); Kelly
v. Butler, Stevens & Co., 12 Ga. App. 794 (1913); and Graham v. John Flannery Co., 32
Ga. App. 713 (1924).
344

Before both the trial and the appellate courts, Warfield & Wayne argued that the
arbitral tribunal had no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the matter, but the precise
basis of this position, if any there was, is not revealed in the appellate report of the case.
The Savannah Cotton Exchange v. The State ex rel. Warfield & Wayne, 54 Ga. 668
(1875).
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any member who shall be accused of willfully violating the constitution and
bylaws, or of fraudulent breach of contract, or of any proceeding inconsistent with
the just and equitable principles of trade, or of other misconduct, may, on
complaint, be summoned before the full board of directors [of the Exchange], and
if the charges against him be, in the opinion of the board, substantiated, he may,
by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the members of the board, be suspended or
expelled from the exchange.345
When this action was taken against the firm, Warfield & Wayne brought a mandamus
action against the Exchange, contesting the validity of the expulsion. In an opinion which may
be read as expressing a certain pique that the Exchange defended itself on the basis that its action
against its recalcitrant member was not subject to official judicial review in the public courts, the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a ruling by the trial judge in the Superior Court of Chatham
County finding the action of the Exchange subject to examination in the regular courts:
In our judgment, the facts as disclosed in the record, did not make out such a
cause of complaint against the relators as would have authorized the defendant
either to have suspended or expelled them from the exchange under the provisions
of the 1st section of the article of its own fundamental articles of association. ...
The only complaint against the relators that we can discover is, that they refused
to pay Tison & Gordon $435.32 which they claimed had been awarded to them by
an arbitration against which the relators protested and which they respectfully
insisted the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to make, but if they had, the award

345

Id.
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could have been only enforced as any other common-law award. ... If the
defendant has the power and authority to act as an arbitration court under its
charter, in relation to all claims of one of its members against another, arising
from cotton transactions, its decisions and awards are subject to be reviewed and
examined, as far as the legal rights of the parties are concerned, by the judicial
tribunals of the state, in the same manner as the awards of other arbitrators are
reviewed and examined.346
Other cases controlled by the arbitration provisions of the Savannah Cotton Exchange
received much more perfunctory –and supportive– action at the hands of Georgia’s appellate
courts.347
Although arbitral procedures before commercial chambers, boards and associations of the
type reviewed here are not today the most prominent feature of these organizations, this
historical function and significance remains an important feature of the evolution of arbitral
policy in Georgia, especially in the mid- and late nineteenth century.

346
347

Id.

See, e.g., Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 3 (1915), where a defendant questioned
the mutuality of a contract signed on its behalf by an agent of the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court affirmed an order of the Superior Court of Emanuel County upholding the contract
against the defense that it was unilateral, noting that the contract terms provided that “ ...
in case of disagreement under this contract as to weight of the bale, or the interpretation
thereof, such matters should be settled by arbitration, and, in the event of disagreement as
to the grade of the cotton, that samples should be sent to the Savannah Cotton Exchange
for classification, which should be final.”
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Public Law Arbitration in Georgia at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century

As the twentieth century drew to a close, a large number – perhaps even a majority – of
the public law forms of arbitration which had been adopted by the Georgia legislature in the
preceding two hundred and fifty years (such as those regarding commercial and mercantile
chambers, boards and associations considered supra) had either been repealed, merged into other
statutes, or had simply fallen into desuetude. A surprisingly large number of the old statutes,
however, had survived the ravages of time and emerged intact into the new twenty-first century.
Perhaps among the oldest of these was the arbitral process adopted by the legislature during the
1861 war permitting the arbitration of disputes as to damages caused by water diversions (as
well as the necessity for the diversions themselves) by an arbitral panel formed pursuant to the
state’s general arbitration code.348 The power of a guardian to compromise by arbitration
contested claims involving a ward, first granted by a statute adopted in the Georgia legislature in
1863, is preserved in the modern code of Georgia laws as well. 349

348

See 1862-1862 Ga. Laws 171, at § 1. This statute now appears in codified form as
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-72.
349

1863 Original Code, § 2500, codified as O.C.G.A. § 29-2-16. That statute was adopted
to allay concerns harbored at common law over the distinction between a “debt,” on the
one hand, and a “claim,” on the other. At common law, it appears, guardians were vested
with authority to settle and compromise claims in favor of a ward. The Georgia
codification of the common law was broad and reaching, and granted extensive powers to
the guardian to arbitrate all such matters:
A guardian is authorized to compromise all contested or doubtful claims
for or against the ward he represents and may submit such matters to
arbitration. A debtor may be released by the guardian if the release is in
the interest of the ward. Furthermore, the guardian may appoint an
attorney in fact in the matter, for whose acts the guardian shall be
responsible.
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The bulk of the provisions relating to arbitration now appearing in the official Georgia
code, however, are of a far more recent vintage and these, attesting to the flexibility,
adaptability, and utility of the arbitration process, address the resolution of matters which hardly
could have been conceived in the Georgia of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. The
establishment of a power in the Georgia Insurance Commissioner to create panels for the
arbitration of disputed property damage claims under personal private passenger motor vehicle
policies would hardly be an issue, for instance, in an age when motor vehicles did not exist and
the office of the insurance commissioner itself would not come into being until far in the
future.350 Similarly, the adaptation of arbitral processes to resolve civil disputes regarding the
assessment of development impact fees351 and respecting complaints alleging violations of
Georgia’s Fair Housing laws352 is reflective of concerns which did not exist before the turn of the
twentieth century.
Perhaps among the best known and recognized of the extant public law arbitration forms
in Georgia –in large part owing to the wide impact of the law authorizing it– is that which
permits the arbitration between employers and employees of disputes falling within the ambit of
George’s labor and industrial relations laws. This possibility was contemplated as far back as

See Campbell v. Atlanta Coach Co., 58 Ga. App. 825 (1938).
350

1991 Ga. Laws, 1608, at § 1.12, appearing now as O.C.G.A. § 33-34-8.

351

See O.C.G.A. § 36-71-10, adopted as 1990 Ga. Laws 692, at § 1.

352

See O.C.G.A. § 8-3-209, enacted as 1990 Ga. Laws 1284, § 1, providing for the
possibility of binding arbitration in connection with conciliation procedures initiated after
the filing of a complaint alleging violations of the Georgia Fair Housing laws. This
statute goes forward to identify permissible forms of relief in the arbitration procedure,
contemplating money damages among these. See generally O.C.G.A. Title 8, Chapter 3,
Article 4.
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the original adoption of a statutory scheme to regulate labor conditions in the state353 but was
afforded a more modern application after the midpoint of the century by the explicit statutory
prohibition in 1966 of sex discrimination in employment in Georgia.354
Responding to the growing consumer movement in United States, a number of
jurisdictions in the nation attempted, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, to create special
mechanisms and procedures whereby consumer complaints against manufacturers and retailers
of a variety of consumer products, goods, and services could be heard expeditiously, with little
expense, and with only truncated and severely limited involvement in conventional court
structures or procedures. In many states, this led to an elaborate growth in alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms, including arbitration, to address such grievances.355 In 1994, Georgia

353

See O.C.G.A. § 34-2-6, adopted originally as 1911 Ga. Laws 133, §§ 2, 5. In its
modern form, this statute specifically authorizes the Georgia Commissioner of Labor “to
do all in his power to promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of
disputes between employers and employees and to avoid strikes, picketing, lockouts,
boycotts, blacklisting, discriminations, and legal proceedings in matters of employment.”
To accomplish this end, the Commissioner is empowered to “appoint temporary boards
of arbitration, provide necessary expenses of such boards, order reasonable compensation
not exceeding $15.00 per day for each member engaged in such arbitration, prescribe
rules for such arbitration boards, conduct investigations and hearings, publish reports and
advertisements, and do all things convenient and necessary to accomplish the purpose of
this chapter.”
354

1966 Ga. Laws, 582, at § 6, appearing now as O.C.G.A. § 34-5-6. The statute tracks
the familiar patterns of arbitration which developed in the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries calling for the appointment of one arbitrator by each of the disputing
parties. Unusually, however, the third party arbitrator in such sex discrimination
arbitration brought under Georgia’s Sex Discrimination in Employment statute is to be
appointed by the senior judge of the superior court in a county (selected by the two partyappointed arbitrators) adjoining that in which the employer has the place of business
where the discrimination allegedly took place. This judge-appointed arbitrator is to serve,
as the statute has it, as “the chairman of the arbitration committee.”
355

The history of the alternative dispute resolution movement in the United States is
documented by a vast number of resources, much of it addressing specific aspects of that
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joined this growing movement, in that year adopting a comprehensive statute governing “motor
vehicle warranty rights” which, among other features, provided a mechanism whereby such
statutory rights could be enforced through arbitral processes.356 Under the terms of the statute,
which came quickly and popularly to be known in Georgia as the “Lemon Law,” the
administrator of the statutory program was empowered to create “new motor vehicle arbitration
panels,” informal tribunals forbidden any affiliation with any manufacturer or new motor vehicle
dealer, and supported in its functions by staff persons having automotive technical expertise.357
The administrator was charged to develop procedures for presentation of oral and written
testimony before the panels, mechanisms for the production of records and documents, the
issuance of subpoenas, and the receipt of written affidavits of employees and agents of dealers,
manufacturers, parties to the transaction, or from any other potential witness to any violation of
the rights in the warranty rights law.358 Consumer resort to the provisions of the “Lemon Law”
was virtually insured by a provision in the act requiring that, before any common law action
could be filed in any Georgia court in consequence of a breach of an automobile warranty by a
dealer or manufacturer, the purchaser must first have exhausted all available remedies, including
that of arbitration, made available by the act.359 The procedures for use in connection with the

evolution, but a good effort to come to terms with the general parameters of the
phenomenon is Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST . L. REV. 165
(2003).
356

See generally O.C.G.A. § 10-1-786, adopted into law as 1990 Ga. Laws 1013, § 1.

357

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-786(a).

358

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-786(b) (1)-(4).

359

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-786(c).

127
work of the arbitration panel were determined by the statute,360 including the duty of the panel to
reject any consumer claim deemed to be frivolous or supported by insufficient evidence.361
Georgia’s “Lemon Law” was hardly a toothless tiger: the arbitration panel, on finding a violation
of the act, was empowered to enter an award extending to repair of the motor vehicle, repurchase
of the vehicle (including payment to the consumer of all collateral charges and incidental costs),
or replacement of the vehicle362 Failure of the manufacturer or dealer to comply with the award
within forty days of notice of its provisions could, under the terms of the law, result in a fine of
$1,000 each day until compliance.363 Despite the notoriety with which the adoption of the
Lemon Law was accompanied, it does not appear to have been frequently invoked in practice.364
Despite the novelty of many of the applications of the arbitral process in the public law
arena in the last half of the twentieth century, among the very last arbitration statutes adopted by
the General Assembly in that century was one which, ironically in some respects, would have
been quite at home had it been passed by the Georgia legislature two hundred years earlier in the

360

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-787

361

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-787(c).

362

O.C.G.A. § 10-1-784.

363

This fine would accrue until a sum twice the value of the car had been reached, or
until a statutory maximum of $100,000 had been attained. See O.C.G.A. § 10-1-787(h).
364

In Taylor Auto Group, Inc. v. Jessie, 241 Ga. App. 602 (1999), Kondo v. Marietta
Toyota, Inc., 224 Ga. App. 490 (1997) and Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank
PLC, 227 Ga. App. 648 (1997), the act was mentioned, but only peripherally. These
appear to be the only three cases handed down by Georgia’s appellate courts to have
made mention of the act at all, and they do not address its arbitral provisions.
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eighteenth. In 1994, the Seed Arbitration Council was brought into existence by legislative act,
as the statute stipulated in its own terms, to:
provide a method for assisting farmers, persons purchasing seed and commercial
fruit and nut trees, and persons selling seed and commercial fruit and nut trees in
determining the validity of complaints of seed and commercial fruit and nut trees
purchasers against seed and commercial fruit and nut tree sellers relating to the
quality performance of the seed and the identity of the variety of fruit and nut
trees by establishing a committee to investigate, hold informal hearings, make
findings, and render recommendations in the nature of arbitration proceedings
where damages suffered by seed and commercial fruit and nut tree purchasers are
caused by the alleged failure of the seed to perform as represented or to conform
to the description on the labeling thereof as required by law or to be the variety of
fruit or nut tree represented by the seller.365
Unique in Georgia law for its creation of a standing tribunal whose sole function was
participation in an arbitral process,366 the statute establishing the Seed Arbitration Council367

365

O.C.G.A. § 2-11-70(a); 1994 Ga. Laws 1761, § 1.

366

An exception to this proposition is, of course, the long-running arbitral process
controlled by statutory provisions adopted in connection with Georgia’s claims before the
United States Supreme Court in the litigation which was associated with the
environmental pollution visited upon Georgia by Tennessee copper mines in the early
twentieth century. This saga –it endured more than three decades– is discussed, supra, in
this survey’s Chapter One, Section 3 (“Statutory Forms of Informal and Nonjudicialized
Arbitration in Georgia,”), under Legislative Provisions for the Arbitral Resolution of
Civil Disputes.
367

The membership of the council consists of a full member and an alternate member
appointed by each member of the council’s executive committee which in turn consists of
the associate deans of both the Cooperative Extension Service and for the experimental
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owed much, if not to the letter then at least to the spirit, of the Georgia Lemon Law adopted only
four years earlier by the legislature. Like the earlier law, the Seed Arbitration Council statute
prescribes its procedure, tasking the Agriculture Commissioner to provide technical expertise to
the council from the commissioner’s own staff.368 The statute constituting the council
specifically authorizes it to hold hearings in the discharge of its arbitral functions, and it does so
in terms which would have found resonance in General Oglethorpe and those who, with him,
founded the utopian colony of Georgia in 1733: the meetings are required to be informal and,
moreover, while attorneys may be present at the sessions, they may not directly participate in
them.369 The process before the council concludes with its report of findings and
recommendations which is to be transmitted to the parties, making such recommendations as it
deems fair and equitable under the circumstances. The council is specifically authorized to enter
a recommendation for the payment of money damages to the purchaser of defective seed or of

stations of the College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences of the University of
Georgia; the president of the Georgia Farm Bureau Federation; the executive committee
of the Georgia Seedmen’s Association; and the Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture.
These individuals serve gratuitously, receiving only travel allowances for their service.
O.C.G.A. § 2-11-74.
368

O.C.G.A. § 2-11-75(c)-(d). The commissioner is to adopt rules and regulations
governing the hearings and other functions of the council, and the council may, in the
discharge of its functions, examine the purchaser on the use of the seed or tree in
question, or the seller on the issue of labeling and packaging of the seed or tree. It may, at
its election, grow a sample of the seed or tree to production for purposes of testing
compliance of the product to the seller’s representations.
369

O.C.G.A. § 2-11-75(c)(3): the council is to “[h]old informal hearings at a reasonable
time as directed by the chairperson. At such hearing, the purchaser and seller shall be
allowed to present their side of the dispute before the council. Attorneys may be present,
provided that no attorney may participate directly in the proceeding . . .” In what seems
an obvious exclusion of Atlanta, the statute further directs that hearings of the council are
to be conducted in Tifton, Macon, Athens, or Rome. O.C.G.A. § 2-11-75(b).
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nonconforming fruit and nut trees.370 Lacking the draconian character of its Lemon Law
analogue, no provision is made in the act for penalties against a recalcitrant seller who fails to
abide by a council decision beyond a somewhat weak provision stipulating that, in any
subsequent lawsuit on the same subject matter, the party electing to do so may introduce into
evidence the report of the arbitration prepared by the council “ as evidence of the facts found in
the report” but, significantly, the findings and conclusions of the council are not admissible as
evidence before the court.371

Conclusion

Informal and nonjudicial arbitration has always existed in Georgia and, as this review has
indicated, such “rustic” arbitration has played an important role in the resolution of disputes in
virtually every facet of public and private life in both the colony and the state, from church
property disputes, contests over the evaluation of property for tax purposes, the reduction of
environmental pollution, disagreements between members of mercantile boards, chambers and
associations, the redress of consumer complaints about purchases, large and small, and the
myriad of other disagreements offered up by the ever-changing kaleidoscope of human conflict.
Even so, the “natural home” of arbitration –that arena where it has most often appeared and
where it arguably has had the most utility and influence– has been the resolution of purely
private (very often commercial) disputes and disagreements, subject to the formalized strictures

370

O.C.G.A. § 2-11-76 (a)(1)-(4), passim.

371

O.C.G.A. § 2-11-76(b).
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of a legal code linking it essentially and intimately with the conventional courts and their powers
of oversight and coercive enforcement. It is to the history of this formal and judicialized arbitral
procedure in Georgia that this study now turns.
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CHAPTER TWO
FORMAL AND JUDICIALIZED ARBITRATION IN GEORGIA:
A DOCTRINAL AND ANALYTICAL EXCURSUS
The great variety of forms of informal and nonjudicialized arbitration known in Georgia
in its colonial and early republican past continued to evolve well into the middle of the
nineteenth century and the approach of war at the beginning of the 1860s; by that time, however,
the early models of arbitral process which had been known in Georgia were giving way to more
formal systems of arbitration which were, to a greater or lesser extent, integrated into the judicial
structure as ancillary or adjunct to the dispute resolution taking place within more structured
world of Georgia’s courthouses. Prior to the major legislative reform initiative of 1988
considered later in this review, these earlier statutory provisions relating to formal, court-linked
arbitration were a somewhat overlapping, sometimes confused and confusing, and always
intricate set of legislative terms premised upon common law principles evolved in Georgia
courts over time, on the one hand, and, on the other, both individual, discrete, and more
comprehensive statutory provisions which were the result of specific initiatives at times in
Georgia’s legal past. While the pre-1988 statutory maze is now largely a matter of the history of
arbitration in Georgia, and although a specific understanding of those statutes is not necessarily
required for the understanding and application of the post-1988 provisions, a general analytical
review of pre-1988 statutory law and doctrine touching on arbitration in Georgia is helpful in
understanding not only the arbitration history of the state but also the substance and content of
the terms and provisions of the 1988 reforms themselves and, therefore, the state of modern
arbitration law in Georgia. The past is indeed prologue, and an appreciation of the doctrinal and
analytical aspects of the statutory law of this state regarding arbitration as it existed before 1988
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will also serve to underscore the importance and significance of the statutory reforms of that
year.
The statutory antecedents of Georgia arbitration law extend to English roots in the
period before the de jure foundation of the colony of Georgia in 1732. In the mid-nineteenth
century, William Hotchkiss was commissioned by the Georgia legislature to prepare a
compilation of statutory laws of the State of Georgia then in force,372 to include the prerevolutionary English legislation which –not being repugnant to the legal and constitutional
principles of the new state– was continued of force in Georgia. In his Codification of the Statute
Law of Georgia, including the English Statutes of Force, published in New York in 1845,
Hotchkiss included, as elements of the statutory law of Georgia bearing on arbitration,
seventeenth century statutes adopted in the time of William III, statutes universally and well

372

William A. Hotchkiss had begun the preparation of a digest of Georgia statutes when,
in 1843, he obtained the passage of a resolution of the Georgia Senate, on the
recommendation of the Committee on the Judiciary, that the state purchase up to two
thousand copies of his work if, after review by a committee of three persons, these made
a report attesting “to the correctness and fidelity of said codification.” See 1843 Ga.
Laws, Vol. I, 230. Hotchkiss’ work –formally, CODIFICATION OF THE STATUTE LAW OF
GEORGIA, INCLUDING THE ENGLISH STATUTES OF FORCE (New York: 1845) was not, of
course, a “codification” in the strict sense but rather a digest: it was not intended to be a
legally binding restatement of the law but rather a re-publication of existing statutory
law, organized in a rational and accessible way for the use primarily of the bench and bar.
See Chanin & Cassidy, GUIDE TO GEORGIA LEGAL RESEARCH AND LEGAL HISTORY
(1990). In 1845, the legislature appropriated $11,500 for payment to Hotchkiss for his
“Codification of the Statute Laws of the State.” 1845 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 4. In 1847, the
legislature authorized the provision of copies of the Hotchkiss’ work to official libraries
in other states and territories of the federal union “to reciprocate the courtesy of such
States as have presented us with their respective State Histories, by transmitting to them
severally a copy of the History of Georgia; and also to extend the same courtesy to any
individual who may present the State with valuable statistical, geographical and historical
works for the public library.” See 1847 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 312.
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known in the general history of arbitration, and which arguably can be said to have directly
affected arbitration and its development in Georgia in the late eighteenth century and the first
half of the nineteenth century:
It shall and may be lawful for all merchants and traders, and others desiring to
end any controversy, suit or quarrel, controversies, suits or quarrels, for which
there is no other remedy but by personal action or by suit in equity, by arbitration,
to agree that their submission of their suit to the award or umpirage of any person
or persons should be made a rule of any of his majesty’s courts of record, which
the parties shall choose, and to insert such their agreement in their submission, or
the condition of the bond or promise, whereby they oblige themselves
respectively to submit to the award or umpirage of any person or persons, which
agreement being so made and inserted in their submission or promise, or
condition of their respective bonds, shall or may, upon producing an affidavit
thereof, may by the witnesses thereto, or any one of them, in the court of which
the same is agreed to be made a rule, and reading and filing the said affidavit in
court, be entered of record in such court, and a rule shall thereupon be made by
the said court, that the parties shall submit to, and be finally concluded by the
arbitration or umpirage which shall be made concerning them by the arbitrators or
umpire, pursuant to such submission.
*

*

*

And in case of disobedience to such arbitration or umpirage, the party neglecting
or refusing to perform and execute the same, or any part thereof, shall be subject
to all the penalties of contemning a rule of court, when he is a suitor or defendant

135
in such court, and the court on motion shall issue process accordingly, which
process shall not be stopped or delayed in its execution, by any order, rule,
command, or process of any other court, either of law or equity, unless it shall be
made to appear on oath, to such court, that the arbitrators or umpire misbehaved
themselves, and that such award, arbitration or umpirage, was procured by
corruption or other undue means. 373
Yet another seventeenth century English statute was cataloged by Hotchkiss as having
force and effect in Georgia:
Any arbitration or umpirage procured by corruption or undue means, shall be
judged and esteemed void and of none effect, and accordingly be set aside by any
court of law or equity, so as complaint of such corruption or undue practice be
made in the court where the rule is made for submission to such arbitration or

373

9, 10 William III 1698, xv 1, Schley 303-304. On William Schley’s earlier
compilation of English statutory law effective in Georgia at the time of the Revolution
(May 14, 1776), see Erwin C. Surrency, The Georgia Code of 1863 and Its Place in the
Codification Movement, 11 J. SOUTHERN LEG . HIST . 81 (2003). Writing in Kulukundis
Shipping Co., S.A. v. Amtrog Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (1942), Judge Frank noted
with respect to these early parliamentary efforts:
... Parliament ... enacted a statute, 9 Wm.III c. 15 (1698), designed to
remedy the situation by providing that, if an agreement to arbitrate so
provided, it could be made a “rule of court” (i.e, a court order), in which
event it became irrevocable, and one who revoked it would be subject to
punishment for contempt of court; but the submission was revocable until
such a rule of court had been obtained. This statute, limited in scope, was
narrowly construed and was of little help. The ordinary executory
arbitration agreement thus lost all real efficacy since it was not
specifically enforceable in equity, and was held not to constitute the basis
of a plea in bar in, or stay of, a suit on the original cause of action. In
admiralty, the rulings were much the same.
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umpirage, before the last day of the next term after such arbitration or umpirage
made and published to the parties.374
Supported by continuing English statutes such as these of William III providing for
formal arbitration linked to the court system and by a robust tradition of resort to informal
arbitration throughout the colony and the young state, arbitration remained a staple feature of
dispute resolution in Georgia throughout the end of the eighteenth century when, in 1799, during
virtually the last meeting of the Georgia legislature prior to the close of that century, the General
Assembly adopted –as an integral part of the famous Georgia Judiciary Act of that year– its first
initiative in the field of arbitral dispute resolution. This statute was to remain of force and effect
in Georgia for nearly one hundred and ninety years, being repealed by the legislature only in
1988:
In all matters submitted to reference by parties, in a suit under a rule of court or
other agreement in writing signed by the parties, judgment shall be entered up by
the party in whose favor the award is given, and execution shall issue for the sums
awarded, to be paid as they respectively come due, and to be levied on the
property of the party against whom the judgment shall have been entered up, and
such other proceedings shall be had thereon by the court as in cases of judgments
entered up on verdicts of juries: Provided, that no judgment shall be entered upon
an award where it shall appear any other cause or causes stand on the docket of
the court against the defendant or defendants, undetermined, before the cause in
which a rule or other agreement in writing for arbitration is entered.375

374
375

9, 10 William III 1697, xv 2, Schley 306.

See 1799 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 33, § 30; OLIVER H. PRINCE, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF
THE STATE OF GEORGIA 212-213 (Milledgeville: 1822), previously codified as O.C.G.A.
§ 9-9-70 (repealed 1988). Among the very few other general arbitral statutes (i.e., those
not restricted in their terms to application within a specified agency, institution, or
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The stage was thus set in Georgia for an elaboration of the statutory framework for
arbitration in the nineteenth century. That elaboration was to prove itself of spectacular
dimensions.

Section 1. The Common Law of Arbitration in Georgia, Codified and Uncodified

Given the generally supportive nature and affirmative character of these statutory
initiatives of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, arbitration then developed apace
on an uncodified, common law basis in the Georgia courts, a form of arbitration practice rooted
in the daily applications of the Georgia bench and bar, and evolving largely independently of the
sparse (but nonetheless very important) general statutory initiatives of the Georgia legislature
adopted before the mid-point of the nineteenth century. The decisional law surviving from this
early period of Georgia’s arbitration history – essentially, the period after the adoption of the

corporation) adopted by the General Assembly of the State of Georgia before the middle
of the nineteenth century was one addressing arbitration in the context of land
evaluations in condemnations by railroad companies:
In all cases where a majority of appraisers, appointed under the authority
of any act or acts of incorporation of any railroad, or railroad and canal
company, shall agree, and return their award in conformity to the rules
provided in such act or acts of incorporation, the same shall be deemed
and held to be the award of the appraisers, and such other proceedings by
appeal or otherwise, shall be had thereon, as are provided for in said act or
acts of incorporation, severally.
See 1839 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 191, § 1. Other major general arbitration statutes of the
nineteenth century, including the important legislation of 1856 and 1863, are reviewed in
some detail, infra.
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1799 “submission to reference” statute but before the legislature’s adoption of Georgia’s first
true arbitration code in 1856– provides the student an unsurpassed glimpse into a legal world
now long past, somehow alien and foreign to modern assumptions regarding alternative dispute
resolution but somehow, at one and the same time, oddly familiar. Few vestiges of this chapter
of Georgia’s legal past remain with us today.376

376

With clear relevance, for instance, to some issues which bedevil modern arbitration
practice in Georgia even at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Georgia Supreme
Court in 1850 ruled that an arbitral award may be set aside where the arbitrators,
intending to decide according to the law, commit a plain legal mistake, an analogue
perhaps to more modern concerns with manifest disregard of law by arbitrators in
fashioning arbitral awards. See Crabtree v. Green, 8 Ga. 8 (1850). The same policy of
low tolerance for arbitrator mistake reared its head in the later decision of the court in
King v. Armstrong, 25 Ga. 264 (1858), where the arbitral panel had failed in its award to
address the issue of the disputed use of waters from a millpond, a matter –the opinion
written by Justice Benning noted– of great importance to the appellant King. Justice
Benning’s decision, in which Justice Lumpkin concurred, held merely that such a mistake
on the part of the arbitrators would justify the grant of a motion to set aside the award
and subsequent judgment, relying on English precedent for this result. Lumpkin, pointing
out that a failure to set the award aside would only lead to a later petition for injunctive
relief by King in a chancery court, decried this circuity in terms that were classic
Lumpkin:
It is conceded that should Armstrong attempt to interfere hereafter, that a
Court of Equity would interpose by injunction and restrain him upon the
case made in the record: why this doubt, delay and expense? Equity!
Equity! Equity! Drive a citizen to resort to equity to do that, which a Court
of law can just as effectually do now! Such absurdity cannot long
withstand the battle axe of reform and the reign of reason and common
sense, ushered in with the present century, but which until within the last
twenty-five years, made but little advance in overturning the superstitious
devotion to precedent and antiquity, which have so long retarded the
progress of legal science.
King v. Armstrong, 25 Ga. 264 (1858). Other decisions on Georgia’s early Supreme
Court demonstrated similar intolerance for substantive or procedural irregularity in the
common law arbitral process on the part of arbitrators. See Cameron v. Castleberry, 29
Ga. 495 (1859) (the panel’s consideration of improper evidence against the losing party
will sustain a motion to set the award aside). Nor was the court a respecter of persons
when it came to insistence on strict compliance with standards of fairness in common law
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As every student of Georgia legal history knows, the Georgia common law originating in
the courts of the state in the first half of the nineteenth century became a major theoretical
foundation and source of substantive principles for the first Code of Georgia, first adopted in
1861 and to later become effective as law in Georgia in 1863, under the aegis and inspiration of
Thomas R. R. Cobb and his father-in-law, Joseph Henry Lumpkin. 377 The “Cobb Code” was, in
its entirety, formally a recapitulation of principles which had been handed down in the form of
Georgia case law from the time of the Revolution: as such, it was the express intent of its
framers not to introduce new principles into Georgia jurisprudence, but only to restate, organize,
and rationalize the law as it had been defined by the Georgia judiciary both before the creation of
Georgia’s Supreme Court in 1845 and, of course, after that point in time.378

arbitral procedures. In Walker v. Walker, 28 Ga. 140 (1859), the court set aside the
portion of an award with respect to which the aggrieved party had not received adequate
notice of a hearing by the umpire, even though the umpire was none other than Eugenius
A. Nisbet, one of the members of the original Supreme Court of Georgia as it was first
constituted in 1846. In yet another opinion arising from the conduct of a common law
arbitration before the outbreak of war in 1861, the court held – somewhat incongruously
given the usual strictness with which it approached the discharge of common law
arbitrator duties – that the legal representatives of a party in litigation had the authority to
make a reference to arbitration without first obtaining the consent of the complainant. See
Wade v. Powell, 31 Ga. 1 (1860).
377

See, on the history of the Original Code of 1863, Jefferson James Davis, The Georgia
Code of 1863: America’s First Comprehensive Code, 14 JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN LEGAL
HISTORY, Vol. IV, No. 1 & 2, (1995-1996). See also Bond Almand, The Preparation and
Adoption of the Code of 1863 14 GEORGIA BAR JOURNAL 161 (1951). A recent
contribution to the scholarship in this area is Erwin C. Surrency, The Georgia Code of
1863 and Its Place in the Codification Movement, 11 J. SOUTHERN LEG . HIST . 81 (2003).
378

The Code was formally adopted into law during the 1860 sitting of the Georgia
legislature. See 1860 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 24, the General Assembly stipulating “[t]hat the
Revised Code of Laws prepared under its authority, by Richard H. Clark, Thomas R. R.
Cobb and David Irwin, Esqr's., and revised and fully examined by its committee, and
recommended and reported for adoption, (The manuscript whereof now being on file in
the Executive Department,) be, and the same is hereby adopted, as the Code of Georgia;
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Under the Georgia common law rules as recapitulated by General Cobb and his
committee, it was recognized that “parties disagreeing as to their rights or liabilities [might]
submit the matter [in dispute] to third persons to decide, and the award made by such arbitrators
will be binding on the person submitting the matter.”379 The Georgia courts took the view that
this code provision rendered unnecessary any order to make the award the judgment of the court,
and that such awards were binding without judgment being entered through the courts unless
they were attacked for fraud in the arbitrators or parties, for a palpable mistake of law, or for
reference to chance or lot, as stated in the terms of the statute.380
The scope of arbitrability under the common law Cobb Code provisions was virtually
unlimited and was, indeed, more exhaustive than that which was to appear in later Georgia
statutes: “Nothing contained in this [code] shall prevent any party from submitting any and all

to be of force and take effect, on the first of January, 1862.” War-time conditions delayed
the effective date of the new code until 1863. See 1861 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 28 (“ ... the ...
revised Code of Laws shall go into operation the 1st day of January, 1863, and not
before.”). Some consideration may have been given to additional revisions to the Code
prior to its effective date, the 1861 legislation providing that “... so soon as said Code has
been properly published and indexed, the Governor is authorized and instructed to take
the necessary steps to furnish each member of the present General Assembly with a copy,
to the end that he may examine and prepare to decide upon the merits of the same,
previous to the next meeting of the legislature.” Id.
379
380

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 (repealed 1988).

See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11 (repealed 1988). See also Brand v. Sorrels, 61 Ga. 162 (1878);
Jones v. Bond, 76 Ga. 517 (1886); Johns v. Security Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 125 (1934). In
addition, the Cobb Code made clear the proposition that “guardians, trustees, executors
or administrators may, in good faith and with proper prudence, submit to arbitration the
matters in controversy in connection with the estates they represent” and that any
arbitration award rendered, with respect to disputes arising in the administration of such
estates, could be made the judgment of the court. See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2 (repealed 1988).
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matters381 of controversy to the arbitration and award of any number of arbitrators whether the
matter is in litigation or otherwise. When so submitted, the proceedings shall be governed by
this code and the common law.”382 Consonant in spirit with this wide scope383 of arbitrability, the

381

Not, strictly speaking, “all” matters, of course:
The Georgia statutes provide that agreements to arbitrate existing
controversies are valid. However, the statutes make no express provision
with respect to contracts calling for the arbitration of future controversies.
Georgia courts ... continue[d] to apply the common-law rule that such
agreements [to arbitrate future disputes] are revocable at any time prior to
the rendition of the award. ...‘[T]he mere executory agreement to submit
[to arbitration] is generally revocable. Otherwise nothing would be easier
than for the more astute party to oust the courts of jurisdiction.’ ... [T]he
courts have continued to hold that unrestricted executory arbitration
agreements are contrary to public policy and may be revoked at any time.
Despite [however] the intransigent position of the Georgia judiciary
regarding agreements to arbitrate all future controversies, the Georgia
courts will enforce executory arbitration provisions that limit their
applicability to specific questions, such as the amount of loss or damage.

See, Note, Commercial Arbitration in Georgia, 12 GA. L. REV. 323, 337-338 (1978).
This article, appearing just before the Georgia legislature’s adoption of the Construction
Arbitration Code in 1978, does not address that or, of course, any subsequent arbitration
legislation in Georgia. It remains, however, perhaps the finest survey and analysis in
print of the pre-1978 arbitration law of Georgia. See also, on the old “ouster” rule which
operated generally to invalidate arbitration “future dispute” clauses in Georgia until the
adoption of the late twentieth century codes, Leonard v. House, 15 Ga. 473 (1854) and
Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98 (1904); see also Millican Electric Co. v. Fisher, 102 Ga.
App. 309 (1960) (contract to refer disputed matters to arbitration insufficient to oust
courts of law or equity of jurisdiction and, except where agreement provides that parties
shall arbitrate their differences as a condition precedent to right to sue, party may resort
to courts to settle dispute).
382

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4 (repealed 1988).

383

There were certainly limitations.
Under common law arbitration “any and all matters” may be submitted to
arbitration. ... Yet, an award may be set aside if “defective for some
manifest cause.” Wood v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 95 Ga. App. 205,
207, 97 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1957). Violation of established public policy
would appear to be “manifest cause.” Further, § 7–219 [O.C.G.A. § 9-9-
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arbitral procedure envisioned by the Cobb Code was quite flexible, the statute providing that
“pending litigation may be referred to an arbitration under an order of court by consent of the
parties; and the award, when rendered, may be made the judgment of the court.”384 This
liberality was further in evidence in the code provisions stipulating that the agreement to
arbitrate (the “submission”) could be oral and the award likewise could be rendered orally if the
matter in dispute did not exceed the sum of $500385 ; “however, all submissions [submitted] by
persons acting as Trustees must be in writing, and the award in such a case must also be rendered
in writing.”386 The arbitrators were, of course, governed by the terms of the parties’ agreement
to arbitrate, since arbitration was regarded as a matter of contract and consent: “[a]rbitrators
should not exceed their authority. An award should cover all matters submitted and should be
rendered in accordance with the terms of the submission.”387 The Cobb Code contemplated,

51(a)] authorizes a challenge to an award “otherwise illegal,” again
providing statutory grounds for vacating an award violative of public
policy. Of course, the courts may decline to enforce an award, as well as
vacate one, on the same grounds.
Note, Commercial Arbitration in Georgia, 12 GA. L. REV. 323, 340 at fn. 99 (1978).
384

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-3 (repealed 1988).

385

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-5 (repealed 1988).

386

Id.

387

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6 (repealed 1988). This is, of course, reflective of the basic contract
rule that parties are generally not bound to a contract unless they agree to be so bound.
Both the common-law and statutory modes of arbitration in Georgia
[were] premised upon the voluntary agreement of the parties to arbitrate
their disputes. Arbitrability –whether the particular dispute is within the
scope of the parties agreement to arbitrate– is often a source of
controversy. Because the arbitration clause, whether restrictive or not, can
be ambiguous as to the subject matter, the parties may disagree on
whether a particular issue is within the purview of the submission. Since
arbitration is a matter of contract, no one can be compelled to have a
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however, those situations where the submission of the parties might be expressed in vague or
general terms, broad and comprehensive, and perhaps not well defined, a situation which might
very well have arisen with some frequency, given the fact that submissions could be of a verbal
nature. “Under a general submission,” ran the language of the code, “ the arbitrators are bound
to decide only those matters brought to their consideration by the parties.”388
Anticipating modern practice which features both a single arbitrator and panels of
multiple (very typically, three) arbitrators, the 1863 Code stipulated that “[i]f an umpire is
provided for in the submission, an award by him alone or jointly with the arbitrators will be
good.”389 The framers of the 1863 Code considered as well the possibility of an award exceeding
the submission of the parties, providing in such a case, that “if an award covers too much, and
the excessive part can be separated from the rest, that which is good shall remain valid”390 ; and,
by analogy, “if an award is defective in part, that which is valid, if capable of separation, shall
stand.”391 Case law developed under the 1863 legislation also addressed the circumstance where
the award of the arbitrators did not exhaust the permissible range of the submission by the
parties, providing that while an award must generally cover all the matters submitted, if the
words of the award are not coextensive with the submission by the parties, the award is

specific dispute decided by an arbitrator unless he has clearly manifested
such an intention.
Note, Commercial Arbitration in Georgia, 12 GA. L. REV. 323, 342 (1978), citing, in fn.
110, Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). Cf. Bowen & Bowen
Construction Co. v. Fowler, 2004 WL 26735.
388

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-7 (repealed 1988).

389

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-8 (repealed 1988).

390

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-10(a) (repealed 1988).

391

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-10(b) (repealed 1988).
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nevertheless valid, as long as it determines matters actually in dispute between the parties.392 It
would appear that the general policy of the courts, in the interpretation of the scope of the
submission of the parties, was generally expansive,393 but there were, of course, limits upon the
liberality of the court, the Georgia judges holding void any award which failed to address the
only issue submitted by the parties to arbitration.394
Of special concern, interest and bearing on the integrity of the arbitral process is the
scope of judicial intervention available to block the enforcement of an award or to set it aside
after its rendition. In this respect, the provisions of the 1863 Cobb Code reflecting the common
law position of Georgia was quite broad but, at the same time, somewhat amorphous: “An award
may be set aside,” the 1863 law provided, “for any unfair advantage given to either party in the
hearing of the case or the rendering of the award, for fraud by the arbitrators or by either party in
obtaining the award, for a palpable mistake of law, or for a reference of any matter to chance or
lot.”395 Under this standard, it was regularly held by Georgia courts that parties would not be
generally heard to impeach the regularity or fairness of the findings of the arbitrators.396 Arbitral
awards under the Georgia common law provisions were viewed favorably and, as a result, the
courts noted that it was a quite difficult undertaking to set such awards aside.397 The appeal to

392

Crabtree v. Green, 8 Ga. 8 (1850).

393

See, e.g., Fowler v. Jackson, 86 Ga. 337 (1890).

394

Beckham v. Beckham, 129 Ga. 831 (1908).

395

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11 (repealed 1988).

396

Eberhardt v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 Ga. App. 340 (1913); see also Johns v. Security Ins.
Co., 49 Ga. App. 125 (1934).
397

Hardin v. Almand, 64 Ga. 582 (1880); see also Johns v. Security Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App.
125 (1934).
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the statutory basis of fraud would have to be clearly and distinctly established before the award
would be set aside on that basis.398 It was also regarded as an insufficient defense to the
enforcement of an award that the award was inadequate399 or excessive.400
This generally supportive policy of the Georgia courts respecting the arbitral process was
reflected in their determination to sustain awards except in most unusual circumstances: “where
a matter at issue between two parties is submitted to third persons for their determination, and
these persons render an award which does not exceed the authority given to them in the
submission and is in strict accordance therewith, the parties will not be heard to impeach the
regularity or fairness of their findings,”401 this in application of the presumption in favor of the
regularity and fairness of awards.402
There were, of course, boundaries to the tolerance of the courts in the enforcement of
arbitral awards, but these were generally reflected in those defenses which one would expect in a
system based upon consent and contractual agreement: while an award made in appraisal and
arbitration proceedings pursuant to an insurance policy, for instance, was a creature of contract
rather than of law, it could presumably be attacked for any reason which would otherwise void
any other contract, and also for fraud in the arbitrators or in either party in obtaining the award,
for a palpable mistake of law, or for a reference of any matter to chance or lot.403 Partiality of

398

Overby v. Thrasher, 47 Ga. 10 (1872); Johns v. Security Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 125
(1934).
399

Pacific Natl. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 87 Ga. App. 294 (1952).

400

Johns v. Security Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 125 (1934).

401

Id.

402

Pacific Natl. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 87 Ga. App. 294 (1952).

403

Ibid; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11 (repealed 1988), discussed more fully, infra.
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the arbitrators was, of course, a statutory basis for the refusal of enforcement of an award or for
setting it aside, and the Georgia courts did not require that this partiality be reflected in an unjust
award in order for this basis of defense to be available to an offended party. 404 As a general
matter, the courts took the position that an arbitral award would not be set aside as being
contrary to the evidence if there was any evidence to sustain the award;405 but, of course, there
were limits to this doctrine as well, the courts holding that “an award of an arbitrator will not be
set aside on the ground that it is illegal because contrary to the evidence unless it is so contrary
to the evidence as to require the inference that it is the result of an unfair advantage given to
either party, fraud, accident, or palpable mistake of law or fact on the part of the arbitrator.406

404

See Edwards v. Employer’s Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 219 Ga. 121 (1963).

405

Fisher v. Gause, 236 Ga. 663 (1976).

406

Id. See also Ralston v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386 (1999), a case decided
long after the disappearance of former O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11 (repealed 1988), in which the
Court of Appeals took pains to point out that the statutory bar to enforcement of an award
made as a result of a “palpable mistake of law” –as contemplated by that former code
section– did not, under the controlling precedent of the Georgia Supreme Court, survive
either in the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code or in the cases decided subject to it under the
nomer of “manifest disregard of law.” The adoption by way of a 2003 amendment to the
Georgia Arbitration Code of this latter doctrine as law in Georgia is discussed in more
detail, infra, in this survey’s Chapter Two, Section 6 (“The 2003 Amendment to the 1988
Georgia Arbitration Code: Manifest Disregard of Law.”
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Section 2. The Arbitration Code of 1856

The final significant intervention into the field of formal and court-linked arbitration by
the Georgia General Assembly in the nineteenth century took place in the legislative session of
1856 when the General Assembly, intending to provide a counterbalance to O.C.G.A. § 9-9-70
(the statutory provision of 1799, repealed in 1988, providing for the referral to arbitration of
cases then pending in litigation), adopted a special statutory code consisting of more than twenty
separate sections governing arbitration in those instances when the matter was referred to
arbitration “out of court,” that is, when the matter was, at the time of submission, not pending
before a court.407 This statutory initiative may have been in response to a perceived need to
provide balance in the Code for the earlier statutory provisions governing “common law”
arbitration and those pertaining to “in court” arbitration, but in point of fact, the Code of 1856
went further in scope than did either the 1799 legislation or that which was prepared by General
Cobb in the late 1850s resulting in the Cobb Code of 1863.
The primary difference between common law and statutory arbitration [was]
procedural: under the common law scheme “the award need not be made the

407

1855-1856 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 222-224 (§§ I-XX). As important and central as was the
effect of the 1856 Code in statutorily authorizing arbitration outside of the context of
pending litigation, this matter was left by the legislative terms to indirection: where the
eighteenth century legislation was limited to circumstances where, “[i]n all matters
submitted to reference by parties, in a suit under a rule of court or other agreement in
writing signed by the parties, judgment [is to be] be entered up by the party in whose
favor the award is given, and execution shall issue for the sums awarded,” the 1856 law
was subject to no such limitation, it providing broadly that “[a]ll persons having matters
of controversy may submit the same to Arbitration.” See Ibid, at 222, ¶ 7, § I.
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judgment of any court, but is binding on the parties until accepted to and set aside
[on grounds of fraud, mistake of law, or reference to chance or lot] ... ; whereas
under the [statutory scheme] ... the award must be entered on the minutes of the
superior court. ...” Therefore, under common law arbitration the arbitrator’s
award is binding until set aside whereas statutory arbitration [under the 1856 law]
requires that the arbitrator’s award be returned to the superior court and the
provisions of the statute complied with before the award is binding.408
The 1856 Code was specific in its evidentiary requirements for submissions and in the
permissible scope of agreements to arbitrate:
To entitle the award to be made the judgment of the court, a submission to
arbitration shall be in writing. It shall contain a clear and accurate statement of
the matters and controversies submitted and any other matter that may be
pertinent to submission and shall also contain the names of the arbitrators chosen
by the parties. The submission shall be delivered to one of the arbitrators chosen
by the parties; when this is done, the submission shall be irrevocable, except by
consent of all the parties.409

408

Note, Commercial Arbitration in Georgia, 12 GA. L. REV. 323, 336 (1978). It is
tempting to think of the arbitrator’s award under the 1799 legislation as being in the
nature of the act of a special master or, perhaps, a special verdict: as an act within the
authority of the court, no return is needed or necessary; the 1856 law, on the other hand,
contemplated an arbitral procedure outside the ambit of the court’s normal function and
therefore required a return to the court for coercive effect and force.
409

1855-1856 Ga. Laws, p. 222, § III, later codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-9-30 (repealed
1988).
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This provision is, of course, significant in a number of important respects. While it was
limited to the submission of existing disputes, the language of the section clarified and made
certain the understanding that, once submitted to the arbitrators, the agreement to arbitrate would
be irrevocable, contrary to the common law position in Georgia which provided for the
revocability of agreements to arbitrate at any time prior to the announcement of the award by the
arbitrators.410 Similarly, the 1856 law eliminated the practice of oral submissions to arbitration,
a practice long countenanced by the common law of this state.411
The 1856 Code showed a special sensitivity to issues of a procedural nature in the arbitral
process. Hence, that code specified that “every arbitration under this part shall be composed of
three arbitrators. One arbitrator shall be chosen by each of the parties and one shall be selected
by the arbitrators chosen by the parties,” a process closely approximating that which is
customary in modern arbitrations.412 Again reflecting modern practice, the code provided that

410

Old practices died hard, however, and the revocability of arbitral agreements appears
to have remained clouded in Georgia practice, even after the adoption of the 1856
statutory provision declaring that agreements to arbitrate would be irrevocable, except
with the consent of the parties. In Register v. Herrin, 110 Ga. App. 736 (1964), the
Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the right to revocation of the arbitral
agreement would be subject to leave of the court, a matter within the sound discretion of
the bench.
411

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-30 (repealed 1988). See Brannon v. Price, 29 Ga. App. 333 (1922).
Curious results would sometimes obtain because of the common law rule permitting oral
agreements to arbitrate, while such oral agreements were not permitted under the 1856
legislation. For instance, where parties initiated the arbitral process in writing in strict
compliance with the provisions of the 1856 law, a subsequent verbal appointment of an
arbitrator would convert the procedure into one governed, not by the statute, but by
common law. See Jones v. Payne, 41 Ga. 23 (1870).
412

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-31 (repealed 1988); see also 1855-1856 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 222, at ¶ 8,
§ II.
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each of the arbitrators chosen by the parties would then cooperate to choose a third party, 413 with
the stipulation, equally consistent with modern arbitral standards, that the arbitrators so chosen
were regarded as impartial and not beholden to the party appointing them. 414 The 1856 Code
provisions also seemingly contemplated the situation where one of the arbitrators (perhaps the
parties themselves) would be recalcitrant and uncooperative in the process of selecting a third
arbitrator. In such a situation, “if either of the arbitrators selected by the parties fail[ed] to attend
at the time and place of meeting or [was] disqualified, the party whose arbitrator [was] absent or
disqualified shall then choose another in his place. If the arbitrator chosen by the arbitrators is
absent or disqualified, the arbitrators chosen by the parties shall choose another in his place. The
arbitrators so chosen shall have all the powers of the arbitrators first chosen.”415
Distinguishing statutory arbitration under the 1856 legislation from the accepted practice
of the common law, it was required that, in the statutory form, arbitrators proceed under oath:
“[b]efore the arbitrators enter upon a hearing of a case to make up their award, they shall be
sworn to determine impartially the matter submitted to them accordance to law and the justice
and equity of the case without favor or affection to either party. They may administer this oath
to each other.”416 Under the common law, however, it had been determined that no oath was
required on the part of the arbitrator before entering into the performance of his duties.417 The

413

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-32 (repealed 1988); see also 1855-1856 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 222, at ¶ 8,
§ II.
414

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-34 (repealed 1988); see also 1855-1856 Ga. Laws, Vol. I, 222, at ¶ 17,
§ XI. See also Wilkins v. Van Winkle & Co., 78 Ga. 557 (1887).
415

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-33 (repealed 1988).

416

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-34 (repealed 1988).

417

Southern Livestock Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 113 Ga. 1088 (1901).
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policy under the 1856 statute was emphatically to the contrary, requiring that the oath be
specifically that prescribed by the statute, failing which the penalty would be the invalidity of the
award.418
A host of other procedural issues was also addressed in the 1856 legislation: the statute
provided for the time and place of the meeting of the arbitrators and the notice required prior to
that meeting;419 the requirement that the parties be notified of the witnesses to appear against
them;420 the question of continuances at the request of a party not prepared to go forward with
the arbitration;421 and adjournments by the arbitrators.422 Whether a continuance was to be

418

Wilkins v. Van Winkle & Co., 78 Ga. 357 (1887); see also Sisson v. Pittman, 113 Ga.
166 (1901).
419

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-35 (repealed 1988) (“After the selection process has been completed,
the arbitrators shall appoint their time and place of meeting, which shall be as soon as
practicable, consistent with a proper preparation of the case. The parties shall have ten
days notice of the time and place of meeting.”)
420

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-36 (repealed 1988) (“At the time the submission is made, or as soon
thereafter as may be possible, the parties shall furnish the arbitrators so chosen, or one of
them, with a list of the witnesses whose testimony they desire to be before the arbitrators.
Any party neglecting to furnish this information to the arbitrators within ten days after
the submission is made shall not be entitled to delay or continuance for the absence of his
testimony or witnesses.”)
421

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-37 (repealed 1988) (“Upon the meeting of the arbitrators, if either
party is not ready for trial, the arbitrators may postpone the hearing of the case to a future
day, which day shall be as early as may be consistent with the ends of justice, considering
all the circumstances of the case. There shall not be more than two postponements of the
case, except for providential cause.”)
422

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-38 (repealed 1988) (“After the arbitrators have commenced their
investigations, they may adjourn from day to day or for a longer time if the ends of
justice require it, until their investigations are completed and they have made up their
award.”)
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granted or not was, predictably enough, determined to be within the sound discretion of the
arbitrators themselves under the provisions of the statute.423
The 1856 statute was sensitive as well to questions of discovery in arbitration,
anticipating issues respecting the arbitral process which were not to be central in most arbitration
systems until the twentieth century.424 The statute addressed the taking of depositions;425 the
subpoena powers of arbitrators and the compensation of witnesses;426 the power to compel
production of documentary evidence;427 and, finally, the power to administer oaths.428

423

Vinton & Davis v. Lindsey, 68 Ga. 291 (1881).

424

See for a general overview of the issues raised by extensive discovery practice in the
arbitration context, Sean T. Carnahan, Discovery in Arbitration? Well, It Depends . . ., 10
APR BUS. LAW TODAY 22 (2001); see also for a more in-depth consideration of this
debate, Theodore O. Rogers, Jr., The Procedural Differences Between Litigating in Court
and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OH. ST . J. DISP . RES. 633 (2001).
425

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-39 (repealed 1988) (“Testimony may be taken by deposition under the
same circumstances, in the same manner, and subject to the same rules as are prescribed
for the Superior Courts. If the deposition is taken pursuant to written questions, the
original interrogatories and the original transcription of testimony shall be filed with one
of the arbitrators, provided that, if testimony is taken under subpoena, the interrogatories
and testimony shall be filed with the arbitrator who issued the subpoena.”)
426

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-40 (repealed 1988) (“The arbitrators shall have all the powers of the
superior courts to compel the attendance of witnesses before them and also to compel
witnesses to testify. Any one of the arbitrators shall have power to issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance of witnesses at the time and place of their meeting, which
subpoenas shall be served in the manner provided by law for the service of subpoenas in
cases pending in the superior courts. Witnesses so attending shall be entitled to the same
compensation as witnesses attending superior courts, which compensation may be
collected in the same manner as that of witnesses in the superior courts.”)
427

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-41 (repealed 1988) (“Arbitrators shall have all the powers of the
superior courts to compel parties to produce books and all other papers which they may
deem necessary and proper for the investigation of the matters submitted to them, giving
to the party, his agent, or his attorney, from whom production is required, such notice as
is required in the superior courts for the production of papers.”)
428

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-42 (repealed 1988) (“Arbitrators shall have power to administer oaths
to witnesses and to administer all other oaths which may be necessary for carrying this
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The 1856 legislation provided a procedural benchmark for the arbitral process, decreeing
that “the examination of witnesses and the admission of testimony shall be governed by the rules
applicable to the superior courts, except as otherwise provided in this part,”429 and also
determining that all persons competent to testify in the superior courts were deemed to be
competent as witnesses in all cases before arbitrators.430 Deadlock among the arbitrators, or at
least an inability on their part to reach a unanimous decision, was also contemplated by the 1856
legislation: “If the arbitrators fail to agree upon an award, any two of them may make an award
which shall have the same force and effect as if made by all.”431 In a practice suggestive of the
modern trend towards allocation of procedural and administrative costs of arbitration against
losing parties,432 the 1856 Georgia law provided that “the arbitrators shall return in their award
the costs of the case, which they may tax against either or both parties as they may think just and
right.”433 In construing the terms of this code section, the Georgia Supreme Court determined
that the legislation did not require the arbitrators to divide the cost of the proceeding equally
among the parties, but rather permitted them to allocate these costs as they, in their discretion,
saw fit.434 The 1856 code further required that the arbitrators furnish each of the parties with a
part into full effect.”)
429

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-44 (repealed 1988).

430

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-43 (repealed 1988).

431

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-45 (repealed 1988).
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This early statute anticipated twentieth century trends permitting the allocation of
costs contingent on the arbitral tribunal’s assessment of fault in the underlying dispute,
essentially permitting the panel to “punish” the wrong-doer in the underlying transaction
and, at the same time, to hold the innocent party harmless by relieving that party of
liability for such costs.
433

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-46 (repealed 1988).

434

Hightower v. Georgia Fertilizer & Oil Co., 145 Ga. 780 (1916).
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copy of their award after it had been concluded and that they return the original award to the
appropriate superior court.435
In addition, the 1856 Code mandated that the award be entered on the minutes of the
superior court.436 After entry on the minutes, the award was, in the terms of the statute, deemed
to “have all the force and effect of a judgment or decree of the court, and may be enforced in the
same manner as a judgment or decree at any time after the adjournment of the court. It shall be
final and conclusive between the parties as to all matters submitted to the arbitrators, unless
objection is pleaded to the same” as provided in the provisions of law respecting defenses to the
enforcement of awards.437 The clerk was declared entitled to a fee for entering the award on the
minutes438 and the legislation, in addition, made specific provision as to the appropriate superior
court where the award was to be so entered, setting the venue for this purpose in the superior
court where the parties resided (if the matter was not one where the reference to arbitration was
made from a pending case) and, in the event the reference to arbitration was from a case then
pending in a court in Georgia, then in that court.439
The 1856 Code made provision for the compensation of arbitrators, providing that such
compensation would be essentially by the agreement of the parties and the arbitrators, but
providing for a jury trial on this question if the parties were unable to come to an agreement.
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O.C.G.A. § 9-9-47(a) (repealed 1988).

436

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-47(b) (repealed 1988).

437

Id.

438

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-49 (repealed 1988).

439

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-48 (repealed 1988).
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The arbitrators shall have such compensation for their services as may be agreed
upon by themselves and the parties, which compensation shall be paid equally by
the parties or included in the judgment or decree of the Court to which the award
is returned as part of the cost in the case. ... If the parties fail to agree on the
amount to be paid, the Court to which the award is returned shall direct an issue
as to the amount of the fee to be formed between the parties and the arbitrators.
The issue shall be tried by a jury whose verdict shall be final and conclusive
unless it is reversed; and the subsequent proceedings thereon shall be the same as
in cases of appeal. 440
Given the generally progressive tenor of the provisions of the 1856 statute, certain of its
terms respecting defenses to the enforcement of arbitral awards come as something of a surprise.

440

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-50 (repealed 1988). The enumerated statutory defenses of the 1856
arbitration code –accident, mistake, or fraud on the part of an arbitrator or a party, or
other intervening illegality– are not substantively wholly dissimilar from the defenses
recognized in common law arbitration under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11
(repealed 1988) discussed above, where the 1863 Code enumerates as common law
defenses to the enforcement of an award “any unfair advantage given to either party in
the hearing of the case or the rendering of the award, ... fraud by the arbitrators or by
either party in obtaining the award, ... a palpable mistake of law, or ... a reference of any
matter to chance or a lot.” While the text and spirit of the two nineteenth century
Georgia statutes appear more or less consistent one with the other, neither shares a great
deal of substance with the defensive provisions of two primary twentieth century
statutory renditions of available defenses, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (the Federal Arbitration Act) or §
12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act. These look to corruption, fraud, or other undue means
employed to obtain the award; evident partiality by an arbitrator or misconduct
prejudicing the rights of any party to the arbitral procedure; procedural error in refusing a
continuance after cause being shown therefore; or other arbitrator misconduct as defenses
to the enforcement or bases for the vacatur of an award. These latter defenses are
considered at length, infra, in connection with the review in the present Chapter of this
survey, in its Section 6, of the 2003 amendment to the Georgia Arbitration Code making
available “manifest disregard of law” on the part of an arbitrator in fashioning an arbitral
award as a basis for vacatur of that award.
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Under the procedure envisioned by the 1856 Code, a judicial review of an arbitral award for the
presence of one of the statutory defenses –limited to considerations of accident, mistake, or fraud
on the part of any arbitrator or any party to the proceeding– would be triggered by the
dissatisfied party after its return and entry on the minutes of the court: “[w]hen an award has
been returned to the superior court and entered upon its minutes ..., either of the parties may
suggest, on oath, at the term to which the award is returned, that the award was the result of
accident, mistake, or the fraud of one or more of the arbitrators or parties, or is otherwise
illegal.”441 In such a circumstance, the code provided, the defense asserted was to be tried to a
jury empaneled for that purpose, an ironic result for a procedure which was presumably intended
by the parties to avoid the cost, expense, and intricacy of jury intervention in conventional
litigation.442 In the event the jury found as a matter of fact that the defense was well-grounded,
the award would be vacated; if not, it would continue in force and effect, the status it obtained
when first entered on the court’s minutes.443 While this resort to a jury trial to test the sufficiency
of a defense to or the setting aside of an arbitral award may seem contradictory and selfdefeating, it should be borne in mind that the analogous provisions of the Federal Arbitration

441

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-51(a) (repealed 1988).

442

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-51(b) (repealed 1988): “[t]hereupon the court shall cause an issue to
be made up, which issue shall be tried by a jury under the same rules as are prescribed for
the trial of appeals. The trial shall be had at the same term of court at which the
suggestion is made unless good cause is shown for a continuance, when the same may be
continued for one term only, except for providential cause.”
443

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-51(c) (repealed 1988): “[i]f upon the trial of the issue the jury returns
a verdict finding against the award on the grounds specified in the issue submitted, the
Court shall forthwith pass an order vacating and setting aside the award. If the jury does
not so find, the award shall remain in full force as provided in Code Section 9-9-47 and
shall be final and conclusive unless the judgment of the Superior Court on the trial of
such issue is reversed by the appellate court.”
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Act, adopted some sixty-five years later, contemplate essentially the same cumbersome and
seemingly incongruous process.444

Section 3. The Georgia Construction Arbitration Code of 1978

After a hiatus of just over one hundred and thirty years, the Georgia legislature again
acted in 1978 to statutorily supplement existing provisions of the Georgia Code regarding
arbitration. In that year, the legislature amended the Code of Georgia to include two new Parts
to Chapter 9, of Title 9, of the Code pertaining to arbitration: a Part 4, “Arbitration of Medical

444

9 U.S.C. § 4 provides in terms with substantive impact not so very different from the
1856 Georgia statute:
“[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement. ... The court shall hear the parties, and upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing
the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. ... If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure,
neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party
alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty
jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an
issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default may, except in cases of
admiralty, on or before the return day of the notice of application, demand
a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an
order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury for that
purpose.” (Emphasis supplied).
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Malpractice Claims”445 and, of more importance and relevance here, a Part 3, “Arbitration of
Construction Contracts.”446 Because the latter of these two sections has survived (with important
modifications discussed later) as the Georgia Arbitration Code of 1988, presently appearing in
Chapter 9 of Title 9 of the Georgia Code, its provisions are of more than passing interest and
relevance, and will be reviewed briefly here in order to gain breadth in the understanding of the
statutory pattern of arbitration now prevailing in Georgia.
The new Code of 1978, coming into effect on July 1 of that year, was limited in
application to construction contracts, contracts of warranty of construction, and contracts
involving the architectural or engineering design of a building, or the design of alterations or
additions thereto.447 Reversing the trend of the statutory arbitration laws of Georgia from the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respecting the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate only
existing–but not future– disputes, the 1978 Construction Arbitration Code provided that “a
written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written
contract to submit any controversy thereafter arising to arbitration is enforceable and confers
jurisdiction on the courts of the state to enforce it and to enter a judgment on an award.”448
Hence, both existing disputes and disputes arising after the conclusion of an arbitration
agreement were deemed enforceable under this new provision. 449 Validity of an agreement to
445

The code provisions relative to medical malpractice now appear as O.C.G.A. § 9-960–83 (2001 Supp.).
446

1978 Ga. Laws 2270, § 1.

447

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-81 (repealed 1988).

448

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-81 (repealed 1988) (Emphasis added).

449

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-82 (repealed 1988). Given the powerful resistance of both Georgia
courts and the Georgia General Assembly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to the adoption of an arbitral principle permitting the agreement to arbitrate future

159
arbitrate within the scope of the Construction Arbitration Code was contingent upon the parties’
selection of arbitrators by mutual agreement or, alternatively, the appointment of one arbitrator
by each party to the arbitration, with the third neutral arbitrator to be agreed upon by the two
arbitrators selected by the parties; or finally, the appointment of a selection process which
utilized an independent administrator, who would select from panels of proposed arbitrators
previously approved by the parties. Alternatively, in lieu of specifying a method of arbitrator
selection in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Construction Arbitration Code, the
parties were afforded the option of incorporating the rules of an arbitral institution to govern the
proceeding, so long as these were in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia statute.450
The Georgia Construction Arbitration Code included provisions which made applicable
to arbitral procedures any statutes of limitation which would have been applicable to the claim
had it been presented in a conventional court procedure, making that statute of limitations a
permissible basis for an application by a party to a court to stay the arbitration or to vacate any
arbitral award entered in violation of any such applicable statute. The 1978 Code provided
alternatively that a party could raise the issue of an applicable statute of limitations before the
members of an arbitral tribunal who then would, in their sole discretion, decide whether or not
the bar was to be applied. The Code specifically provided that this exercise of discretion would
not be subject to the review of the court on any application to confirm, vacate or modify any
award made as a result of the procedure in question. 451

disputes, the significance of this section can hardly be overstated introducing, as it does,
the possibility of such a compromis into Georgia law for the first time. This, it can well
be argued, is the most important single aspect of the 1978 arbitration legislation.
450

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-83 (repealed 1988).

451

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-85 (repealed 1988).
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Mirroring to some extent the analogous provisions of federal law in 9 U.S.C. § 4,452 the
Georgia Construction Arbitration Code empowered any party, aggrieved by the failure of
another to arbitrate, to seek an order compelling arbitration before any competent Georgia court.
If the Court determines there is no substantial issue concerning the validity of the
agreement to submit to arbitration or compliance therewith and the claim sought
to be arbitrated is not barred by limitation of time, the Court shall order the
parties to arbitrate. If a substantial issue is raised or the claim is barred by
limitation of time, the court shall summarily hear and determine that issue and,
accordingly, grant or deny the application for an order to arbitrate.453
In a related provision, the Construction Arbitration Code provided as well that a failure to
raise the issue of the validity of the arbitration agreement after the service of a demand for
arbitration would constitute a waiver454 of the right to resist
452

§ 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act [See Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, §1, 62 Stat.
669 (1947), now codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16] permits one party to an arbitration
agreement to seek an order of the court compelling the other party to comply with such
stipulation, even over the objection of that party. Typically, this statutory provision is
invoked when the recalcitrant party has initiated a suit in the regular courts in
contravention to their agreement to arbitrate. Not infrequently, this motion to compel
arbitration is joined with a related motion under FAA § 3 to enjoin the prosecution of the
litigation filed in contravention to the agreement to arbitrate.
453

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-86(a) (repealed 1988). This section does not appear expressly to
admit of the possibility of a jury trial on the issue of the making of the agreement to
arbitrate, something of an improvement over the explicit language in the federal
analogue. See 9 U.S.C.§ 4, discussed supra.
454

Waiver of the right to arbitrate under the 1978 Georgia Code provisions could result
from a variety of circumstances indicating the intention of the party not to insist on the
performance of the agreement to arbitrate. Where, however, it was argued that the filing
of materialmens’ liens contemporaneously with a demand for arbitration was such a
waiver, the Georgia Court of Appeals found no intent to waive the right of arbitration:
Appellant's argument raises an interesting issue which our courts
have not yet decided. We have searched the record and have found
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nothing to indicate that appellant raised the issue of waiver in the
trial court. Despite the fact that appellant did not properly raise the
issues of waiver and estoppel, we note that no waiver of appellee's
arbitration rights took place under the circumstances of this case.
"While a distinct stipulation in a contract may be waived by the
conduct of the parties, it must appear that it was the intention of
the parties to treat such stipulations as no longer binding. [Cit.]"
Parker v. Schochat, 113 Ga. App. 13, 15(1), 147 S.E.2d 58 (1966).
Here, where appellee [claimant] consistently sought to enforce its
right to arbitration under the contract, it is clear that it had no
intention of waiving such a right. See A. Sangivanni and Sons v.
F. M. Floryan and Co., 158 Conn. 467, 262 A.2d 159 (1969). Had
appellee flagrantly disregarded arbitration as a contractual
prerequisite, filed a claim of lien and a complaint of foreclosure
without attempting to enforce its arbitration rights, a waiver of the
arbitration provisions of the contract may have occurred. See
Oakdale Park Ltd. v. Byrd, 346 So.2d 648 (Fla. App.1977).
Appellee is entitled to protect its rights to a materialmen's lien by filing a
claim of lien and by filing a petition to foreclose said lien at the same time
it is pursuing its arbitration rights under the contract. In fact, we agree
with the Florida Court of Appeal that the operation of the Arbitration
Code (Ga. Code Ann. § 7-301 et seq.) and the materialmen's lien law is
interdependent and compatible. Beach Resorts Intern. v. Clarmac Marine
Const., 339 So.2d 689, 692 (Fla.App., 1976). ...
Here, appellee sought to resolve a dispute under the contract by
demanding arbitration, and responded to appellant's attempt to stay
arbitration by seeking to enforce the contract. ...
If the trial court had stayed arbitration, appellee would have been
able to proceed with its claim against appellant under Code Ann. §
67-2002. Since the trial court correctly ordered arbitration, the
correct procedure is to stay judicial proceedings in the lien
foreclosure action and proceed to arbitration. If judicial
enforcement of an arbitration award in favor of Batson-Cook is
necessary, appellee (if it is otherwise entitled to a materialmen's
lien) may enforce said award by means of the lien foreclosure. See
Beach Resorts, supra, at 692. Thus, we do not view appellee's
counterclaim to foreclose its claim of lien as inconsistent with its
attempt to enforce arbitration under the contract, nor does said
counterclaim amount to a waiver of [claimant’s] contractual right
to arbitrate. Accord, EFC Develop. Corp. v. F. F. Baugh Plumbing
& H. Inc., 24 Ariz.App. 566, 540 P.2d 185 (1975).
H. R. H. Prince Ltc. Faisal M. Saud v. Batson-Cook Co., 161 Ga. App. 219, 221-222
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arbitration in the absence of an application by the resisting party within thirty days of the
demand for arbitration for an order to stay the proceeding. 455 The statute further imposed a
burden on the responding party to seek a stay of the arbitration within thirty days after the
service of the demand for arbitration upon penalty of being precluded from denying the validity
of the agreement or compliance therewith, or from asserting limitation of time as a bar in
court.456 Providing a certain symmetry for the code’s provision for judicial power to compel
arbitration,457 the 1978 Georgia Construction Arbitration Statute further provided that any party
who had not participated in the arbitration and who had not made an application to compel
arbitration, would be permitted to make an application to stay any arbitration on the grounds that
there was no valid agreement supporting such an arbitral procedure, that the agreement to
arbitrate had not been complied with by the party seeking the arbitration, or the arbitration was
barred by a limitation of time.458
Under other provisions of the 1978 Georgia Arbitration Code, it was stipulated that no
arbitration agreement would be rendered nugatory for failure of the appointment of arbitrators:
the default position laid down was that arbitrators were to be appointed in accordance with the
agreement of the parties. Upon failure of this clearly preferable method of arbitrator
appointment, the court would be authorized to make the appointment of the arbitrators. In the
event that the arbitral agreement did not provide for any method of appointment, or if the agreed
upon method failed, or in the event that the agreed upon method was not followed for some
reason, or if the arbitrators appointed under the agreement of the parties failed to act and no
successors had been appointed, then the court would step in and perform this essential
function.459 In the only term of the Georgia Construction Arbitration Code touching upon the

(1982).
455

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-86(b) (repealed 1988).

456

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-86(c) (repealed 1988).

457

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-86(a) (repealed 1988)

458

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-86(d)(1)-(3) (repealed 1988).

459

See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-9-87 (repealed 1988).
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qualification of arbitrators, the legislation provided that “in appointing arbitrators [in the
exercise of its default appointment power] ..., the Court shall seek to appoint persons having
general knowledge and experience as to the type of dispute or controversy to be arbitrated.”460
The 1978 Code also required the administration of an oath to the arbitrators prior to
commencing their duties.461 Flexibility in the location of the arbitral proceedings was provided
by a statutory provision permitting the arbitral proceedings to be held at a time and place
appointed by the arbitrators, even though the underlying arbitral agreement may have designated
another county in which the arbitration hearings were to be held. In the event the place so
appointed was deemed to be unduly burdensome on any party, the court retained the power to
stay proceedings pending the appointment of an alternative venue for the arbitration.462 In
addition, the 1978 law guaranteed fundamental due process rights in insuring that the parties
would be entitled to be heard in the proceeding and to present pleadings, documents, testimony,
and other matters, as well as to cross examine witnesses. Supplementing these rights of parties,
the arbitrators were empowered to hear and determine the controversy upon the pleadings,
documents, testimony, and other matters produced by the parties, notwithstanding the failure of a
party duly notified to appear in the proceeding. 463
Reflecting the provisions of modern arbitral statutes, the Georgia Construction
Arbitration Code of 1978 further provided for the right to be represented by an attorney at the
proceedings authorized by the statute, together with a provision that hearings held under the
statute would be conducted by all of the arbitrators unless agreed otherwise by the parties, but
preserving the right of a majority of the arbitrators to render and change an award should one or
more of the arbitrators be absent.464 Not unlike the comparable provisions of the Federal

460

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-87(c) (repealed 1988).

461

That oath bound the arbitrator to decide the controversy “faithfully and fairly.”
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-88(a) (repealed 1988).
462

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-88(b) (repealed 1988).

463

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-88(c) (repealed 1988).

464

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-88(e) (repealed 1988).
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Arbitration Act,465 arbitrators under the Georgia statute were granted the legal authority to issue
subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses at arbitral proceedings and to require the production of
documentary records including books, records, and other documentary evidence. The production
of this evidence pursuant to arbitrators’ subpoenas was made subject to their explicit right to use
documents and other evidentiary materials so produced in the arbitral proceedings according to
the procedures to be established by the arbitrators themselves.466 Any award consequent upon an
arbitral proceeding under the 1978 Georgia Construction Arbitration Code was required to be in
writing and signed by the arbitrators joining in that award.467 In a provision which surely would
be regarded today as somewhat stringent by most experienced arbitrators, the statute required the
rendition of an arbitral award within thirty days of the close of the hearing in the proceeding,
although the parties had the statutory right to extend the time either before or after its
expiration.468 The 1978 Code made allowance for the right of the arbitrators to modify an award
for reasons of clerical mistake, or in the event that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers by
rendering an award on a matter not within the scope of the arbitral agreement, or if the award
was imperfect in any respect as to form not touching upon the merits of the controversy.469

465

Under the provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 7, arbitrators in a proceeding subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act are authorized and empowered to issue a summons to a nonparty witness,
the enforcement of which –in the event the party summoned fails or refuses to appear– is
to be on petition to the federal district court where the arbitrators are sitting. In contrast to
the federal legislation, however, the 1978 Georgia statute in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-89(a)
(repealed 1988) enumerated grounds of defense to the enforcement of such a summons,
i.e., that the summons was unduly burdensome or oppressive as to the party to whom it
was addressed.
466

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-89(b) (repealed 1988).

467

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-90(a) (repealed 1988).

468

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-90(b) (repealed 1988). A failure on the part of the losing party to
object to an award’s lack of timeliness under this provision, however, was deemed to
constitute a waiver of any right to urge this fact as a defense to confirmation. See
Diversified Ass’y, Inc. v. Ra-Lin & Associates, 186 Ga. App. 904 (1988).
469

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-91(a)(1)-(3) (repealed 1988).
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In perhaps one of the most significant sections of the entire 1978 Georgia Construction
Arbitration Code, the legislature also provided for substantive bases upon which an arbitral
award could be refused enforcement by the court. These provisions reflected the influence of a
variety of substantive bases for such action, including the defenses made available in the 1856
statute, the corresponding terms of the Federal Arbitration Act, and perhaps –one senses –a
reading of the 1952 Uniform Arbitration Act as well:
(b) The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either
participated in the arbitration or was served with a demand for arbitration if the
court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;
(2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;
(3) An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such
imperfect execution of it that a final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made;470 or

470

In Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company v. Nunnally Lumber Company, 176 Ga.
App. 232 (1985), a losing party urged as a basis for the vacation of an award the fact that
the arbitrators did not provide written reasons for the result obtained in the proceeding.
The Court of Appeals, recognizing that nothing in the 1978 Code required arbitrators to
provide reasoned awards, refuted the notion that the absence of such written reasons
would, in ipso, constitute “such imperfect execution of [the arbitrators’ authority] that a
final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made,” as provided in
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(b)(1)-(3) (repealed 1988). The ratio decidendi of Nunnally was
confirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Sayler Marine Corp. v. Dixie Metal Co.,
194 Ga. App. 853 (1990), a case decided after the significant revisions to Georgia
statutory arbitration law in 1988, revisions which did not, however, alter the language of
the former O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(b)(1)-(3) (repealed 1988). The 1988 Code is, of course,
considered more fully, infra, as is the recent decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Marchelletta v. Seay Construction Services, Inc., 2004 WL 26729, which adopts the rule
of Cotton States v. Nunnally and confirms its position that written reasons need not
accompany an award made under the current Georgia Arbitration Code.
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(4) A failure to follow the procedure of this part [of the Georgia
Code], unless the party applying to vacate the award continued
with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without
objection. 471
The 1978 Georgia Construction Arbitration Code further contemplated that, upon
vacating an award, the court would have the authority to order a rehearing of the matter and a
determination of all or any of the issues either before the same arbitrators or before new
arbitrators appointed as provided in the code.472 In addition, the court was vested with authority,

471

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(b)(1)-(4) (repealed 1988). Subsection ©) of this statute further
provided that the award was to be vacated
on the application of a party who neither participated in the arbitration nor
was served with a demand for arbitration if the court finds that:
(1) The rights of the party were prejudiced by one
of the grounds specified in subsection (b) of this
code section;
(2) A valid agreement to arbitrate was not made;
(3) The agreement to arbitrate has not been
complied with; or
(4) The arbitrated claim was barred by limitation of
time.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93©) (repealed 1988).
472

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(d) (repealed 1988). This statute authorized trial courts to restrict
the issues in any rehearing under this section to ones specified by the trial court in its
order remanding the proceeding to the arbitrators. See Mid-American Elevator Co. v.
Gemco Elevator Co., 189 Ga. App. 143 (1988). The ability under the 1978 statute for an
arbitral proceeding to move among the arbitral panel, the relevant and competent trial
court, and the Georgia appellate courts partook of the nature of the English case stated
practice whereby specific issues of law could be referred out of the arbitral proceeding by
a party for a legal ruling by a court, to then be returned with judicial instructions to the
arbitral panel. The Mid-American Elevator Company decision also determined that it
would be prejudicial error for the trial court, in an order entered after a decision by the
Court of Appeals, to require, in its order concerning the arbitral rehearing, that the
arbitrators decide a contested issue before them solely on the basis of the existing record
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analogous to that of arbitrators under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-91(a)(1)-(3) (repealed 1988), in that the
court too could modify an award if it found that there had been a miscalculation of figures or a
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referenced in the award, or where the
arbitrators purported to act upon a matter not submitted to them (at least under circumstances
where the award could be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues
submitted), or under the circumstance where an award was imperfect in any manner of form, not
affecting the merits of the controversy. As so modified, the award was to be confirmed by the
court.473
The general principle adopted in the Georgia case law construing O.C.G.A. § 9-9-91(c)
narrowly circumscribing the power of a court to change an award seems to have been that the
court was strictly limited in its authority in the confirmation of an award to the terms of the
award as rendered by the arbitrators or, possibly, as modified by the court independently on
request of one of the parties: hence, trial courts tasked to confirm awards were strictly limited in
their authority to do so, and could not use the confirmation procedure as a device to work
–whether intentionally or unintentionally– a revision of the award. For instance, in Thacker
Construction Company v. A Betterway Rent-A-Car, Inc., decided in 1988 by the Georgia Court
of Appeals, the arbitration panel had made an award against a joint venture, but had not made
any findings of liability on the part of the constituent legal entities which made up that joint
venture. In confirming the award, however, the trial judge entered judgment against the joint
venture and the business organizations of which it was composed. The Court of Appeals found

and without permitting the parties to submit additional evidence and arguments of law on
the issues.
473

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-94 (repealed 1988).
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this to be error, drawing on an analogy between the finding of arbitrators in a panel and the
verdict of a jury:
When a verdict is rendered by a jury, the judgment must conform to it. See
Taylor v. Taylor, 212 Ga. 637, 638(1), 94 S.E.2d 744.
*

*

*

An arbitration award is not unlike the verdict of a jury. See generally 6 C.J.S.
431, 432, Arbitration, § 163. Thus, if an award is confirmed the judgment must
be entered in conformity with the award. See generally O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-92;
9-9-95. Of course, an award can be modified; but a modification cannot be
substantive, it cannot affect the merits of the case. See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-94. See
also 6 C.J.S. 440, Arbitration, § 168.
By entering judgment against [the constituent entities of the joint venture] jointly
and severally, the superior court, in effect, modified the arbitrators' award in a
substantive way. It found facts which the arbitrators did not. See Harrell v. Bank
of the South, 174 Ga. App. 384, 386, 330 S.E.2d 147, supra. This the superior
court could not do. “If modification of the award in a matter of substance is
required there must be a remission to the arbitrators.” 6 C.J.S. 440, Arbitration, §
168. See also O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93(b)(3).474
Where the award was confirmed as submitted or as modified by the court, the code
stipulated that judgment was then to be entered by the court on the award, the minute entry to

474

Thacker Construction Company v. A Betterway Rent-A-Car, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 660
(1988).
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include the arbitral agreement, the award, a copy of any order confirming modifying or
correcting the award, and a copy of the judgment.475
Under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97(a) (repealed 1988), the expenses and fees of
the arbitrators, together with other expenses of the arbitral procedure incurred in the conduct of
the arbitration, were to be paid as provided in the award.476 This recovery, under the explicit
terms of the statute, did not extend to the recovery of legal fees incurred as a result of the arbitral
process. A line of Georgia authority stemming from O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, an ancient “bad faith”
standard which had worked its way into Georgia statutory law with the Cobb Code in 1863,477

475

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-95 (repealed 1988).

476

The court retained the right, however, to reduce (or even disallow) fees and expenses
which it found, on application of an aggrieved party, to be excessive. Presumably, a party
to an arbitral proceeding unhappy with an award of arbitrator fees and expenses would
have been authorized, under the terms of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97(b) (repealed 1988), to seek a
judicial review of the order based on this issue alone.
477

The terms of that nineteenth century provision, still of force in Georgia law, state:
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the
damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made
prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been
stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and
expense, the jury may allow them.

O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. For a discussion of a twentieth century legislative attempt in
Georgia to update the provisions of this old statute, see E. R. Lanier, Forward into the
Past: Georgia's “New” Statutory Tort of Abusive Litigation, 6 G.S.U. L. REV. 337
(1989). A decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in March, 2004, determined that an
award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 by an arbitration panel convened in a
claim against a security broker, a transaction in interstate commerce, would properly be
vacated as arbitrary and capricious where the claimant failed to specially plead the statute
as the basis for the award of such fees: because the terms of the statute itself require that
it be “specially pleaded,” and that the claimant “[make] prayer therefor,” an award by the
panel in the absence of such special pleading may be vacated under the nonstatutory
ground authorized in Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141
F.3d 1434 (1998). The court also expressed reservations as to whether an award under
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 would be available in arbitral preceding governed by federal law.
Joyner v. Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., 2004 WL 603912 (Ga. Ct. of
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had seemed to indicate that its provisions would, in tandem with the Construction Arbitration
Code, permit the recovery of such fees in an arbitral proceeding. The reasoning in Jamison v.
West, a 1989 opinion of the Court of Appeals, seemed to stand for the proposition that, while
attorneys fees were excluded from the scope of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97(a), the provision in the 1863
Code was independent and could be applied within the context of the 1978 arbitration statute.
This notion was put to rest in Walton Acoustics, Inc. v. Currahee Construction Company, a 1990
decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals:
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97(a) provides: "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to
arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not
including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as
provided in the award." In Hughes & Peden, Inc. v. Budd Contracting Co., 193
Ga. App. 656, 388 S.E.2d 753 (1989), this court held that attorney fees are not
recoverable in an arbitration action. Walton argues that attorney fees are
recoverable under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. We disagree. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97,
enacted in 1978, controls over O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 because it is the later
expression of the legislature on the subject of attorney fees in this context. "The
courts are to be guided by the last expression of the General Assembly on a
subject." Board of Trustees v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 555, 272 S.E.2d 288 (1980).
We do not find persuasive Walton's argument that Jamison v. West, 191 Ga. App.
431(4), 382 S.E.2d 170 (1989), stands for the proposition that attorney fees
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 may be recovered in an arbitration action, if

Appeals).
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timely and properly pleaded. Rather, we hold that Jamison stands only for the
proposition that expenses, but not attorney fees, may be recovered. We note
specifically that the pertinent portion of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97(a) allows recovery of
"other expenses" incurred in the conduct of the arbitration.478
Thus, an expansive application of the terms of former O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97 in the Georgia
courts479 resulted in the rule that attorney’s fees were not to be included in orders issued under
the authority of that statute, regardless of the language of the underlying contract of the parties.
While the cases on which this theory rests do not, on close examination, necessarily bear that
reading, the potential that they did so invoked a ruling from the federal courts that if they were to
be so construed, they would run counter to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act and
would, hence, be preempted.
In proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitration award lawfully
may include an award of attorneys fees if the underlying agreement between the
parties so provides. Ierna et al. v. Arthur Murray International, Inc., et al., 833
F.2d 1477, 1476 (CA 11, 1987). [The Georgia cases relied upon] are simply
inapplicable to this case. The opinions in both of those cases purport to construe
the Georgia Arbitration Act O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97. In [those] cases it appeared that
there was no provision for an award of attorneys fees in the underlying
agreement, and therefore the decisions themselves are not inconsistent with what
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Walton Acoustics, Inc. v. Currahee Construction Co. Inc., 197 Ga. App. 659, 399
S.E.2d 265 (1990).
479

See Hughes and Peden, Inc. v. Budd Contracting Company, Inc., 193 Ga. App. 656,
388 S.E.2d 753 (1989); see also Walton Acoustics, Inc. v. Currahee Construction Co.
Inc., 197 Ga. App. 659, 399 S.E.2d 265 (1990).
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this court has stated above. Those cases, however, construed O.C.G.A. 9-9-97
[sic] to preclude the award of attorneys fees even if agreement therefor was
included in an underlying agreement. ... While the question of what the initial
clause of 9-9-97 modifies is certainly debatable, it is clearly within the
competence of the Georgia appellate courts to settle that debate as to cases subject
to the Georgia Arbitration Act. Once it is found ... that the underlying contract
involves interstate or foreign commerce or a maritime transaction, the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts the field. ... Whatever court or tribunal, state or federal,
is applying the law must then resort to the Federal Arbitration Act and the body of
Federal common law construing it. That is the case here.480

480

Ceco Concrete Construction v. J. T. Schrimsher Construction Company, 792 F. Supp.
109 (1992) (Citations omitted). It is doubtful whether Georgia law, properly construed,
ever prohibited the enforcement of attorneys fees in arbitral proceedings under OCGA §
9-9-97 (repealed 1988) where the parties had agreed to such fees in their underlying
contract, whatever the perceptions of the Federal District Court in Ceco. This issue, and
the potential preemptive application of federal law which it might invoke, appear to have
been resolved, however, in Hope & Associates v. Marvin M. Black Company, 205 Ga.
App. 561 (1992), where the Georgia Court of Appeals held that “[t]his section [O.C.G.A.
§ 9-9-17, reenacting O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97] does not specifically prohibit the parties from
contracting for the recovery of attorney’s fees in arbitration proceedings; it only
addresses the allocation of the expenses of arbitration other than attorneys fees and
provides that, as to the allocation of those expenses, the award will control insofar as it is
not inconsistent with the parties’ agreement.” Equally ambiguous, however, is Judge
Moye’s remark in Schrimsher that “[o]nce it is found ... that the underlying contract
involves interstate or foreign commerce or a maritime transaction, the Federal Arbitration
Act preempts the field,” if, by this observation, he means that state legislative jurisdiction
is wholly displaced by federal law over any matter in interstate commerce. Such an
assertion would be difficult to reconcile with the counsel of the United States Supreme
Court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Stanford University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989):
“[t]he FAA contains no express preemptive provision,” the court there reminds us, “nor
does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.” Volt, 489
U.S. at 469. A fuller appraisal of the doctrine of federal preemption in the context of state
arbitration law is included in this arbitral policy review, infra, in Chapter Three, Section
1, The Doctrine of Federal Preemption and the Autonomy of Georgia Arbitration Policy.
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Section 4. The Georgia Arbitration Code of 1988

As the last decades in the twentieth century approached, effective Georgia arbitral policy
encompassed not only a general common law matrix, codified and uncodified, but also the
important 1856 statutory revisions to the common law, as well as the provisions of the 1978
Georgia Arbitration Code, a code thoroughly modern in its substantive content but narrowly
limited to disputes within the construction industry. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of
Georgia, in a statement in support of statutory revisions of arbitration law in Georgia,
summarized both the challenge facing the state and its solution:
There exists an urgent need to modernize the arbitration law of Georgia,
particularly in view of the enhanced role the state plays as a regional and
international center for business. Georgia must join the other important
commercial centers in the United States and abroad in making available the use of
commercial arbitration for the settlement of the large variety of commercial
disputes. Every effort must be made to prevent business from being discouraged
from coming to Georgia or from going elsewhere as result of uncertainties in
Georgia’s arbitration law.
The present uncertainties in the law in Georgia should be eliminated by a statute, tailored
to Georgia’s special current and future requirements, and which will be consistent with the
Federal Arbitration Act’s interstate and international arbitration provisions, as well as being in
harmony with the basic concepts of the Uniform Arbitration Act which has been adopted by a
large majority of states. . . .481
481

As a consequence of these considerations, “[t]he Board endorse[d] the concept of a
modern arbitration act for Georgia which will contain sound principles for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements, submissions and awards for
intrastate transactions and for international transactions and operations.” See A
Resolution in Support of Amending Georgia’s Commercial Arbitration Laws and
Enacting an International Commercial Arbitration Statute by the Board of Governors of
the State the Bar of Georgia, January 8, 1986, reproduced in Memorandum, Bar
Sponsorship of Legislative Proposal to Amend Arbitration Statute, from E. Wycliffe Orr,
Sr., Chair of the Committee To Study Practicality of Mediation and Arbitration of the
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The time was right482 for a general revision of Georgia’s fundamental statutory approach
to formal and judicialized arbitration,483 and this came with the adoption by the General
State Bar of Georgia, to the Advisory Committee on Legislation of the State Bar of
Georgia, dated October 23, 1986, in the possession of the author.
482

An early version of a bill to substantially reform Georgia’s’s arbitration statutes had
been approved by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at the Annual Midyear Meeting of the Bar on January 8, 1986, and a proposal based upon the Bar
Association’s recommendation had gone to the Georgia Senate during its spring, 1986
session. Although the Georgia Senate approved this bill as SB 540, it never became law.
See Memorandum, Bar Sponsorship of Legislative Proposal to Amend Arbitration
Statute, from E. Wycliffe Orr, Sr., Chair of the Committee To Study Practicality of
Mediation and Arbitration of the State Bar of Georgia, to the Advisory Committee on
Legislation of the State Bar of Georgia, dated October 23, 1986, in the possession of the
author. A Senate attempt to enact the law the following year as SB 73 stalled in the
House Judiciary Committee which delayed action, ostensibly for lack of adequate time to
study the measure because of slowness by the Senate in reporting the proposal out.
Barbara N. Berkman, Will Be Held For Study: House Says No To Arbitration Bill,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT , March 6, 1987, at 1. As a consequence, measures were
put in place to bring the matter before the legislature once again in its next session in
1988. S.B. 73 was reintroduced by Senator Nathan Deal, D-Gainesville, and it received
its first, second, and third readings in the Georgia Senate on January 14, February 19, and
February 20, 1987, respectively. It passed the Senate unanimously. In the Georgia
House, it received its first reading on February 23, 1987; its second reading the next day,
and its third reading on February 24t , 1987. After a series of spirited exchanges by
supporters and opponents of the measure centering on issues such as protection of
consumer rights, anxiety over the enforcement of contracts of adhesion, the arbitration of
personal injury claims, and special notice provisions (see, “Proposed Amendments to
S.B. 73, on Arbitration” [“as submitted by the State Bar drafting group”], dated January
25, 1988, and “Proposed Amendments to S.B. 73, on Arbitration,” from “Professor
Gabriel M. Wilner and Douglas Yarn of the Arbitration Bill Drafting Group,” dated
January 26, 1988, both in possession of the author), the bill was passed in the House by a
vote of 136 in favor and 6 opposed. It was adopted by both houses on March 3, 1988,
and became effective as law on April 5, 1988. See 1988 Ga. Laws, Vol. 1, 903 et seq.
483

The widespread interest which appeared in the mid-1980s in modernizing Georgia’s
arbitration statutory framework is evidenced by the diverse interests represented by those
who were the primary architects of the new statutory scheme. A Georgia State Bar
Committee to Study the Practicality of Mediation and Arbitration, chaired by Mr. E.
Wycliffe Orr, Sr., collaborated in this effort with the International Section of the State
Bar of Georgia, then chaired by Mr. Judson H. Simmons, to frame the new law. On
November 4, 1986, the Advisory Committee on Legislation of the State Bar of Georgia
directed these bodies to continue in their work toward a consolidated draft of the
proposed new legislation, based upon their earlier consensus achieved in early
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Assembly in 1988 of a new Georgia Arbitration Code which displaced the bulk of the previous
statutory structure and put in its place an advanced legislative scheme which still serves today as
the foundation of Georgia’s modern arbitration policy.484

November, 1986, as to the structure of the new law:
The agreement [between the Georgia State Bar Committee to Study The
Practicability of Mediation and Arbitration, together with the International
Section of the State Bar of Georgia] in principal [sic] has four points.
First, the existing construction contract arbitration code is to be expanded
to deal both with agreements to arbitrate all future disputes and
submissions to arbitrate existing disputes. Except for specified
exclusions, the new law will cover all disputes – not just those arising out
of construction contracts. Second, the existing “Common Law
Arbitration” and “Special Statutory Proceedings” provisions of the
Georgia Code will be repealed because they are no longer needed. Third,
internal inconsistencies in the existing construction arbitration code will
be remedied. Fourth, a chapter dealing with the arbitration of
international commercial disputes will be added.
Memorandum, Comments on Proposed Georgia Arbitration Law, from Philip L. Ray, Jr.,
to Members of the International Section, State Bar of Georgia, Drafting Committee for
Amending Georgia’s Arbitration Laws, dated November 7, 1986, in the possession of the
author. The primary draftsmen of the new legislation included Mr. Philip L. Ray, Jr., an
attorney now with Siemens A.G. in Erlangen, Germany; Professor Gabriel M. Wilner, at
that time and still today a faculty member at the Lumpkin School of Law of the
University of Georgia; and Mr. Douglas Hurt Yarn, then a staff attorney with the
Southeastern Office of the American Arbitration Association and today a faculty member
of the College of Law at Georgia State University.
484

This code appears in codified form as Title 9 of the O.C.G.A., §§ 9-9-1 – 84, and
consists of two articles. Article 1 (“General Provisions”) encompasses §§ 9-9-1 through
9-9-43, which in turn is subdivided into two Parts. The first of these (“Part 1," including
§§ 9-9-1 – 9-9-18) is given over to the “Arbitration Code,” which replaces the 1978
Construction Arbitration Code; Part 2 (“International Transactions,” §§ 9-9-30 – 9-9-43)
was a new feature of the 1988 law, and is discussed in greater detail, infra, in this
survey’s Chapter Two, Section 5, “The Georgia International Transactions Arbitration
Code.” Article 2 of Title 9 of the Code is given over to matters touching on arbitration of
“Medical Malpractice” claims, and is based on the provisions of 1978 Ga. Laws, 2281 et
seq. (now codified as O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-6 – 9-9-84), and is not considered further here.
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It is perhaps simplistic but not wholly inaccurate to describe the relationship of the 1988
Georgia Arbitration Code485 and the 1978 Georgia Construction Arbitration Code486 as basically
an enlargement and extension of the fundamental policies of the latter into the former: a cursory
review of its terms indicates that the later Georgia Arbitration Code represents an essential
reworking of the earlier 1978 statute to extend the provisions of that earlier statute beyond the
more narrow field of construction contracts and, with certain major innovations, make it broadly
applicable to arbitrations in Georgia including those outside the strict confines of the
construction industry.
It remains, however, a gross overstatement to say that the 1988 Code is little more the
1978 legislation with only a change in title. The 1988 legislation is, of course, broader in ambit
and scope than that of 1978, applying to “all disputes in which the parties thereto have agreed in
writing to arbitrate” and “provid[ing] the exclusive means by which agreements to arbitrate
disputes can be enforced . . .”487 Excepted from the broad reach of the 1988 Code were,
however, the medical malpractice claims governed by Article 2 of the 1988 Georgia Arbitration

485

1988 Ga. Laws, 903, § 1 et seq.

486

1978 Ga. Laws, 2270, § 1 et seq.

487

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c) (2001 Supp.). Since this provision repeals the common law,
including common law rules regarding arbitration, it must be strictly construed. "The
Georgia Arbitration Code 'shall apply to all disputes in which the parties thereto have
agreed in writing to arbitrate and shall provide the exclusive means by which agreements
to arbitrate can be enforced.' [§OCGA 9-9-2(c).] By its enactment, the Arbitration Code
repealed common law arbitration in its entirety, and it must, therefore, be strictly
construed." Greene v. Hundley, 266 Ga. 592, 594(1), 468 S.E.2d 350 (1996).” Aycock v.
Re/Max of Georgia, Inc., 221 Ga. App. 587 (1996). Despite the policy evident in the
code to enforce written arbitration agreements, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled in
March of 2004 that a contract provision simply noting that “there is a voluntary “Binding
Arbitration Procedure” available to the parties to [the] Agreement” under the Georgia
Arbitration Code, “ provided all parties to this Agreement concur in writing to abide by
same,” is not such an agreement in writing as will be enforced by the courts under
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c) (2001 Supp.). Laird v. Risbergs, 2004 WL 396438 (Ga. Ct. of
Appeals) (emphasis in original).
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Code488 ; collective bargaining agreements between employers and labor unions representing
employees of such employers489 ; any contract of insurance (but not including arbitration clauses
appearing in contracts between insurance companies)490 ; loan agreements or consumer financing
agreements in which the amount of indebtedness is $25,000 or less at the time of the
agreement491 ; contracts for the purchase of consumer goods492 ; contracts involving consumer acts
or practices or involving consumer transactions;493 sales agreements or loan agreements for the
purchase or financing of residential real estate, unless the clause agreeing to arbitrate is initialed
by all signatories at the time of the execution of the agreement494 ; contracts relating

488

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-60 (2001 Supp.); 1988 Ga. Laws, p. 903, § 1 et seq. See also O.C.G.A.
§ 9-9-2(c)(1) (2001 Supp.).
489

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(2) (2001 Supp.).

490

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (2001 Supp.). See McKnight v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 2004
WL 178728, where the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit sustained the
application of this exception against the argument that it was preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act on the basis that such state laws were validated and made enforceable,
despite their clear anti-arbitration intent and effect, by the provisions of the McCarranFerguson Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1012[b]) permitting such provisions in state laws enacted
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. To the same effect, see
Continental Ins. Co. v. Equity Residential Props. Trust, 255 Ga. App. 445 (2002), cited
by the Eleventh Circuit in McKnight, at 3.
491

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2 (c)(5) (2001 Supp.).

492

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2 (c)(6) (2001 Supp.).

493

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2 (c)(7) (2001 Supp.). See Pate v. Melvin Williams Manufactured
Homes, Inc., 198 L.R. 841, 845 (1996), determining this section to be preempted by the
pro-arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act if the consumer transaction in issue
is one “affecting interstate commerce.”
494

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2 (c)(8) (2001 Supp.). In the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals
in Haynes v. Fincher, 241 Ga. App. 179 (1999), the court sustained the enforceability of
an arbitration clause in a contractor’s warranty agreement which was contained in a
booklet attached to the contract. The court reasoned that the warranty contract was
neither a sales agreement nor a loan agreement with respect to the purchase or financing
of residential real estate and therefore not within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(8)
(2001 Supp.).
The [defendants’] attempt to avoid their agreement to be bound by
the warranty's arbitration provision is unpersuasive. It is
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undisputed that the [defendants] applied for the warranty; the face
of their application plainly states that the warranty consists of the
application and the warranty program booklet, and that by signing
the application they acknowledge having read the warranty
booklet; the booklet clearly provides that disputes may be resolved
by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act; the
[defendants] sought the benefit of such dispute resolution by
requesting arbitration pursuant to the warranty program; they
participated in the arbitration which they had started; and they
obtained a final arbitration award that they did not challenge under
the arbitration appeal procedures.
Based on these facts, there is no question that the [defendants]
agreed to ... the warranty program's binding arbitration provision.
And contrary to the [defendants’] arguments, such an agreement is
valid and enforceable.
Haynes v. Fincher, 241 Ga. App. 179 (1999), at 180. See also Pinnacle Construction Co.
v. Osborne, 218 Ga. App. 366 (1995) and Goodrich v. Southland Homes Corp., 214 Ga.
App. 790 (1994), both sustaining the application of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(8) (2001 Supp.)
to void arbitration clauses. Cf. Laird v. Risbergs, 2004 WL 396438 (Ga. Ct. of Appeals),
where the Georgia Court of Appeals held in March, 2004, that clauses in a home
construction and purchase agreement and associated warranty could not be enforced
against the purchasers where, among other reasons, they had not initialed the relevant
provisions in the documentation of the sale. Special notice requirements respecting
arbitral clauses in contracts not unlike those called for in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(8) (2001
Supp.) were the object of the U. S. Supreme Court’s critical analysis under the Federal
Arbitration Act in its opinion in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotta, 517 U.S. 681
(1996), considered, infra, in this survey’s Chapter Three, Section 1, Continuing Debate:
The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act and Its Displacement of State Law. The
Southeastern Regional Office of the American Arbitration Association, at the time of the
adoption of the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code, expressed some reservation regarding the
enforceability of special notice requirements such as those found in O.C.G.A. § 9-92(c)(8) (2001 Supp.), noting that “... such exceptions would only be applicable in purely
intra-state transactions. State-created exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration are
not permitted under federal law and policy, which is applicable when the transaction
merely ‘involves’ interstate, foreign, or maritime commerce.” Press Release, “The
Georgia Arbitration Code,” transmitted to Rhys Wilson by the Southeastern Regional
Office of the American Arbitration Association under letter dated March 28, 1988, a
copy of which is in the possession of the author. Where the Federal Arbitration Act
controls, the Georgia Court of Appeals has since held, the special signature requirements
of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(9) (2001 Supp.) are in fact –even as the AAA predicted–
preempted by the federal law. See Primerica Financial Services, Inc. v. Wise, 217 Ga.
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to employment, except where the clause agreeing to arbitration in that connection is initialed by
all signatories at the time of the execution of the agreement495 ; and all agreements to arbitrate
future claims arising out of personal bodily injury or wrongful death based on tort.496
The statutorily defined effect of an arbitration agreement as set forth under the 1988
legislation497 is virtually identical to the analogous provision of the 1978 Construction

App. 36, 40-41 (1995).
495

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(9) (2001 Supp.). See Primerica Financial Services, Inc. v. Wise,
217 Ga. App. 36, 40-41 (1995), discussed supra, holding this provision preempted by the
FAA in an interstate transaction. But see, more recently, ISS Intern. Service Systems v.
Widmer, 264 Ga. App. 55 (2003), applying O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(9) (2001 Supp.) without
any apparent concern for federal preemption in a case centering, in part, on the transfer of
a corporate employee from New York to Georgia. See also Doman v. Stapleton, 256 Ga.
App. 383 (2002), where the Georgia Court of Appeals took no issue with an arbitrator’s
decision that O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(9) (2001 Supp.) was inapplicable to the attorney-client
relationship; and Columbus Anesthesia Group, P.C. v. Kutzner, 218 Ga. App. 51 (1995),
deciding against federal preemption of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(9) (2001 Supp.), even though
the employment contract in that case entailed the transfer of a physician from Indiana to
Georgia. The result in Kutzner is drawn into question by the broad scope given to the
definition of interstate commerce by the United States Supreme Court in its subsequent
decision in the case of Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003). Interesting
too, for comparative purposes, is the decision of the South Carolina Court of Appeals in
James C. Thornton, M.D. v. Trident Medical Center, L.L.C., 357 S.C. 91 (2003) (S.C.
App.), which, on facts almost identical to those in Kutzner, reached a diametrically
opposite decision.
496
497

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c)(10) (2001 Supp.).

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-3 (2001 Supp.). In the absence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, of
course, the Georgia courts will not compel a party to do so. See Leigan v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 248 Ga. App. 145 (2001). While O.C.G.A. § 9-9-3 (2001 Supp.) advances the
long-standing policy of the state that arbitration agreements are to be enforceable, it does
not go so far as to create an amorphous presumption that parties have some sort of
obligation to so agree. It is not, therefore, indicia of bad faith or stubborn litigiousness to
refuse to refer a pending dispute to arbitration where there is not otherwise an agreement
to do so. In Witty v. McNeal Agency, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 554 (1999), the plaintiffs
argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence in the proceeding below that they
had asked defendants to submit to expedited arbitration. Plaintiffs then argued in court
that defendants' refusal constituted evidence of stubborn litigiousness on plaintiffs' claim,
seeking an award of attorney’s fees on that basis under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, discussed
supra. “Absent a mandatory arbitration clause in a contract,” said the court:
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Arbitration Code,498 with the exception that agreements to arbitrate both existing and future
disputes in the 1988 legislation were declared enforceable without regard to the justiciable
character of the controversy, this language being absent from the earlier statute. As reiterated in
the 1988 legislation, then, the general policy of the State of Georgia regarding the effect of an
arbitration agreement is declared to be that:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit any controversy thereafter arising to
arbitration is enforceable without regard to the justiciable character of the
controversy and confers jurisdiction on the courts of the state to enforce it and to
enter judgment on an award.499
The provisions of the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code regarding venue, service of papers,
and scope of the court’s consideration, 500 reiterated fundamentally the analogous provisions of
refusal to arbitrate is not, in itself, stubborn litigiousness, because
arbitration is only one of the alternative dispute resolution procedures to
avoid trial and to resolve a controversy. Unless made mandatory by state
or federal law, arbitration is voluntary by agreement of all parties. See
§§OCGA 9-9-2; 9-9-6; 9-9-32; 9-9-61. If refusal to do an act that is a
voluntary exercise of rights constitutes stubborn litigiousness, then
arbitration no longer would be voluntary. Thus, stubborn litigiousness is
not the failure to follow a procedure or the following of a particular
procedure in seeking to resolve a legal dispute.
Witty v. McNeal Agency, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 554, 555 (1999).
498

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-82 (2001 Supp.).

499

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-3 (2001 Supp.).

500

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4 (2001 Supp.). Subsection (d) of this statute (“In determining any
matter arising under this part, the court shall not consider whether the claim with respect
to which arbitration is sought is tenable nor otherwise pass upon the merits of the
dispute.”), in tandem with the provisions of subsection (e) (“The superior court ... may
entertain an application for an order of attachment or for a preliminary injunction in
connection with an arbitral controversy, but only upon the ground that the award to
which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without such provisional
relief.”), have been construed to authorize the court to pass on issues of arbitrability, to
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the 1978 statute, except that an additional provision as to venue was provided in the later statute,
essentially establishing a default venue for those cases where no specific venue provision of the
statute resolved this fundamental issue; in such a case, venue was to be in any court.501 More
importantly, the 1988 legislation filled a significant gap in authorizing the appropriate superior
court to “entertain an application for an order of attachment or for a preliminary injunction in
connection with an arbitral controversy, but only upon the ground that the award to which the
applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without such provisional relief.”502 This
legislative directive with respect to provisional relief had no counterpart in the earlier Georgia
Construction Arbitration Code or in the case law decided under it.503
The terms of the 1988 legislation pertaining to the bar of the statute of limitations in
application to arbitral proceedings 504 was not remarkably different from that established in the
earlier statute,505 except that the new statute made explicit the fact that “the court has discretion

the exclusion of the arbitral panel. See BellSouth Corporation v. Forsee, 2004 WL
170145 (Ga. Ct. of Appeals). Cf., however, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-34 (2001 Supp.), the section
of the Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code treating the independence of
the arbitration clause, and providing that “the arbitrators may rule on their own
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement.” This latter statutory provision has not as yet been construed by
any Georgia appellate court.
501

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4(b)(4) (2001 Supp.).

502

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4(e) (2001 Supp.).

503

In addition, the terms of the 1978 law respecting the validity of arbitral agreements,
and conditioning the validity of the arbitration agreement on the incorporation by the
parties of an approved method of selecting arbitrators, was deleted from the 1988
legislation. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-83 (2001 Supp.).
504

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-5 (2001 Supp.).

505

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-85 (2001 Supp.).
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in deciding whether to apply the bar [of the statute of limitation].”506 Moreover, the 1988
legislation made clear that “a party waives the right to raise limitation of time as a bar to
arbitration in an application to stay arbitration by that party’s participation in the arbitration.”507

506

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-5(a) (2001 Supp.).

507

Id. This rule is, of course, a specific application of the broader principle of waiver
respecting the contractual right to arbitrate as it exists under modern Georgia law. In
Burnham v. Cooney, 2004 WL 78152 –where the parties had extensively litigated an
attorney’s fee contract before the defendant in the litigation raised the potential bar of a
mandatory arbitration agreement– the Georgia Court of Appeals rehearsed the general
principles of waiver as these apply to the enforcement of arbitration agreements in
Georgia law:
"The purpose of arbitration is to avoid the courts for dispute resolution. ...
[A]rbitration parties agree to waive certain ... rights in favor of a quick
resolution of their dispute by extralegal means." "'An agreement to
arbitrate is waived by any action of a party which is inconsistent with the
right of arbitration.' [Cits.]" In Wise v. Tidal Constr. Co., the defendant
raised the issue of mandatory arbitration in its answer but then proceeded
to conduct discovery and move for summary judgment. Finding the latter
actions "grossly inconsistent with the inherent purpose for arbitration," we
held that the defendant had thereby waived a mandatory arbitration clause.
Accordingly, we later held in Phil Wooden Homes v. Ladwig that the
defendants had waived their right to mandatory arbitration by filing a
counterclaim and obtaining discovery before raising the issue of
arbitration.
Here, [the defendant] Burnham pled to the merits of the case, responded to
discovery, and obtained a transfer of the case from Richmond County to
Houston County before asserting the mandatory arbitration clause years
after suit was filed. The superior court was authorized to find that he
thereby waived his right to a quicker resolution of the dispute in
arbitration. ... The court in which this case was originally filed had
authority to compel arbitration.
Burnham v. Cooney, 2004 WL 78152 (2004) (Ga. Ct. Of Appeals), at 1-2 (footnotes
omitted). See also Phil Wooden Homes, Inc. v. Ladwig, 262 Ga. App. 792 (2003) and
Wise v. Tidal Constr. Co., 261 Ga. App. 670 (2003).
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The basic principles of the 1978 legislation regarding the application to compel or stay
arbitration508 were carried forward to the new statute. Moreover, the new legislation509 provided
that:
If an issue claimed to be arbitrable is involved in an action pending in a court
having jurisdiction to hear a motion to compel arbitration, the application shall be
made by motion in that action. If the application is granted, the order shall
operate to stay a pending or subsequent action, or so much of it as is referable to
arbitration.510
Furthermore, the new legislation also stipulated specific defenses to a motion to compel
arbitration, including the grounds (available as well as the basis for a motion to stay arbitration)

508

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-86 (2001 Supp.).

509

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a) (2001 Supp.). The Georgia Arbitration Code does not appear to
have explicit language, as does § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, empowering the court
to stay pending litigation independent of the effect of an order compelling arbitration. See
Yeremian v. Ellis, 239 Ga. App. 805 (1999), holding that an application to compel
arbitration operates merely to stay further proceedings in an action when entered by the
same court in which the action is pending. Georgia courts have, in addition, apparently
appropriated to themselves the authority to issue orders staying litigation, reasoning that,
while a motion for summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 would be an
inappropriate device to employ where a plaintiff has filed suit in violation of an
arbitration agreement since it is designed to adjudicate a matter summarily on its merits,
nonetheless “the defendant who is aggrieved by the refusal of a plaintiff to arbitrate is to
apply to the court for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration.” Tillman Group, Inc. v.
Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680 (1991). Presumably such a motion to stay litigation proceedings
would be joined with a motion to compel arbitration under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a) (2001
Supp.). The relationship of the permissive motion to stay litigation pending arbitration,
seemingly endorsed in the Tillman Group decision, to the traditional standard in Georgia
exemplified by the terms of § 9-5-3 (2001 Supp.) (“Equity will not enjoin the
proceedings and processes of a court of law, absent some intervening equity or other
proper defense of which a party, without fault on his part, cannot avail himself at law.”)
is unclear.
510

Id.
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that “no valid agreement to submit to arbitration was made; ... the agreement to arbitrate was not
complied with; or ... the arbitration is barred by limitation of time.”511
New in the 1988 Arbitration Code were its provisions regarding the consolidation of
arbitral proceedings:
Unless otherwise provided in the arbitration agreement, a party to an arbitration
agreement may petition the court to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings,
and the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings when:
(1) Separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between
the same parties or one party is a party to a separate arbitration
agreement or proceeding with a third party;
(2) The disputes arise from the same transactions or series of
related transactions or series of related transactions; and
(3) There is a common issue or issues of law or fact creating the
possibility of conflicting rulings by more than one arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators.512
In addition, the new statute provided with respect to the formation of the arbitral tribunal
in cases of consolidation, that:
If all the applicable arbitration agreements name the same arbitrator, arbitration
panel, or arbitration tribunal, the court, if it orders consolidation ..., shall order all
matters to be heard before the arbitrator, panel, or tribunal agreed to by the
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O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(b) (2001 Supp.).

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(e)(1)-(3) (2001 Supp.). This section is drawn from the essentially
identical language appearing in Section 1281.3 (West 1982) of the California Civil
Procedure Code, adopted by the California legislature in 1978.
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parties. If the applicable arbitration agreements name separate arbitrators, panels,
or tribunals, the court, if it orders consolidation ... shall, in the absence of an
agreed method of selection by all parties to the consolidated arbitration, appoint
an arbitrator.513
Needed flexibility was afforded in the 1988 Code’s stipulations that the court had the
power to resolve any inconsistency in parallel arbitral agreements, to resolve any such conflicts,
and to determine the rights and duties of the various parties; in addition, the statute makes clear
the power of the court to exercise its discretion to deny consolidation of separate arbitration
proceedings only as to certain issues, leaving other issues to be resolved in separate
proceedings.514
The stipulations of the 1978 statute regarding the appointment of arbitrators was brought
forward into the 1988 legislation, with the seemingly significant exception that language of the
older statute requiring that potential arbitrators have general knowledge and experience as to the
type of dispute or controversy to be arbitrated was deleted from the new legislation. 515

513

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(f) (2001 Supp.). Cf. Section 1281.3, California Civil Procedure
Code (West 1982).
514

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(g)(h) (2001 Supp.). Cf. Section 1281.3, California Civil Procedure
Code (West 1982). On the special procedural problems present in complex, multiparty
arbitration proceedings, see generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 653-700 (2001), and the works therein
cited at 653.
515

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-7 (2001 Supp.). The belief was, apparently, that considerations of
party autonomy dictated that the qualifications of the arbitrators be left entirely to the
judgment and discretion of the parties.
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Provisions of the old legislation regarding the procedural due process rights of parties to
an arbitral proceeding516 were fundamentally carried forward into the new legislation,517 except
that the older statute’s provisions regarding the necessity of an arbitrator’s oath were deleted
and, in addition, the arbitrators’ former discretion to ignore the agreement of the parties as to the
county in which the arbitration hearing is to be held518 was stricken and does not appear in the
new law.
The arbitrator’s powers to issue and enforce subpoenas and discovery orders as provided
in the 1978 legislation519 were brought forward virtually intact into the new 1988 Georgia

516

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-88 (2001 Supp.).

517

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-8(b)-(e) (2001 Supp.). These rights relating to basic procedural
protections of the parties are quite important, of course, and include the right to be heard;
to present pleadings, documents, testimony, and other matters; and to cross-examine
witnesses. In addition, parties have the right to be represented by an attorney; and the
right to the active participation of all of the arbitrators. Until March of 2004, the
requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-8(e) (2001 Supp.) that “[t]he arbitrators shall maintain a
record of all pleadings, documents, testimony, and other matters introduced at the
hearing,” had evaded judicial construction. However, in Brown v. Premiere Designs, Inc.,
2004 WL. 434239 (Ga. Ct. of Appeals), it was determined that the requirements of this
code section were subject to the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-8(f) (2001 Supp.),
permitting a waiver by the parties of the general requirement that arbitrators maintain
records of their proceedings. Since the claimant and respondent in that case had, prior to
the initiation of arbitral proceedings, agreed to dispense with a written record of the
arbitration hearing and because they had, in addition, continued with the proceeding in
the knowledge that no record was being made, they effectively waived the procedural
requirement of a written record. See Brown v. Premiere Designs, Inc., at 1.
518

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-88(b) (2001 Supp.).

519

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-89 (2001 Supp.).
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Arbitration Code.520 Similarly, the prior legislation’s requirement that the arbitral award be in
writing and that copies thereof be furnished to the parties was perpetuated in the 1988 statute.521
The authority of arbitrators to modify an award on the grounds that there was a
miscalculation of figures or a mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred
to in the award; or that the arbitrators made an award ultra vires on a matter not submitted to
them; or on the basis that the award was imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy, were all features retained virtually intact in the new 1988 Georgia Arbitration
Code.522
Particularly important was the fact that the authority for a vacatur of an arbitration award
by the court and the grounds therefore as stipulated in the Georgia Construction Arbitration
Code were brought forward into the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code almost without change.523

520

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-9 (2001 Supp.).

521

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-10 (2001 Supp.). Writing in Marchelletta v. Seay Construction
Services, Inc., 2004 WL 26729, the Georgia Court of Appeals, quoting Cotton States
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nunnally Lumber Co., 176 Ga. App. 232 (1985), at 234, noted that
subsection (a) of this provision has been interpreted to exclude any requirement for
reasoned awards: “OCGA § 9-9-90 (a) [the statutory predecessor of O.C.G.A. § 9-910(a)] provides in part that, ‘[t]he award shall be in writing and signed by the arbitrators
joining in the award.’ There is no mandate that the award include specific findings or
reasons, or that it expressly address each and every issue and collateral issue arising in
an arbitration.’ (Emphasis supplied.).”
522

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11 (2001 Supp.).

523

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (2001 Supp.). This section of the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code
was construed by the Court of Appeals in Atlanta Gas Light Company v. Trinity
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 231 Ga. App. 617 (1998), at 619-620, so as to
provide substantial leeway to an arbitrator in framing an award:
“The authority of the arbitrator gives [him] the inherent power to fashion a
remedy as long as the award draws its essence from the contract or
statute.” . . . The Code does not require that an arbitrator enter written
findings of fact and law in support of an award, "nor does the Code
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require an arbitrator to explain the reasoning behind an award." . . .
Simply because the umpire in the instant case provided a limited rationale
for his holdings does not provide a vehicle whereby the awards may be
vacated because Georgia law was allegedly "imperfectly" applied.
"[M]erely because the relief granted in the arbitration award could not or
would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not grounds for
vacating or refusing to confirm an award.” . . . In the instant case, the
umpire made "final and definite award[s] upon the subject matter
submitted," as required by statute. §OCGA 9-9-13(b)(3). As the awards
are consistent with the terms of the Agreement and thus reflect the
"essence" of the contract, they do not demonstrate an imperfect execution
of the umpire's authority.
Georgia case law sometimes evidences somewhat disturbing tendencies to use the
ambiguity and vagueness of the statutory bases for judicial vacation of awards provided
in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(1)-(3) (2001 Supp.), especially that which provides that an
award may be vacated if it has been demonstrated that it represents “[a]n overstepping by
the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of them that a final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made...,” as a means of evading
the limitations on judicial review of arbitral awards. In the recent decision of the Georgia
Court of Appeals in Sweatt v. International Development Corp., 242 Ga. App. 753, 755
(2000), the court correctly noted that
[d]uring arbitration proceedings, the general rules of contract construction
apply. Martin v. RocCorp, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 177 ... (1994). An
arbitration award should be consistent with terms of the underlying
agreement and reflect the ‘essence’ of that contract; it must not
demonstrate ‘imperfect execution’ of the arbitrators authority. ... Although
the arbitrator has some latitude in fashioning remedies, he is not free to
ignore the express terms of a valid and enforceable contract...
Relying on this principle, however, the court chose to vacate an award in a construction
dispute which granted actual damages where the contract between the parties had
stipulated liquidated damages in the event of a dispute. The ratio decidendi of the court
stressed that the award of actual damages instead of the contractually agreed-upon
liquidated damages was an “overstepping” of authority under the submission and an
“imperfect execution” of his charge by the arbitrator sufficient to justify the vacation
(and, in this case, modification under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-14[b][1]-[3])
(2001 Supp.) of the award by the court as a matter of law. The gravamen of the Sweatt
decision touches, of course, on the related issue of the availability of the arbitrator’s
manifest disregard of law as a basis for the vacatur of an arbitral award, an issue
considered at more length, infra, in this Chapter’s discussion, in its Section 6, of the 2003
amendment to the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code adopting “manifest disregard of law”
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The permissible period in which to make application for a modification of an award by the court,
however, was changed from the thirty days allowed under the 1978 legislation,524 and enlarged in
the new act to a period of three months after the delivery of a copy of the award to the
applicant.525 The remaining bases for the modification of an award, however, were left intact.526
Moreover, the obligation of the court to confirm an award which it has modified was reiterated
in the new statute.527 The new law’s provisions for the entry of judgment on the award after its
confirmation are identical to that contained in the older legislation.528
The language of the 1978 law regarding the finality of a judgment or order entered under
the Georgia Arbitration Code for appeal purposes was continued under the 1988 legislation, 529 as
were the earlier provisions of the 1978 law530 regarding the award of arbitrators’ fees and
expenses.531 Significant, however, was the absence
as a permitted grounds for the vacatur of an arbitral award.
524

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-94 (2001 Supp.).

525

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-14(a) (2001 Supp.).

526

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-14(b)(1)-(3) (2001 Supp.).

527

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-14©) (2001 Supp.).

528

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-15 (2001 Supp.).

529

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-16 (2001 Supp.).

530

Significantly, this provision carried forward the general statutory prohibition of an
award of attorneys’ fees. “Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the
arbitrators’ expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees,
incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award.”
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97 (repealed 1988).
531

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-17 (2001 Supp.). A decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals has
considerably expanded this section, however. While conceding that the statute does not
authorize the recovery of fees in the absence of an agreement allowing their recovery, the
court has found that such an agreement can be evidenced explicitly by the conduct of the
parties. In Akintobi v. Phoenix Fire Restoration Company, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 760
(1999), the respondent “Akintobi's sole enumeration of error [was] that the trial court
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erred in confirming the arbitration award because neither the written contract nor the
parties' arbitration agreement expressly provided for the recovery of attorney fees.” The
court nonetheless found that the arbitrator’s award granting such fees was proper under
the circumstances of this case:
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) sets forth the exclusive grounds upon which an
arbitration award may be vacated. Greene v. Hundley, 266 Ga. 592, 595596(3), 468 S.E.2d 350 (1996). The Georgia Arbitration Code requires a
trial court to confirm an award upon timely application by a party, unless
one of the statutory grounds for vacating or modifying the award is
established. Haddon v. Shaheen & Co., 231 Ga. App. 596-597(1), 499
S.E.2d 693 (1998). "[T]he power of a court to vacate an arbitration award
has been severely limited in order not to frustrate the legislative purpose
of avoiding litigation by resort to arbitration." (Emphasis in original.) Id.
Here, nothing on the face of the arbitration award including the award of
attorney fees appears to be the result of corruption, fraud, or misconduct.
Greene, 266 Ga. at 596, 468 S.E.2d 350. Nor does the award evince any
partiality or overstepping by the arbitrator. Gilbert v. Montlick, 232 Ga.
App. 91, 93(2), 499 S.E.2d 731 (1998). In fact, although no contract
provided for attorney fees, the record demonstrates that both sides
vigorously pursued such fees before the arbitrator. Not only did Akintobi
fail to object to the evidence of Phoenix's attorney fees at arbitration,
Akintobi submitted its own evidence of attorney fees. In so doing,
Phoenix and Akintobi implicitly agreed to arbitrate that issue. See Hope
& Assoc. v. Marvin M. Black Co., 205 Ga. App. 561, 562(1), 422 S.E.2d
918 (1992). Inasmuch as Akintobi failed to sustain its burden of showing
that the arbitrator's decision was "completely irrational" or constituted a
"manifest disregard of the law," it must be upheld. Amerispec Franchise
v. Cross, 215 Ga. App. 669, 671(1), 452 S.E.2d 188 (1994); § O.C.G.A.
9-9-13(b).
Akintobi v. Phoenix Fire Restoration Company, Inc., at 761. The
“manifest disregard of law” as a foundation for the vacatur of an arbitral
award under modern Georgia law is discussed more fully, infra. Further,
the Georgia Court of Appeals has now explicitly recognized that
independent claims to attorney fees arising from statutory authorizations
for the award of such fees, such as the Prompt Pay Act, O.C.G.A. § 13-111, may be arbitrated if the parties so agree. See Yates Paving & Grading
Co. v. Bryan County, 2004 WL 253734 (Ga. Ct. of Appeals). See also
Hope & Assocs. v. Marvin M. Black Co., 205 Ga. App. 561 (1992),
discussed supra, approving an award of attorney fees in arbitration
proceedings based on an independent agreement of the parties for such an

191
from the new 1988 Arbitration Code of the stipulations appearing in the 1978 legislation
permitting the court to reduce or disallow any fees or expenses found to be excessive, and the
power of the court to allocate them “as justice requires.”532

Section 5. The Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code of 1988

The enactment of Georgia’s 1978 Construction Arbitration Code was a clear signal that
the nineteenth century underpinnings of the state’s arbitral system was inadequate; the
inadequacy of the common-law base of that antiquated system –even though reinforced by the
provisions of the 1856 arbitration statute– was hardly remedied, however, by the arbitration code
legislatively enacted in 1978. Much remained yet to be done at that point in time in order to
provide Georgia with a functioning, efficient, modern and comprehensive statutory foundation
for the conduct of alternative dispute resolution procedures generally, and arbitral measures in
particular. Especially in the fields of international relations and international commerce and
trade, Georgia’s arbitral infrastructure was woefully lacking as the state lurched toward the end
of the twentieth century.533

award and construing the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-17 to permit such
an award. But see Joyner v. Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., 2004
WL 603912 (Ga. Ct. of Appeals), requiring strict compliance with the
special pleading requirements of O.C.G.A. § 13-11-1 in order to put into
issue any fees under that statute.
532
533

See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-97(b) (2001 Supp.).

Beyond the patent general need for a modern arbitration code responsive to current
trends and requirements, special concerns in the international arena centered on the utility
of arbitration legislation addressing unique considerations in developing countries which
were increasingly recognized as markets for Georgia-based goods and services. On the
concerns and interests of developing nations in this regard, see generally Gabriel M.
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Long occupying a position of preeminence in cultural, economic and commercial matters
throughout the Southeast, Georgia (and especially its capital city, Atlanta) began in the second
half of the twentieth century to assume a position of natural leadership with respect to
international contacts and relationships as well. Writing in 1982, Dr. Delwin A. Roy, then
Director of The Georgia World Congress Institute, an international trade research center in
Atlanta, observed:
One of the measures of “internationalization” [in Georgia] is the degree to
which foreigners are in evidence in business, economic and political affairs of the
city [of Atlanta]. Atlanta recently has felt increasing foreign presence in the areas
in banking, direct investments and consular trade offices. As a regional center,
Atlanta always has been viewed as an appropriate host for representatives of
foreign governments. Consular and trade offices have been long-standing
symbols of the international significance of our city. And, with more and more
foreign governments establishing offices here, this will continue to be a
significant factor in the future internationalization of Atlanta.
The opening of representative offices of foreign banks is even more dramatic
evidence of our growth in that direction. At present, ten such banks have been
established in the city, most opening only recently as a result of the state’s new
liberalized banking laws. The increasing number of foreign bank offices can be
construed as evidence of the increasing importance the South may have for their

Wilner, Acceptance of Arbitration in Developing Countries, in RESOLVING DISPUTES
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 283, 283-291 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed.
1984).
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clients – the large multi-nationals of such countries as England, France, Japan,
Germany and the Netherlands.534

As late as 1974, Georgia had been the host

to a mere thirty-six discrete instances of foreign direct investment, but by the end
of the 1970s, the state had become home to 375 such investments; this number
was to rise dramatically to 550 such investments (with a value of almost $2
billion) within the first twelve months of 1981. This dramatic increase in the
number and volume of foreign direct investments in the state may be attributed to
“its abundance of natural resources, a labor force adequate both in terms of
numbers and skills to accommodate virtually any proposed investment, and an
active and aggressive policy on the part of the state government to attract the
foreign investor.”535 The modernization of the state’s seaport facilities in
Brunswick and Savannah, complemented by the dramatic growth of the air
transportation system centered in Atlanta, as well as the elaboration of a modern
and efficient road system throughout the state, all contributed to the attractiveness
of the city of Atlanta and the State of Georgia as magnets for foreign trade and
investment activities.536 The state, in turn, fostered additional growth in these
sectors by a favorable tax structure; generous tax exemptions and freeport
legislation; the elaboration of a system of industrial development bond financing;
vocational training programs; and the establishment of foreign trade offices at a

534

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN GEORGIA: A BUSINESS REFERENCE GUIDE 22 (E. R. Lanier,
ed., 1982)
535

Ibid, at 23.

536

Id.
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number of critical venues around the globe, all of which fostered the rise of
Atlanta and Georgia as focal points for international cultural, trade, investment
and commercial relations.537
Douglas H. Yarn –in an article published in 1987 in support of the adoption of a new and
revised arbitration code for the State of Georgia intended to encompass provisions addressing the
particular problems of international commercial arbitration while rationalizing and updating the
existing code’s terms relative to domestic arbitrations as well– noted that among those areas
requiring special attention in the transnational context were “the unique problems of
international arbitration, such as language, foreign currency awards, enforcement of foreign
awards, and the nationality of the arbitrators.”538 Philip L. Ray, Jr., a major advocate of
Georgia’s adoption of modern statute to govern international commercial arbitrations, made out
a convincing case for the adoption of a special international commercial arbitration law for the
state , emphasizing the comparative disadvantage which Georgia would suffer in the absence of
such legislation:
In the competition to bring industry and economic development to
Georgia the perception that Georgia has an unfavorable legal environment
for alternative dispute resolution is a negative consideration. This is
particularly true in the international area, with Florida’s recent enactment
of an international commercial arbitration statute and its establishment of
an international commercial dispute settlement center. Other Southern

537
538

Ibid, at 23-24.

Douglas H. Yarn, Proposed Changes in the Arbitration Law of Georgia, 23 GA. ST .
BAR J. 153 (1987).
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states, such as Texas, have also recently established international dispute
settlement centers. To facilitate the continued development of Atlanta and
other major Georgia cities as an [sic] international commercial and
financial centers and the economic development for all of Georgia, it
would be helpful to have a progressive domestic and international
commercial dispute settlement law in Georgia.539
The Southeastern Office of the American Arbitration Association was even more blunt in
assessing the need for the adoption of special international commercial arbitration laws in
Georgia: “Arbitration is the dispute resolution method of choice in transnational transactions,” it
stated. “Although federal arbitration law enforces arbitration agreements and awards involving
foreign commerce, the confusing and backward nature of Georgia’s arbitration laws has had a
subtle deleterious effect on international trade and investment in this state.”540
Despite the misgivings of some that the widespread adoption of state international

539

See Draft of A Resolution in Support of Amending Georgia’s Commercial Arbitration
Laws and Enacting an International Commercial Arbitration Statute, submitted to the
Board of Governors of the State the Bar of Georgia, by Philip L. Ray, Jr., October 24,
1986, reproduced in Memorandum, International Commercial Arbitration Proposal,
from George E. Hibbs, Assistant General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, to the
Advisory Committee on Legislation of the State Bar of Georgia, dated October 27, 1986,
in the possession of the author.
540

Press Release, “The Georgia Arbitration Code,” transmitted to Rhys Wilson by the
Southeastern Regional Office of the American Arbitration Association under letter dated
March 28, 1988, a copy of which is in the possession of the author. The AAA continued,
in praise of the standards established by the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code: “The new
GAC not only resolves this problem, it also provides a set of provisions applicable to
international commercial arbitrations. These provisions make Georgia’s legal
environment particularly conducive for international commercial arbitration and are
designed to attract international commercial disputes to our state for resolution in the
arbitral forum.” Id.
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arbitration codes might have a detrimental effect in attracting arbitrations to the United States,541
Georgia’s code became law in the 1988 session of the Georgia General Assembly. 542

541

J. Stewart McClendon argues:
There are at least two potentially serious problems created by most state
efforts to attract business by adopting international arbitration legislation.
One is the risk of confusion created by increasingly complicated state laws
that depart from the UAA and the FAA; the other is increased lack of
uniformity between the arbitration laws of the various states. Both
problems have the potential to make it more difficult for foreign users to
understand how international arbitration operates in the United States. In
short, many of the state efforts to attract international arbitration are likely
to be counterproductive.

J. Stewart McClendon, State International Arbitration Laws: Are They Needed or
Desirable?, 1 AM . REV. INT ’L. ARB. 245, 259 (1990) (Footnotes omitted), quoted in
Sébastian Besson, The Utility of State Laws Regulating International Commercial
Arbitration and Their Compatibility With The FAA, 11 AM . REV. INT ’L. ARB. 211, 244
(2000). Besson concurs generally in the opinion of McClendon, finding “that the
enactment of state laws on international arbitration creates serious risk of confusion for
foreign users. It could even be misleading to propose and promote a legal regime, which
is preempted by the federal arbitration law on very important questions.” Ibid, at 245.
There is substantial academic and scholarly commentary to the contrary, of course.
George K. Walker takes the position that “... while international agreements to which the
United States is a party, federal statutes, and federal common law necessarily trump state
law, where applicable, there is an appropriate place for the state acts”:
Particularly, this is the current situation since Congress has not yet revised
federal statutes governing arbitration. Even where federal law does apply,
the state acts may supply norms if adopted as rules. The state acts may
apply may play an interstitial role in a transaction otherwise governed by
federal law. Even if federal law controls, the state acts may be factors in
informing the policy for the choice of federal law. In any future
amendments of the federal arbitration statutes, Congress may choose to
incorporate state law by reference.
George K. Walker, Trends in State Legislation Governing International Arbitrations, 17
N.C.J. INT ’L. & COM . 419 (1992) (Footnotes omitted).
542

1988 Ga. Laws 903 § 1 et seq., codified as O.C.G.A. § 9-9-30–43 (2001 Supp.).
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As adopted in 1988, the Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code addresses
not only these challenges, but it does so in such a way that its “provisions work in tandem with
the domestic rules, forming a single integrated set of arbitration provisions.”543 Yarn provided
an assessment of the impact, domestic and international, which the adoption of these provisions
would entail:
The new Arbitration Act is carefully crafted to provide a flexible procedural
framework for the arbitral resolution of disputes arising under a broad range of
domestic and international transactions. As with the application of the existing
construction arbitration provisions, the modified version provides for party
autonomy in fashioning the arbitration process, reflecting principles of fairness
and equality in the treatment of parties, and includes basic provisions for the
functioning of arbitration proceedings where the parties have failed to do so. It is
submitted that the proposed act strikes a proper balance between arbitration and
the courts. The role of the courts is one of assistance, supportive of the arbitral
process while not interfering or speculating on the merits. Most importantly,
basic considerations of procedural process are well protected. The right of each
party to be informed of all claims, evidence, and arguments presented against it
and to receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard is safeguarded.544

543

Id.

544

Ibid, at 153-154. Yarn makes explicit the various sources which influenced the
specific terms of the new Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code.
In the course of its work, the drafting group studied and compared
the current or proposed arbitration laws of New York, California,
and all the states of the Southeast; the United Kingdom, and
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The 1988 Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code makes explicit the fact
that it is an integral part of the title of the Georgia Code addressing arbitration, and not a free
standing set of principles divorced from the existing provisions relating to arbitration. This
stands in contrast to the approach adopted in other states, where an attempt was made to set
international arbitration provisions apart as distinct and independent portions of the state law:
In order to encourage the use of arbitration in the resolution of conflicts arising
out of international transactions effectuating the policy of the state to provide a
conducive environment for intentional business and trade, this part [2, The
Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code] supplements part 1 of this
article [the general arbitration code] and shall be used concurrently with the
provisions of part one of this article whenever an arbitration is within the scope of
this part. 545

France; the Uniform Arbitration Act drafted by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; the Federal Arbitration
Act, including Title II implementing the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards; the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration recently ratified by the United States
Senate; and the model international commercial arbitration statute
developed by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). In addition, the drafting group
reviewed recent legislation in Florida and British Columbia which
created entirely separate sets of provisions for the arbitration of
international commercial disputes.
Id. The single most influential of these appears to have been the UNCITRAL initiative.
545

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-30 (2001 Supp.).
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Statements of the scope of the International Transactions Arbitration Code were
expressly articulated in the statute, employing terms reminiscent of the approach taken by the
Federal Arbitration Act546 in its delineation of scope in its international part:
[The Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code] shall apply to
arbitrations within its scope notwithstanding provisions in Part 1 in this article to the
contrary.
(b) This part shall apply only to the arbitration of disputes between:
(1) two or more persons at least one of whom is domiciled or
established outside the United States; or
(2) two or more persons all of whom are domiciled or established in the
United States if the dispute bears some
relation to property, contractual performance, investments, or other activity
outside the United States.547
546

See 9 U.S.C. § 202:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as
commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in
section 2 of this title, falls under the [United Nations] Convention [on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10,
1958]. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall
under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located
abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.

If anything, the Georgia analogue appears stronger than its federal counterpart: while the
federal act extends only to foreign elements considered to have a reasonable relationship
to the transaction, the Georgia act appears content to extend the international provisions
wherever there is any relationship to property or activity outside the United States.
547

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-31 (2001 Supp.). The dispositions of this section bear the
unmistakable traces of Article 1 (“Scope of application”) of the United Nations
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Expanding on the statutory requirement that, in order to come within the scope and ambit
of the Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code, the agreement to arbitrate need be in
writing as required by the general provisions of the Georgia Arbitration Code,548 the 1988
legislation defined with more particularity what would constitute an “agreement in writing.”
The Code provides in this respect that:
For purposes of this part, in particular, an agreement is in writing if it is contained
in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams,
or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement, or
in an exchange of statements of claim and defense in which the existence of an
agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another. The reference in a
contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration

Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Model Law of 1985 (adopted by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985) which
provides for the application of its terms to an arbitration if the parties to an arbitration
agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of their agreement, their places of business
in different states; or the place of arbitration, the place where a substantial part of the
obligations of the commercial relationship is to be performed, or the place with which the
subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected relates to more than one country.
Both the 1988 Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code and the UNCITRAL
Model Law of 1985 owe, of course, much of their spirit, if not their letter, to Article I of
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards June 10, 1960 (“The New York Convention”), and its United States analog, 9
U.S.C. § 202, discussed supra. This article of the New York Convention provides
essentially that arbitral awards which are made in a country other than the enforcing state
or which are otherwise regarded as nondomestic under the law the enforcing state will be
accorded the favorable treatment provided for in the Convention terms. The New York
Convention will be discussed further, particularly with respect to the defenses to the
enforcement of arbitral awards made available in its Article V, infra in this survey’s
present Chapter, Section 6, “The 2003 Amendment to the 1988 Georgia Arbitration
Code: Manifest Disregard of Law.”
548

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c) (2001 Supp.).
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agreement, provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to
make that clause part of the contract.549
Secondly, while the provisions of the Georgia Arbitration Code of 1988 did not carry
forward the particular standards of arbitrator competence which had been apparent in the 1978
legislation, the Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code, nonetheless, elected to
make clear one principle regarding arbitrator qualification: “[n]o person [is to] be precluded by
reason of his nationality from acting as an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”550
The existing provisions of the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code respecting provisional
relief were similarly elaborated in the International Commercial Arbitration Code by making
specific provision for broader forms of interim relief than those specifically contemplated in the
domestic legislation:
[t]he arbitrators may grant such interim relief as they consider appropriate and, in so doing, may
require a party to post bond or give other security. The power conferred in this Code Section
upon the arbitrators is without prejudice to the right of a party to request interim relief directly
from any court, tribunal, or other governmental authority, inside or outside this state, and to do
so without prior authorization of the arbitrators.551

In a provision touching upon a major

substantive consideration respecting the jurisdictional authority of the arbitral tribunal, the
Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code of 1988 specifically adopted the doctrine of

549

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-32 (2001 Supp.). Article 7(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985
is the source of the inspiration for this section of the Georgia law.
550

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-33 (2001 Supp.). See Article 11(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law of
1985 for the corresponding terms of the international standard.
551

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-35 (2001 Supp.). Compare Article 9 and Article 17 of the UNCITRAL
Model Law of 1985: the Georgia provision tracks the international expectation in this
respect.
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compétence de la compétence.552 This principle –which has now gained wide international

552

This doctrine essentially leaves it to the arbitrators to pass on challenges to their
authority rooted in allegations of contract invalidity. If arbitrators were required under
the applicable arbitral law to cease their proceedings in order to give way to a judicial
ruling on challenges to the arbitration panel’s power [compétence] over the dispute
generally, the arbitral process might well become a mere adjunct of the conventional
court and the extrajudicial procedure could lose much of its effectiveness. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1967), adopted the general principle that the under the Federal Arbitration Act,
a claim of fraud in the inducement of an entire contract is for the arbitrators to decide
under an arbitration clause providing for reference of any controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to the agreement or breach thereof, in the absence of evidence that
contracting parties intended to withhold that issue from arbitration. This rule, generally
interpreted as very supportive of the institution of arbitration, is now reflected in most
international institutional arbitral rules, including those of the UNCITRAL itself. See
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ARBITRATION RULES
(adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 28 April
1976), Article 21(1) (“The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on objections that
it has no jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of
the arbitration clause or of the separate arbitration agreement.”). But see, in a purely
domestic case, Stewart v. Favors, 264 Ga. App. 156 (2003), where the Georgia Court of
Appeals ruled that it was for the court, and not for the arbitrators, “to pass on the
enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate where the consumer raised a clear and
specific challenge to the enforceability of the arbitration provisions in both the loan
contract and the agreement accompanying [a] auto club contract. Under these
circumstances,” the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled, “the lower courts construing Prima
Paint are in agreement that it is the court that has authority to decide whether the
arbitration provision is enforceable.” Ibid, at 3. Since Prima Paint, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), has stressed that
issues of arbitrability and the allocation of authority over these “gateway” questions
between the courts and the arbitral panel are to be resolved according to the intentions of
the parties, subject to the application of ordinary state-law contract principles. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, courts are not to presume the arbitration of such
questions. First Options, at 943. The federal supreme court’s position on these matters
has been recently refined in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002);
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); and Green Tree Financial
Corp v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003). On the current position of the U. S. Supreme
Court on issues of arbitrability and the competence of the arbitral tribunal, see June
Lehrman, On The Threshold of Arbitration, 26-DEC. L.A. LAW. 20 (2003) and Richard
Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring
Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 819
(2003). See also, in a Georgia domestic context, BellSouth Corp. v. Forsee, 2004 WL
170145, where the Georgia Court of Appeals approved the grant of permanent
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acceptance, although a somewhat tepid and mixed reaction from United States courts and
lawmakers553 – is incorporated into Georgia law by the statute providing that:
[t]he arbitrators may rule on their own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose,
an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the
arbitrators that the contract is null and void shall not thereby invalidate the
arbitration clause.554
The Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code further responded to particular
concerns in the context of international dispute resolution by making clear and certain that the
parties to the arbitral agreement enjoyed autonomy with respect to the selection of the language
of their proceeding:

interlocutory relief withdrawing issues of arbitrability from a panel of arbitrators on the
twin basis that the party invoking equitable relief in the conventional court was also the
party seeking to compel arbitration and that, in addition, such action by the trial judge
was consistent with the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-4 (2001 Supp.) which, as construed
by the court, authorized judicial determination of these issues of arbitrability.
553

Daniel A. Zeft summarizes the status of the doctrine in the United States context,
writing that “Supreme Court precedent establishes that with regard to cases subject to the
FAA, the arbitrators do not have the authority in most instances to resolve disputes
concerning the validity or scope of an arbitration agreement, but rather such questions
require judicial resolution in most cases,” citing in support of this proposition Moseley v.
Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167, 171 (1963), as well as dicta in Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flooding & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404 (1967),
suggesting that “if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself [as
opposed to fraud in the inducement of the whole contract, a matter appropriate for
arbitral resolution] ... the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.” See Daniel A. Zeft,
The Applicability of State International Arbitration Statutes and the Absence of
Significant Preemption Concerns, 22 N.C.J. INT ’L. L. & COM . REG . 705, 773 (1997).
554

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-34 (2001 Supp.). This language is taken essentially from Article 16(1)
of the UNCITRAL Model Law OF 1985.
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The parties are free to agree on the language or languages to be used in the
arbitral proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitrators shall determine the
language or languages to be used in the proceedings. This agreement or
determination, unless otherwise specified therein, shall apply to any written
statement by a party, any hearing, and any award, decision, or other
communication by the arbitrators.
*

*

*

(b) the arbitrators may order that any documentary evidence shall be accompanied
by a translation into the language or languages agreed upon by the parties or
determined by the arbitrators.555
Responding to considerations which were paramount in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Stanford University556 the Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code makes clear that
“[s]election of this state as the place of arbitration shall not in itself constitute selection of the
procedural or substantive law of that place as the law governing the arbitration.”557 This
provision makes clear that the mere fact of an arbitral proceeding having its seat in Georgia
under the agreement of the parties will not necessarily constitute a selection of the law of this

555

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-37 (2001 Supp.). The language of this section is drawn virtually
verbatim from UNCITRAL Model Law Article 22.
556

Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Stanford University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). In Volt,
the federal high court took the position that a contractual choice of California law by the
parties to an agreement served as basis for the application of California procedural and
substantive law in an arbitral proceeding arising out of that agreement, even to the point
of displacing the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act. Essentially the court
underscored the party autonomy which is a dominant feature of modern arbitration rules
and emphasized the capacity of the parties to determine most aspects of their arbitral
procedure for themselves. Volt is considered at greater length, infra, in Chapter Three of
this survey, Section 1, The Doctrine of Federal Preemption and the Autonomy of Georgia
Arbitration Policy.
557

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-36 (2001 Supp.).
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state as the law applicable to the procedural or to the substantive law relevant to the resolution of
the dispute. No language in this code section, however, prevents the parties from making such
an election if they choose to do so as a matter of private agreement.
The statutory standard in Georgia respecting the use of expert testimony is drawn into
line with international understanding and practice by the provisions of the Georgia International
Commercial Arbitration Code stipulating that:
(a) unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitrators:
(1) may appoint one or more experts to report on specific issues to
be determined by the arbitrators; and
(2) may require a party to give the expert any relevant information
or to produce or to provide access to, any relevant documents,
goods, or other property for his inspection.
(b) unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if a party so requests or if the
arbitrators consider it necessary, the experts shall, after delivery of his written or
oral report, participate in a hearing where the parties have the opportunity to put
questions to him and to present expert witnesses in order to testify on the points at
issue.558
Although there is a long domestic tradition in United States arbitration that arbitrators are
not required to provide a statement of the legal and factual reasons supporting their awards, this
American practice has long been regarded as a peculiarity at the international level where

558

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-38 (2001 Supp.). Here too, the language of this section is drawn
virtually verbatim from UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985, in this instance from that
instrument’s Article 26.
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reasoned awards are the virtually universal norm.559 In language designed to draw the Georgia
practice into line with the international understanding at least with respect to international
arbitrations, the 1988 Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code provides:
(a) A written statement of the reasons for an award shall be issued if the parties
agree to the issuance thereof or the arbitrators determine that a failure to do so
could prejudice recognition or enforcement of the award.560

559

William W. Park summarizes these contrasting traditions:
Without exception, all major institutional rules for international
commercial arbitration (ICC, LCIA, AAA International, UNCITRAL,
ICSID and Geneva Chamber of Commerce) require arbitrators to state the
grounds for their decision unless the parties explicitly opt out of a
reasoned award. . . .
A written opinion adds rigor to the process. Arbitrators required to explain
themselves must think more about the basis for their decisions.
Conversely, sloppy and lazy arbitrators will have an easier time without
having to give an account of the why and wherefore of their award.
Reasoned awards are not an unalloyed blessing, however. By giving the
loser a hook on which to challenge the award, they may detract from
finality. For this reason the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in
domestic cases has long discouraged reasoned awards. The marketplace
has pushed international arbitration toward reasoned awards. Even for
disputes decided within the AAA framework, a separate set of rules
requires reasoned awards for international controversies. When millions of
dollars are at stake, neither business managers nor governments find a
"check-the-box" approach satisfying. In many Continental European legal
systems, reasoned opinions are mandatory

William W. Park, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration, 10 GEO . MASON L. REV. 803 (2002), at
823-824 (footnotes omitted). See also Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for
Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the
Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 443 (1998).
560

O.C.G.A.§ 9-9-39(a) (2001 Supp.). This section reflects the underlying intent of
UNCITRAL Model Law Article 31(2). In Trend-Pak of Atlanta, Inc. v. Arbor
Commercial Div., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 137 (1990), this section was construed to mean that
there does not exist in Georgia law any requirement, absent a request by the parties under
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(b) If so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request
the arbitrators to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award.
The interpretation shall form part of the award.
(c) The arbitrators may award reasonable fees and expenses actually incurred,
including, without limitation, fees and expenses of legal counsel to any party to
the arbitration and shall allocate the cost of the arbitration among the parties as it
deems appropriate.561
Responding to some American precedent holding otherwise, the Georgia International
Transactions Arbitration Code provides that “[t]he courts of [Georgia] shall confirm or vacate a

this provision, that the award of the arbitrators recite specific reasons or findings in
support of the resulting award; nor is it necessary under this law that each and every
issue, including relevant collateral issues arising in the course of the arbitration, be
addressed in the award, the court citing Cotton States Ins. Co. v. Nunnally Co., 176 Ga.
App. 232 (1985) in support of this view as well as the terms of this section. Accordingly,
the court affirmed a judgment of the trial court confirming the award, there not being
otherwise any ambiguity or indefiniteness on the face of the award. The basis for the
court’s application of O.C.G.A.§ 9-9-39(a) (2001 Supp.) is unclear, however, since the
parties to the litigation apparently were domestic corporations and there was no other
discernible international affiliation of the case.
561

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-39 (2001 Supp.). Subsection ©) adopts as law in Georgia the
international trend in commercial arbitration, heavily influenced by the so-called
“English Rule” permitting the award of attorneys fees to the prevailing party and against
the loser. This loser-pays-all approach, while there is much to recommend it, remains the
object of debate in the United States and is not widely applied across the board in
American civil litigation; the fashion is otherwise, however, with respect to the award of
fees in international commercial arbitration proceedings, and this Georgia law is
consistent with both that trend and with the position of the UNCITRAL Model Law of
1985 on this issue. On the general question of the award of fees in litigation, see W. Kent
Davis, The International View of Attorneys Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States
the “Odd Man Out” In How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ . J. INT ’L & COMP. L. 361
(1999). On the issue of the American Rule and international commercial arbitration
specifically, see John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in
International Commercial Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT ’L L. 1 (1999).
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final award, notwithstanding the fact that it grants relief in a currency other than United States
dollars.”562
In some American case law, courts have shown a special sensitivity to the issue of
whether or not a court asked to confirm an arbitral award may do so if that same arbitral award
has been the subject of prior judicial action either within or outside of the United States.563 In
part, this special sensitivity has arisen from doubts as to whether or not an American court has
statutory authority under the Federal Arbitration Act to confirm and enforce a foreign judgment,
since the United States is not a party to any multilateral instrument providing for the mutual or
reciprocal recognition of foreign court judgments.564 Hence, the paradox has arisen that an
American court is obligated to enforce a foreign arbitral award, this under the provisions of
multilateral instruments to which the United States is a party, such as the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,565 but does not
have the same obligation with respect to a judgment of a foreign tribunal. A conceptual
uncertainty arises when the foreign award (presumably enforceable qua award) has been reduced
to a judgment in a court, foreign or domestic. The ambiguities originating in this doctrine of
“merger” are the subject of special language in the 1988 Georgia International Transactions
Arbitration Code:

562

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-40 (2001 Supp.).

563

See, on this question, Island Territory of Curaçao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d
1313 (1973); see also Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir.1975).
564

For a general and current review of efforts to standardize and harmonize procedural
aspects of divergent legal systems with respect to enforcement of foreign judgments, see
James P. George, International Parallel Litigation – A Survey of Current Conventions
and Model Laws, 37 TEX . INT ’L. L. J. 499 (2002). See also Linda Silberman,
Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will The Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319 (2002).
565

United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T 2517, T.I.A.S No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S 3, codified in 9 U.S.C.A §§ 201-208 (1970), discussed infra in greater detail.
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If a final award has been reduced to judgment or made the subject of
official action by any court, tribunal, or other governmental authority
outside the United States, the courts of this state shall confirm or vacate
the award without regard to any term or condition of the foreign judgment
or official action and without regard to whether the award may be deemed
merged into the judgment.566
In a measure intended to further integrate Georgia practice with regard to the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the 1988 Georgia International Transactions Arbitration
Code reaches out and captures federal standards in this respect:
An arbitration award irrespective of where it was made, on the basis of
reciprocity, shall be recognized as binding and shall be enforceable in the courts
of this state subject to the grounds for vacating an award under [the 1988 Georgia
Arbitration Code] and providing that the award is not contrary to the public policy
of this state with respect to international transactions. Reciprocity in the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards shall be in accordance
with applicable federal laws, international conventions, and treaties.567

566

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-41 (2001 Supp.). The federal circuit court opinion in The Island
Territory of Curaçao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (1973), rehearses the
issues which underlie the language of this section of the Georgia International
Transactions Arbitration Code.
567

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-42 (2001 Supp.). The United States acceded to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards subject to a
stipulation requiring reciprocity in the enforcement of the Convention. This provision of
the Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code mirrors that federal standard.
The extent to which the 2003 amendment to the Georgia Arbitration Code elevating
“manifest disregard of law” to the status of a ground for the vacatur of an arbitral award
under Georgia law impacts on foreign arbitral awards and nondomestic awards governed
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The conduct of an arbitral proceeding falling under the 1988 Georgia International
Transactions Arbitration Code will presumably involve parties whose seats are in different
countries or, alternatively, address a subject matter or property located offshore. The presence of
these factors will necessarily entail a measure of delay more extensive than that which typically
would appear in the context of domestic arbitration. This circumstance augurs for lengthened
time periods for mandatory actions in the arbitral process. For this reason, the Georgia
International Commercial Arbitration Code, in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-43, makes provisions for
extended time periods in circumstances where a party to the arbitral proceeding may or must
take certain action, doubling the time for making applications for both stays of arbitration568 and
for applications to arbitrators to change their award569 and, in addition, trebling the ten day notice
period for notification of arbitral hearings.570
The provisions of the 1988 Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code, as
adopted by the Georgia General Assembly that year, were unquestionably
long overdue, and they clearly responded to a critical need and a demonstrated statutory gap then
existing in Georgia’s legislative provisions for arbitration. The substantive content of that Code
was carefully crafted to respond to the peculiar and special needs of arbitration in the
international trade and commercial context; moreover, Georgia’s International Transactions
Arbitration Code demonstrated a profound sensitivity to developments in the field of
international commercial arbitration at the national and international levels, taking into account

by the New York Convention is discussed further, infra, in this Chapter of the present
survey, in Section 6, “The 2003 Amendment to the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code:
Manifest Disregard of Law.”
568

Thirty days is the normal period for this purpose. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6 (2001 Supp.). Cf.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-43(1).
569

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11 (2001 Supp.), providing twenty days after delivery of the award to
the applicant in normal circumstances. Cf. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-43(1).
570

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-8 (2001 Supp.). Cf. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-43(3).
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current developments in both United States federal, foreign, and international law bearing on
arbitration in private international trade. It may be significant, however, that, in only a single
instance has any term or provision of the Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code, as
of early 2004, come before any court –state, federal, foreign or international– for judicial
construction or application. 571

Section 6. The 2003 Amendment to the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code: Manifest Disregard of
Law

From the time of its initial adoption until the end of the twentieth century and on into the
first years of the new millennium, Georgia’s 1988 arbitration code settled quietly into its place as
Georgia’s legislative keystone in the structure of statutory arbitration. Little attention, whether
public, legislative or judicial, was directed to the new code, at least not until an issue –seemingly
of little widespread interest and touching few sensitive nerves among the public at large– ignited

571

In that one instance –Witty v. McNeal Agency, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 554 (1999)–
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-32 was cited, along with O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-2, 9-9-6, and 9-9-61, for the
general proposition that arbitration is generally voluntary and subject to the agreement of
the parties. See Witty, at 555. Another apparent qualification to this statement is
necessary with respect to the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Trend-Pak of
Atlanta, Inc. v. Arbor Commercial Div., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 137 (1990), discussed supra,
where the Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code was also cited. While
that decision considered the terms of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-39 [the provisions of the Georgia
International Transactions Arbitration Code touching on the necessity for reasoned
awards], it does not appear that, in fact, the case invoked the application of that Code
since there were in the facts of the dispute no apparent international element of any kind.
The case stands, nevertheless, as the only instance (other than the Witty decision) in
which any appellate court has ever acknowledged the existence of this important 1988
legislation.
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a firestorm of controversy respecting not only the inner workings of the code but the proper role
of private arbitration in modern Georgia society.

Disregard of the Law as a Basis for Arbitral Award Vacatur in Georgia Law

For more than a century, Georgia statutory law had admitted of the possibility of setting
aside an arbitral award –at least if it were one of those governed by the provisions of the Cobb
Code of 1863– where it was infected by a “palpable mistake of law” on the part of the
arbitrators who fashioned it.572 Even so, the courts were loathe to set aside awards on this basis,
and the application of the rule was as narrow as it was rare:
The general rule is this: an award cannot be impeached but for corruption,
partiality or gross misbehavior in the arbitrators, or for some palpable mistake of
the law or fact. Awards are treated with great liberality. The parties make the

572

See O.C.G.A. § 9-9-11 (repealed 1988), discussed supra, providing that “[a]n award
may be set aside,” inter alia, “for a palpable mistake of law.” A “palpable” legal mistake
under this statute had been equated in the courts with a “plain” mistake. See Crabtree v.
Green, 8 Ga. 8 (1850). For further references to this standard in Georgia law, see Ralston
v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386 (1999); Southern General Ins. Co. v. Kent, 187
Ga. App. 496 (1988); Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 251 Ga. 15 (1983); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. United
Services Auto. Assen, 158 Ga. App. 739 (1981); Fisher v. Gause, 236 Ga. 663 (1976);
Skinner v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 35 (1969); State Highway Dept. v. W. L. Cobb Const.
Co., 111 Ga. App. 822 (1965); Jordan v. General Ins. Co. of America, 92 Ga. App. 77
(1955); Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 87 Ga. App. 294 (1952); Barnes v. Avery,
192 Ga. 874 (1941); Johns v. Security Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 125 (1934); Murray v.
Hawkins, 144 Ga. 613 (1916); Eberhardt v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 Ga. App. 340 (1913);
Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98 (1904); Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turnley, 100 Ga. 296
(1897); Jones v. Bond, 76 Ga. 517 (1886); Black v. Harper, 63 Ga. 752 (1879); Brand v.
Sorrells, 61 Ga. 162 (1878); Virginia Home Ins. Co. v. Gray, 61 Ga. 515 (1878);
Spearman v. Wilson, 44 Ga. 473 (1871); Anderson v. Taylor, 41 Ga. 10 (1870); and
Sasseen, Whitaker & Co. v. Weakley, 34 Ga. 560 (1866).
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arbitrators judges, and their judgment has much of the solemnity which attaches
to the judgment of a Court of Justice. The rule above laid down, obtains in Equity.
It is still more stringent at Law. At Law, an award, upon a submission which
involves both law and facts, will not be opened for a mistake of the law, unless
the mistake appear on the award itself, and even then, it must be in a case where
the arbitrator, intending to apply the law correctly, has mistaken what the law is. .
. . Parties may submit the law to arbitrators--they may clothe them with power to
decide that, or to decide upon equitable principles, irrespective of the rules of
law. I apprehend that no case is to be found, where the question of law being
submitted distinctly, and the judgment being on that question, nakedly, that
judgment has been opened because of a mistake of the law. That is this case.573
When the Georgia legislature came to the adoption of the Construction Arbitration Code
of 1978, the old “palpable mistake of law” basis for award vacatur was left intact as it had
appeared in the 1863 common law codifications, but it was not carried forward to the new (and
separate) statutory scheme 574 ; nor, significantly, was it brought into the 1988 recitation of
available bases for vacation of awards when the current Georgia Arbitration Code was adopted
as law a decade later.575

573

Crabtree v. Green, 8 Ga. 8 (1850), an opinion by Justice Nisbet.

574

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-93 (repealed 1988), discussed supra.

575

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (2001 Supp.), discussed supra.
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Although neither the Federal Arbitration Act576 nor the Uniform Arbitration Act577
enumerate any analogy to Georgia’s common law “palpable disregard” standard for vacatur or
setting aside of arbitral awards, the defense of manifest disregard of law –conceptually quite
close to the old Georgia variant– has nevertheless managed to garner some currency, especially
in the federal courts:
In federal circuit courts ... in addition to the statutory provisions, there have been
limited judicially created bases for intervention. These include vacatur for
reasons of public policy [citing Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
Am. 531 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) and Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 861
F. 2d 665, 671 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989)], or because the
award is deemed arbitrary and capricious [citing Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F. 2d (1410) (11th Cir, 1990)], or because the award

576

Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, § 10(a), stipulates that awards may be vacated:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.

577

Uniform Arbitration Act §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A 6-469 (1997) [“UAA”], National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL), http://www.nccusl.org,
cited in John F. Allgood and E. R. Lanier, Manifest Disregard of the Law, 10th Annual
ADR Institute and the 2003 Neutrals Conference: Celebrating 25 Years of ADR: A
Glance Back A Look Forward (Lake Lanier Island, Georgia, November 20-22, 2003), at
Vol. I, Chapter 3-A [hereinafter, Allgood & Lanier], 3.
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given by the arbitrator is in “manifest disregard of the law”. This last basis
derives from dicta by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan [346 U.S. 427,
436, 74 S. Ct. 182, 98 L. Ed 2d 168 (1953)]. In that decision the Court looked to
earlier maritime cases and said that arbitration awards could be set aside based on
a manifest disregard of the law [Id., at 436]. No Supreme Court case, however,
has ever so held. Some commentators have suggested these dicta must be read in
the context of the F.A.A. Section 10 (a) and not as a new exception [citing
Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 Ga. L. Rev 731, 814-815 (1996) and Michael
P. O’Mullen, Note, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Securities
Arbitration, an Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 1121 (1995)]. The same author suggests that the Court
implicitly overruled Wilko in its 1989 decision, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson
Lehman Bros., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 [citing Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the
“Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard: the Key to Restoring Order to the
Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. Disp. Resolution 117, 121]. Nevertheless, the federal
circuit courts have adopted some formulation of manifest disregard of the law as
judicially created grounds for vacatur [citing NCR Corp. v Sac-Co.,Inc., 43 F. 3d
1076, 1079 (6th Cir. 1995) (arbitrator exceeded powers and punitive damage
award vacated under § 10 of FAA.)].578

578

Allgood & Lanier, 3-4. See also the discussion of the evolution of the federal common
law understanding of “manifest disregard of law” as a basis for award vacatur in Douglas
H. Yarn, Are Arbitrators Bound to Follow the Law? Vacating Arbitral Awards for
“Manifest Disregard” of Law in Georgia, 10th Annual ADR Institute and the 2003
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Given the long experience in Georgia with the “palpable mistake of law” standard under
the Cobb Code and the glaring absence of any similar principle under the 1978 and 1988 state
legislative initiatives in the field of arbitration, it should not be surprising that litigants before
Georgia courts would, from time to time, urge the adoption of some such standard as a matter of
common law in the state. In Bartlett v. Dimension Designs, Ltd.,579 a 1990 decision of the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the court seemed implicitly to accept the proposition, based on
federal law,580 that such a basis for the vacation of awards existed in Georgia, but refused to
apply it in that case.581 The inference in Bartlett that manifest disregard of law would, however,

Neutrals Conference: Celebrating 25 Years of ADR: A Glance Back A Look Forward
(Lake Lanier Island, Georgia, November 20-22, 2003), at Vol. I, Chapter 3, at 8-27.
579

195 Ga. App. 845 (1990).

580

French v. Merrill, Lynch, etc., Inc., 784 F.2d 902 (1986) (holding that an arbitrator’s
decision must be upheld unless it is completely irrational or it constitutes a manifest
disregard of law). The Georgia court suggested that it agreed with the French court’s rule
of manifest disregard of law:
In French v. Merrill Lynch, etc., Inc., 784 F.2d 902(3) & (4) (9th Cir.), the
court concluded that an arbitrator's decision must be upheld unless it is
completely irrational or it constitutes a manifest disregard of the law. This
court is in agreement with this general rule and finds no reason to depart
from it in this case. As the record before us neither establishes that the
arbitrator's decision was completely irrational nor constitutes a manifest
disregard of the law within the meaning of French, we are satisfied that
the trial court did not err in its ruling.
Bartlett, 195 Ga. App. 845, at 848.
581

The appellant in Bartlett argued that the arbitrator had applied an inappropriate level
of burden of proof. The court rejected such as a grounds for vacating the award:
[A]rbitrators are not obliged to apply strict rules of law in the matter at
hand, when they act within the scope of their authority, unless the parties
require adherence to such rules. In fact, it is stated that they may disregard
the traditional rules of law. Accordingly, as a general rule, arbitrators are
free to apply broad principles of justice and good conscience, and decide
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be an available basis on which to vacate a Georgia arbitral award was on its way, four years
later, to becoming fixed in judicial stone when the Bartlett dictum was cited as a “general rule”
in Amerispec Franchise v. Cross,582 yet another ruling from the Georgia Court of Appeals. The
same court extended this line of authority in support of the manifest disregard of law standard
for award vacation in Hundley v. Greene,583 and the Bartlett dictum recognizing manifest
disregard of law as an element of Georgia arbitration law received yet another boost through
favorable references by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Hilliard v. J. C. Bradford & Company,
a decision handed down in 1997,584 and in Greenway Capital Corporation v. Schneider, decided
by that court later that same year.585
The Court of Appeals’ headlong rush to embrace the principle of “manifest disregard of
law” as a matter of common law in Georgia was dealt a serious setback when the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled on the appeal taken from the former court in Greene v. Hundley. There, the
Court of Appeals, in a forceful opinion by Judge Birdsong, had ruled that an award lacking

according to their concept or notion of justice. They are still obliged,
however, to be guided by the basic agreement of the parties." 6 CJS, supra
at § 70. We are satisfied from the state of the record before us that the
arbitrator was applying broad principles of justice and good conscience
rather than technical rules of evidence when he made his award.
Moreover, from the state of the record, it is not apparent that the parties
required the arbitrator to apply any other standard than that of justice and
good conscience in his resolution of the issues before him.Bartlett, 195
Ga. App. 845, at 848.
582

215 Ga. App. 669 (1994), at 671.

583

218 Ga. App. 193 (1995). In Hundley, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled essentially
that a finding by an arbitrator wholly unsupported by evidence of record was an abuse
and a disregard of the law such as would justify its vacation. Ibid, at 195-196.
584
585

229 Ga. App. 336 (1997).

229 Ga. App. 485 (1997), at 486-487. The Greenway Capital case, however, cited the
Bartlett rule as it had appeared in Amerispec Franchise v. Cross.
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evidentiary support was unenforceable.586 In rejecting the ratio decidendi of the lower court, the
Supreme Court –whose decision was written by Justice Sears– emphatically ruled that, under
Georgia law, arbitral awards could be vacated only on the grounds enumerated in the 1988
Georgia Arbitration Code and that common law grounds for such action had been eliminated by
the adoption of the 1988 legislation:
The Arbitration Code sets forth four statutory grounds for vacating an
arbitration award upon the application of a party subject to the award. The
arbitration award shall be vacated if the court finds that the rights of the applying
party were prejudiced by: (1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the
award; (2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) An overstepping
of the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of it that a final
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or (4) A
failure to follow the procedure of this [Code], unless the party applying to vacate
the award continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and without
objection.
Relevant case law states that these four bases are the exclusive grounds for
vacating an arbitration award. The Arbitration Code requires a trial court to
confirm an award upon the timely application of a party to the award, unless one
of the statutory grounds for vacating or modifying the award is established. The
Code specifically states that merely because the relief granted in the arbitration
award "could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not

586

218 Ga. App. 193 (1995), discussed supra.

219
ground for vacating or refusing to confirm an award." In this regard, the power to
vacate an arbitration award "should be severely limited in order not to frustrate
the purpose of avoiding litigation by resorting to arbitration."587
Because Justice Sear’s opinion in Greene had not explicitly banned the doctrine of
“manifest disregard of law” from application by Georgia trial courts when called upon to
confirm arbitral awards, some degree of confusion entered the Georgia case law on this point,
especially in the Court of Appeals588 ; this issue continued to fester in Georgia’s appellate courts
until, finally, in its 2002 decision in Progressive Data Systems, Inc. v. Jefferson Randolph
Corporation,589 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled on the question, and ruled definitively:
... [U]nder Greene, an arbitration award can be vacated in only one of four
statutory ways. See Ralston v. City of Dahlonega, 236 Ga. App. 386, 512 S.E.2d

587

Greene v. Hundley, 266 Ga. 592 (1996), at 594-595. (Footnotes omitted). The
fundamental rationale of the court rested on the premise that the legislature’s action in
adopting a general arbitration code had effectively repealed any common law principles
not confirmed by the legislative language, citing Raymer v. Foster & Cooper Inc., 195
Ga. App. 200 (1990) and Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nunnally Lumber Co., 176 Ga.
App. 232 (1985) in support of this principle.
588

See, e.g., the decision of the Court of Appeals in Haddon v. Shaheen & Company, 231
Ga. App. 596 (1998) which was handed down after the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Greene:
We need not here decide whether Greene, supra, has precluded this Court
from vacating arbitration awards by applying the "manifest disregard for
the law" or "complete irrationality" tests to determine whether an
arbitrator has exceeded his authority under OCGA § 9-9-13(b)(3). ...
Suffice it to note that the appellate record reveals neither a "manifest
disregard for the law" or "complete irrationality" by the arbitrator
warranting vacation of the award.
Haddon v. Shaheen & Company, 231 Ga. App. 596, at 599. (Footnotes omitted).
589

275 Ga. 420 (2002).
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300 (1999) (review must be confined to the four statutory grounds). That is
because the Georgia Arbitration Code is in derogation of the common law and
must be strictly construed. Greene, supra at 594, 468 S.E.2d 350.
Inasmuch as the Code does not list "manifest disregard of the law" as a
ground for vacating an arbitration award, it cannot be used as an additional
ground for vacatur. Nor can it be said that a "manifest disregard of the law" fits
within the framework of the third statutory ground listed above-- overstepping of
the arbitrator's authority. That ground only comes into play when an arbitrator
determines matters beyond the scope of the case. Threatt v. Forsyth County, 250
Ga. App. 838, 841, 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001) (citing Haddon v. Shaheen & Co., 231
Ga. App. 596, 499 S.E.2d 693 (1998)). It is not applicable where, as here, the
issue to be decided, i.e., damages, is properly before the arbitrator.
*

*

*

Our legislature set forth four statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration
award. Significantly, it did not include "manifest disregard of the law" as one of
those grounds. Whatever the merits of the "manifest disregard of the law"
principle, we should not be so bold as to judicially mandate its use as an
additional ground for vacatur, especially since, as noted above, our Arbitration
Code is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed.590

590

Ibid, at 421. Justice Carley registered a strong dissent to the majority opinion in
Progressive Data Systems, ibid, at 421-425, in which Justice Hunstein joined: “manifest
disregard of the law” as a basis for vacatur of an arbitral award was an implicit defense
which could be drawn from those expressly appearing in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (2001
Supp.), they argued; moreover, in their view, it could not have been the intent of the
legislature in adopting that statute to permit arbitrators consciously to evade applicable
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Given the Supreme Court’s emphatic insistence that the legislative will was the dominant
analytical element in construing Georgia arbitration policy, it comes as little surprise that the
next act in this unfolding drama took place in legislative chambers of the Georgia General
Assembly in 2003, the first session of the legislature to be convened after the decision of the
Georgia Supreme Court in Progressive Data Systems. Within days of the opening of the 2003
legislative session of the Georgia General Assembly, Representative Mary Margaret Oliver (DDecatur) had introduced a draft of House Bill 91,591 designed explicitly to work a reversal of the

substantive law. With a touch of hyperbole, the dissent concluded:
The rationale for this almost universal acceptance of the "manifest
disregard of the law" principle is that it is deemed a necessary component
of the courts' "obligation to exercise sufficient judicial scrutiny to ensure
that arbitrators comply with their duties and the requirements of the
statutes." Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, supra at 761(II). "A
primary advantage of arbitration is the expeditious and final resolution of
disputes by means that circumvent the time and expense associated with
civil litigation." Greene v. Hundley, supra at 597(3), 468 S.E.2d 350.
However, that advantage is surely lost if the judiciary permits arbitrators
to circumvent the applicable law wilfully. No reasonable potential
litigant would select arbitration in lieu of a lawsuit if there is a possibility
that the dispute will be resolved by a final award issued by an arbitrator
who has judicial approval to ignore controlling legal principles.
Therefore, to the extent that Greene bars acceptance of a "manifest
disregard of the law" as a valid ground for vacating an award, it
discourages arbitration as an alternate method of dispute resolution and
places Georgia outside the mainstream of persuasive authority.
Accordingly, I would overrule the holding in Greene that OCGA §
9-9-13(b) provides the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration
award, and adopt "manifest disregard of the law" as a viable basis for
doing so.
Ibid, at 477-478.
591

House Bill 91 was clearly linked in the mind of its author with a perceived need to
protect Georgia consumers from overbearing arbitrators and from large corporations. To
this extent, HB 91 can be seen in the context of a broader national movement which sees
protection of consumers in limitations on the unfettered right to resort to arbitration. See

222
position of the Georgia Supreme Court adopted in Progressive Data Systems by amending
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (2001 Supp.) to authorize Georgia courts to vacate awards when the arbitrator
had manifestly disregarded the law in reaching that award.592
The adoption in Georgia of the amended statute permitting vacatur of awards for an
arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law drew immediate response, much of that from the
arbitration community in the state of a hesitant and qualified nature. Criticism of the lack of
definition in the statute; potential abuse by courts prepared to characterize any mere mistake of
law as a manifest disregard of the prevailing legal rule; increased expense in arbitration flowing
from the need for more exact records of proceedings; and enhanced burdens on arbitrators who
would be under increased pressure to develop elaborate records of arbitral proceedings and to

John F. Dienelt and Jerome D. Pinn, State Efforts To Limit Arbitration, 11 FRANCHISE L.
J. 104 (1992). In her discussion of the bill on the floor of the Georgia House on February
12, 2003, she stated that “I think over half our Georgian citizens right now have
submitted to arbitration, knowingly or unknowingly” and that, “ ... as a Visa card owner I
have submitted contractually to arbitration instead of the rights of a citizen to go to court.
This is a very significant phenomenon and our businesses, particularly, are benefitting
from this opportunity to avoid traditional litigation.” See the videotape transcript of the
discussion of HB 91 found at
<http://www.georgia.gov/00/article/0,2145,4802_0_11795314,00.html>, timer segment
1:16:15-1:17:50. I am indebted to Mr. David Boohaker for the typewritten version of this
legislative record which he made available to me in his unpublished paper, “Georgia
Arbitration and Manifest Disregard of the Law (Fall, 2003), at 14-15. See also Jonathan
Ringel, Arbitrators May Lose Right To Ignore Law, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT ,
Volume 3, No. 28, March 23, 2003 (“ ‘I’m very optimistic,’ Oliver said, adding that it
would be wrong for the General Assembly to allow arbitrators knowingly to violate the
law when many consumers are required to arbitrate their disputes.’ ”).
592

When finally adopted on April 25, 2003, as a part of House Bill 792, Representative
Oliver’s bill added a fifth basis for the vacation of arbitral awards to the four already
present in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (2001 Supp.), inserting the provision that the courts could
vacate an award infected by “the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.” See 2003 Ga.
Laws, 820, 821 § 2, 828 § 9, codified as O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (5) (2003).
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provide more detailed expositions of the legal foundations for awards, were all among the
sources of anxiety cited in opposition to the new law.593

The National Dimension: Georgia’s “Manifest Disregard of Law” Statute as a Permissible
Defense to the Enforcement of Domestic and Foreign Arbitral Awards in Federal Judicial
Procedures594
Among the many concerns voiced regarding the adoption of “manifest disregard of the
law” as a statutory basis for the vacatur of an arbitral award under Georgia state law were those
relating to the interaction of that statutory standard with analogous provisions of federal
legislation, especially the provisions of § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 which do not,
of course, explicitly incorporate any such defense or basis for vacatur in their terms. Further
discomfort centers on the fact that “manifest disregard of the law” does not appear as one of the
enumerated defenses to the enforcement of arbitral awards set forth in Article V of the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958,

593

See, e.g., Douglas H. Yarn, Are Arbitrators Bound to Follow the Law? Vacating
Arbitral Awards for “Manifest Disregard” of Law in Georgia, 10th Annual ADR Institute
and the 2003 Neutrals Conference: Celebrating 25 Years of ADR: A Glance Back A
Look Forward (Lake Lanier Island, Georgia, November 20-22, 2003), at Vol. I, Chapter
3; see also, in the same volume at Chapter 3-B, John Hinchey and Thomas V. Burch,
Georgia General Assembly Adopts “Manifest Disregard” As A Ground for Vacating
Arbitration Awards: How Will Georgia Courts Treat the New Standard?; and Allgood &
Lanier, at 6-8. As of early April, 2004, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (5) had not been construed or
applied by any Georgia appellate court, although its adoption had been referenced in
Marchelletta v. Seay Construction Services, Inc., 2004 WL 26729 (2004)(Ga. Ct. of
Appeals).
594

This discussion, prepared by the author for use in this general review of Georgia
arbitration policy, was included as his contribution to the latter portion of Allgood &
Lanier, at 8-14.
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subsequently incorporated into domestic United States law as Chapter Two of the Federal
Arbitration Act.595
Anxieties respecting the potential clash of Georgia state and federal law over the new
statutory provision with respect to the vacatur or enforcement of domestic arbitration awards
governed by Chapter One of the Federal Arbitration Act may be exaggerated since there does
not, under current federal law on this subject, appear to be any fundamental inconsistency
between the new Georgia statutory standard and prevailing federal case law. 596 At least since

595

The same concern could be registered with respect to the compatibility of Georgia’s
new “manifest disregard of the law” statute and the defenses to the enforcement of
arbitral awards recited in the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration of 1975, incorporated into United States law in 1990 as Chapter Three of the
Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. § 301, Pub .L. 101-369, § 1, Aug. 15, 1990, 104
Stat. 448. That Convention, like the earlier United Nations Convention, omits any
“manifest disregard of the law” defense in its terms.
596

... [E]very ... circuit [other than the Eleventh] except the Fifth (which has
declined to adopt any non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration
awards), has expressly recognized that "manifest disregard of the law" is
an appropriate reason to review and vacate an arbitration panel's decision.
See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234 (1st Cir.1995);
Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp.,
103 F.3d 9 (2d Cir.1997); United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban
Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376 (3d Cir.1995); Upshur Coals Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of America, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225 (4th Cir.1991); M & C
Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844 (6th Cir.1996);
National Wrecking Co. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Local 731,
990 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.1993); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 906, 114 S.Ct. 287, 126 L.Ed.2d 237 (1993); Barnes v.
Logan, 122 F.3d 820 (9th Cir.1997); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir.1988); McIlroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989
F.2d 817, 820 n. 2 (5th Cir.1993)(rejecting any non-statutory grounds for
vacating arbitration awards). . . .
In [the Eleventh] circuit, we have not found it necessary to expressly
adopt this ground, as it was unnecessary for the resolution of the cases in
which it was discussed.
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1997, the Eleventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals has admitted of the possibility of “manifest
disregard of law” as a common law defense to award enforcement. In that year, Judge Barkett,
writing for a unanimous panel of that Circuit Court of Appeals,597 brought the Eleventh Circuit
into line with other federal circuit courts by explicitly approving of manifest disregard of law as
a basis on which to deny enforcement of arbitral awards in federal district court procedures
within the circuit. Writing in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc.,598 he announced the
court’s conclusion “that a manifest disregard for the law, in contrast to a misinterpretation,

Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1460 (1997).
597

Judge Carnes felt constrained to register a concurring opinion in the decision in order
to insure that the narrow parameters of the doctrine as adopted into Eleventh Circuit
common law under the Federal Arbitration Act would not be, by misinterpretation,
expanded beyond the limited scope the court intended. In Montes, the arbitral panel was
urged by the respondent’s counsel explicitly to disregard the provisions of the Federal
Labor Standards Act which governed the claimant’s demand for unpaid back wages. The
panel’s award in favor of the respondent stated no reasons for its decision. In these
circumstances, Judge Carnes wrote:
I concur in Judge Barkett's fine opinion and write separately only to
emphasize how narrowly the decision in this case is limited to the unusual
facts presented. Those facts are that: 1) the party who obtained the
favorable award had conceded to the arbitration panel that its position was
not supported by the law, which required a different result, and had urged
the panel not to follow the law; 2) that blatant appeal to disregard the law
was explicitly noted in the arbitration panel's award; 3) neither in the
award itself nor anywhere else in the record is there any indication that the
panel disapproved or rejected the suggestion that it rule contrary to law;
and 4) the evidence to support the award is at best marginal. The Court
does not imply that it would find a manifest disregard of the law based on
anything less than all of those factors. For example, the fact that an
attorney misstated the law to the arbitration panel, as attorneys sometimes
do, even if there was only weak evidence to support the award, will not
justify a conclusion that the award resulted from a manifest disregard of
the law.
Ibid, at 1464.
598

128 F.3d 1456 (1997).
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misstatement or misapplication of the law, can constitute grounds to vacate an arbitration
decision.”599 The court’s insistence that this common law defense is a narrow and constrained
one seems borne out by the experience of the court since the announcement of the Montes
decision in 1997: since that time, the Eleventh Circuit has never on a single occasion sustained
this defense in any case coming before it.600
Although HB 91 was explicitly drafted with respect to issues in domestic arbitration, the
terms of the statute as adopted by the legislature on April 25, 2003, have a decided significance
in the arena of international arbitration where it will present the courts with peculiar and acute
interpretive challenges. This was perhaps not fully appreciated when “manifest disregard of law”
was engrafted onto the terms of Georgia’s Arbitration Code as it had been adopted in 1988.601

599

Ibid, at 1461-1462.

600

It has had, however, several opportunities to do so. See Scott v. Prudential Securities,
Inc., 141 F.3d 1007 (1998); Weaver v. Florida Power & Light Co., 172 F.3d 771 (1999);
Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (2000); and University
Commons-Urbana, Ltd., v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 304 F.3d 1331 (2002). In the
Scott, Brown, and University Commons-Urbana decisions, the Eleventh Circuit
specifically passed on the allegations of “manifest disregard of law” in those cases and
found that the facts did not establish the presence of the defense. In Weaver, the appeals
court reversed an injunction issued by the lower district court against the prosecution of
an arbitration. Finding that this constituted an abuse of its discretion because the
arbitration represented an adequate remedy at law, the court remanded the matter to the
trial court for the dissolution of the improvidently granted injunction. See Weaver v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 172 F.3d 771, 774 (1999). On the federal matrix of domestic
arbitration cases invoking “manifest disregard of the law” as a basis for the vacatur of an
award or a defense to its enforcement, see also John W. Hinchey and Thomas V. Burch,
Georgia General Assembly Adopts “Manifest Disregard” as a Ground for Vacating
Arbitration Awards: How Will Georgia Courts Treat the New Standard?, 9 GEORGIA
BAR JOURNAL 11, 12-14 (2004).
601

HB 91 was adopted as an amendment to the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (2001
Supp.), the statutory bases for the vacation of arbitral awards set forth in Part I of the
Georgia Arbitration Code, adding “manifest disregard of the law” to those already
provided by the law as bases for an application to vacate such awards. The terms of the
unamended 1988 statute were in turn brought forward from the 1978 Georgia
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In the aftermath of the Second World War, many international trade analysts attributed
the advent of that global conflict, in part, to the absence of effective international trade control
mechanisms, particularly in the years after the end of the First World War. These pointed
especially to the lack of any internationally recognized forum for the resolution of commercial
trade disputes as one of the significant causes in the breakdown in trade relations prior to the
outbreak of military conflict in 1939.602 The result in the years after 1945 was a concerted effort

Construction Arbitration Code which was, at least as far as its enumerations of grounds
on which to vacate arbitral awards, rooted very firmly in the 1925 Federal Arbitration
Act grounds for vacation of awards found in 9 U.S.C.A. § 10. Part 2 of the Georgia
Arbitration Code (governing “International Transactions,” defined in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13
[2001 Supp.] as involving a non-United States party or otherwise being substantially
related to commercial activity outside the United States) provides that “[a]n arbitration
award irrespective of where it was made, on the basis of reciprocity, shall be recognized
as binding and shall be enforceable in the courts of this state subject to the grounds for
vacating an award under Part 1 of this article [O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13] and providing that the
award is not contrary to the public policy of this state with respect to international
transactions.” O.C.G.A. § 9-9-42 (2001 Supp.). To this extent, this section does little
more than restate the domestic bases for award vacation as grounds to set aside those
arising from international transactions as well, in addition to make the explicit addition of
the public policy defense authorized by Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention
(incorporated into United States law by 9 U.S.C.A. § 207), discussed infra. The statute
goes on, however, to provide that “reciprocity in the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards shall be in accordance with applicable federal laws, international
conventions, and treaties,” raising significant interpretive issues. Does this language
mean that reciprocal enforcement of the designated arbitral awards will be controlled
exclusively by federal law to the displacement of Georgia law, including that which is
not contrary to or inconsistent with preemptive federal standards? Is this rule to be
limited to foreign arbitral awards, to the exclusion of the non-domestic awards which are
within New York Convention coverage under both Article I(1) of the Convention and
under 9 U.S.C.A. § 202? None of this is wholly clear, and no case law has been handed
down by the Georgia appellate courts to clarify these questions since the adoption of this
section of the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code.
602

A summary overview of international trade history after the First World War,
emphasizing the role of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in the
development of post-1945 trade institutions (including its International Court of
Arbitration) can be accessed at <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/menu_what_is_icc.asp>.
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on the part of the international trade community, spearheaded in major part by the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, to achieve globally accepted trade standards to facilitate
international exchange and commerce.603 One of the major facets of this initiative was the
improvement of the conditions under which international commercial arbitration was conducted,
and in this respect two objectives became paramount: first, a multilateral understanding that
arbitral awards rendered in one nation would be legally (and with an absolute minimum of
obstruction) enforceable in another; and, secondly, the unification (or at least a general
harmonization) of most of the procedural and substantive conditions under which international
commercial arbitrations would take place. In this latter respect, particularly important was the
elimination of local or parochial barriers, both procedural and substantive, to the recognition of
arbitration agreements and the mutual enforcement of arbitration awards in international
commerce.604

603

On the leadership of the ICC in consolidating the function of arbitration in
international trade dispute resolution, especially before the accession of the United States
to the New York Convention in 1970, see Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of
Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773 (2002), especially at 781, and
William W. Park, Award Enforcement Under the New York Convention, 688 PLI/LIT 573
(2003), at 577-578. For a quick overview of ICC arbitration and aspects of its history, see
the remarks (if now a bit dated) of Michel Gaudet reported in Choosing a Forum for
International Commercial Arbitration, 76 AM . SOC'Y INT 'L L. PROC. 166 (1982), at 172175. A classic statement respecting the leadership of the ICC in the development of the
New York Convention is ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981). See also Cindy Silverstein, Comment, Iran Aircraft
Industries v. Avco Corporation: Was a Violation of Due Process Due? 20 BROOK. J.
INT ’L L. 443 (1994), especially at 451-453.
604

See generally, Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the
Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT ’L. L. 675 (2003), especially at 700-701 (footnotes
omitted, but quoting U.N. Doc. No. E/Conf. 26/SR.25, at 2 [1958]):
The principal vehicle for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
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Perhaps the greatest single milestone in the emergence of internationally acknowledged
standards for the conduct of arbitrations around the globe was achieved in 1958 with the
conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards,605 a treaty which established extremely important principles both defining the
legal requirements for recognition of arbitration agreements606 and limiting the defenses which

agreements and awards is the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly
known as the New York Convention. With over 130 signatories, the New
York Convention enjoys extraordinary application and is one of the
hallmarks for the facilitation of international commerce. The purpose of
the New York Convention is to "encourage the recognition and
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international
contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries."
According to the drafters of the New York Convention, two of its
principal achievements were that it "gave a wider definition of the awards
to which the Convention applied" and it "reduced and simplified the
requirements with which the party seeking recognition or enforcement of
an award would have to comply.”
605

United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10,, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3, codified in 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 210-08 (1970), hereinafter, “NYC.” Negotiated and
concluded in New York City, this important Convention is often identified simply as the
“New York Convention.”
606

Under the terms of the New York Convention, all that is necessary for an arbitral
award to fall within the terms of this supportive treaty is that there be a written agreement
by the parties to undertake to submit to arbitration all or any present or future differences
which exist between them “in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” See NYC, Art.
II (1). The scope of the Convention extends to awards rendered in the territory of a
foreign nation, as well as to “arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the
State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.” NYC, Art. I (1). When the
United States acceded to this treaty in December 1970, it did so subject to two
reservations which are, more than three decades later, still in force: the United States will
extend Convention coverage only to arbitration awards which are of a commercial nature
and, in addition, only to those foreign awards which are rendered on the territory of
another nation which has acceded to the New York Convention. See FAA, § 202 (“An
arbitration agreement ... arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
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signatory nations could, through their national laws, make available to thwart (or set aside) the
enforcement of arbitral awards subject to the Convention. This latter feature –the strict limitation
on the defenses which could lawfully be used to block the enforcement of an award covered by
the Convention– was regarded as of critical significance, since it assured the international
commercial community that arbitration awards would not be frustrated at the enforcement stage
by local, and sometimes obscure, legal provisions devised to protect the local party. 607
The award enforcement defenses authorized by the terms of the New York Convention
–and there are only seven of these608 – are quite circumscribed: awards will not be enforced under
the treaty if it is shown that a party lacked capacity or the agreement was for some other reason

which is considered commercial ...” is enforceable under Chapter Two of the Federal
Arbitration Act); see also Declaration of the United States upon Accession, reprinted in 9
U.S.C. § 201 note at n. 29 (1994), which stipulates that "[t]he United States of America
will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement
of only those awards made in the territory of another Contracting State." Both of these
reservations were authorized under the Convention, see NYC, Art. I (3), and many other
nations have taken advantage of them as well.
607

On the Convention and its policies generally, together with a specific discussion of the
arguments, pro and con, on the merits of the Convention mechanisms to insure an
internationalized interpretation of its provisions and offering a challenge to aspects of the
accepted wisdom that treatment under the domestic chapter (Chapter One) of the Federal
Arbitration Act is not as advantageous to foreign awards as is Chapter Two implementing
the New York Convention, see Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American
Courts, 7 AM . REV. INT 'L ARB. 213 (1996).
608

The Convention’s defenses to the enforcement of arbitral awards covered by it are all
grouped in Article V of the treaty. This article can be seen as a conceptual counterbalance
to the expansive provisions of Article I: where the treaty’s scope and reach are broad and
encompassing under Article I of the Convention, the available defenses to award
enforcement under Article V are intentionally narrow and constrained, thus assuring the
widest possible play for enforceability of awards in the international trade and commerce
arena.
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invalid609 ; if inadequate notice was afforded a party of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the
proceedings themselves, or where parties were otherwise unable to present their case610 ; if the
award was ultra vires on the part of the arbitrators who proceeded to decide matters not
submitted to them611 ; if the composition of the arbitral panel was not in accord with either local
law or the agreement of the parties612 ; or if the award, at the time its enforcement is sought, is not
binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court authorized to do so.613 In
addition, these five procedural defenses are supplemented by two substantive ones: no award
will be enforced under the New Convention if it addresses a subject matter which is not capable
of settlement by arbitration under the law of the nation of enforcement614 or if the award is
somehow offensive to the public policy of the nation called upon to enforce it.615
Manifest disregard of law is not among the enumerated defenses of the Convention; nor
does it appear in the listing of defenses to the enforcement of arbitral awards listed in the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration of 1985.616 Not only is the manifest disregard defense wholly absent

609

NYC, Article V(1)(a).

610

NYC, Article V(1)(b).

611

NYC, Article V(1)( c).

612

NYC, Article V(1)(d).

613

NYC, Article V(1)(e).

614

NYC, Article V(2)(a).

615

NYC, Article V(2)(b).

616

This Model Law is substantively integrated with the New York Convention and
essentially provides for the same bases for the refusal of award enforcement as does the
treaty. Now almost twenty years old, the Model Law has been substantially adopted as
national law in a growing number of nations, among them, Australia, Canada, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Hungary, India, Mexico,
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from these treaty and statutory provisions, the terms of both of those instruments provide cogent
evidence that the defenses enumerated in the Convention were the only defenses contemplated
and that no others were to be interpolated into them. 617 Moreover, the limited grounds for
defense enumerated in them are –in the virtually unanimous view of American courts, state and
federal, which have addressed the issue– to be given the narrowest of constructions in order to
make the enforcement of international arbitral awards as liberal as possible.618
The availability of the “manifest disregard of the law” defense in actions under the New
York Convention remains clouded. Early on after the adoption of the treaty, United States courts

New Zealand, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Ukraine, and
(within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Scotland. Among
jurisdictions within the United States, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon and Texas
have adopted legislation based largely on the UNCITRAL Model Law. See GARY B.
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d, Ed.)
(2001), at 30-31. Georgia’s International Transaction Arbitration Code is heavily
influenced by the Model Law.
617

Article V(1) of the New York Convention states, for instance, that the “[r]ecognition
and enforcement of the [arbitral] award may be refused, at the request of the party against
whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement are sought, proof” that one of the enumerated defenses
exists. (Emphasis supplied). 9 U.S.C.A. § 207, incorporating the Convention’s Article V
defenses into United States law, stipulates that “[t]he [U.S.] court shall confirm the award
unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of
the award specified in the said Convention.” (Emphasis supplied).
618

In Parsons Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de L’Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974), one of the earliest cases decided by a
federal circuit court following the United States’ accession to the New York Convention,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals counseled that the defenses of the Convention were
to be given a restrictive interpretation and application by the courts of the United States
in order to implement the intention of the United States in joining the Convention to
facilitate the enforcement of international agreements and awards to the maximum extent
and not to permit local or parochial concerns to stand in the way of this general objective.
The court, in writing of the public policy defense authorized by the treaty, emphasized
that the defenses of the Convention were not to be utilized as “parochial device[s]
protective of national political interests [which] would seriously undermine the
Convention’s utility.” Parsons Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., at 974.
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split over the issue, some courts rejecting it as a defense in cases within the scope of the
Convention,619 others affording it some measure of play.620 The influential Second Circuit has
now ruled on the basis of its construction of technical language in the Convention that, although
the manifest disregard defense may not be raised against a foreign arbitral award (i.e., one
rendered on the territory of another contracting State), it may nevertheless be raised to block the
enforcement of a “nondomestic award,” one which falls under the Convention’s terms but is
made in the United States or under United States law. 621 Hence, it would appear under this
reasoning that manifest disregard of the law will never be permitted, because of the operation of
the New York Convention, as a defense to the enforcement of a foreign award made abroad,
while there remains a better than theoretical possibility that such a defense might well be

619

See, e.g., Brandeis Intsel, Ltd. v. Calabrian Chem. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160
(S.D.N.Y.1987). Cf. Biotronik Mess- und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford
Med. Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976); and Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.
Ltd., 517 F. 2d 512 (1975) (the Convention defenses are exhaustive). See also Karaha
Bodas Co. L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 190 F.
Supp. 2d 936 (2001), at 955, fn 19:
. . . . it is likely that disregard of a principle of law is not a valid basis for
avoiding confirmation under the Convention. See M & C Corp., 87 F.3d
at 851 n. 2 ("Whatever may be meant by the manifest disregard doctrine
applicable in domestic arbitration cases, it is clear that such a doctrine
does not rise to the level of a violation of public policy that is necessary to
deny confirmation of a foreign arbitral award."); RAKTA, 508 F.2d at
977 ("Both the legislative history of Art. V and the statute enacted to
implement the United States' accession to the Convention, are strong
authority for treating as exclusive the bases set forth in the convention for
vacating an award.").
620

See, e.g., American Construction Machinery & Equipment Corp. Ltd. v. Mechanised
Construction of Pakistan, Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 426 (1987).
621

See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1111, 118 S. Ct. 1042, 140 Law. Ed. 2d 107 (1998); see also
Ludgate Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 2003 WL 443584
(S.D.N.Y.)
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admitted with respect to a Convention award made in the United States. This result will obtain, it
would seem, regardless of the presence of the manifest disregard of law grounds for vacatur in
Georgia law.
In assessing the general value and feasibility of including a “manifest disregard of law”
provision and a conceptually related defense based on violations of public policy in the
catalogue of defenses to award enforcement and bases for award vacatur enumerated in the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act [RUAA], the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
considered but rejected such proposals:
There are reasons for the RUAA not to embrace either the "manifest disregard" or
the "public policy" standards of court review of arbitral awards. The first is
presented by the omission from the FAA of either standard. Given that omission,
there is a very significant question of possible FAA preemption of a such a
provision in the RUAA, should the Supreme Court or Congress eventually
confirm that the four narrow grounds for vacatur set out in Section 10(a) of the
federal act are the exclusive grounds for vacatur. The second reason for not
including these vacatur grounds is the dilemma in attempting to fashion
unambiguous, "bright line" tests for these two standards. The case law on both
vacatur grounds is not just unsettled but also is conflicting and indicates further
evolution in the courts. As a result, the Drafting Committee concluded not to add
these two grounds for vacatur in the statute. A motion to include the ground of
"manifest disregard" in Section 23(a) [of the RUAA] was defeated by the
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Committee of the Whole at the July, 2000, meeting of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.622
Writing in terms more elegant if perhaps not so technical as those of the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, William Park nonetheless found that the inevitable effect of the
application of the manifest disregard defense to the enforcement of an arbitral award is clear:
The availability of a right to attack awards for "manifest disregard" gives losing
parties the opportunity to disrupt the arbitral process, whatever the ultimate
outcome of a challenge might be. Hanging like a sword of Damocles over the
arbitration, "manifest disregard" serves as a vehicle for attempts to renege on the
bargain to have a dispute decided by arbitrators. The result is to give the United
States a competitive disadvantage compared to arbitral venues where judicial
intervention is limited to matters related to fundamental procedural integrity.623

622

See “Comment on the Possible Codification of the ‘Manifest Disregard of the Law’
and the ‘Public Policy’ Grounds For Vacatur,” Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
reprinted in the official annotation to N.C.G.S.A. § 1-569.23. North Carolina law does
not include the “manifest disregard of law” defense in its enumeration of matters
available as a basis on which to vacate arbitral awards but, as a result of recent legislation
in 2003, the State of Texas does include such a provision in its Residential Construction
Arbitration Code: “ ... on application of a party, a court shall vacate an award in a
residential construction arbitration upon a showing of manifest disregard for Texas law.”
See § 438. 001, Vernon’s Texas Code Ann. [Texas Residential Construction
Commission Act, Enforceability of Residential Construction Arbitration Awards,
Grounds for Vacating Award]. See also Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 458, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
2003. It would seem then that Georgia’s statute has the distinction of being the first in the
nation to include “manifest disregard of the law” as a statutory basis for the vacatur of an
arbitral award, but that the legislation of Texas comes in, by a matter of only two months,
a very close second.
623

William W. Park, Award Enforcement Under the New York Convention, 688 PLI/Lit
573 (2003), at 594.
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CHAPTER THREE
A CONCLUDING NOTE: CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION POLICY IN GEORGIA AT
THE DAWN OF A NEW MILLENNIUM
The rapid expansion of arbitral devices, procedures, and mechanisms experienced in the
colony and state of Georgia throughout the late eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries
provides clear and irrefutable historical evidence of their popularity and success in the first two
and a half centuries of Georgia’s existence.624 As this survey has indicated, entities as widely
diverse in their organization and objectives as churches, banks, railroads, mining companies,
canal and plank road companies, and chambers of commerce, as well as cities, counties, and the
state itself, lent powerful impetus to the evolution and development of arbitral techniques for the
extrajudicial resolution of those disputes which, inevitably it seems, arose in the course of their

624

Georgia’s penchant for dispute resolution outside of the conventional courthouse has
been, as demonstrated in this survey, a factor in the life of the colony and state since the
earliest colonial period, and Georgia’s readiness to experiment with new and innovative
forms of alternative dispute resolution, even those beyond traditional arbitration,
continues apace at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Court-referred alternative
dispute resolution programs proliferated in Georgia beginning as early as the late 1970s.
These were outgrowths of experience in the state with private initiatives which later
associated themselves with trial-level courts around Georgia to offer access to alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. The Justice Center of Atlanta, Inc., is perhaps the oldest
and best-known of these. The American Arbitration Association opened an Atlanta
office at about the same time. Other initiatives such as the Neighbor to Neighbor
Mediation Center of Savannah/Chatham County and the Civil Arbitration Program of
Fulton County Superior Court introduced new forms of mediation and mandatory,
nonbinding arbitration in areas which had previously had little experience with such
innovations. A Joint Commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution was established in
the fall of 1990, co-chaired by Chief Justice Harold Clarke of the Georgia Supreme Court
and the president of the State Bar of Georgia, in order to explore the possibilities offered
by court-annexed mediation programs to enhance existing techniques in alternative
dispute resolution. The history of these developments in extrajudicial dispute resolution
in Georgia is detailed in Edith B. Primm, Alternative Dispute Resolution, GEORGIA
PROCEDURE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: SPECIAL REMEDIES AND PROCEEDINGS (1995), at 485491.
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activities. Nonetheless, the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries have
witnessed both in Georgia and throughout the United States gathering storms in disparate areas
of arbitral practice and theory, tempests which threaten to undermine the very foundations of the
theoretical and doctrinal bases upon which state arbitration policy has been so carefully and
painstakingly constructed over the preceding epochs.625 Illustrative of these has been an
emerging consumer challenge to the integrity and utility of the arbitral process and a growing
public skepticism, at least in some quarters, of the inherent quality of the justice available
through arbitration implicated in the enactment of state statutory initiatives to restrict arbitration
procedures, on the one hand, and the looming threat of total cooption of state initiatives in the
arbitral process by parallel federal legislation (particularly the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925626 ), on the other. The former is implicated in the recent adoption by the Georgia General
Assembly, discussed above, of an amendment to the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code627 providing
the statutory defense of “manifest disregard of the law” as an additional basis upon which the
vacatur of an arbitral award may be had in this state; the latter –the substantial risk of the loss of
state independence and autonomy in arbitral policy emerging as the consequence of twin forces,
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No public clash over arbitration has drawn the spotlight of national attention to quite
the same degree as has that which is ongoing in the State of Alabama. See Stephen J.
Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: a Case Study of Arbitration Law in
Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583 (2002).
626

Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, §1, 62 Stat. 669 (1947), now codified as 9 U.S.C. §§
1-16 [sometimes hereinafter, Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Federal Arbitration Act, or
“FAA.”].
627

O.C.G.A § 9-9-13 (b) (5), as amended on April 25, 2003, by HB 792 (2003 Ga. Laws,
Act 363, § 2), signed by Governor Sonny Perdue on June 4, 2003, and effective as law in
Georgia on July 1, 2003. This amendment to the 1988 Code is discussed at more length,
supra, in Chapter Two, Section 6, of this survey, “The 2003 Amendment to the 1988
Georgia Arbitration Code: Manifest Disregard of the Law.”
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the “federalization” of arbitration in the United States and expansive understandings of the
doctrine of federal preemption of state law– is reviewed here as a conclusion to this survey of
arbitration policy in the state of Georgia.

Section 1. The Doctrine of Federal Preemption and the Autonomy of Georgia Arbitration Policy
The utility and frequency of arbitration in the colonial and early republican eras of
Georgia’s legal history belie to some extent the open rejection (or, at best, the begrudging
acceptance) which arbitration received at the hands of both English and American courts
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth and centuries. The traditional common law hostility
towards arbitration generally is, of course, the stuff of legend: until well into the beginning
decades of the twentieth century, the courts in the United States (both state and federal)
demonstrated an abiding distaste for the arbitral process, premising this profound antipathy on
the proposition, inter alia, that arbitration ousted the courts of their proper role and subject
matter jurisdiction.628 On this logic, American courts customarily refused to enforce many

628

Judge Jerome Frank mused on the origin of this doctrine in Kulukundis Shipping Co.,
S.A. v. Amtrog Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (1942) (footnotes omitted):
... It has been well said that 'the legal mind must assign some reason in
order to decide anything with spiritual quiet.' And so, by way of
rationalization, it became fashionable in the middle of the 18th century to
say that such [arbitration] agreements were against public policy because
they 'oust the jurisdiction' of the courts. But that was a quaint explanation,
inasmuch as an award, under an arbitration agreement, enforced both at
law and in equity, was no less an ouster; and the same was true of releases
and covenants not to sue, which were given full effect. Moreover, the
agreement to arbitrate was not illegal, since suit could be maintained for
its breach. Here was a clear instance of what Holmes called a 'right' to
break a contract and to substitute payment of damages for
non-performance ...
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arbitration agreements on the basis that such agreements were invalid as against public policy; a
slightly different logic led them to conclude, but with essentially the same result, that arbitration
agreements were revocable by the parties and hence, could not be enforced against one who
retracted his agreement to arbitrate before the entry of an arbitral award; and, finally, some
courts in the United States premised their refusal to enforce arbitration agreements and awards
on the simple proposition that such agreements were unenforceable as a matter of law. 629 The
case reports of the United States are littered with the evidence of this enduring judicial hostility
towards arbitration, a hostility so deeply ingrained that it took a major statutory revolution,
beginning in the first decades of the twentieth century, to undo the work of generation after
generation of common law judges.630

On the old “ouster” doctrine in Georgia case law, see Leonard v. House, 15 Ga. 473 (1854)
and Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98 (1904); see also Millican Electric Co. v. Fisher, 102 Ga.
App. 309 (1960), discussed supra. Under Georgia’s former policy, arbitration agreements
were held, consistent with the national view, void and unenforceable as against public
policy because they attempted to oust the courts of jurisdiction. However, this rule was
applicable only where there was an agreement to arbitrate all questions which might arise in
the execution of a contract, both as to liability and to loss. If the contract contained an
arbitration provision relating only to such “incidentals” as price, value, measure, quantity,
quality, classification and similar issues, the arbitration provisions in such contracts were
regarded by Georgia courts as valid. See Manderson & Associates, Inc. v. Gore, 193 Ga.
App. 723, 731 (1989).
629

A good review of the origins of and grounds for the English enmity towards arbitral
processes, and the various forms it took, is rehearsed in Kulukundis Shipping Co., S.A. v.
Amtrog Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-984 (1942). See also THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 49
(2000).
630

Judge Frank, in the Kulukundis Shipping Company decision, sought to clarify the
foundation for this hostility as well:
An effort has been made to justify this judicial hostility to the executory
arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitrations, if unsupervised by
the courts, are undesirable, and that legislation was needed to make
possible such supervision. But if that was the reason for unfriendliness to
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such executory agreements, then the courts should also have refused to aid
arbitrations when they ripened into awards. And what the English courts,
especially the equity courts, did in other contexts, shows that, if they had
had the will, they could have devised means of protecting parties to
arbitrations. Instead, they restrictively interpreted successive statutes
intended to give effect to executory arbitrations. No similar hostility was
displayed by the Scotch [sic] courts. Lord Campbell explained the English
attitude as due to the desire of the judges, at a time when their salaries
came largely from fees, to avoid loss of income. Indignation has been
voiced at this suggestion; perhaps it is unjustified. Perhaps the true
explanation is the hypnotic power of the phrase, 'oust the jurisdiction.’
Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad as its
bark.
Kulukundis Shipping Co., S.A. v. Amtrog Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983-984 (1942)
(footnotes omitted).
Frances Kellor, a senior official of the American Arbitration Association just after
the Second World War, also detected broader, social reasons, for the resistance to
arbitration in some quarters in the United States:
It is probable that this situation was due somewhat to the attitude of
Americans toward discord and dispute. They were complacently accepted
phenomena, to be settled by force or by litigation, if need be. America
was a rich country, full of adventure and could afford a considerable
volume of disputes at a high cost of settlement. As disputes were regarded
as an inevitable and healthful process in the development of a new
country, the prospect that they might sometime become a menace to
society was not of immediate concern. Since in trade and commerce the
marginal profit was then sufficient to allow for a very considerable waste,
the attribute of economy was not an attraction to arbitration. In industrial
relations, parity of power between employers and employees had not
reached the point of encouraging arbitration. ... It is also probable that this
early American attitude towards disputes also failed to give arbitration any
outstanding advocates. Without such leadership, so conspicuous in other
advancing fields of endeavor, arbitration could not present an effective
challenge to the fast-growing volume of disputes.
FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 6-7 (1948).
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Section 2. The Advent of the Federal Arbitration Act
A sea change in the generally negative attitude of the American bench towards arbitration
began to appear in the latter years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth,
when commercial interests, primarily in the northeast sector of the United States and centered in
New York,631 first sensed the utility and value of arbitration as a means of resolving commercial
disputes outside of traditional court structures. The first significant statutory inroads against the
entrenched judicial enmity towards arbitration were registered in New York City, where there
had been a long tradition of commercial arbitration that stretched back even to the period of the
Dutch hegemony.632 This continuing and persistent commercial tradition registered statutory

631

Commercial arbitration had early on found a home in the urban centers of the
northeastern United States:
Although arbitration had found a foothold in chambers of commerce as
early as 1768 in New York, 1794 in New Haven, and 1801 in
Philadelphia, the examples thus set had not resulted in its general
acceptance by other chambers of commerce; and even when established it
was not generally used because little effort was made to educate the public
in its use. Of the thousands of trade associations in operation in 1927,
only a comparatively small number of them knew about or used
arbitration. Financial and commodity exchanges that had found
arbitration practical in New York achieved only a limited application in
similar exchanges throughout the country.
Ibid, at 7. The history of Georgia’s early experiments with commercial arbitration in
chambers, boards, and exchanges is rehearsed in some detail, supra, in this survey’s
Chapter One, Section 3 (“Statutory Forms of Informal and Nonjudicialized Arbitration in
Georgia”), under Arbitration in Chambers of Commerce.
632

See Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on
the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 479 (1995),
especially at 481-483 (footnotes omitted):
Arbitration actually was in widespread use in the United States almost
three centuries before modern arbitration statutes were passed in the
1920s; its history traces back to the early colonial period. Aiken (1974:
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successes when the Chamber of Commerce of the City of New York prevailed on the New York
legislature in Albany in 1920 to adopt an arbitration statute providing that arbitration agreements
and awards would be “valid, enforcible [sic] and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at

160) explored records from the Dutch period in New York (1624-1664),
for instance, and explains: "Arbitration in New Netherlands in the 17th
century ... was frequent, swift, and relatively simple compared to the
English common law." Jones (1956: 209) examined newspapers,
merchant letters, and the records of the New York Chamber of Commerce,
as well as legal records, and found that arbitration was in constant and
widespread use in New York throughout both the Dutch colonial period
and the British colonial period (1664-1783). Indeed, there is substantial
evidence demonstrating that merchants established arbitration
arrangements in each of the American colonies (Aiken, 1974; Auerbach,
1983; Jones, 1956; Smith, 1961: 180-88; Odiorne, 1953, 1954). ...
Furthermore, arbitration was also used to settle disputes between
businessmen from different colonies; arbitration of disputes between New
York and Philadelphia merchants developed in the 17th century, for
instance, as trade between those communities developed (Aiken, 1974;
Jones, 1956). ...
The most complete record of an arbitration tribunal during the late 18th
century is that of the New York Chamber of Commerce. One of the first
actions taken by this organization at its first meeting on April 5, 1768, was
to make provisions for arbitration, and the Chamber's first arbitration
committee was appointed on June 7 of that year (Jones, 1956: 207).
There is also evidence of "considerable demand" for arbitration services
from the Chamber, as committees were appointed regularly until 1775
when the Chamber temporarily suspended meetings because of the war
(Jones, 1956: 207). Four years later, on September 7, 1779, an arbitration
committee was again appointed, and arbitration meetings continued
throughout the revolutionary period. In fact, during the British
occupation of New York, all civil disputes were referred to the Chamber's
arbitration committee by the British occupation forces (Jones, 1956: 209).
See also on early New Amsterdam and New York commercial arbitration, Eben Moglen,
Commercial Arbitration in the Eighteenth Century: Searching For The Transformation of
American Law, 93 YALE L. J. 135 (1983), especially at 135-147.
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law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”633 Kellor describes this statute as a “change
in pattern” from that which was customary in the United States:
This law possessed the unusual features of looking forward instead of backward,
and of enabling parties in dispute to control future disputes as well as to settle
existing disputes. Although similar features had existed in British and Scottish
laws for many generations, it proved to be a revolutionary step in the Americas as
it had not been in other countries.634
The New York statute found a receptive welcome and was soon emulated by similar
statutory initiatives in other American states.635 Drawn by the success of the New York statutory
innovation, it was only five years later when the United States Congress turned its attention to

633

1920 N.Y. Laws ch. 275 § 2, cited in Anthony S. Fiotto, The United States Arbitration
Act and Preliminary Injunctions: A New Interpretation of an Old Statute, 66 B.U. L. REV.
1041 (1986), at 1058, fn. 121.
634

In 1948, Kellor wrote:
Under the provisions of this new law [adopted in New York in 1920],
agreements to submit to arbitration future disputes arising out of the
contract containing such agreements, were made legally valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable save as any other contract is revocable.
Hitherto only existing disputes had enjoyed such legal protection.
Furthermore, this law closed the courts to parties to arbitration agreements
until they had complied with their arbitration agreements and it brought to
the aid of the parties the powers of the court in enforcing agreements and
awards by authorizing them to appoint arbitrators or otherwise expedite
arbitration upon default of one of the parties.

Ibid, at 10-11.
635

Kellor asserts that the New York statute was the inspiration for substantially similar
legislation in “Arizona, California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wisconsin.” Ibid, at 11, fn. 6. It is unclear why she redundantly
includes the New York law in this list.
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the validation of the commercial arbitral process through the adoption of the Federal Arbitration
Act.636 The nuclear, operative language of that act was drawn almost verbatim from the terms of
the earlier New York initiative and provided:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.637
The new federal legislation thus announced a general policy firmly committed to the
enforcement of arbitral arrangements. In addition, the act went forward to make available
procedural devices which could be put to the service of the enforcement of such agreements. § 4
of the Act, for instance, was intended to ensure that federal district courts could exercise the

636

United States Arbitration Act February 12, 1925, ch. 213 [Federal Arbitration Act of
1925, Federal Arbitration Act, or “FAA”], 43 Stat. 883.
637

Federal Arbitration Act, § 2. It was not wholly clear until the decision of the U. S.
Supreme Court in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 443 (1987), that the final clause of this
section was a reference to state law and, hence, something of a victory for the viability of
state policy in the field of national arbitration law. This important point in the case may
have been overlooked because, in its holding, the court sustained the preemption by the
Federal Arbitration Act of a California statute preserving the right to trial in the
conventional courts on claims arising out of employment contracts, even when these
contained an arbitration clause. See Charles Davant IV, Tripping on the Threshold:
Federal Courts’ Failure to Observe Controlling State Law Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 51 DUKE L. J. 521 (2001) (footnotes omitted), at 529: “Perry was the first Supreme
Court decision to indicate (albeit in dicta) that under the Federal Arbitration Act, federal
and state courts should apply ordinary state contract principles to determine whether an
agreement to arbitrate is valid, revocable, or enforceable ... .”
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procedural prerogative of ordering parties to obey an existing agreement to arbitrate.638
Similarly, the federal legislation in its § 3 sought to prevent any recourse to the conventional
courts by parties to a prior arbitration agreement by authorizing federal courts to enjoin litigation
brought in violation of such an arbitral contract.639
Given these statutory features promoting and supporting arbitration, none could
reasonably question the broadly favorable policy towards commercial arbitration which
informed the 1925 federal legislation. Nonetheless, the novelty of the language and the
innovation which it represented in the context of American arbitration law created a number of

638

Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, § 4, stipulates:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement ...

Analogous language exists in § 206 the Federal Arbitration Act providing, in cases where
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards controls, that:
A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration
be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided
for, whether that place is within or without the United States. Such court
may also appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the
agreement.
639

Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, § 3, states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the courts in which such suit is pending, upon
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant
for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration ...
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residual ambiguities with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act and the scope of its statutory
reach, ambiguities which persist even today and which cloud, in many respects, the efficiency,
effectiveness, and viability of the Federal Arbitration Act as it has evolved since 1925.640 The
consequence of these uncertainties is perhaps even greater with respect to the stability in the
application of state arbitration laws, including those of Georgia.

Section 3. The Substantive and Preemptive Character of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925

One of the most fundamental questions surrounding the implementation of the Federal
Arbitration Act remains its proper ambit and reach and the corresponding impact of the federal
legislation on the power and autonomy of the states of the American union to adopt and enforce
laws in the area of arbitration and arbitral policy. It is clear in the explicit terms of the Federal
Arbitration Act itself that the provisions of the act reach to the regulation of arbitral agreements
“in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”641
This language is strongly suggestive of federal constitutional authority over admiralty and
interstate commerce as a matter of American federalism and the basic allocation of authority
between the federal government and the states of the Union in this important sphere642 ; the

640

These ambiguities focus largely on the application of the Federal Arbitration Act as
substantive law in federal and state courts, and on its application in displacement of state
law in state courts. These issues are treated in more detail, infra.
641
642

Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, § 2.

See Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1984), discussed more fully,
infra.
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language is, however, by no means free of inherent ambiguity.643 While maritime transactions
and contracts in interstate commerce are clearly regulated by the act, it is not at all beyond
debate whether the provisions of the act were intended by Congress to apply in the courts of the
American states as well as the courts of the federal union.644 There is, in fact, no specific

643

On the evolving interpretation of FAA § 2, see generally David P. Pierce, The Federal
Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpretations of Its Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 623 (1992)
and Preston Douglas Wigner, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive Approach to
the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look At the Past, Present and Future of Section 2, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1499 (1995).
644

See Isham R. Jones, III, The Federal Arbitration Act and Section 2’s “Involving
Commerce” Requirement: The Final Step Towards Complete Federal Preemtion [sic]
Over State Law and Policy, 1995 J. DISP . RESOL. 327, 332 (1995) (footnotes omitted):
For years following the enactment of the FAA, the idea that the FAA
applied in state courts was not raised. ... It was not until 1967 when the
United States Supreme Court decided Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co. ... that state courts began to apply the FAA.
Cited by Jones, id., on this point, see also Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration
Act’s Interstate Commerce Requirement: What’s Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 391 (1992) (footnotes omitted):
Although the significance of the FAA at the date of its enactment
depended on the scope of its applicability, the Act was ambiguous on that
point. Section 2 of the Act made enforceable only those arbitration
agreements that related to maritime transactions and contracts involving
interstate commerce. The Act did not specify, however, whether it applied
to cases in state court as well as federal court. Nor did specify whether it
applied to cases in federal court on diversity of citizenship as well as
federal question jurisdiction.
These questions, however, do not appear to have been controversial ones
in the decades following the FAA’s enactment, at least not with respect to
the FAA’s central provisions making arbitration agreements valid and
enforceable. Courts and commentators concluded, almost unanimously,
that the Act applied in all federal cases, including those in federal court on
diversity jurisdiction.... Few if any commentators, meanwhile, thought that
state courts were obligated to apply the Act.
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language contained within the Federal Arbitration Act unambiguously resolving this important
and fundamental issue.645 Similarly, the act is unclear and open to differing interpretations as to
whether it was intended to apply in the federal courts in the context of actions filed on the basis
of diversity of citizenship or whether it was the intention of Congress to create federal question

The application of the legislation by federal courts in diversity cases was consistent with
the traditional notion that, under long-standing principles of conflicts of laws, the forum
court always applies its own procedural law. Cf. Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). This in turn implies that the act, as a
federal procedural matter, would not apply in state court litigation.
645

Davant writes:
During the first three or four decades of the Arbitration Act’s existence,
the Supreme Court (and everyone else) understood that it was a procedural
statute applicable only in the federal courts. Most people accepted that the
Act’s sponsors in Congress intended for its scope to be quite narrow,
applying only to cases in admiralty and in “interstate commerce,” as that
term was defined before the New Deal. In short, the Act was considered
part of a “truly federal-state system of arbitration law.”

Charles Davant IV, Tripping on the Threshold: Federal Courts’ Failure to Observe
Controlling State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 51 DUKE L. J. 521 (2001)
(footnotes omitted), at 526.

249
subject matter jurisdiction in the language employed by the statute.646 These fundamental
questions were to become, decades later, the focal points of judicial debate in subsequent cases.
These basic issues regarding the scope and reach of the Federal Arbitration Act and its
preemptive effect on state law are imbedded in its terms but they do not, however, appear to
have been the source of substantial concern in the first few years of the act’s application. 647 Well
into the 1940s and 1950s, federal courts customarily applied the terms of the Federal Arbitration
Act648 to cases coming before them, whether the cases were in the federal judicial system as a

646

Diversity subject matter jurisdiction and federal question subject matter jurisdiction
are the two basic forms of disputes which may constitutionally come before federal
courts in the United States and be adjudicated by them. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (as amended
July 25, 1958, Pub L. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat 415; Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-574, § 2, 90
Stat. 2721; December 1, 1980, Pub. L. 96-486, § 2[a], 94 Stat. 2369), essentially permits
the federal courts to adjudicate matters where the claim of the plaintiff arises under the
constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See generally Louisville & Nashville
R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 1332, as
amended July 26, 1956, c. 740, 70 Stat. 658; July 25, 1958, Pub. L. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat.
415; Aug. 14, 1964, Pub L. 88-439, § 1, 78 Stat. 445; October 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-583,
§ 3, 90 Stat. 2891; November 19, 1988, Pub L. 100-702, Title II, §§ 201-203, 102 Stat.
4646; October 19, 1996, Pub L. 104-317, Title II, § 205, 110 Stat. 3850), on the other
hand, does not require that the claim of the plaintiff arise under federal law at all, but
only –in basic terms– that diversity of citizenship exist (in the most usual case, signifying
a difference between the state citizenship of the litigants) between or among the parties to
the suit. See, e.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (1974).
647

See Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce
Requirement: What’s Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 391
(1992), quoted supra.
648

There are, of course, concerns with the preemption of state arbitration policy by
federal statutes other than the Federal Arbitration Act, but issues raised by these laws,
while relevant, are somewhat aside of the main focus here. On the preemptive effect of,
for instance, the federal Labor Management Relations Act with respect to the Georgia
Arbitration Code, see Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881 (1985), at 884:
The [U. S. Supreme] Court most recently restated the scope of preemption
under the NLRA in Local 926 , International Union of Operating
Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 674-78, 103 S.Ct. 1453, 1458-59, 75
L.Ed.2d 368 (1983), where it noted that if the conduct at issue "is actually
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function of diversity subject matter jurisdiction or federal question subject matter jurisdiction.649
One can draw from the earlier history of the application of the Federal Arbitration Act that the
courts sometime perceived it (albeit most often implicitly) as substantive regulation which would
be applicable to all cases in the federal courts, whether filed by the plaintiff as a diversity action
or as a federal question subject matter jurisdiction suit.650
This issue as to the fundamental nature of the Federal Arbitration Act as procedural or as
substantive became more critical with the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Erie v.
Tompkins651 in 1938. The Erie decision –perhaps one of the best known cases ever to be handed

or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA ... state law and
procedures are ordinarily preempted." The Court added that exceptions
are proper only where the issue "is only a peripheral concern of the Act or
touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility
that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be
inferred that Congress intended to deprive the state of the power to act."
Id. at 676, 103 S.Ct. at 1459.
The converse is also true, of course: The Federal Arbitration Act may well have
preemptive effect on state statutes other than the local arbitration code. For example,
where it was argued that the FAA preempted the Georgia Nonresident Contractor’s Act
(closing the doors of Georgia courts to non-Georgia contractors who had not registered in
the state to do business here), Judge Ernest Tidwell of the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia ruled, in an opinion conceptually rooted in the rationale of
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468 (1989), discussed infra, that “[t]he FAA cannot pre-empt the Georgia
forum-closing statute since the Georgia statute does not directly conflict with any
provision of the FAA nor does it frustrate the federal policies that underlie the FAA. Cf.
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S.Ct. 477 (1956); DeKalb County, Georgia v.
Henry C. Beck Company, 382 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1967).” Winter Construction Company
v. Lamas Constructors, Inc., 1987 WL 60203 (1987), rev’d in part and affirmed in part,
863 F.2d 889.
649

See, e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959).
650

Ibid.

651

Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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down by the Supreme Court of the United States– reversed the hoary ruling of that court in the
1842 case of Swift v. Tyson.652 In Swift, the United States Supreme Court had taken the position
that federal courts were entitled to evolve their own substantive principles and rules of law on
questions of general application which would fall under the rubric of general common law. This
decision –one which was often challenged but never overruled until 1938– essentially vested the
federal courts with authority to develop substantive principles of law for application in all cases
coming before them, whether the case was filed as a federal question matter or one falling under

652

Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). The more refined details of the Swift v.
Tyson decision fall well outside the limited scope of this review, but it is important to
underscore the fundamental holding of the Swift opinion that the federal courts of the
United States possess an inherent power to develop their own rules of common law on
substantive matters including, significantly, matters of contract. This decision was
premised upon the court’s construction of § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (now
appearing in codified form as 28 U.S.C. § 1652 [1948 Acts. Based on Title 28, U.S.C.
1940 ed., § 725 (R.S. § 721)], providing that “the laws of the several states, except where
the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States in cases where they apply.” The philosophical foundation for the court’s
position in Swift rested upon assumptions of natural law which premise the existence of
an objective body of principle governing human affairs. This being so, reasoned Justice
Story in Swift,
... it has never been supposed by us, that the section [34 of the original
Federal Judiciary Act] did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of
a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or local
usages of a fixed and permit operation, as for example, to the construction
of ordinary contracts or other written instruments and especially to
questions of general commercial law, where the state tribunals are called
upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon
general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the
contract or instruments, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles
of commercial law to govern the case.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
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the diversity jurisdiction of the court.653 In Erie, the Supreme Court reversed this longstanding
principle and took the position that the Swift rule countenancing a general federal common law
was a violation of certain fundamental precepts of American constitutional law limiting the
federal government to those matters expressly granted to it under the United States Constitution,
and leaving all other substantive matters for regulation by the states and their proper
constitutional organs.654 Under the Erie approach, then, federal courts remained competent to
evolve federal principles of common law only in restricted areas where such authority was
clearly theirs under the terms of the federal constitution; in all other areas, substantive law

653

On Swift and its reversal by Erie, see the influential statement by Judge Charles E.
Clark, a principal draftsman of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, The Tompkins
Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417 (1940).
654

Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Justice Brandeis, who wrote
the majority opinion in the Erie case, premised his holding on several independent
grounds. The major concern of the court seemed to have been the danger of a violation of
the principle of equal protection of the laws which the Swift ruling had constructed in
creating a division between federal common law and the corresponding perception of
common law held by the courts of the various states. This schism in common law
principles in turn permitted the nefarious practice of forum shopping by affording an
astute plaintiff the option of choosing a state or federal court in a diversity case solely on
considerations as to which system would provide the most favorable substantive rule in
the resolution of the dispute. This ability to “shop around” was denied to the plaintiff who
could not bring his suit in diversity and was relegated solely to the disposition of the case
in the state courts.
Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens against
citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal
court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be
determined was conferred upon the noncitizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered
impossible equal protection of the law. In attempting to promote uniformity
of law throughout the United States, the doctrine had prevented uniformity
in the administration of the law of the state.
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
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–including the law of contract where the bulk of principles relevant to arbitration would
conceptually and analytically be embedded– remained largely the exclusive province of the
states of the American union. In a diversity case, then, the federal courts were under a
constitutional obligation to apply the applicable state law to the relevant substantive issues.
Even at the heyday of the Erie philosophy, however, it was never questioned that the federal
courts would remain competent to apply federal principles of procedure.655 Hence, the Erie case
in reversing Swift v. Tyson precipitated an important issue in determining whether the principles
of the Federal Arbitration Act were to be properly characterized as substantive or as procedural:
if the Federal Arbitration Act and its wide-ranging countenance of arbitral processes were to be
regarded as simply procedural in nature, then the Federal Arbitration Act would arguably never
apply in state court litigation to displace state regulation and would have binding application in
federal litigation only when the litigation was otherwise properly pending before a federal court
since, as a procedural measure, that act could not have created a form of federal question subject
matter jurisdiction.656

655

In a separate concurring opinion in Erie, Justice Reed noted that “[t]he line between
procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure.
... The Judiciary Article [of the federal constitution], 3, and the ‘necessary and proper’
clause of article 1, s 8 [also of the national constitution], may fully authorize legislation,
such as this section of the Judiciary Act.” Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 92 (1938). See also Charles E. Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1
F.R.D. 417 (1940), cited supra.
656

It was not an uncommon view in the period that the FAA was, in substantial measure,
adopted pursuant to the power of Congress to regulate procedure implied by Article III,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. .
Westchester Service Corp., 70 F.2d 297, 298 (1934), aff’d 293 U.S. 449 (1935), and
Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (1944), both of which were
cited by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for this proposition in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Company of America, Inc., 218 F.2d 948 (1955), at 951, considered more
fully, infra.
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These questions intensified when, eighteen years later, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in the case of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc.657 That
litigation was rooted in the arbitration clause appearing in a contract of employment which
provided that “any differences, claim or matter in dispute arising between [the parties] out of this
agreement or connected herewith”658 would be subject to a mandatory arbitral procedure. The
plaintiff Bernhardt had been discharged by his employer Polygraphic and thereafter sued for
breach of his employment agreement; the defendant Polygraphic then sought relief under § 3 of
the Federal Arbitration Act, seeking to stay the litigation filed by Bernhardt pending arbitration
of their dispute in accordance with the clause in their agreement. The federal district court in
which the case had been filed first ruled that, in a diversity case and in obedience to the mandate
of Erie v. Tompkins, the federal court must reach substantially the same result as would a state
court deciding the same matter.659 The district court interpreted prevailing Vermont law to
require the denial of the stay of litigation sought by the defendant, thus permitting the litigation
to proceed despite the presence of the arbitration clause. On appeal of this decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court and made the
determination that the availability of a stay under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act was not
substantive within the meaning of Erie: the net effect of this holding by the appellate court was
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Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).

658

Substantial portions of the contract between the parties, including its arbitration
clause, were reprinted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion in the case.
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, Inc., 218 F.2d 948 (1955), at 949.
659

The district court’s rationale is indicated by the Second Circuit at 218 F.2d 948
(1955), at 950.
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that § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (and, by extension, all of the Federal Arbitration Act) was
of a procedural nature and therefore applicable in the federal courts even in a diversity case.660
On review by the Supreme Court of the United States, no definitive decision on this
sticky question on the fundamental nature of the Federal Arbitration Act was forthcoming. The
Supreme Court held instead that the Federal Arbitration Act was simply inapplicable to the
dispute since the contract between Bernhardt and the Polygraphic Company of America did not
involve either a maritime transaction or a transaction in interstate commerce661 : accordingly, the
660

Judge Frank, writing for the Second Circuit, found, ibid at 951, that:
1. We think that a stay, pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, is not "substantive" within the meaning of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, and Guaranty Trust
Company of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.
2079. We so held, per Judge Learned Hand, in Murray Oil Products
Company v. Mitsui & Company, 2 Cir., 146 F.2d 381, 383, where we
said: "Arbitration is merely a form of trial, to adopted [sic] in the action
itself, in place of a trial at common law: it like [sic] a reference to a
master, or an 'advisory trial' under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
39 (c), 28 U.S.C.A."
2. Section 3 [as a federal procedural rule] applies [in litigation in a federal
district court] whether or not the agreement is of a kind covered by Sec. 2,
i.e., for purposes of Sec. 3, the agreement need not involve a maritime
transaction or interstate or foreign commerce. The power to enact Sec. 3
derives from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. [v.]. Westchester Service Corp., 2 Cir.,
70 F.2d 297, 298, affirmed 293 U.S. 449, 55 S.Ct. 313, 79 L.Ed. 583;
Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 4 Cir, 142 F.2d 854.

661

Wrote Justice Douglas for the majority of the court:
Section 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] makes “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable” only two types of contracts: those relating to a maritime
transaction and those involving commerce. No maritime transaction is
involved here. Nor does this contract evidence “a transaction involving
commerce” within the meaning of s 2 of the Act. There is no showing that
petitioner while performing his duties under the employment contract was
working “in” commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was
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act by its own terms would not apply, held the court, thus obviating any necessity to decide the
more fundamental issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act is of a basically substantive or
procedural nature.662
The Supreme Court in its review of the case –while not required by its analysis of the
case to provide any definitive guidance as to whether the federal law was substantive or
procedural or the source of its authority– nevertheless took the opportunity to express its strong
view that the provisions of the Vermont arbitration law which were at issue in Bernhardt were of
a substantive character and thus should presumably be applied by a federal court sitting in a
diversity case:

engaging in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of our
decisions.
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, 350 U.S. 198, 200-201 (1956).
662

“If respondent's contention is correct,” the court noted, “a constitutional question
might be presented.”
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does not have the
constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies
in diversity of citizenship cases. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. of
Delaware v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449, 55 S.Ct. 313, 79
L.Ed. 583, applied the Federal Act in a diversity case. But that decision
antedated Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins; and the Court did not consider the
larger question presented here--that is, whether arbitration touched on
substantive rights, which Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins held were governed by
local law, or was a mere form of procedure within the power of the federal
courts or Congress to prescribe. Our view, as will be developed, is that §
3, so read, would invade the local law field. We therefore read s 3
narrowly to avoid that issue. Federal Trade Commission v. American
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 307, 44 S.Ct. 336, 337, 68 L.Ed. 696. We
conclude that the stay provided in § 3 reaches only those contracts covered
by §§ 1 and 2.
Bernhardt, at 202.
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If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought.663
For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially
affects the cause of action created by the State. The nature of the tribunal where
suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.
The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical
difference in the ultimate result.664
The court then proceeded to recite a litany of ways in which the parties’ selection of an
arbitral tribunal for the resolution of their disputes under the state arbitration law would
determine the outcome of a case and would be, hence, of a substantive character:
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury that is guaranteed both by the Seventh
Amendment and by ... the Vermont Constitution. Arbitrators do not have the
benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for their
results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial;
and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial. ...
“The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same
transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court
instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different
result.” There would in our judgment be a resultant discrimination if the parties
663

Earlier decisional law in the United States Supreme Court had ruled that, in defining
whether a given provision of state law was procedural or substantive in character for
purposes of Erie classification, matters which were outcome determinative in the case
were generally to be taken as substantive in nature and, hence, in a diversity action, were
to be controlled by state law. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
664

Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
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suing on a Vermont cause of action in the federal court were remitted to
arbitration, while those suing in the Vermont court could not be.665
The issue respecting the fundamental nature of the Federal Arbitration Act and,
consequently, the scope of its reach (and possible displacement of state law) was not determined
in Bernhardt; neither would it simply go away. The question was implicated yet again a decade
later in the case of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,666 where the federal
Supreme Court once again adverted to persistent questions as to the fundamental nature of the
Federal Arbitration Act, deciding that the contract at issue was one within the constitutional
prerogative of the Congress to regulate and that it had, in fact, done so in the FAA.
In Prima Paint, the plaintiff had purchased a paint business from Flood & Conklin and,
in connection with the sale of the business, there had been executed a consulting agreement
under which Flood & Conklin committed themselves to advise and assist the purchaser (Prima
Paint) for a stipulated period of time and within a certain geographical area.667 That consulting
agreement stated that arbitration would be the method of resolution of “any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this agreement.”668 Later, after a dispute arose between the parties,
the buyer Prima Paint initiated a suit in a federal district court and, in response, Flood & Conklin
responded with an application under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act to stay the litigation
pending arbitration in accordance with the agreement of the parties in the consulting contract.
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Ibid, at 203-204. (Citations omitted).

666

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), discussed supra
in connection with this survey’s consideration of the doctrine of compétence de la
competénce, in Chapter Two, Section 5, “The Georgia International Transactions
Arbitration Code of 1988.”
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The facts of the case are detailed in ibid, at 397-398.
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Ibid, at 398.
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The federal district court thereupon issued the injunction staying the litigation669 ; this order was
then affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.670
On review in the Supreme Court of the United States, the stay of litigation under the
authority of the federal act was affirmed.671 The Supreme Court first held that the contract in
question was indisputably governed by the Federal Arbitration Act since, in Prima Paint unlike
in Bernhardt, the contract was clearly one related to a transaction in interstate commerce.672 The
majority opinion in Prima Paint, authored by Justice Fortas, met this in limine issue head on. In
affirming the lower courts, the Supreme Court decided that the federal Congress had adopted the
669

262 F. Supp. 605.

670

360 F.2d 315.

671

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). The reasoning
of the Supreme Court differed markedly from that of the Second Circuit, 360 F.2d 315,
which essentially addressed the issue in the case within the framework of Erie, finding
that “national substantive law” as expressed in the FAA controlled the outcome of the
case. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), at 399400.
672

Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, held that:
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 76 S.Ct. 273, 100 L.Ed.
199 (1956), this Court held that the stay provisions of s 3 [of the Federal
Arbitration Act], invoked here by respondent F & C, apply only to the two
kinds of contracts specified in ss 1 and 2 of the Act, namely those in
admiralty or evidencing transactions in 'commerce.' Our first question,
then, is whether the consulting agreement between F & C and Prima Paint
is such a contract. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is. Prima
Paint acquired a New Jersey paint business serving at least 175 wholesale
clients in a number of States, and secured F &C's assistance in arranging
the transfer of manufacturing and selling operations from New Jersey to
Maryland. The consulting agreement was inextricably tied to this
interstate transfer and to the continuing operations of an interstate
manufacturing and wholesaling business. There could not be a clearer case
of a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce.

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967) (footnotes
omitted).
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Federal Arbitration Act in exercise of its constitutional authority over interstate commerce and
admiralty, and not simply in the employment of its power over the regulation of federal courts
contained in Article III of the United States Constitution.673 As framed by the court, “the
question [here] is whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves
with respect to subject matter such as interstate commerce over which Congress plainly has the
power to legislate. The answer to that can only be in the affirmative.”674
... [I]t is clear beyond dispute that the [FAA] is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of “control over interstate commerce and over
admiralty.” H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924); S. Rep. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924). . . . Federal courts are bound to apply rules enacted by
Congress with respect to matters – here, a contract involving commerce – over
which it has legislative power.675
Accordingly, some of the lingering questions regarding the applicability of the Federal
Arbitration Act in the context of federal diversity cases were laid to rest by the court’s decision
that the FAA was adopted as a matter of substantive initiative under the clause of the federal
constitution permitting congressional control over matters in interstate commerce; to that extent,
nettlesome issues arising under the Erie dichotomy of substance versus procedure were
diminished.676 At the same time, however, a thoughtful observer might well have sensed in this
673

Ibid, at 404-405.
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Ibid, at 405.
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Id.
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The certainty and clarity of the Court’s majority opinion in Prima Paint should not,
however, lull the reader into a false sense of security regarding the stability of the judicial
position that the Federal Arbitration Act is of a substantive character. Even in Prima
Paint itself, strong dissenting views were registered by Justice Black, in which Justices

261
vindication of federal prerogative that an emerging federal challenge to the viability of
independent and autonomous state determination in arbitral policy matters, at least in the vital
field of commercial relations, was becoming ominously more pronounced.
Despite the direct implications of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Prima Paint, many
state courts continued to disregard the Federal Arbitration Act in cases filed in them where the
act was, under the rubric of the 1967 decision, arguably applicable: Prima Paint was, after all, a
diversity action initiated in a federal district court and not a suit in a state court. This resistance
to the logic of Prima Paint –while not universal677 – persisted until 1984 when the Supreme Court
Douglas, and Stewart joined, regarding the characterization of the act as substantive (and
thus applicable in both federal and state courts) and not procedural (and, hence, binding
only on federal courts in a diversity case):
Today, without expressly saying so, the Court does precisely what Judge
Medina did in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d
402 (2d Cir. 1959), a prior federal opinion presaging the court’s ruling in
Prima Paint that the Federal Arbitration Act is of a substantive character].
It is not content to hold that the Act does all it was intended to do: make
arbitration agreements enforceable in the federal courts if they are valid
and legally existent under state law. The Court holds that the act gives
federal courts the right to fashion federal law, inconsistent with state law,
to determine whether an arbitration agreement was made and what it
means. Even if Congress intended to create substantive rights by the
passage of the Act, I am wholly convinced that it did not intend to create
such a sweeping body of federal substantive law completely to take away
from the States their power to interpret contracts made by their own
citizens in their own territory. ...”
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 422 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting). For a recent comment on Prima Paint, see Andre V. Egle, Back to Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.: To Challenge an Arbitration
Agreement You Must Challenge the Arbitration Agreement, 78 WASH . L. REV. 199
(2003). The debate among the justices of the federal Supreme Court regarding the
substantive nature of the Federal Arbitration Act goes on, however, and this survey will
return to this central and critical issue, infra.
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Georgia state courts, at least in dicta, came at least as early as 1973 to the position that
the Federal Arbitration Act could apply to the displacement of Georgia arbitration law in
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made the express determination that the Federal Arbitration Act, as substantive law, was to have
application in state courts as well as in federal diversity actions as intimated earlier under Prima
Paint. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,678 the Supreme Court decreed that state courts were
required to apply the nuclear provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, extending the holding of
Prima Paint and affirming both that the Act “creates a body of federal substantive law”679 and
that this initiative of the federal Congress was to have the full impact of one premised on the
power to regulate interstate commerce.680 Noting that Congress “normally creates rules that are

an action filed in a Georgia court. See West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line
Industries, Inc., 231 Ga. 329 (1973), discussed at greater length, infra.
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Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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Wrote the court:
At least since 1824 Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause has
been held plenary. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196, 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 6
L.Ed. 23 (1824). In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, the authority of
Congress is "the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed." Ibid. The statements of the Court in Prima
Paint that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause
power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in
state as well as federal courts. As Justice Black observed in his dissent,
when Congress exercises its authority to enact substantive federal law
under the Commerce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable
in state as well as federal courts. Prima Paint, 388 U.S., at 420, 87 S.Ct.,
at 1814 (Black, J., dissenting).
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., --U.S., at ----, ---- n. 32, 103 S.Ct., at 942 n. 32, we reaffirmed our view that
the Arbitration Act "creates a body of federal substantive law" and
expressly stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, i.e., the substantive law
the Act created was applicable in state and federal court.

Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984).
680

On this point, the court noted:
The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact
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enforceable in state as well as federal courts” when it uses its constitutional power to regulate
commerce, the court conceded that there were persistent questions respecting the historical
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the act:
Although the legislative history [of the 1925 FAA] is not without ambiguities,
there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than
making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts. ... This
broader purpose can also be inferred from the reality that Congress would be less
likely to address a problem whose impact was confined to federal courts than a
problem of large significance in the field of commerce. ... [The circumstance of
the adoption of the act] makes clear that [the federal Congress] contemplated a
broad reach of the FAA, unencumbered by state law constraints. ...681

substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. In Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18
L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967), the Court examined the legislative history of the Act
and concluded that the statute "is based upon ... the incontestable federal
foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.' "
Id., at 405, 87 S.Ct., at 1806 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1924)). The contract in Prima Paint, as here, contained an
arbitration clause. One party in that case alleged that the other had
committed fraud in the inducement of the contract, although not of
arbitration clause in particular, and sought to have the claim of fraud
adjudicated in federal court. The Court held that, notwithstanding a
contrary state rule, consideration of a claim of fraud in the inducement of
a contract "is for the arbitrators and not for the courts," id., at 400, 87
S.Ct., at 1804. The Court relied for this holding on Congress' broad power
to fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.
Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S., at 11.
681

Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984). (Citations omitted). In
Southland, Justice O’Connor picked up the torch of dissent bequeathed to her by Justices
Black, Douglas, and Stewart in Prima Paint:
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Southland v. Keating remains among the primary authorities for the proposition that the
terms of the Federal Arbitration Act must be applied in state court litigation when the litigation
centers upon an arbitral contract relating to maritime transactions or transactions in interstate
commerce. “Prima Paint and Southland thus federalized the law of arbitration by establishing
the FAA as the generally applicable substantive law of arbitration in the United States. The
scope of the FAA’s applicability now depends entirely on the terms of the FAA itself; if the
FAA by its terms applies to an agreement to arbitrate, then it preempts conflicting state law.”682

The Court’s decision [today] is impelled by an understandable
desire to encourage the use of arbitration, but it utterly fails to recognize
the clear congressional intent underlying the FAA. Congress intended to
require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements. ...
The FAA ... was enacted in 1925. ... Congress thought it was
exercising its power to dictate either procedure or “general federal law” in
federal courts. The issue presented here is the result of three subsequent
decisions of this Court.
In 1938 this Court decided Erie Railroad ... [which] denied the
federal government the power to create substantive law solely by virtue of
the Article III power to control federal court jurisdiction. Eighteen years
later the court decided Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. ... [which] held that
the duty to arbitrate a contract dispute is outcome-determinative –i.e.,
substantive– and therefore a matter normally governed by state law in
federal diversity cases. ...
... In Prima Paint ... we addressed [the] concern [that the act was
to be applied only in federal court cases arising under federal law], and
held that the FAA may constitutionally be applied to proceedings in a
federal diversity court. The FAA covers only contracts involving
interstate commerce or maritime affairs, and Congress “plainly has the
power to legislate” in that area.
Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1984) (citations omitted).
682

Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce
Requirement: What’s Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 396-397
(1992) (emphasis added).
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Section 4. Continuing Debate: The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act and Its Displacement of
State Law

However clear the fundamental holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating, it is equally
certain that great controversy still swirls around the propriety of this decision. Even in
Southland itself, the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court were hardly unanimous in their
approach to this question. Justice O’Connor and Justice Rehnquist dissented from the decision
in Southland,683 taking the position that the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act
clearly indicated the intent of Congress to exercise its authority only to prescribe a procedural
rule for the federal courts. In the view of those two Justices, the decision in Southland “utterly
fail[ed] to recognize the clear congressional intent underlying the FAA.”684 From their
perspective, the intent of Congress in the adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act was only “to
require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.”685 Justice O’Connor remains
of the opinion that “Congress never intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply in state
courts.”686 More recent additions to the Supreme Court –Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas –
have also indicated their belief that the Southland decision was wrongly decided and that the
Federal Arbitration Act has no application in state courts and, consequently, the possibility of
only limited preemptive impact on state arbitration law. “Southland clearly misconstrued the

683

Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21-36 (1984).
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Ibid, at 22-23.
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Ibid, at 23.
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See Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, at 283 (1995): “I continue to believe that Congress never intended the Federal
Arbitration Act to apply in state courts, and that this Court has strayed far afield in giving
the Act so broad a compass.”
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Federal Arbitration Act,”687 in the opinion of Justice Scalia, and that same Justice has declared
his ongoing willingness to overrule the decision of the court in Southland.688
In the more recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce Terminex
Companies v. Dobson,689 Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented forcefully from a majority
position sustaining the continued vitality of the Southland doctrine, registering their strong and
continuing opposition to the central holding of Southland that the Federal Arbitration Act is of a
substantive character and hence restrictive of state authority over arbitral policy and preemptive
of inconsistent state arbitration legislation: “I do not believe that proper application of stare
decisis prevents correction of the mistake,” Justice Scalia wrote. “Adhering to Southland entails
a permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of
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Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, at 284 (1995) (Justice Scalia,
dissenting).
688
689

Ibid, at 285 (Justice Scalia, dissenting).

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). The primary holding of
this significant case also advanced the general “federalization” of American arbitral law
under the Federal Arbitration Act. In Allied-Bruce, the fundamental issue before the
United States Supreme Court was not whether the FAA was adopted by the Congress in
the exercise of its commerce power –this issue had been finally laid to rest in Southland
v. Keating by the ruling that the FAA constituted substantive law applicable in both state
and federal courts – but rather the proper test for application of the act under the
commerce clause itself. The Alabama consumer in Allied-Bruce insisted that the FAA
would extend to a transaction, to the displacement of state law, only if its application was
in the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting; in opposition, the corporate
party (a national pest-control company), relying on the arbitration clause in the consumer
contract, advocated a less subjective test. The federal supreme court opted for the
application of an expansive understanding of the exercise of congressional power through
the Federal Arbitration Act, finding that it was the intent of the Congress for the act to
apply whenever, in fact, the underlying transaction involved interstate commerce. Ibid, at
278; see also Isham R. Jones, III, The Federal Arbitration Act and Section 2’s “Involving
Commerce” Requirement: The Final Step Towards Complete Federal Preemtion [sic]
Over State Law and Policy, 1995 J. DISP . RESOL. 327 (1995).
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disputes.”690 Explaining his concurrence in earlier decisions of the Supreme Court which were
constructed on the bedrock principles of Southland, Scalia noted:
... I have previously joined two judgments of this Court that rested upon the
holding of Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed.2d 1
(1984). See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 103 L. Ed.2d 488 (1989);
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L. Ed.2d 426 (1987). In
neither of those cases, however, did any party ask that Southland be overruled,
and it was therefore not necessary to consider the question. In the present case,
by contrast, one of respondents' central arguments is that Southland was wrongly
decided. . . .691
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Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-285 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Nor should anxieties over party reliance on the holding of the 1984
Southland decision deter the court from rejecting its reasoning, Scalia noted:
“Abandoning it does not impair reliance interests to a degree that justifies this evil.
Primary behavior is not affected: No rule of conduct is retroactively changed, but only
(perhaps) the forum in which violation is to be determined and remedied. I doubt that
many contracts with arbitration clauses would have been forgone, or entered into only for
significantly higher remuneration, absent the Southland guarantee. Where, moreover,
reliance on Southland did make a significant difference, rescission of the contract for
mistake of law would often be available.” Ibid, at 285.
691

Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-285 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). (Citations omitted). To dispel any notion that his concurrence in these
decisions was an endorsement of Southland, Justice Scalia served notice of his readiness
to overturn the decision: “I shall not in the future dissent from judgments that rest on
Southland. I will, however, stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling it, since
Southland will not become more correct over time, the course of future lawmaking seems
unlikely to be affected by its existence, cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
34-35, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2298-2299, 105 L. Ed.2d 1 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), and the accumulated private reliance will not likely increase
beyond the level it has already achieved.” Ibid, at 285.
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The net effect of this evolution in federal case law in the construction of the Federal
Arbitration Act is to diminish the overarching importance of state legislation in the field of
arbitration generally, with regard to both national and international applications. Even in an
extreme view of the effect of these cases, however, there still remains a continuing importance of
state regulations touching on both domestic and international commercial arbitration, and statebased codes for arbitration retain great vitality and importance in the regulation of domestic and
international trade and commerce.
Arguably, the perception that cases such as Southland v. Keating and their progeny
displace state arbitration codes and render them ineffective does not reflect the true state of
federal law regarding state initiatives in the field of arbitration generally, or international
commercial arbitration more specifically. The federal courts –including the Supreme Court692 –
have repeatedly affirmed their belief that it was the fundamental purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act to enforce private arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms.693 The
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E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc.,534 U.S. 279 (2002); Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989),
reviewed more fully, infra.
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Among the lower federal court decisions so holding are Mayard-Paul v. The Mega
Life & Health Insurance Co., 2001 WL 1711519 (S.D.Fla.,2001); Texaco Exploration
and Production Co. v. AmClyde Engineered Products Co., Inc., 243 F.3d 906 (5th
Cir.(La.) 2001); Trefny v. Bear Stearns Securities Corp., 243 B.R. 300 (S.D.Tex., 1999);
Community Motors Property Associates Ltd. Partnership v. McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc.,
59 F.3d 166, Unpublished Disposition, 1995 WL 371424 (4th Cir.(Md.) 1995); Broadcort
Capital Corp. v. Dutcher, 859 F.Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y., 1994); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.
v. Prouse, 831 F.Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y., 1993); Rubashkin v. Philips, Appel and Waldren
Inc., 722 F.Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y., 1989); Hays and Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3rd Cir.(Pa.) 1989); and Nicholson v. CPC Intern. Inc.,
877 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir.(N.J.) 1989). State courts have so ruled as well. See Cantor
Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Prebon Securities (USA) Inc., 731 A.2d 823 (Del.Ch., 1999) and
Simmons Co. v. Deutsche Financial Services Corp., 243 Ga.App. 85 (Ga.App., 2000), the
latter of which is discussed at greater length, infra.
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importance afforded by the Supreme Court to the implementation of the party’s agreement to
enforce arbitral clauses can be seen in cases such as Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Corp.,694 where the implementation of the party’s intention in this respect resulted in the
arbitration of certain issues, while other issues were relegated to judicial fora, since they were
not within the ambit of the party’s agreement to arbitrate.695
The Moses H. Cone rationale was central in the later decision by the Supreme Court of
the United States emphasizing party autonomy and the importance of enforcing arbitration
agreements in strict accordance with the wishes of the parties, the core policies of Volt
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Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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The court recognized the dilemma where some claims of a party are subject to arbitral
resolution, others not:
That misfortune, however, is not the result of any choice between the
federal and state courts; it occurs because the relevant federal law
requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an
arbitration agreement. Under the Arbitration Act, an arbitration
agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons
who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration
agreement. If the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is arbitrable
under the Act, then the Hospital's two disputes will be resolved
separately--one in arbitration, and the other (if at all) in state-court
litigation. Conversely, if the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is
not arbitrable, then both disputes will be resolved in state court. But
neither of those two outcomes depends at all on which court decides the
question of arbitrability. Hence, a decision to allow that issue to be
decided in federal rather than state court does not cause piecemeal
resolution of the parties' underlying disputes. Although the Hospital will
have to litigate the arbitrability issue in federal rather than state court, that
dispute is easily severable from the merits of the underlying disputes.
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1983) (citations
omitted).
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Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. University.696 In placing
added emphasis on these values, the federal high court necessarily boosted the relative
importance of state arbitration policy as expressed in legislative enactments and in state court
judicial precedents.697 In Volt –arguably one of the most important decisions in the field of
arbitration to be handed down by the Supreme Court in the waning years of the twentieth
century– the court ruled that the parties to a commercial undertaking may agree to apply state
arbitration law, even where the arbitration would otherwise be within the scope and application
of the Federal Arbitration Act.698 This would, in the terms of the Volt decision, remain true, even
where the implementation of state law would result in the delay of an arbitration which would,
under the Federal Arbitration Act, be required to proceed:
It does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a
result would be quite inimical to the FAA’s primary purpose of insuring that
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Volt Information Services, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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Daniel Zeft concludes, in an observation directed toward the impact of Volt in shoring
up the application of state international arbitration codes, but with implications for state
law on arbitration generally, that “ ... the Volt decision appears to allow the application of
state international arbitration act provisions that further the arbitral process, even if the
FAA contains no comparable provisions, when there is a standard choice of law clause
selecting the law of the state that has enacted an international arbitration statute.” Daniel
A. Zeft, The Applicability of State International Arbitration Statutes and the Absence of
Significant Preemption Concerns, 22 N.C.J. INT ’L. L. & COM . REG . 705, 787 (1997).
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“... [W]e conclude that even if §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA [authorizing motions to compel
arbitration and orders staying litigation, respectively] are fully applicable in state-court
proceedings, they did not prevent application of Cal.Civ.Proc.Code. Ann. § 1281 2(c) to
stay arbitration where, as here, the parties have agreed to arbitrate in accordance with
California law.” Volt Information Services, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
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private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Arbitration
under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and
parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.
Just as they limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they
specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.699

699

The distinction made by the court here between the parties’ definition of the scope of
arbitrability and their designation of the rules whereby the arbitration is to be conducted
was brought home forcefully in the later case of Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). There, claimants had entered into a standard-form
agreement with the defendant securities brokerage firm which provided, inter alia, for
the selection of New York law to control the contract and, at the same time, for any
arbitration under the agreement to be conducted according to the Rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Under New York law, punitive damages were
forbidden in arbitration proceedings (a rule which, the U. S. Supreme Court later noted,
Mastrobuono, at 60, would have been preempted by the FAA in the absence of the
parties’ agreement); according to the NASD rules, however, the panel of arbitrators
convened to hear a dispute between the parties was empowered to make an award of such
damages. The arbitrators ultimately found for the claimants in an amount including
$400,000 punitive damages. Shearson Lehman Hutton moved to vacate the award, and
the Seventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals affirmed an order of the district court
granting this motion. The U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case and
ultimately issued its decision reversing the federal trial and appellate courts and
reinstating the award as rendered by the panel of arbitrators. Under the rubric of
enforcing the parties’ intentions in their arbitration contract, the court found that the
contractual agreement to abide by the NASD Rules, with its provision permitting the
award of punitive damages, represented the true intention of the parties regarding such a
recovery. The ambiguity in the contract was, according to ancient rules of contract
construction, to be construed against its drafter, the NASD. Mastrobuono, at 62-63.
Moreover, ruled the court, the contract terms with their choice of law provision invoking
New York law and its prohibition against punitive damages in arbitration proceedings,
and their seemingly incompatible choice of forum clause selecting the Rules of the
NASD, were to be “read to give effect to all its provisions and to render them consistent
with each other.” Mastrobuono, at 63. Accordingly, the court found that the choice of law
clause related to substantive rules of contract while the invocation of the NASD Rules
would govern all aspects of the arbitral proceeding, including the right of the arbitrators
to make an award or punitive damages. Mastrobuono, at 64. The underlying principles of
Mastrobuono were later affirmed by the federal supreme court in First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), at 944: “When deciding whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally ...
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Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent
with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the
act would otherwise permit it to go forward. By permitting the court to
“rigorously enforce” such agreements according to their terms, we give effect to
the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing violence to
the policies behind the FAA.700
The clear gravamen of the Volt decision is, then, that parties are free to select the application of
state law to their arbitration701 and, where they do so, the intent and

should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.” A
qualification to this broad principle is discussed, supra, in this survey’s Chapter Two,
Section 5, The Georgia International Transactions Arbitration Code of 1988, in
connection with the adoption in that code of the doctrines of compétence de la
compétence and severability of arbitral clauses.
700

Volt Information Services, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). (Emphasis added and citations omitted).
701

Too much should not, of course, be read into the Volt decision. While that case
clearly stands for the proposition that private, contractual choice of law clauses may
designate the application of state arbitration codes to disputes arising out of maritime and
interstate commercial transactions, the bedrock provisions of § 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act mandating the enforceability of arbitration agreements in maritime
transactions and transactions in interstate commerce will not permit the validation of
state laws antithetical to these principles through the convenient device of private choice
of law. Such was the essential holding of the federal supreme court in Doctor’s
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotta, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) where a Montana State statute singled
out arbitration clauses for special mandatory “notice” requirements in written contracts.
Such a statutory provision, invalid in itself under the FAA, would not somehow accrue a
measure of enforceability by the simple expedient of party choice of law:
The Montana Supreme Court misread our Volt decision and therefore
reached a conclusion in this case at odds with our rulings. Volt involved
an arbitration agreement that incorporated state procedural rules, one of
which, on the facts of that case, called for arbitration to be stayed pending
the resolution of a related judicial proceeding. The state rule examined in
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purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act remain to give full vent and effect to their contractual
agreement, even if this means that the effectuation of particular terms of the Federal Arbitration
Act may be deflected.702

Volt determined only the efficient order of proceedings; it did not affect
the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself. We held that
applying the state rule would not "undermine the goals and policies of the
FAA," 489 U.S., at 478, 109 S.Ct., at 1255, because the very purpose of
the Act was to "ensur[e] that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced
according to their terms," id., at 479, 109 S.Ct., at 1256.
Applying [Montana’s special notice statute] here, in contrast, would not
enforce the arbitration clause in the contract between DAI and Casarotto;
instead, Montana's first- page notice requirement would invalidate the
clause. The "goals and policies" of the FAA, this Court's precedent
indicates, are antithetical to threshold limitations placed specifically and
solely on arbitration provisions. Section 2 "mandate[s] the enforcement of
arbitration agreements," Southland, 465 U.S., at 10, 104 S.Ct., at 858,
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract," 9 U.S.C. § 2. ... Montana's law places arbitration
agreements in a class apart from "any contract," and singularly limits their
validity. The State's prescription is thus inconsonant with, and is therefore
preempted by, the federal law.
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotta, at 688. Of some historical interest is the fact that
SB 540, an early 1986 version of the legislation which was to become the modern
Georgia Arbitration Code in 1988, contained a provision requiring special notice
measures almost identical to those reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Casarotta. This provision was never effective in Georgia law, however. See
Memorandum, Bar Sponsorship of Legislative Proposal to Amend Arbitration Statute,
from E. Wycliffe Orr, Sr., Chair of the Committee To Study Practicality of Mediation
and Arbitration of the State Bar of Georgia, to the Advisory Committee on Legislation of
the State Bar of Georgia, dated October 23, 1986, in the possession of the author.
702

And just as the Federal Arbitration Act is reticent in overriding the intention of the
parties to arbitration agreements, the act is also not without boundaries in displacing state
legislation on the subject of arbitration. “The FAA contains no express preemptive
provision,” the court reminds us, “nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the
entire field of arbitration.” Volt, 489 U.S. at 469. The doctrine of preemption under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution with specific reference to the
Federal Arbitration Act and Georgia arbitration legislation is treated more fully, infra, in
the present Chapter of this survey, Section 1, under The Federal Arbitration Act and
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From this understanding of Volt and its intellectual genealogy, then, we may speculate
that state arbitration policy –and implementing state codes– will be of critical importance in at
least three broad circumstances touching on the formation of arbitral contracts, the course of the
arbitral process, and the enforcement of arbitral awards:
1. The realization of party autonomy. If the parties in their choice of law clause in their contract
elect the application of state law, the premium placed upon the high value of party autonomy
may well require that the Federal Arbitration Act be displaced and that the provisions of state
arbitration codes be given precedence, even where these are contradictory to, or at least
incompatible with, the spirit or the letter of the Federal Arbitration Act itself. This was, of
course, the specific scenario in which the decision of the Supreme Court in Volt 703 was grounded.

Georgia Arbitration Law: Georgia Courts, Georgia Arbitration Law, and Federal
Preemption.
703

In a word, the provisions of state law may well represent the active condition upon
which the parties have come to their agreement and, in such a case, the fundamental
Grundnorm of pacta sunt servanda dictates that state law apply regardless of its
compatibility with federal provisions. Party autonomy too must have its limits, of course;
otherwise, the in terrorem specter summoned up by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Volt
(in which he was joined by Justice Marshall) could well have merit: “Were every state
court to construe such [choice of law] clauses [indicating a selection of state law] as an
expression of the parties’ intent to exclude the application of federal law, as has the
California Court of Appeal in this case, the result would be to render the Federal
Arbitration Act a virtual nullity as to presently existing contracts. I cannot believe that
the parties to contracts intend such consequences to flow from their insertion of a
standard choice-of-law clause. Even less can I agree that we are powerless to review
decisions of state courts that effectively nullify a vital piece of federal legislation.” Volt,
489 U.S. at 491-492 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan’s observations bring into
sharp focus legitimate questions as to the reality and reasonableness of an inference to
exclude federal law, drawn only from the simple adoption by the parties of a form choice
of law clause electing the application of state law. On party autonomy generally, see
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration
Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1189 (2003), especially at 1205, where the
author articulates the kind of concerns which prompted Justice Brennan’s reservations
about party autonomy in arbitration:
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2. Constitutional federalism and the limitation on the scope of federal authority. By its own
terms, the Federal Arbitration Act is applicable only to contracts in interstate commerce or
related to a maritime transaction. In the event that the subject matter of a given agreement falls
neither within the interstate commerce authority of the Congress to regulate nor within the scope
of federal admiralty jurisdiction, presumably state legislative authority would remain intact and
the provisions of state codes on arbitration would apply fully.704

Despite its provision of efficiency and functionality, should the
deregulation of arbitration be absolute? Must the enacted law on
arbitration always have a secondary, default status in all circumstances
and in every transaction? Are some limits (perhaps pertaining to the
arbitrability of disputes) feasible, warranted, or essential as to various
aspects of arbitration’s scope of application? What type of restraints
should be considered and how extensive should they be? Should they
proceed from public-interest considerations, a rights-protection rationale,
or only from issues pertaining specifically to the operation of the arbitral
process? From whose authority might such limits proceed?” Larry E.
Ribstein voices much the same concern about the excesses of party
autonomy: “But choice-of-law clauses present normative and positive
analytical puzzles. From the normative standpoint of whether courts
should enforce these clauses, if we reasonably assume that some
mandatory laws are efficient, why should parties be able to evade them by
the simple expedient of writing contracts providing for application of
alternative law? This reasoning seems to underlie the traditional hostility
to these clauses on the ground that government rather than private parties
should determine scope of application of its laws.
See also Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency To Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37
GA. L. REV. 363, 366 (2003) and Faith A. Kaminsky, Arbitration Law: Choice-of Law
Clauses and the Power to Choose Between State and Federal Law, 1991 ANN. SURV.
AM . L.527 (1992), at 541.
704

Concededly, the adoption by the Supreme Court of the United States of an expansive
objective, factual standard for involvement in interstate commerce in Allied-Bruce
Terminex Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), will reduce (if not outright
eliminate) virtually all commercial transactions outside of the regulatory ambit of
interstate commerce. Accordingly, few instances of unregulated commercial transactions
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3. Interstices in the regulatory structure of the Federal Arbitration Act. The FAA clearly
reflects the time and circumstances of its origin and there are few responsible authorities in the
field of arbitration who would contend that the act is comprehensive or exhaustive of the
subjects related to the arbitration or the arbitral process. Accordingly, there is much of an
interstitial character which remains open for state legislative regulation in the field of arbitration.
While there are many instances of such lacunae in the legislative framework of the Federal
Arbitration Act, among the more prominent and widely discussed are the possibilities of
discovery in the arbitral process and the availability of preliminary relief.705 In areas such as
these where there is no language within the Federal Arbitration Act dispositive of the matter, any

will exist:
The overall effect of [Allied-Bruce Terminex] is to enforce arbitration
agreements contained in contracts which in fact affect interstate
commerce. Any state law or policy contrary to federal law and policy will
be superseded. The only hope for party wishing to avoid an arbitration
clause is to show the contract has no effect on commerce. Given the
broad definition of commerce, however, proving a contract does not affect
interstate commerce in any way is no easy feat.
Isham R. Jones, III, The Federal Arbitration Act and Section 2’s “Involving Commerce”
Requirement: The Final Step Towards Complete Federal Preemtion [sic] Over State Law
and Policy, 1995 J. DISP . RESOL. 327, 349 (1995).
705

The possibilities here are myriad. Questions concerning the formal validity of the
arbitration agreement are not addressed in the FAA itself, as noted supra. Similarly, the
composition of the arbitral tribunal; the obligation of arbitrators to make disclosure of
conflicts of interest; details regarding the challenge of an arbitrator; the number and
appointment of arbitrators; and consolidation of arbitral proceedings are among the
matters which are largely unregulated by the federal statute. See Sébastian Besson, The
Utility of State Laws Regulating International Commercial Arbitration and Their
Compatibility With The FAA, 11 AM . REV. INT ’L. ARB. 211,225-232 (2000). To be sure,
federal common law picks up where the FAA leaves off in many instances, but even here
state arbitration codes can have an important role in filling gaps and supplying
definitions. See George K. Walker, Trends in State Legislation Governing International
Arbitrations, 17 N.C.J. INT ’L. & COM . 419, 455 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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state regulation on these subjects would survive a preemption argument unless, arguably, it
somehow thwarted, directly or indirectly, the pro arbitration bias of the Federal Arbitration
Act.706
The single most significant point to be made regarding the continued viability and the
enduring utility of state statutory initiatives in the field of commercial arbitration –whether
domestic or international in scope and application– was that registered by Heather Purcell:
State international statutes include critical procedures pertaining to choice of law,
jurisdiction, and the appointment of and grounds for challenging arbitrators that
the authors of the FAA never anticipated seventy years ago. Since the FAA
clearly does not fill the entire field of arbitration law, the existence of these onpoint provisions would, under current practices of making federal common law,
provide clear guidelines that should make judicial “legislation” in this area
unnecessarily presumptive. The federal statute’s broad guidelines invite
supplementation from the states, and recent Supreme Court rulings indicate that
existing statutory schemes supportive of underlying federal policies can have
significant impact on the making of “interstitial” federal common law.707
Some lines of Georgia case authority in recent years, however, have failed to make the fine but
nonetheless critical distinctions drawn by Purcell and have, in an apparent misperception of the
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Heather A. Purcell argues persuasively that federal preemption concerns are minimal
with regard to state international commercial arbitration codes, and that such codes have
special utility with regard to the interstices in the Federal Arbitration Act where
important matters are simply not referenced or regulated. Heather A. Purcell, State
International Arbitration Statutes: Why They Matter, 32 TEX . INT ’L. L.J. 525, 540-542
(1997) (emphasis added).
707

Ibid, at 542 (emphasis added).
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law, come dangerously close to foreclosing entirely any significant role for Georgia state
arbitration policy as expressed in statutory codes and thus to bringing to an untimely end any
viable impact of state policy in this critical field.
This survey of arbitration policy in Georgia concludes by turning here to this line of case
authority.

Section 5. The Federal Arbitration Act and Georgia Arbitration Law: Georgia Courts, Georgia
Arbitration Law, and Federal Preemption
The extent to which state legislative policy is displaced and preempted by federal
legislation under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution708 is, it hardly need be
said, a sophisticated and nuanced inquiry which touches upon the very essence of American
federalism.709 No better statement of the doctrine of federal preemption has been penned than
that written in 1983 by Justice White in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources & Development Commission,710 a

708

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” U. S. CONST ., ART . VI.
709

On the doctrine of federal preemption generally, see WILLIAM B. LOCKHART , ET AL .,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed.) 287-293 (1991);
DONALD E. LIVELY, ET AL ., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY, AND DIALOGUES
389-395 (1996); and DAVID CRUMP, ET AL ., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 139-148 (3d ed.) (1998).
710

Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources & Development
Commission, 460 U.S. 190 (1983).
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case which pitted the federal Atomic Energy Act against state regulations enacted by California.
Finding no federal preemption of the state law in that case, the federal high court noted:
It is well-established that within Constitutional limits Congress may preempt state
authority by so stating in express terms. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). Absent explicit preemptive
language, Congress' intent to supercede state law altogether may be found from a
"scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room to supplement it," "because the Act of Congress may
touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject," or
because "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose."711

711

Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources & Development
Commission, 460 U.S. 190, 203-204 (1983), citing Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) and
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447
(1947). The court, at 204, continued:
Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a
specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210,
1217-1218, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or where state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct.
399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
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The general principles of federal preemption formulated in cases such as Pacific Gas &
Electric,712 Hines,713 and Rath Packing Company714 are, of course, acknowledged within the body
of Georgia jurisprudence as well. The Georgia Court of Appeals has only recently taken the
opportunity once again to reiterate the basic principle that federal law preempts state law, 715 and
Georgia courts accept without murmur the proposition that the federal Congress retains authority
under the Supremacy Clause to preempt state law when it so directs.716 Such a federal override of
Georgia law can take the form, the Georgia courts concede, of an express preemption by the
federal Congress where the intent of the federal legislature is articulated in the national
legislation; it may, alternatively, appear where the entire field of legislative action is occupied by
the federal law; or preemption may be implied, as where the federal legislation is inconsistent
with and contradictory to the state law. 717

712

460 U.S. 190, 203-204 (1983).

713

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). The Hines decision is perhaps best known
for its articulation of the so-called “stand as an obstacle” test for the presence of federal
preemption: where state legislation impedes the accomplishment of the legislative
objectives of Congress, it is deemed preempted even in the absence of the specific
congressional intent to displace the state regulation. See Hines, 312 U.S., at 67.
714

430 U.S. 519 (1977).

715

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. MacLeod, 259 Ga. App. 761, 764 (2003). See also Poloney v.
Tambrands, Inc., 260 Ga. 850 (1991) and Duren v. Paccar, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 758 (2001)
(a state law which conflicts with a federal law is without effect once it is shown that
Congress has expressed its intent, through federal law or regulation, that the federal law
should preempt the state law).
716

City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 192 (`1996) (“Congress retains authority
under the Supremacy Clause to preempt state law when it so directs. ... When faced with
the issue of whether a state court must apply a federal statute over a state statute or rule
of law, the primary question is whether Congress intended to exercise this authority to set
aside state laws.”). (Footnotes omitted).
717

Gentry v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 785, 786-787 (1999). See also
Georgia Public Service Com’n v. CSX Transp., Inc., 225 Ga. App. 787 (1997):
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The general federal reticence to intrude on state prerogatives under the federal
constitution demonstrated in decisions such as Pacific Gas & Electric, Hines, and Rath Packing
Company, and the usual inclination of federal courts to respect the governmental and regulatory
authority of the states of the American union, has carried over into the broad field of
arbitration,718 and these considerations motivated the observations of Justice Stevens in his
concurring and dissenting opinion registered in Southland Corporation v. Keating in which he
brought to bear the general policies of Pacific Gas and Electric Company regarding the limited
nature of federal preemption into the field of arbitration: “[t]he exercise of State authority in a
field traditionally occupied by State law,” Justice Stevens wrote, “will not be deemed preempted
by a federal statute unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”719 He continued:

"[The] [p]reemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause and
grows from the premise that when state law conflicts or interferes with
federal law, state law must give way." Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 993
(11th Cir.1996). Congress may express a "clear and manifest" intent for
federal law to have preemptive effect in three ways: (1) by expressly
defining the extent of preemption; (2) by regulating an area so
pervasively that an intent to preempt the entire field may be inferred; and
(3) by enacting a law that directly conflicts with state law. Id.
Ibid, at 788-789.
718

The readiness of the federal judiciary to yield to the states a substantial arena of
permissible activity in the field of arbitration policy is hardly surprising, especially given
the history of the development of arbitration policy in colonial North America, the early
republican period of American history in general, and on into the early twentieth century:
the states were the only governmental actors involved in the formulation of arbitration
policy during that long period, and it was not until 1925 that a substantial presence in the
field for the federal government was staked out by the adoption of the Federal Arbitration
Act. See the discussion, supra, in this survey’s Chapter Three, Section 1, The Advent of
the Federal Arbitration Act.
719

Citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) and ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST , No. 32, 300 (Van Doren, ed., 1945), in support of this
proposition.
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Moreover, even where a federal statute does displace State authority, it "rarely
occupies a legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal
systems of the states. ... Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived
and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon
legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting them only so
far as necessary for the special purpose."720
And, of course, an apex of federal judicial regard for state regulatory and governmental
power within the field of arbitration was reached in the federal Supreme Court’s decision in
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,
considered at length, supra, where the court found no preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act
of California’s statutory provisions staying arbitration under certain circumstances in favor of
judicial resolution of related claims.721

720

Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting, at 18, citing and quoting P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H.
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
470-471 (2d ed.) (1973).
721

Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), 477-479, passim (footnotes and citations omitted,
emphasis added):
The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor
does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
arbitration. ... But even when Congress has not completely
displaced state regulation in an area, state law may nonetheless be
pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law--that is, to the extent that it "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399,
404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). The question before us, therefore, is
whether application of Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Ann. § 1281.2(c) to stay
arbitration under this contract in interstate commerce, in
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It was just shy of a half century after the adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act by the
national Congress in 1925 before that legislation made its debut appearance in the pages of
Georgia’s appellate court reports when, in 1973, the Georgia Supreme Court handed down its
decision in West Point-Pepperell v. Multi-Line Industries, Inc.,722 the first reported case in the
Georgia appellate reports which addressed the fundamental issue of whether, in a given case
where both arguably applied, state arbitration law or the national policy in the Federal

accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement itself,
would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. We conclude
that it would not.
In recognition of Congress' principal purpose of ensuring
that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms, we have held that the FAA pre-empts state laws which
"require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858, 79 L.Ed.2d 1
(1984). ... But it does not follow that the FAA prevents the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules than
those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be
quite inimical to the FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that
private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their
terms. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the
issues which they will arbitrate, see Mitsubishi, supra, 473 U.S., at
628, 105 S.Ct., at 3353, so too may they specify by contract the
rules under which that arbitration will be conducted. Where, as
here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is
fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that
arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go
forward. By permitting the courts to "rigorously enforce" such
agreements according to their terms, see Byrd, supra, 470 U.S., at
221, 105 S.Ct., at 1242, we give effect to the contractual rights and
expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies
behind by the FAA.
722

West Point-Pepperell v. Multi-Line Industries, Inc., 231 Ga. 329 (1973).
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Arbitration Act would control. West Point Pepperell, a major west Georgia textile manufacturer
but one with a central sales office in New York and production plants and facilities in North
Carolina,723 had sought to compel the arbitration of a dispute which had arisen between it and
one of its customers, Multi-Line Industries, Inc., another Georgia corporation which had entered
into a sales purchase agreement with West Point-Pepperell through the latter’s New York
offices. To this end, West Point-Pepperell had filed a suit against Multi-Line in New York to
compel arbitration in accordance with their contract agreement; Multi-Line, for its part, resisted
the Georgia textile manufacturer’s effort to arbitrate on the basis that, under Georgia common
law, arbitral agreements were regarded as void against public policy because of their effect of
ousting the conventional courts of their jurisdiction.724 It pressed this position in an action it filed
in the Superior Court of Troup County, Georgia, in an attempt to restrain West Point-Pepperell

723

The somewhat convoluted facts of the case are reflected at West Point-Pepperell, 329331.
724

See Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98 (1904), discussed at greater length, supra, in this
survey’s Chapter Two, Section 1, The Common Law of Arbitration in Georgia, Codified
and Uncodified. Georgia’s common law rule, as noted earlier, provided that broad, allissue arbitration agreements were void as against public policy since their effect was to
oust the conventional courts of jurisdiction. This blanket prohibition was applied full
force only where the agreement required the parties to arbitrate all questions which might
arise in the execution of a contract, both as to liability and to loss. If, however, the
arbitration agreement was restricted to such contract incidentals as price, value, measure,
quantity quality, classification and like issues, the arbitration provisions in such contracts
were deemed valid and were enforced by Georgia courts. See Manderson & Associates,
Inc. v. Gore, 193 Ga. App. 723, 731 (1989) (citations and emphases omitted); see also
generally Leonard v. House, 15 Ga. 473 (1854) and Millican Electric Co. v. Fisher, 102
Ga. App. 309 (1960). The salient point here, of course, is that Georgia law generally
prohibited arbitration agreements while federal law was just as rigorous in enforcing
them. As a consequence, anytime any arbitration agreement came within the ambit of the
federal legislation, conflict between the Georgia law and the federal statute was
automatic; just as automatic was the dominance of the federal legislation under the
Supremacy Clause whenever and wherever the federal law reached the matter.
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from the prosecution of its arbitration proceeding in New York. In response, West PointPepperell obtained an order from the New York state court restraining Multi-Line from pressing
its action in Georgia in which, in the meantime, an order had been entered by the Troup County
court restraining West Point-Pepperell from pursuing the arbitration proceeding in New York on
the basis that, as argued by Multi-Line, the broad arbitration agreement between the two
corporations 725 was void under Georgia law as against public policy. This order was then
appealed by West Point-Pepperell which insisted that its arbitration agreement with Multi-Line
was valid and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, Georgia’s anti-arbitration common
law rule (if it applied at all) notwithstanding.
When the matter reached the Georgia Supreme Court, the issue –one of first impression
in Georgia– was squarely put: did Georgia’s deep-seated common law prohibition against
arbitration yield under the circumstances of this case to the federal statute and its vehemently
pro-arbitration policy? In response, the Georgia court managed to evade a clear and direct ruling
on this question but, at the same time, gave an unambiguous indication of its conviction that the
Federal Arbitration Act was directly implicated in the matter and would control the outcome of
the case.

725

The arbitration clause at issue in the case provided that “[a]ny controversy arising out
of or relating to this contract, including any modification or amendment thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration in the City of New York in accordance with the Rules than
obtaining of the American Arbitration Association or the General Arbitration Council of
the Textile Industry, whichever shall be first selected by the party instituting set
arbitration.” West Point-Pepperell, 231 Ga. 329, at 332. The order of the trial court
restraining West Point-Pepperell from its attempts to compel arbitration under this clause
left no room that, in that court’s opinion, the provision was one of those broad form
arbitration clauses “so far contrary to the public policy of the state as an attempt to oust
the courts of this state from jurisdiction as to render said attempt avoid.” Ibid, at 330.
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The court rebuffed the argument of Multi-Line, the party resisting the enforcement of the
arbitration contract, that Georgia’s common law of arbitration would not enforce the arbitration
contract between it and West Point Pepperell: under Georgia’s long-standing rule still prevalent
in 1973, general, broad arbitration clauses mandating the arbitral resolution of all issues in a
dispute were concededly invalid; nonetheless, the court pointed out, this general proposition had
always been subject to a major qualification permitting the arbitration of any incidental and
limited issues in dispute between contract parties, including such matters as “price, value,
measure, quantity, quality, classification, and similar questions.”726 As the Georgia court
understood the case, the arbitration sought by West Point Pepperell related solely to such
“incidentals” in its contractual relationship with Multi-Line and, accordingly, was enforceable by
a motion to compel under Georgia law.727
The decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, however, went a step further and took note
of its view that the same result would ensue from the application of the Federal Arbitration Act.

726

West Point-Pepperell, at 331, citing and quoting Wright v. Cecil A. Mason
Construction Company, 115 Ga. App. 729 (1967) and Southern Mutual Insurance
Company v. Turnley, 100 Ga. 296 (1897).
727

One of the more curious aspects of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in this case
is its conclusion that the arbitration clause between the two parties concerned was one
addressing only “incidentals” as that term had been employed in prior Georgia case law
to describe the permissible ambit of arbitration in the state. “The controversy between the
parties to this case,” the Georgia court wrote, seemingly tongue-in-cheek, “involved only
the failure to pay the purchase price and the claim by the appellee of a breach of the
implied warranty of the merchantability of the goods,” West Point-Pepperell, at 331332, the court’s clear implication being that these fundamental matters were mere
“incidentals,” the arbitration of which was permitted under Georgia law. In point of fact,
the scope of the arbitration clause in West Point-Pepperell seems to be functionally
identical to that which had been criticized by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Wright v.
Cecil A. Mason Construction Company, 115 Ga. App. at 730-731, as an attempt to oust
the Georgia courts of their jurisdiction. The West Point-Pepperell court ignored any
impulse to explain its apparently contradictory reasoning in this respect.
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Stressing the multi-state and interstate elements present in the relationship between West PointPepperell and Multi–Line Industries, Georgia’s high court was clear as to the consequence:
Where such a transaction involves commerce, within the meaning of the Federal
Arbitration Statute, the state law and policy with respect thereto must yield to the
paramount federal law.728 . . . [Georgia cases establishing the state’s antiarbitration rule are] not applicable to the facts in the present case where the
transaction involves interstate commerce. The United States Arbitration Act was
intended to avoid the common law rule that an agreement between parties to a
contract to settle any dispute between them by arbitration was void and against
public policy as and [sic] effort to oust the courts of their jurisdiction.729
The court provided no definition of its use of the term “paramount” in the rule handed
down in West Point-Pepperell, especially as to the critical question as to whether the federal law
would be paramount for the simple reason that it was federal in character or, alternatively,
whether it would enjoy paramount status only in the event of conflict with state provisions. In
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In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the decision of the Sixth Circuit
Federal Court of Appeals in American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Airport, 269 F.2d 811 (1959), which in turn rested on the rationale of Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Company, 350 US 198 (1956), considered at more length, supra, in this
survey’s Chapter Three, Section 1, The Substantive and Preemptive Character of the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.
729

Citing Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F.2d 255 (1957), a decision of the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit enforcing an arbitral award
rendered in Norway. It does not stand directly for the proposition for which it was cited
by the Georgia Supreme Court in West Point-Pepperell but rather for the concededly
related concept that “Congress intended by § 2 of the [Federal Arbitration] Act to
abrogate the common-law rule that agreements to arbitrate are revocable by either party
at any time before an award has been made and to place arbitration agreements on the
same footing as other contracts.” Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455
(1957), at 457.
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the factual and legal circumstances of West Point-Pepperell, it would be entirely possible to
conflate the two disparate possibilities for the simple reason that, at the time of this decision,
Georgia law generally denied validity and enforceability to arbitral agreements across the board.
Accordingly, in the context of the case then at bar, the simple fact of a transaction being within
the jurisdictional ambit of the Federal Arbitration Act meant, in essence, that the federal law
would in every case be applied to override the virtually universal anti-arbitration position of
Georgia. In a word, application of the Federal Arbitration Act meant, ipso facto and without any
further analysis, conflict with Georgia policy and, hence, the constitutional supremacy of the
federal rule. Thus, the substantive result reached by the Georgia Supreme Court in West Point
Pepperell v. Multi-Line Industries is, in most aspects, unassailable in its logic and yet, as future
decisions of Georgia’s appellate courts handed down in the next several decades were to
demonstrate, the intellectual construct of the decision contained within itself a serpent’s egg, a
subtlety subject to easy misperception and distortion which was to cloud future opinions of
Georgia’s appellate courts for years to come and which indeed, to some degree, still befuddles
and renders ambiguous the position of Georgia law regarding its preemption by the Federal
Arbitration Act.
Within three years of its decision in West Point Pepperell, the Georgia Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Hill, returned to the issue of the scope and application of the Federal
Arbitration Act and its potential preemption of Georgia state law in CCC Builders, Inc. v. City
Council of Augusta.730 There, a contracting firm had petitioned for a writ of mandamus to
compel performance of an arbitration clause in connection with a wastewater treatment plant

730

CCC Builders, Inc. v. City Council of Augusta, 237 Ga. 589 (1976).
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construction contract it had earlier concluded with the City of Augusta. Following much the
pattern as had been presaged in the West Point Pepperell decision, Justice Hill concluded that
the Federal Arbitration Act would have application because the transaction was one involving
interstate commerce;731 he nevertheless premised the decision of the court sustaining the
mandamus on the basis that the contract in question was not, contrary to the assertion of the City
Council of Augusta, a broad form arbitration provision such as would be void under Georgia
law, but rather one permissibly limited in scope to issues such as the amount of loss or damage
and, as such, enforceable.732 Cited in support of the court’s conclusion that, where “such a
transaction involves [interstate] commerce, within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration
Statute, the State law and policy with respect thereto must yield to the paramount federal law,”733
were both the decision in West Point-Pepperell itself and the Sixth Circuit opinion in American
Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville Air Board which had been relied upon in West Point-Pepperell to
sustain the rationale of that earlier decision. The inherent ambiguity surrounding the court’s use

731

“Under the Federal Arbitration Statute (9 U.S.C. s 1 et seq.) a broad arbitration
provision (invalid under State law) in a contract involving interstate commerce is valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable,” citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 and West Point Pepperell, Inc. v.
Multi-Line Industries, Inc., 231 Ga. 329, 201 S.E.2d 452 (1973).
732

CCC Builders, Inc. v. City Council of Augusta, 237 Ga. 589, 591 (1976). A similar
device was invoked to avoid a direct ruling on the degree of preemption by the Federal
Arbitration Act in Savannah Transit Authority v. Ledford, 179 Ga. App. 238 (1986). In
Savannah Transit, however, Judge Carley took the view that the appellate record was not
sufficient to determine whether or not the arbitration agreement between the parties was
of an impermissibly broad form or acceptably limited and, for this reason, could not
determine whether the FAA acted to preempt the arbitration agreement if in fact it were
determined to be an all issues contract. Presumably, this matter was to be resolved after
remand to the trial court; no further record of the case, however, appears in the Georgia
appellate court reports.
733

Ibid, at 592.
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of the term “paramount federal law” was, just as that phrase had been in West Point-Pepperell,
left unexplained and unexplored.
By the time this issue returned to appellate court consideration a year later in Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. W. W. McNeal734 –the first instance in which the question of
federal preemption through the FAA of Georgia’s arbitration law had appeared in the Georgia
Court of Appeals– subtle shifts in the phraseology of the West Point-Pepperell rule were
beginning to signal the emerging perception by Georgia’s courts that the sheer fact of the Federal
Arbitration Act’s application to a given transaction meant, ipso facto, the automatic, unflinching
application of the federal law of arbitration without any further consideration of the potential
application of state law. In the McNeal case, a dispute between a former customer of the
securities broker-dealer filed a common law tort action in the State Court of Fulton County,
alleging at the same time violations of the federal Securities Act of 1933. The brokerage firm
responded, quite predictably, with its motion to stay the litigation and to compel arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration clause in the contract between the parties.735 In doing so, they

734
735

Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. W. W. McNeal, 143 Ga. App. 579 (1977).

In addition, the the plaintiff asserted that the securities broker employed by Paine,
Webber (and also a named defendant in the action) was not subject to the arbitration
agreement contained in the contract between Paine,Webber and McNeal, and could not
avoid common law trial in reliance on the arbitration agreement, because he had not
signed the instrument. The trial court was to sustain this position, holding that, under
Georgia law, a nonsignatory to a contract could not be compelled to arbitrate under a
provision of that agreement. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. W. W. McNeal,
143 Ga. App. 579 (1977). The Court of Appeals reversed this holding, ruling “that the
ends of justice are more nearly met by holding that [the employee] must be allowed to
participate in the arbitration . . .” Ibid, at 582. The underlying policy of the McNeal
decision to extend, in some circumstances, the right to participate in arbitration to a
nonsignatory of the underlying arbitration clause –a policy premised on the Georgia
court’s perception of the applicable rule under the Federal Arbitration Act and that
legislation’s decidedly pro-arbitration bias– has been extended by cases purportedly
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explicitly relied on the decision in West Point-Pepperell and its rule that, where the underlying
transaction is one within commerce as defined in the Federal Arbitration Act, “the federal law is
paramount.”736 “That holding,” the court, in its opinion by Judge Shulman, noted, “is now law in

applying the FAA but decided after the adoption of the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code.
In Comvest, L.L.C. v. Corporate Securities Group, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 277 (1999), the
Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the corporate customer of a securities
brokerage firm which did not sign the instrument containing the arbitration clause
involved in the case was nonetheless bound by the terms of that provision because of its
imputed knowledge of industry practice regarding arbitration and because of its
acceptance of benefits under the contract with apparent knowledge of the arbitration
clause, Comvest, at 280; at the same time, the court found on similar reasoning that a
nonsignatory corporate alter ego of the signatory brokerage firm would be permitted to
enforce the clause, even though it too had not signed the original arbitration agreement.
See Comvest, at 281, citing Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 7 F.3d
1110 (3d Circ. 1993). This expansive application of the duty or obligation to arbitrate on
the part of nonsignatories to arbitral agreements was confirmed in late 2003 by the Court
of Appeals in AutoNation Financial Services Corporation v. Arain, 264 Ga. App. 755
(2003), where a lender was permitted to assert an obligation to arbitrate contained in a
sales contract which it had not signed. Reasoning that the interlocking rights, duties and
obligations bound up in a sales contract and its underlying finance agreement represented
but a single factual transaction and that considerations touching upon the potential for
conflicting decisions by an arbitral panel and a conventional court; the status of the
parties as alleged joint tortfeasors; the relationship of the claims to the arbitration
contract; and the existence of an agency relationship, all weighed in favor of permitting
the lender to assert the arbitration clause in the sales contract. See AutoNation, 592
S.E.2d 96, at 98-100, citing McNeal, Comvest, and, perhaps with most emphasis, MS
Dealer Svc. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 (11th Circ. 1999). Most recently, in March of
2004, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in a case where the customer of a pest control
company sought to avoid liability for extermination services, determined once again that
a nonsignatory might, under appropriate circumstances, be bound by an obligation to
arbitrate. See Lankford v. Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc., 2004 WL 445130. Citing
its decision in Comvest, the court ruled that “the law is plain that by accepting benefits
and making payments under the contract, [the defendant customers] ratified it even if the
signature [appearing on the original contract] was irregular.” See Lankford, at 2, citing
Comvest, at 280-281. Moreover, the court ruled, the customers –when they brought a suit
for breach of contract against the pest control company in a conventional court– ratified
and confirmed that agreement and, with it, its arbitration clause. Id. In reaching its
decision in this case, the court leaned heavily on its prior ruling in AutoNation Financial
Svcs. v. Arain. See Lankford, at 3.
736

Ibid, at 580.
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this state.” And, formulating in substance what was to become a virtual mantra in Georgia courts
in future years, he continued, “West Point-Pepperell is controlling here if this arbitration
agreement comes within the Federal Arbitration Act.”737 Although the language used by Judge
Shulman in the opinion in McNeal is conditioned upon the application of paramount federal law
–again, an ambiguous term open to a construction which would permit only the preemption of
conflicting738 state rules– McNeal’s affirmation of the rule invoked in CCC Builders and in West
Point-Pepperell further solidified the growing impression within the pages of Georgia appellate
opinions that the mere application of the FAA to a transaction automatically and without further
analysis inferred the sole and exclusive use of federal law without any in-depth consideration of
the underlying compatibility of the corresponding or analogous state rule.739
The Court of Appeals’ decision in McNeal in October, 1977, was the last decision
rendered by any Georgia appellate court on the question of FAA preemption of Georgia
arbitration law prior to the adoption by the Georgia legislature in 1978 of the Georgia
Construction Arbitration Code,740 the statutory initiative which, among other innovations in

737

Id.

738

The presence of conflict in this case was easy to find, and the conflict was an even
easier one to resolve: “whether the Georgia policy against arbitration must yield to the
Federal Arbitration Act,” as the issue was framed by the court, was a rhetorical question
at best. Id.
739

See, for instance, the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. Henson, 169 Ga. App. 950 (1984), where yet another conflict involving
securities transactions on a national exchange presented itself for appellate court
resolution. The court, dutifully bowing to West Point-Pepperell and McNeal, found an
attempted revocation of his arbitration agreement by the disgruntled client to be
controlled adversely by the Federal Arbitration Act. See Henson, at 950-951.
740

The Georgia Construction Arbitration Code of 1978 is considered in detail in this
surveys’s Chapter Two, Section 3, The Georgia Construction Arbitration Code of 1978,
supra. Perhaps the most important conceptual point in the new code was its reversal of
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Georgia arbitration law, was the first expressly to reverse Georgia’s long-standing rule of
arbitration agreement invalidity to any significant extent. Whatever may have been the
expectations that the 1978 law might trigger a reassessment by the courts of Georgia of their
open hostility to the enforcement of general arbitration agreements, these were to be short-lived.
As a consequence of the 1977 decision in McNeal, one facet of which indicated that the
claimant’s allegations of violations of the 1933 Securities Act were not within the authority of
the state court to adjudicate, any more than they were within the power of an arbitral tribunal to
settle,741 the federal securities law violations alleged by the plaintiff were subsequently litigated
before the federal district court in Atlanta pursuant to the rule prevalent at that time which barred
the arbitration of such claims.742 The case returned to the Georgia Court of Appeals in 1982, this
time presenting the basic question as to whether the decision in the federal district court finding
no securities law violation on the part of Paine, Webber constituted res judicata with respect to

the strong Georgia policy against all issues arbitration, at least in the limited sphere of
construction contracts. The litigants involved in the McNeal case made an additional
appearance in the Georgia Court of Appeals five years later. See Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, Inc. v. W. W. McNeal, 161 Ga. App. 835 (1982). In an opinion written by
Judge Carley, the Court of Appeals noted, inter alia, that the arbitration contract between
the brokerage firm and its customer would, under Georgia law, encompass the claims of
the customer against the employee of the brokerage firm.
741

See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), as to the federal rule, prevailing at the time
of McNeal, prohibiting the arbitration of claims under the Securities Act of 1933. The
central holding of Wilko that claims under the Securities Act were not subject to arbitral
resolution was reversed by the Supreme Court of United States in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), perhaps among the most
significant decisions touching on arbitrability handed down by the federal high court in
the late twentieth century. See, among the numerous publications on this case, Mark A.
Cleaves, An Irresistible Force Meets An Immovable Object: Reforming Current
Standards As To The Arbitration of Statutory Claims, 8 J. L. & COM . 245 (1988).
742

See the discussion of these events in Paine,Webber v. McNeal, 161 Ga. App. 835
(1982), at 835-836.
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McNeal’s common law tort claims for fraud and misrepresentation then pending in the State
Court of Fulton County.743 The Georgia Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Carley
determined that it had been within the pendent subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district
court to adjudicate McNeal’s common law claims along with his Securities Act violation
allegations.744 Accordingly, since he could have brought these claims before the federal court but
did not, he was then barred by the doctrine of res judicata from asserting these in the state court
action.745
Almost simultaneously with its second decision in McNeal, the Georgia Court of
Appeals, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Wilbanks,746 an opinion written by
Judge Banke, melded the rules in West Point-Pepperell and the 1972 McNeal decision, holding
that, “although Georgia’s policy does not favor ‘all issues’ arbitration clauses, that policy must
yield where it conflicts with federal policy as set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act,”747 citing
West Point Pepperell and the first McNeal opinion as support for this proposition. The earlier
McNeal decision was also relied upon as support for the proposition that “transactions involving
the purchase and sale of securities on national exchanges involve commerce within the meaning
of the Federal Arbitration Act and that arbitration agreements relating to such transactions are
consequently enforceable . . .”748 In candor, objective analysis indicates that the phraseology of
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Paine,Webber v. McNeal, 161 Ga. App. 835 (1982).
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Ibid, at 837-838.
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Ibid, at 838.

746

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Wilbanks, 162 Ga. App. 154 (1982).

747

Id.

748

Ibid, at 155. (Emphasis added). As unquestionably correct as is the ruling of the court
here, the automatic equation of enforceability of the Federal Arbitration Act with the bare
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the rule relied upon by the Wilbanks court, purportedly drawn from West Point Pepperell, is
substantially more faithful to the law than the rendition of that rule in the original source itself:
by stressing that state law “yields” to federal policy only where it “conflicts” with the Federal
Arbitration Act, Judge Banke came measurably closer to the mark than did either the Court of
Appeals opinion in McNeal I or the earlier Georgia Supreme Court decision in West PointPepperell.749
In Hilton Construction Co., Inc. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc.,750 Judge
Quillian, writing for the Georgia Court of Appeals in 1983, found that, in a case subject to the
reach of and held to be controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act, a state court had no authority
under § 10 of the legislation addressing the authority of a court to vacate arbitral awards because,
in his view, that section (facially pertaining to the power of a “United States court in and for the

fact of coverage by the FAA is one fraught with dangerous implications for the viability
of state policy in the field.
749

Not even a month after his decision in Wilbanks, Judge Banke, dissenting in Tasco
Ind., Inc. v. Fibers & Fabrics of Georgia, 162 Ga. App. 593 (1982), took issue with the
dismissal of an appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals where the appellant sought a
review of a trial court’s decision denying a motion to stay litigation in order to afford the
parties to the litigation an opportunity to arbitrate in accordance with their underlying
agreement. The majority of the court, in an opinion by Chief Judge Quillian, took the
position that the purported direct appeal filed in the case was inappropriate, and that an
interlocutory appeal should have been sought by the disappointed party, therefore
dismissing the misbegotten appeal. Judge Banke took this action as a denial of the
appellant’s right to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act,
which he clearly regarded as applicable in the case. In the absence of the right to make a
direct appeal, Judge Banke insisted, the disappointed party “may lose his rights under the
arbitration agreement altogether if, upon denial of the motion, he is not afforded the right
of direct appeal.” Tasco Ind., Inc. v. Fibers & Fabrics of Georgia, 162 Ga. App. 593
(1982) at 594.
750

Hilton Construction Co., Inc. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 40
(1983).
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district wherein the award was made”751 to vacate an award) was restricted in its use to federal
courts only.752 On motion for rehearing in the case, the appellant insisted that the Federal
Arbitration Act was to be applied by state courts in its entirety, a position which would permit
state courts to vacate awards under § 10 of the FAA just as could federal district courts. “The
Georgia cases do not so hold,”753 the Court of Appeals ruled and, in rebuffing the suggestion to
the contrary by the appellant, added unintentional support to a hyperbolic interpretation of West
Point Pepperell. “The court [in West Point Pepperell] held,” the Court of Appeals wrote in an
unsigned order denying the motion for a rehearing of the case, “that the Georgia policy,
expressed in such cases as Parsons v. Ambros, 121 Ga. 98 (1) 48 S.E.696 which held that
arbitration agreements operating to oust courts of jurisdiction are void, must yield to national
policy where the transaction involves interstate commerce.”754
The distinction between Judge Carley’s post hoc rendition of the West Point Pepperell
rule and the rule as it appeared in the original case was, admittedly, a subtle one, but one which
nonetheless served to reinforce a growing misperception in Georgia courts that a finding of an
application of the Federal Arbitration Act meant automatic displacement of any corresponding
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Federal Arbitration Act, § 10. This provision of the Federal Arbitration Act is
discussed at some length, supra, in connection with this survey’s consideration of the
grounds for vacatur of an arbitral award under Georgia and federal law found in Chapter
Two, Section 6, The 2003 Amendment to the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code: Manifest
Disregard of Law.
752

Hilton Construction Co., Inc. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 40
(1983), at 42.
753
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Ibid, at 44.

Id. West Point Pepperell, it must be admitted, made no such ruling: it restricted its
holding to instances where state arbitration law would yield to paramount federal law,
and did not endorse reflexive, immediate state subservience to some amorphous concept
of “national policy” in the field of arbitration law.
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provision of state arbitration law, whether that law was contradictory to, or consistent with, the
federal statutory requirement. The misplaced emphasis drawn from West Point Pepperell was
compounded by the court’s unqualified and unconditioned reference to the rule in McNeal
which, in its view, “recognized that federal law is paramount,”755 without suggesting any
necessity for further analysis to determine actual conflict or incompatibility between the state
and federal legislation.
The Court of Appeals premised its decision in Hilton Construction Company on
immeasurably more accurate grounds where it found, in its order denying any rehearing in the
case, that Georgia’s “method of and . . . basis for attacking an arbitration award”756 was not
preempted by any provision of the Federal Arbitration Act and that, in fact, Georgia law
provided a recourse against invalid awards, a recourse not displaced by the Federal Arbitration
Act. “Thus,” because of the presence of an analogous method of vacating awards in Georgia
law, “one is not deprived of a valuable right nor is the paramount federal policy favoring
arbitration in any way diminished by a Georgia court applying its own state law vis a vis grounds
for setting aside an award rather than the grounds that the federal district courts are required to
utilize [under § 10 of the FAA].”757 “In summary,” the court continued,
the Federal Arbitration Act expresses a policy that arbitration agreements arising
out of a transaction involving interstate commerce are to be enforceable by all
courts of this land. However, the all inclusive aspects of the Act are directed only
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Hilton Construction Co., Inc. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 40
(1983), at 45.
756

Ibid, at 46.
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Id.
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to the federal courts who must apply this law in its entirety regardless of former
federal decisions in this area and regardless of the law of the situs state of such
federal court. . . . Under the circumstances here, we find no plainly manifest
congressional intent to impose the same statutory grounds– explicitly detailed as a
basis for a federal district court to set aside an arbitration award– on a state court
which is passing upon such matters.”758
Accordingly, the subtle inaccuracy of the court’s earlier observation that “Georgia policy” must
yield to “national policy” where the transaction involves interstate commerce was more than
offset by the court’s carefully crafted and perceptive observation that preemption is ultimately a
question of congressional intent, a matter which must be inquired into on a case by case basis
and is not subject to blanket, knee jerk automatic rules.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Hilton Construction Company was affirmed in
late 1983, but the Georgia Supreme Court in doing so disputed the decision of the Court of
Appeals that state courts could not apply the vacatur standards in § 10 of the FAA. Stressing
that the Federal Arbitration Act had been interpreted in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corporation759 to create a body of federal substantive law, the Supreme
Court took issue with the Court of Appeals over the question of whether or not the state courts
could (or should) apply the provisions of § 10 of the FAA. Finding that such power was within
the prerogatives of the state judiciary, Georgia’s high court found nonetheless that the absence of
facts in the dispute to invoke any statutory ground for such a vacatur of the arbitral award
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Ibid, at 46-47.
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460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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mooted the question of the court’s jurisdiction to apply FAA § 10 and, “since there [was] no
question that none of the Section 10 grounds for vacation of the award was present, the [trial]
court’s refusal to vacate the award and the court’s confirmation of the award should be
confirmed.”760
Although the case is not entirely free from all uncertainty, it appears that a major
conceptual step towards the complete “federalization” of the field of arbitral policy in Georgia
was accomplished in late 1983 when Georgia’s Supreme Court handed down its opinion in
DiMambro-Northend Associates v. Blanck-Alvarez, Inc.,761 a dispute which had risen out of the
construction of a water management facility in Atlanta.762 In one of the first decisions of the

760

Hilton Construction Company v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 251 Ga. 701
(1983), at 704.
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251 Ga. 704. The case was decided on November 30, 1983, and a motion for a
rehearing of the matter denied on December 15 of that same year. Earlier, in January
1983, the Georgia Supreme Court had decided the case of Phillips Construction Co. v.
Cowart Iron Works, Inc., 250 Ga. 488 (1983), in which it had acknowledged the
legislative adoption of the Arbitration Code for Construction Contracts, along with its
provision that courts may compel arbitration, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-86 (a), “thereby
demonstrating the General Assembly’s approval of arbitration of construction contracts,”
and thus taking this class of arbitration agreements out of Georgia’s traditional
prohibition against the enforcement of broad arbitration agreements. The Phillips
Construction decision did not, however, entail any significant application or
interpretation of the new Construction Arbitration Code, and the opinion in the case was
not cited later in 1983 when the Georgia Supreme Court came to its ruling in DiMambroNorthend Associates. The Phillips Construction opinion also made reference to the
appellate decision in Pace Const. Corp. v. Houdaille Industries, Inc., 155 Ga. App. 923
(1980), as well as to the related decisions in that litigation made in 245 Ga. 696 (1980)
and 247 Ga. 367 (1981), but a fair reading of those opinions does not clearly indicate that
these decisions were rendered under the (at that time new) Georgia Arbitration Code for
Construction Contracts.
762

Given the sweeping (and displacing) mandate afforded by the Georgia Supreme Court
to the Federal Arbitration Act in DiMambro Northend Associates, it is not surprising that
the court did not take up the issue of whether the construction of a water management
facility construction project would fall within the ambit of Georgia’s Arbitration Code
for Construction Contracts of 1978. That code provided, in O.C.G.A § 9-9-81(b), that it
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court respecting the arbitration of disputes arising out of construction agreements since the
Georgia legislature had adopted the “Georgia Arbitration Code for Construction Contracts” in
1978, the court decided the issue between the parties in exclusive reliance on § 3 of the Federal
Arbitration Act making provision for a stay of litigation pending arbitration. In justification of
its sub silentio slight of the analogous provision found in Georgia’s 1978 legislation, the court
emphasized its perception of the impact of the recent decision by the United States Supreme
Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation,763 and its
teaching, as understood by the Georgia court, “that the statutory policy of rapid and unobstructed
enforcement of arbitration agreements is binding on state as well as federal courts.”764 In
presumed obedience to the rule in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, Georgia’s high court
completed the doctrinal leap which had been inferred, hinted at, and suggested by Georgia state

applied “only to construction contracts, contracts of warranty on construction, and
contracts involving the architectural or engineering design of any building or the design
of alterations or additions thereto.” However, the same court which decided DiMambro
Northend Associates in December of 1983 ruled in February of 1984 in Camp v.
Columbus, 252 Ga. 120 (1984), that the construction of a sanitary landfill in the City of
Columbus, Georgia, fell within the statutory definition of a construction contract
provided in O.C.G.A § 9-9-81(b). Accordingly, it stretches credulity to believe that the
Georgia Supreme Court in DiMambro ignored the possibility of applying Georgia’s own
Construction Arbitration Code, vice the FAA, on the basis that the project involved did
not fall within the statutory definition of a construction contract. The source of this slight,
it would appear, lies elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that Chief Justice Hill, who
joined in the DiMambro opinion, dissented in Camp on the basis that the Georgia
Construction Arbitration Code did not encompass within its terms the project involved in
that case: “[a]lthough the phrase ‘construction contracts’ is not defined [in the
Construction Arbitration Code], it is clear to me that the General Assembly intended the
[construction] arbitration code to apply to the building and erection of structures, not the
burying of waste.” Camp, at 122 (Hill, C. J., dissenting).
763

460 U.S. 1 (1983), discussed, supra, in the survey’s Chapter Three, Section 1, The
Substantive and Preemptive Character of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.
764

Dimambro Northend Associates, at 706.
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judicial constructions following the West Point-Pepperell decision in 1973: without so much as a
suggestion of analysis or construction of Georgia’s law to determine its compatibility with or
contradiction of the analogous federal standard, the DiMambro-Northend court ruled broadly:
“we accept and adopt this construction regarding the scope and purpose of the Arbitration Act
[stated in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital] and find that the arbitration clause at issue in the
present case clearly falls within the ambit of the act.”765 The broad nature of this pronouncement
is all the more stunning in light of the fact that, in the same paragraph in which it announces the
general, sweeping (but unanalytical) rule of federal predominance in arbitration policy, it quotes
the moderating and temperate language of the U. S. Supreme Court, also an integral part of the
holding the federal high court in Moses H. Cone, clearly reserving to the states substantial area
of play in the formulation of arbitration law, procedure, and policy: “... the [Federal Arbitration]
act,” said the federal tribunal, “embodies ‘a Congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to
the contrary.’”766 This recognition by the U. S. Supreme Court of the expansive leeway given
states to develop arbitration policy consistent and compatible with the federal legislation seems
not to have registered with the Georgia Supreme Court in its opinion in DiNambro-Northend
Associates.
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Dimambro-Northend Associates, at 707, citing Hilton Construction Co. v. Martin
Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 251 Ga. 701 (1983), presumably for the proposition that an
arbitration agreement in a transaction in interstate commerce is within the ambit of the
Federal Arbitration Act and “[w]here such a transaction involves commerce within the
meaning of the Federal Arbitration Statute, the state law and policy with respect thereto
must yield to the paramount federal law.” Ibid, at 703, quoting West Point-Pepperell, Inc.
v. Multiline [sic] Industries, Inc., 231 Ga. 329 (1973).
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Dimambro-Northend Associates, at 706-707, quoting Moses H. Cone, 103 S. Ct. 927,
941-942 (1983).
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In mitigation –if not in defense– of the decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia in
DiMambro-Northend Associates, following in the conceptual wake of its decade-earlier opinion
in West Point-Pepperell to equate unanalytically and reflexively FAA jurisdiction with
unquestioning FAA application, it must be said that the nuanced and sophisticated approach to
issues of federal preemption demonstrated in cases such as Cincinnati Insurance Company v.
McLeod,767 Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc.,768 Duren v. Paccar, Inc.,769 City of Atlanta v. Watson,770
Gentry v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,771 and Georgia Public Service Commission v. CSX
Transportation, Inc.772 (each of which is considered more fully, supra) were years off in the
future and Georgia appellate courts arguably had not, as of the time of the DiMambro-Northend
Associates decision, fully developed the fine art of coordination of state and federal policies
inherent in a fully matured approach to questions of federal preemption of state legislation.
Nonetheless, DiMambro had opened the floodgates and, as a consequence, decision after
decision in both the Georgia Supreme Court and in the Georgia Court of Appeals in the
following years dutifully followed in the doctrinal tracks of DiMambro, intoning like a
monotonous litany the incantation, however imperfect it may have been –most often without a
semblance of significant analysis to determine the presence of either conflict between or
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225 Ga. App. 787 (1997).

303
compatibility of the state and federal laws– if there is federal jurisdiction then there must be
federal control.
The appearances over the years of the Dimambro-West Point-Pepperell equation of FAA
jurisdiction with FAA displacement of state law have been discouragingly frequent in the
Georgia appellate reports, especially those of the Georgia Court of Appeals. Among the most
cited of such cases is the 1985 decision of that court in ADC Construction Co. v. McDaniel
Grading, Inc.,773 where a construction contract between two Georgia corporations, slated to be
performed in Georgia, was determined to entail interstate commerce: that fact prompted the
court to rule, almost as a matter of self-evident causal relationship, that “[w]e have determined
that interstate commerce is involved and that the Federal Arbitration Act ... controls the issues
involved.”774 Significantly, ADC Construction Company was decided after the adoption of the
1978 Georgia Construction Arbitration Code, but this fact did not prompt the Court of Appeals
to inquire as to whether any provision of that code survived wholesale preemption by the FAA
under the rule the court applied in that case. A short form for the ejection of state law under the
emerging rubric of the Court of Appeals later made its appearance in McCormick-Morgan, Inc.
v. Whitehead Electric Company:775 in this construction case where the 1978 Construction
Arbitration Code might well have determined the issues, the Court of Appeals contented itself by
holding simply that where “interstate commerce is involved ... the Federal Arbitration Act
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ADC Construction Co. v. McDaniel Grading, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 223 (1985).
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Ibid, at 226.
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McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Whitehead Electric Company, 179 Ga. App. 10 (1986).
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applies.”776 Two years later, in Tampa Motel Management Co. v. Stratton of Florida, Inc.,777 the
Court of Appeals explicitly pushed aside the venue provisions of the Georgia Construction
Arbitration Code, explaining that, as held previously in ADC Construction Company, “state law
and policy must yield to the federal statute if interstate commerce is involved.”778 The Court of
Appeals in Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc. v. Williams779 determined that the implementation of a
trust agreement did not, in and of itself, entail “a transaction involving commerce”780 so as to
require arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, but that a related customer agreement did
constitute interstate commerce “within the meaning of the Federal Alteration Act,”781 with the
consequence that arbitration would be compelled, presumably subject to the provisions of that
federal act, and that act only.
Perhaps the most extreme statement by the Georgia Court of Appeals of the perceived
causal relation between FAA jurisdiction and FAA displacement of state law came in November
of 1989, barely three weeks before the Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc. v. Williams decision, in
Brockett Pointe Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Development Contractors, Inc.782 : “... [a party]
presented undisputed evidence showing that out-of-state goods, services, materials and financing
were supplied during execution of the construction contract [at issue in the case]. This evidence
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shows that the transaction involved,” the court concluded, “interstate commerce as contemplated
by [the FAA]. It therefore follows that the parties’ arbitration agreement is controlled by the
Federal Arbitration Act, not the Georgia Arbitration Code,”783 citing in support of this dubious
assertion ADC Construction Company, McCormick-Morgan, and Hilton Construction Company.
The same emphasis on the automatic causal relationship between interstate commerce, the
application of the FAA, and the displacement of Georgia arbitration statutory law appeared yet
again in Hilliard v. J. C. Bradford & Company,784 where, in an opinion by Judge Eldridge, the
Court of Appeals ruled that “since the transaction [in that case] involved commerce within the
meaning of the Federal Arbitration Statute, the state law and policy with respect thereto must
yield to the preemption of the paramount federal law.”785 A similar (but in some respects,
perhaps, a better) result was achieved, but with inverse reasoning, in Rhodes v. Inland-Rome,
Inc.,786 where, since the evidence did not demonstrate that a timber purchase contract had
involved interstate commerce, the Federal Arbitration Act was held –for that reason alone–
inapplicable.787 Even in a case where the parties made an express choice of the FAA to control
their arbitration agreement, the Court of Appeals felt constrained to cite its cases establishing the
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Rhodes v. Inland-Rome, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 39 (1990). A similar conclusion, and for
similar reasons, was reached by the Court of Appeals in Columbus Anesthesia Group,
P.C. v. Kutzner, 218 Ga. .App. 51 (1995).
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The later decision of the United States Supreme Court in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,
Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003), adopts an exceedingly broad definition of the term “commerce”
as it is employed in the Federal Arbitration Act and would seem to impeach the rationale
on which the earlier decisions of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Rhodes v. InlandRome, Inc., and Kutzner were based.
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seemingly inexorable linkage between interstate commerce, the application of the FAA, and the
displacement of “state law and policy [by the] federal law.”788 An almost identical result, in
almost indistinguishable terms, was announced two years later by the Court of Appeals in
Greenway Capital Corporation v. Schneider.789 It seems clear that no consideration was given to
the application of Georgia law in Comvest, L.L.C. v. Corporate Securities Group, Inc.,790 where
Judge Beasley, somewhat uncritically, noted that “[s]ince the contract relates to transactions in
interstate commerce, we decide the case pursuant to the FAA.”791 The Court of Appeals tacitly
approved a trial court’s invocation of the “jurisdiction equals FAA application equals state law
displacement” rationale in Galindo v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc.,792 employing language which
underscored the court’s endorsement of the causal relationship of the formula’s factors: “[t]he
trial court found that the transaction at issue involved interstate commerce and that therefore the
arbitration was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.”793 And, in one of the most recent
Georgia appellate cases to address the application of the FAA in circumstances where there
might very well have been an accommodation with the analogous provisions of the Georgia
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Comvest, L.L.C. v. Corporate Securities Group, Inc. 234 Ga. App. 277 (1998), at 279.
See also Eure v. Cantrell Properties, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 427 (1999), employing
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decision, finding that Georgia procedural law permitting the interlocutory appeal of
orders compelling arbitration was preempted by the contrary § 16 of the Federal
Arbitration Act which prohibited such interlocutory appeals, was soon overturned by the
decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Simmons Company v. Deutsche Financial
Services Corporation, 243 Ga. App. 85 (2000), discussed infra.
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Arbitration Code, Judge Eldridge of the Court of Appeals, after a discussion of the interstate
character of the construction industry, concluded in Wise v. Tidal Construction Company, Inc.,794
that “when the FAA is applicable, it must be applied using federal substantive law and,” without
any apparent consideration of the possibility for the application of consistent and compatible
provisions of the Georgia Arbitration Code, “ the FAA preempts state law.”795
Although it would be a clear overstatement to say that the Georgia courts have now
backed away from their views regarding the general displacement, at least in the field of
interstate commerce, of Georgia’s arbitration statutes by the Federal Arbitration Act and the
consequent restriction of the permissible arena for Georgia policy in the field of arbitration
law,796 unmistakable cracks have more recently appeared in the solid phalanx of appellate
decisions in the state suggesting the total preemption of the field by federal law. These opinions
–and they have come predominately from the Georgia Court of Appeals which, under the
allocation of subject matter jurisdiction among Georgia’s appellate courts made in the Georgia
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Ibid, at 676. The suggestion of Judge Eldridge in Wise that the Federal Arbitration Act
has “preempted the field” of arbitration [“Georgia appellate courts have followed federal
cases when the FAA has preempted the field, because the federal act created a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the
FAA,” Wise, at 673], inferring that there is no latitude for state legislative initiative in
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square with the assurance in Volt to the contrary: “The FAA contains no express
preemptive provision,” the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in Volt, “nor does it reflect a
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.” Volt, 489 U.S. at 469.
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As late as March of 2004, the Georgia Court of Appeals continued to cite Hilton
Construction Company and Tampa Motel Management Company, as well as the more
recent Galindo v. Lanier, for the general proposition that the arbitration of a dispute
arising in interstate commerce would invoke, to the apparent exclusion of any
consideration of state law, the application of the Federal Arbitration Act and associated
common-law principles. See Joyner v. Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., 2004
WL 603912 (Ga. Ct. of Appeals).
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constitution and relevant statutes, is the tribunal which most often receives these questions797 –
demonstrate a fresh sensitivity to the appropriate role of state law in the field of arbitration and a
pronounced willingness to achieve an accommodation between the coordinate levels of
government, state and federal, in this area.
Winds of potential change first appeared in the Court of Appeals 1996 ruling in North
Augusta Associates Limited Partnership v. 1815 Exchange, Inc.798 There, North Augusta
Associates had entered into a real property development contract with the predecessor of 1815
Exchange, Inc., for the construction of a project in North Augusta, South Carolina. The parties’
contract contained an intricate dispute resolution clause which called for the binding arbitration
of any insoluble disagreements between them and, after a dispute arose, this provision was
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The Georgia Court of Appeals was first authorized by constitutional amendment in
1905 and began its work as Georgia’s second appellate court in early 1906. The tribunal
was intended to siphon off much of the workload from the Georgia Supreme Court which
had functioned, since it began its work in 1846, as the single appellate court in the state
for the review of error in both law and equity cases. On the origin of the Georgia
Supreme Court, see Justice Joseph R. Lamar, A Unique and Unfamiliar Chapter in Our
American History, 10 ABA J. 513 (1924) and John B. Harris, The Supreme Court of
Georgia: An Account of its Delayed Birth, in A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
GEORGIA, A CENTENNIAL VOLUME (1948). On the establishment of the Georgia Court of
Appeals, see Robert H. Jordan, A History of the Court of Appeals of Georgia, 24 GA. B.
J. 371 (1962). Under modern constitutional and statutory provisions distributing the
appellate workload between Georgia’s two appellate courts, the Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over a limited number of matters including constitutional issues,
matters in equity, criminal cases in which capital punishment has been adjudged, and the
like. See GA. CONST . ART . 6, SECTION 6, PAR. 3 on the general appellate jurisdiction of
the Georgia Supreme Court and GA. CONST ., ART . 6, SECTION 6, PAR. 2, on the exclusive
jurisdiction of that court. The powers of the Georgia Supreme Court are enumerated in
O.C.G.A. § 15-2-8. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is determined by GA.
CONST ., ART . 6, SECTION 5, PAR. 3. The Court of Appeals has appellate review of all
other matters which would include, of particular import here, most contract cases
including those involving arbitration clauses.
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North Augusta Associates Limited Partnership v. 1815 Exchange, Inc., 220 Ga. App.
790 (1996).

309
invoked by 1815 Exchange; in response, North Augusta filed an action in Cobb Superior Court
to stay the arbitration, insisting that 1815 Exchange had failed to comply with certain conditions
precedent stipulated in their contract to be necessary before the invocation of binding arbitration.
The Superior Court, after a hearing, denied the motion for a stay of arbitration on the basis that
the Federal Arbitration Act applied to this transaction in interstate commerce799 and did not,
under the circumstances of the case, permit judicial action to delay the arbitral proceeding. The
trial court had, in apparent reliance on the continued vitality of older cases such as ADC
Construction, ruled that the provisions of the Georgia Arbitration Act would be displaced in
favor of the those in the FAA, and ruled that, under applicable federal law, issues touching upon
arbitrability of a dispute (including questions surrounding compliance with conditions precedent
to arbitration such as those in the agreement between the parties in the case at bar) were for
resolution by the arbitrators, not for the court.800
In his review of the matter, Judge Smith, writing for the Georgia Court of Appeals,
disputed the lower court’s decision that the FAA, because of nothing more than the fact of the
parties’ contract being one in interstate commerce, controlled every aspect of the case,
substantive and procedural. “We do not overlook our earlier holding in ADC Constr. Co. v.
McDaniel Grading,”801 the court wrote in preface to the heart of its decision, “that the FAA

799

Neither of the parties to the action contested the finding that their contract was one in
“commerce” as that term is defined in the Federal Arbitration Act. See North Augusta
Associates Limited Partnership v. 1815 Exchange, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 790 (1996), at 792,
fn. 1.
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controls an agreement involving interstate commerce. ... That holding has been modified,
however, by Volt Information Sciences v. Bd. of Trustees ... ”802 :
In Volt Information Sciences, the agreement contained a choice of law provision
reciting that the contract would "be governed by the law of the place where the
Project is located." ... The same choice of law provision appears in this case. ...
The Supreme Court [of the United States in Volt] deferred to the sanctity of
individual contracts consistent with the goals of the FAA and held that California
arbitration law was not preempted by the FAA: "Where, as here, the parties have
agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the
terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the
result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go
forward." ... The entire field of state arbitration law therefore is no longer
preempted by federal arbitration law in all cases involving commerce.803 State
law may apply where parties agree to be bound by state arbitration law, so long
as that law does not conflict with the FAA.804

Although the application of
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North Augusta Associates Limited Partnership v. 1815 Exchange, Inc., 220 Ga. App.
790 (1996), at 791.
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Interestingly, the North Augusta Associates court passed over in silence the many
decisions of the Georgia Court of Appeals handed down after Volt but before the 1996
decision which did not recognize, as the court put it, that “[t]he entire field of state
arbitration law ... is no longer preempted by federal arbitration law in all cases involving
commerce.”
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North Augusta Associates Limited Partnership v. 1815 Exchange, Inc., 220 Ga. App.
790, 791-792 (1996). (Citations deleted and emphasis added). Even an active choice of
state law did not always suffice to secure its application to an arbitration agreement,
however, even after the decision in Volt. It was a transitory, but nonetheless interesting,
configuration which arose in Booth v. Hume Publishing, Inc., 902 F.2d 925 (1990).
There, the parties had executed a contract with a choice of law clause (the contract was
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Georgia arbitration law in the context of interstate commerce was, in the terms of
declared to be "subject to and [to be] construed in accordance with the laws of the State
of Georgia") arguably a good deal stronger than that which had been determined by the
U. S. Supreme Court in Volt to have invoked the application of California state
arbitration law. Nonetheless, the federal district court in Hume declined to apply Volt,
finding that –again, on language more definitive than that in Volt– it could not reasonably
have been the parties’ intention for Georgia arbitration law to apply to their transaction
and its arbitral clause. The facts of the case – decided after Volt came down but on facts
which developed before the 1988 Georgia Arbitration Code– were not such, ruled the
court, to indicate that the parties’ intent was to have the Georgia common law control
their transaction:
It is true that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Volt creates new law
that was not available to Hume when it argued its case in the court below.
However, construing the arbitration agreement in accordance with the law
of Georgia at the time the contract was negotiated, we are not convinced
that the parties to this contract intended that Georgia's common law of
arbitration would apply to disputes arising between them. . . . The
arbitration provision at issue in this case is an "all issues" arbitration
provision of the type disfavored by the Georgia common law of
arbitration. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Wilbanks,
162 Ga. App. 154, 290 S.E.2d 122 (1982). Such a clause would be
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act but not under Georgia
common law. Id. ... At the time [the parties] executed their employment
agreement, the Georgia courts took the position that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempted the state's substantive arbitration law, at least
where state law would render the arbitration agreement void. See, e.g.,
West Point-Pepperell v. Multi-line [sic] Indus., 231 Ga. 329, 330-31, 201
S.E.2d 452, 453-54 (1973) (holding that "[w]here such a transaction
involves commerce, within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Statute,
the state law and policy with respect thereto must yield to the paramount
federal law."). Therefore, when [the parties] agreed that their employment
contract would be subject to Georgia law, they probably intended that the
federal arbitration law would apply rather than the Georgia common law.
Booth v. Hume Publishing, Inc., 902 F.2d 925 (1990), at 928-929. In a footnote, the court
noted that “Georgia [has] recently passed the new Georgia Arbitration Code, which is
applicable to disputes arising on or after July 1, 1988. Ga. Code Ann. 9-9-2(a) (1988).
Since the dispute at issue in this case arose in 1986, the new statute does not apply.”
Booth, at 929, fn. 3. The strong inference is that the court was unwilling to permit the
state’s common law to have displacing effect on the federal act even under a choice of
law clause seemingly requiring that result, but that it was quite prepared to permit a
modern state statute supportive of arbitration to override the application of the national
statute.
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the opinion in North Augusta Associates, inextricably linked to the agreement of
the parties to apply that law, 805 the decision advanced the general viability of state
arbitration law and its underlying policy by suggesting that the consistency of
state law with federal law was a prime consideration in a court’s decision to apply
the state policy vice that expressed in the FAA. The opinion’s endorsement of the
general application of consistent “state procedural mechanisms” in the field of
arbitration was especially significant and would figure prominently in the next
ruling of the Georgia Court of Appeals where this point was controlling.806
At issue in Simmons Company v. Deutsche Financial Services Corporation,807 handed
down by the Georgia Court of Appeals some four years after its decision in North Augusta
Associates, was just such a “state procedural mechanism” as had been contemplated in the earlier
case and, consistent with the North Augusta Associates rationale, Judge Andrews, writing for the
court, sustained a Georgia procedural norm even though it differed fundamentally from that
sanctioned by the Federal Arbitration Act. The facts in Simmons were straightforward: the
debtor under a written floor plan repurchase agreement containing an arbitration clause filed suit
against its lender for breach of contract; the latter then moved to compel arbitration under an
arbitration clause inconstestably within the ambit of the federal law. When the trial court ruled
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“Appellants agree,” the court wrote in North Augusta Associates, “that the
‘substantive portions’ of the FAA apply to this case but contend that the FAA does not
preempt the field of arbitration in that state procedural mechanisms that are consistent
with the goals of the FAA are applicable.” North Augusta Associates, at 791. “We agree,”
it concluded. Id.
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the arbitration agreement enforceable and issued its order compelling arbitration, the debtorplaintiff appealed only to meet the objection that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over
the matter at that point because, in essence, permitting an interlocutory appeal worked to deprive
the lender of his right to arbitrate and subordinated that right to a judicial procedure, a result not
permissible under the Federal Arbitration Act.808 The Georgia court did not dispute the fact that
the relevant provisions of the FAA809 would not countenance an appeal given the procedural
posture of the case, a result quite different from that provided for under the analogous provision
of the Georgia Arbitration Code.810 “Thus,” Judge Andrews wrote, “whether we have [appellate]
jurisdiction depends on whether the FAA preempts the Georgia rule.”811
In reaching its conclusion as to the preemption by the FAA of the state rule of
appealability of an interlocutory order compelling arbitration, the court first noted that “[t]he
FAA preempts state laws that undermine enforcement of private arbitration agreements,” citing
the Southland Corp. v. Keating decision of the United States Supreme Court: " ... to the extent
that [a state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
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As explained by the Georgia Court of Appeals, “[u]nder § 16 of the FAA, once a court
has determined that the parties agreed to arbitrate the claim, preliminary appellate review
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compelling arbitration,” the Court of Appeals noted, citing Phillips Construction Co. v.
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and objectives of Congress," that court had written, 812 “it will be preempted by the FAA.”813
Reversing the logic of Southland, the Georgia court ruled:
It follows that procedural rules established by a state for the arbitration process
that do not undermine the purposes and objectives of the FAA are not
preempted.814 ... As explained by the Supreme Court in Volt, "[t]here is no federal
policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal
policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private
agreements to arbitrate."815
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals concluded, “ ... the Georgia rule allowing a
preliminary appeal from an order compelling arbitration does not undermine the purposes or
objectives of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements,”816 and, as a consequence, the FAA did
not preempt the Georgia Arbitration Code in this procedural instance.817
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The court expanded at some length on the reasons why, in its view, there was no
fundamental conflict between the state and the national arbitration laws:
The timing of the right to appeal from an order compelling arbitration is a
procedural matter which may delay but does not prevent enforcement of a
valid arbitration agreement. See Batton v. Green, 801 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.
App.1990); Weston Securities Corp. v. Aykanian, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 72,
703 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Mass. App.1998). Georgia's procedure allowing
a preliminary appeal from an order compelling arbitration recognizes that,
if the trial court erred in determining there was an enforceable arbitration
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The Georgia Court of Appeals, again writing through Judge Andrews, had the occasion
barely six months later to take up once again a number of the doctrinal themes which had been
considered by the court in Simmons but, on this occasion, turning considerations of party
autonomy in its decision in Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford818 toward the affirmation of the
application of federal, not state, arbitration law. In that case –litigation between a consumer
purchaser, on the one hand, and a mobile home manufacturer and commercial loan maker, on the
other, and touching on the former’s claims of unconscionability and violations of public policy–
the court found no potential for state-federal clash because the record of the case did not reflect
any active choice of law by the parties indicating anything other than the application of the FAA.
In its view, the absence of any explicit choice of Georgia law, coupled together with specific
reliance on the FAA in the terms of the consumer’s installment contract, indicated an intent of
the parties that the federal statute control their transaction. 819 Still, the court seized the
opportunity –an opportunity almost forced, a fair reading suggests– to drive home once again the
possibility of the application of state arbitration law given the appropriate circumstance:

agreement, a party may be forced to participate in an unwarranted
arbitration proceeding. Phillips, 250 Ga. at 489, 299 S.E.2d 538. ... We
conclude under the present facts that, assuming § 16 of the FAA would
prohibit the appeal, it does not preempt Georgia's procedural rule allowing
this appeal. Compare Primerica Financial Services, Inc. v. Wise, 217 Ga.
App. 36-37, 41, 456 S.E.2d 631 (1995) (finding state signature
requirements were preempted by the FAA).
Simmons, at 89. This logic compelled the court to reverse the decision in Eure v. Cantrell
Properties, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 427 (1999), which had held that § 16 of the FAA
preempted Georgia’s rule permitting appeal of interlocutory orders compelling
arbitration, a decision which, at the time when Simmons was handed down, was barely
ten months old. See Simmons, at 89.
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Ibid., at 437.
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“Georgia has also enacted an Arbitration Act,” the court reminded the parties, “ ... evidencing
the legislature’s conclusion that arbitration is not in violation of the public policy of this State
and, therefore, cannot be said, per se, to be unconscionable. ‘What the Legislature allows cannot
be contrary to public policy.’”820
The court’s pronounced sensitivity to values of party autonomy drove the decision,
handed down four months later in February, 2001, in Southwire Company, NSA, Ltd., v.
American Arbitration Association,821 where the Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge
Phipps, stressed once again that the application of the FAA, normally implicated when a
transaction in interstate commerce was in evidence, would nonetheless be displaced by an active
choice of law by the parties to an arbitration agreement designating the application of Georgia
law to their contract with respect to its validity, interpretation, and enforcement.822 Although this
Volt-based decision was hardly surprising at this juncture in the evolution of the court’s thinking
on questions of FAA preemption of state arbitration law, the court went further and, in affirming
the action by the trial court below in refusing to vacate an arbitral award under the terms of the
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Results Oriented, at 437, quoting NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390 (1996)
and W. J. Cooney, P.C. v. Rowland, 240 Ga. App. 703 (1999). The court reiterated once
again the holding in Southland Corporation to the effect that the Federal Arbitration Act
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FAA, insisted that the erroneous application of the federal statute by the trial court did not
necessarily mandate a reversal on appeal. Rather, Judge Phipps wrote, it simply meant that the
Court of Appeals would “review the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award under the
standards of the GAC as set forth in OCGA § 9-9-13 (b), rather than under the comparable
standards of the FAA as found in 9 USC § 10 (a).” Since the court found no significant
difference relevant in the case in the substance of the two laws, state and federal, with respect to
the vacatur of awards, it affirmed under the provisions of the Georgia Arbitration Code the
action taken by the trial judge under the Federal Arbitration Act.823
Southwire was but a recent example of a not altogether unhealthy tendency on the part of
Georgia appellate judges to review simultaneously the action of a trial judge under both the
Georgia Arbitration Code and the Federal Arbitration Fact, where possible because of the
substantial identity of the substantive provisions in the two statutory schemes.824 The latest such
instance came in early 2004 when, in BellSouth Corporation v. Forsee,825 a decision of the
Georgia Court of Appeals written by Judge Phipps, issues as to the arbitrability of an executive

823

Southwire Company, at 229. Judge Phipps was joined in this opinion by Judges Barnes
and Smith, the latter of whom was the author of the conceptually consistent opinion in
Results Oriented, Inc., v. Crawford, 245 Ga. App. 432 (2000).
824

See, e.g., Barge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 245 Ga. App. 112
(2000), at 113-114 (citations and footnotes omitted) [“Under both federal and Georgia
law, arbitration is a matter of contract, meaning that arbitrators derive their authority to
resolve disputes only from the parties’ agreement. Thus, the extent of that authority
depends on the language of the contract.”]. Cf. Leigan v. Sears Roebuck & Company,
248 Ga. App. 145 (2001), at 148, where the court-approved, sub silentio, the action of a
trial court in denying a motion to compel arbitration of a fraud claim premised on
considerations of both the Georgia Arbitration Code and the Federal Arbitration Act. See
also Camp v. Columbus, 252 Ga. 120 (1984).
825

BellSouth Corporation v. Forsee, 2004 WL 170145 (2004).
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employment contract were analyzed under both the Georgia and the federal arbitration
statutes.826
Such an approach on the part of Georgia’s appellate judges underscores and emphasizes
the substantial community of interest which is shared by both state and federal governments in
the orderly and rational administration of a systematic régime of laws governing extrajudicial
resolution of disputes generally and arbitration in particular. Georgia common law authorities
following the older West Point-Pepperell, DiMambro, and ADC Construction rationale seemed
for long decades to threaten the viability of arbitral policy within the State of Georgia. The
vitality of Georgia-generated arbitration law and policy, a policy with a rich history stretching
back almost three centuries, now –as a consequence of new strains of thought more sensitive to

826

Gary Forsee had been a vice chairman of the domestic operations division of
BellSouth Corporation when he left that company to take up employment with a major
competitor of BellSouth, Cingular Wireless Corporation. BellSouth filed suit to enjoin
Forsee from taking a position with the competitor, charging that he was familiar with
information within BellSouth which was both confidential and subject to trade secret
restrictions. Forsee’s contract of employment with BellSouth contained a noncompetition
clause as well as a provision for the arbitration of disputes arising under the agreement.
When BellSouth sought to enforce the restriction against taking employment with the
competitor, a temporary restraining order against Forsee was initially issued by the
Superior Court of Fulton County. After this order was later rescinded, BellSouth sought
to enforce the arbitration provision in the contract, in response to which Forsee raised
questions as to the arbitrability of the dispute. With respect to the law applicable to this
issue, the court noted, “the parties agree that the employment agreement at issue involves
interstate commerce, and that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), as well as consistent
provisions of the Georgia Arbitration Code (GAC) apply.” Forsee, at 2. Judge Phipps’
emphasis on the application of compatible and consistent provisions of the Georgia
Arbitration Code, together with the applicable provisions of the FAA, is reminiscent, of
course, of the approach she adopted in the earlier Southwire opinion which was similarly
protective of the integrity of state arbitration policy. After an extensive analysis of
federal law regarding arbitrability under the provisions of the FAA, Judge Phipps
concluded that “the GAC is in accord,” in support of which conclusion she reviewed in
some detail Georgia statutory and case authority bearing on the issue. See Forsee, at 2.
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and appreciative of the vital role of the states of the American union in the formulation of
dispute resolution régimes– seems assured.
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